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iABSTRACT
This thesis seeks to describe and account for the organization 
and activities of the inner working bodies of the federal and 
republican Supreme Soviets, namely their Presidia and Standing 
Commissions. Since this appears to be the first book-length study 
of these bodies, the author has sought to cover as many significant 
aspects as possible, rather than concentrating narrowly on particular 
aspects. Special attention has been paid to elucidating developments 
over the last twelve years. A number of different theoretical 
concepts suggested by students of political and administrative 
science have been found useful in analysing various aspects.
The INTRODUCTION opens with a brief review of relevant 
Western writing, and goes on to outline a framework of analysis.
PART ONE describes recent structural changes in the federal and 
republican Supreme Soviets, after sketching in their earlier 
evolution and comparable changes in East European parliamentary 
assemblies. PART TWO, dealing with the Presidia, comprises 
chapters on institutional structure and membership, and on process. 
PART THREE employs a similar framework to treat the Standing 
Commissions. In PART FOUR major conclusions and arguments 
presented in earlier chapters are brought together, in an attempt 
to assess the actual functions of the Supreme Soviet organs and 
their institutional development.
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1CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
Object
The main object of this thesis is to establish, in so far as 
our sources of information permit, what the federal and republican 
Supreme Soviet organs actually do, how they operate, and why they 
operate as they do and their operation changes over time.
Supreme Soviet
The language ordinarily used to describe parliament and 
legislative bodies in Britain or the United States is of limited 
value in discussing the federal and republican Supreme Soviet. On 
the formal level of Soviet constitutional law, the Supreme Soviet 
is invested with functions which go beyond those normally associated 
with the notion of parliament or legislature. Further, concepts of 
representation and party competition of the kind found in the parli­
amentary systems of western states, which are fundamental in describ­
ing their legislatures, are not applicable to the Soviet system.
And finally, the notion that the executive of the State is subject 
to organized criticism and opposition in the legislature (though 
admittedly limited in various respects even in the British and 
American legislative systems) is in practice quite foreign to the 
Soviet legislature.
The first of these points may be explained in more detail.
From the standpoint of its status and function in the Soviet pyramid, 
the federal Supreme Soviet is conceived as the highest organ of 
state power of the USSR, and likewise in each of the republics it 
is the Supreme Soviet of the republic to which all the organs of
2state power and state administration are subordinate. The Supreme 
Soviet is empowered to supervise the activity of the various organs 
of the State, including the Council of Ministers of the USSR. It 
is regarded as the embodiment of all authority —  legislative, 
executive and judicial —  constituting the source of authority 
and direction for the activity of the other Soviet organs. By 
rejecting the principle of separation of powers, the Constitution 
communicates to different organs particular ranges of legislative, 
executive and administrative powers. This means that functions and 
spheres of activity are distributed and graded not according to a 
theory of the different kinds of powers, but according to purely 
technical and ad hoc considerations. Thus, the Supreme Soviet may 
legitimately participate in any and every aspect of the state 
mechanism, and not only in the legislative sphere.
According to the Soviet concept, "the Soviets of Working People's 
Deputies are the organs of state power; they are divided into higher 
(federal and republican Supreme Soviets) and local (regional, 
district, city, village and settlement soviets) organs. The rep­
ublican Supreme Soviets exercise state power within the bounds of 
the corresponding republics and the local soviets. The entire 
activity of the Supreme Soviet as the higher organ of state power 
is said to be aimed at consolidating the might of the Soviet Union, 
strengthening the Soviet social and state system, raising the defence 
capacity of the country to a new, higher level, and improving the 
material and cultural well-being of the working people. To this end, 
the Supreme Soviets exercise all rights vested in the USSR and in 
the republics in so far as they do not come within the jurisdiction 
of other organs that are accountable to the Supreme Soviets - that 
is, the Presidia of the federal and republican Supreme Soviets, the 
federal and republican Council of Ministers, and ministries."
"The organs of state administration, on the other hand, carry out 
executive and administrative activity, that is, activity connected 
with the direct guidance of various branches of life. From the point 
of view of the territorial limits of this activity, the organs of 
state administration are divided into higher (federal and republican 
Council of Ministers), central (federal and republican ministries 
and departments) and local organs (the executive committees of the 
local s o v i e t s ) S e e  Denisov and Kirichenko, 1960, p.204, 213 and 218.
3Western views on Supreme Soviet
The fact is that most students of Soviet politics have ventured 
passing judgement on the role of the federal and republican Supreme 
Soviets on the basis of only limited and fragmentary evidence avail­
able in the past years. Therefore, to date the actual role of the 
Supreme Soviets is surrounded by mystery. In those cases where 
Western observers have attempted to define the role of the Supreme 
Soviet, they have usually represented it as a ritualistic, mock- 
representative body, or at best, as a device for testing public 
opinion, a school for impressing relatively humble and provincial 
figures, or an agency for the transmission of central policies and 
decisions."^ These definitions reflect an evaluation of the machinery 
with which the Supreme Soviet operated, as one lacking in dynamism 
and political significance. Evidence for this evaluation is seen, 
inter alia,in the way elections are staged, with deputies evidently 
being chosen behind the scenes by the Party, even though the repre­
sentation of various geographical, national and social groups is 
ensured. Western opinion has been that the election system is der 
signed not to provide access for persons holding different views but 
to ensure the exclusive selection of persons who fully accept the 
leadership and politics of the Communist Party. In addition, the 
sessions of the Supreme Soviet are seen as mere ceremonies of 
ratification, characterised by set speeches rather than debate, and 
by unanimous acceptance of legislation introduced by government 
spokesmen. And also its Standing Commissions play no more than nominal 
and ornamental role.
^ Such views are expressed by Western scholars such as e.g., Towster, 
1948, p.263 and 1965, p.321; Scott, 1958, pp.110-111; Grottian, 1965, 
p.326; Armstrong, 1966, p.107; Conquest, 1968, p.58.
4Although few other Western scholars have expressed radically 
different views from those mentioned above, a few serious students 
of Soviet politics have viewed the Supreme Soviet somewhat positively. 
In the opinion of L. G. Churchward, for example, the Supreme Soviet 
does allow for a limited discussion of government policy and it does 
play an important secondary role in legislation (see Churchward, 1968, 
p.130). As early as 1964, T.H. Rigby also speculated that the 
Budget Commissions of the two Houses of the federal Supreme Soviet 
and the Economic Commission of the Soviet of Nationalities might 
make some contribution towards articulating and accommodating con­
flicting departmental and especially local interests (see Rigby, 1964, 
p.193). The proliferation of the federal Standing Commissions in 
1966 compelled John N. Hazard to revise the negative views previously 
expressed on the Supreme Soviet (see Hazard, 1968, p.47). It should 
be said, however, that in the absence of systematic research on the 
Supreme Soviet, these scholars have largely speculated on its 
functions from different viewpoints.
Since 1960, a few works have been written either exclusively or 
substantially on the role of the federal and republican Supreme 
Soviets. We refer in particular to three Ph.D. theses.
P. Juviler, Functions of a deputy to the Supreme Soviet of
the USSR, 1938-1959, (Columbia University, 1960).
A.C. Berson, Change in structure and Personnel in the Soviet
State and Communist Party from 1953 to 1959: A study 
of Party-State relations, (London University, 1962).
J.W. Cleary, Politics and Administration in Soviet Kazakhstan,
1955-1964, (ANU, 1967).
5As the title shows, P. Juviler's main attention was given to 
the activities and functions of the deputies rather than the 
organizational aspects of the Supreme Soviet organs: such as leader­
ship and experience of the Presidium and the Standing Commissions, 
working relations between these two organs, and changes in these 
organizational aspects. Yet he attempted to define the functions 
of the Supreme Soviet as a whole by describing not only the activities 
of deputies in the Chambers and constituencies, but also in the 
Presidium and Standing Commissions. His failure to give attention 
to the organizational aspects of the two organs may have been 
responsible for his over-simple conclusion on the functions of the 
Supreme Soviet that it is a ceremonial state summit, symbol and 
'transmission belt'. These views are little different from those 
presented by other Western observers to that date.
A.C. Berson, on the other hand, carried out extensive and pain­
staking personnel studies on the federal and republican Presidia 
and Standing Commissions, as a part of his enquiry to identify the 
changes in structure of the Soviet state. At the same time, Berson 
made a number of inferences from his personnel studies as to the 
functions of these two organs. Although his inferences appeared to 
be convincing, they remained matters of conjecture without supporting 
evidence, for this could only have been derived from the examination 
of the actual operations of these two organs. J.W. Cleary studied 
the activities of the Kazakhstan Supreme Soviet as part of his re­
search into the political and administrative system of the Kazakhstan 
republic. Much of his description of the Kazakhstan Supreme Soviet 
was centred on the latter's Chamber and Presidium. With regard to
6the Standing Commissions, he provided a general account of their 
activities, recognizing, albeit on an intuitive level, the potential 
growth points for any future expansion of their role. Clearly, at 
the same time, provided fresh insights into the role of the Supreme 
Soviet organs (particularly the Presidium), presenting provocative 
speculations based on the available material and analysis of its 
actual operations. He ascribed, for instance, the role of a 
pressure group, an administrative justice tribunal, or an ombudsman 
to the Kazakhstan Presidium. Nevertheless, these definitions of 
the role of the Supreme Soviet organs, while valid up to a point and 
based on much hard fact and reasonable inference, appear to be in­
adequate in the light of information that has accumulated in recent 
years. In fairness to the three authors mentioned, it must be 
admitted that it is only since 1966 that general accounts of the 
activities of both federal and republican Supreme Soviet organs have 
been reported to the public with increasing frequency.
During the time of writing of the present thesis, at least one 
German and two American scholars have drawn attention to recent 
developments in the Standing Commissions of the federal Supreme 
Soviet, namely Hans-Christian Reichel, "Die Ständigen Ausschüsse der 
Kammern des Obersten Sowjet der Sowjetunion", 1970; Henry Krish, 
"The Changing Role of the Standing Commissions of the USSR Supreme 
Soviet, 1966-1971", 1971; and D.R. Little, "Soviet Parliamentary 
Committees After Khrushchev: Obstacles and Opportunities", 1972.
Although the article written by D.R. Little presented some 
interesting discussion of characteristics of the composition of the 
Standing Commissions, his findings were not systematically related
7to the functions of these bodies. This was evidently because up to 
that point Little does not appear to have undertaken systematic re­
search on the operations of the Commissions and therefore had to rely 
almost entirely on Soviet secondary literature and the newly imple­
mented Standing Commissions' rules of procedure as his sources.
Secondly, his analytical framework based on treating the Supreme 
Soviet as a legislative body of some kind seems to have been too 
narrow to generate interesting hypotheses. For an example, Little 
took a sample of the four original Standing Commissions (Credentials, 
Foreign Affairs, Legislative Proposals, and Budget and Planning) in 
the Soviet of the Union to show characteristics of its composition. 
However, it is highly pertinent here that during the seventh convo­
cation (1966-1970), these particular four original Commissions always 
held their meetings jointly with the corresponding Commissions of the 
Soviet of Nationalities. Thus, the enquiry into the composition of 
the Soviet of the Union on its own may have little meaning, if the 
composition of the Standing Commissions in the other Chamber (Nation­
alities) differs to a considerable degree from that of the Soviet of 
the Union. If reports on the operation of the Commissions had also 
been analysed, Little would have recognized that much of the Standing 
Commissions' activities in recent years have centred on supervisory 
rather than legislative tasks. His conclusion that "the future role 
of the Standing Commissions will evolve through the interaction with
During the 7th convocation (1966-70), 31 meetings of the four federal 
Standing Commissions were reported. The Credential Commissions of 
the Soviet of the Union and of the Soviet of Nationalities separately 
held two meetings. The rest of the three Commissions held 26 meetings 
jointly with the corresponding Commissions of the other Chamber, 
except the Budget and Planning Commission of the Soviet of Nationalities 
which held one meeting alone.
8three agencies —  the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the Council 
of Ministers and the Party Central Committee" (see Little, 1972, 
p.59) has some truth in it, but it is likely to be only one among 
several factors that will affect the future role of the Standing 
Commissions.
Henry Krish, on the other hand, designed a more fruitful approach 
to the study of the federal Standing Commissions. He avoided the 
use of any single conceptual model even for a guide to research, 
for that implication would prejudge the role of the Standing 
Commissions. Despite this plausible approach, however, Krish also 
does not report any detailed research into the structure and oper­
ations of the Standing Commissions. His somewhat cursory analysis 
of the latter resulted in rephrasing the old concept of a moribund 
institution so that the Standing Commissions remain for him one of 
the less important institutions of Soviet politics. But he added 
rather ambiguously that "the Commission could develop a number of 
capabilities useful and interesting within the context of the Soviet 
political system, even without any change in their political status" 
(Krish, 1971, p.16).
Hans-Christian Reichel takes the view that the Standing Commi­
ssions are no longer auxiliary organs of the Supreme Soviet, but 
have taken over the functions, particularly the supervisory function 
of the federal Supreme Soviet. The supervisory function, according 
to his opinion, was hardly exercised by the federal Standing 
Commissions in the periods prior to the introduction of the branch 
Commissions in 1966 (see Reichel, 1970, pp.291-292). Regrettably, 
however, he presents little evidence to support this statement.
9The work of these three authors* nevertheless represents a 
significant advance, and the criticisms offered here are perhaps too 
harsh if one regards these papers as preliminary reports on ongoing 
research.
Our brief review on some of the works which have appeared 
since 1966 has nevertheless indicated to us how inadequate existing 
accounts are, and what in fact is known and thought about these 
bodies, and suggests that the following considerations might be 
added and expanded in our studies:
— one is required to describe the structural changes under­
gone in the Supreme Soviet organs and so far as possible 
gather evidence on their actual operation (mainly, that 
of the Presidium and the Standing Commissions);
— one needs to examine the institutional arrangements and 
formal proceedings in order to identify some of the char­
acteristics of these organs;
— to pursue these ends, one needs to conduct systematic and 
empirical studies, covering at least the last ten years, in 
order to obtain some perspectives on the stages of institut­
ional development. This should embrace study of the 
Standing Commissions and the Presidium of not only the 
federal, but also some, if not all, of the fifteen republican 
Supreme Soviets, so as to understand the vertical (between 
the federal and republican Supreme Soviets) as well as 
horizontal (among the republican Supreme Soviets) relations.
This should give a rough picture of the organizational frame­
work of the entire higher organs of State power. At the same
^ While the thesis was in the proof reading stage, the author discovered 
that two other scholars, Jerome Gilison and Carl-Günther Sprögel had also 
drawn attention to certain recent developments in the federal Standing Comm-
(cont)
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time, it should reveal similarities and differences between 
the structure and operations of these organs in individual 
republics.
In the present author's view, such an account has the advantage 
that it resists the temptation to accommodate oneself to a single 
neat formula. On the contrary, the reality turns out at closer 
consideration to be complex and untidy, dictating a degree of 
eclecticism of approach to make sense of it. Nevertheless, a 
certain formula of analysis has emerged to allow certain evaluation 
of these organs. This may perhaps best be considered as two 
mutually complementary themes, which are comparable to the objects 
of the thesis.
The first of the two themes is the function of these organs.
The second is their institutional development.
We use the term "function" in a structural-functionalist sense, 
i.e. the functions performed within the political system. We do not 
argue here whether or not structural functionalism is an adequate 
model for analysing the Soviet political ststem, nor would we wish 
to distinguish between input and output functions. Difficulties 
facing with these problems are studied adequately by other scholars 
(Cf. Rigby, 1968, pp.18-32). We merely list the likely functions 
performed by the Supreme Soviet organs within the Soviet political 
system. However, we would also wish examine some of the functions 
it serves other systems, notably the social system. We hope to 
establish thus the extent to which the Supreme Soviet organs function 
in the political system as well as in the social system. The nature 
of the political system appears to be that it directs or attempts to
11
direct the behaviour of its citizens or members. (Weber, Almond, 
Austin, and Huntington and Brzezinski, all share the proposition 
that the political system's relation to coertion is its distinctive 
quality.) Although the boundary between the two systems is 
difficult to draw in the Soviet context, the Soviet social system 
exists, by and large, for assisting the implementation of the 
directions of the political system. Thus, we could call political 
institutions active, directing agents and social institutions 
passive, implementing agents.
The functions of the Supreme Soviet organs may vary according 
to the point in time in the life cycle of the institution. The 
functional analysis alone thus restrict one's evaluation of the 
Supreme Soviet organs to a narrow and static interpretation of 
their operations in the period examined. It fails to explain how 
they came to operate and why they operate as they do. Institutionali­
zation is a process over time. Research into institutional 
development places the Supreme Soviet organs in a time perspective, 
thus offseting drawbacks in structural-functional analysis.
The above mentioned two themes and findings on them, naturally 
bear on one another in important ways. Insufficient findings on 
the first will make affirmative evaluations on the second difficult, 
perhaps impossible. It will be useful to attempt below some prelimi­
nary discussion of these mutually complementary themes. It should 
be added, however, that the various aspects discussed below under 
the two themes are not mutually exclusive.
12
Functions.
1. Legitimation and identification.
Political legitimation and identification is the function of 
maintaining the political culture, i.e. the pattern of individual 
attitudes and orientations toward politics among the members of 
the political system (see Almond, 1966, p.50). In the USSR vast 
efforts are devoted to disposing the individual to accept the 
legitimacy of the system's structures, processes, roles and role- 
incumbents, and to identify his personality and interest with them 
(see Rigby, 1968, pp.23-24). During the Stalinist period, symbolic 
bodies such as the Supreme Soviet were employed as one of the major 
mechanisms for performing precisely this function. Our aim here is 
to see to what extent the Presidium and the Standing Commissions of 
the Supreme Soviet still perform this function and share it with 
other bodies, and how this performance qualitatively differs from
the previous performance of these organs.
2. Communication.
Our task here is to identify the communication networks 
established in and around the Presidia and the Standing Commissions 
and locate them within the general pattern of political communication 
in the USSR. We must seek to answer the question - paraphrasing 
Laswell - who says what, through what channels, to whom and with 
what effect? (Cf. Laswell, 1948, pp.37-51). This is obviously a • 
difficult task, in view of the sketchiness of the published record 
and the inability to engage in direct observation, but some headway 
may be made by supplementing the direct evidence of actual communication 
events by inferences drawn from the relevant characteristics of 
members of these bodies, against the background of what we know
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of the social system and cultural context in which he operates.
In this study, we identify the "who" largely with the communicator's 
occupational positions, which indicates to us his status in a 
highly bureaucratized political system, his political importance 
and the nature of his involvement. One assumption of this model 
is that communication is assumed to be a purposive, but of course 
there is rarely direct evidence as to the precise intention of a 
communicator. We must, therefore, make what we can of indirect evidence, 
in the form of data on such characteristics of communicators as the 
following: generational, educational and career background, Party or 
non-Party membership, professional, occupational, organizational, 
personal followings, regional and ethnic affiliation; taking into 
account the politico-socio-economic environment at the time he is 
communicating.
An attempt will also be made to assess the quality of the 
communication system in such aspects as sources of information, 
degree of understanding by the members of the Supreme Soviet organs 
acting as receivers or transmitters, their ability to interpret 
and transmit information to the right people, and strength of common 
background held by the leaders (chairmen of the federal and republican 
Presidia and Standing Commissions). This last aspect is particularly 
important in view of the fact that the leaders must build or take 
over the communication network which they can then direct to their 
common objects. Common background such as that provided by executive 
experience in political affairs would thus help them to attain a 
central position in such a network, while also assisting in the 
solution of other problems. Each must be concerned with "the 
effectiveness and efficiency of channels and circuits for collecting
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information and for transmitting it to points where further commu­
nication events are to be produced and for observing and recording 
the consequences and transmitting information about such conse­
quences back to central points in the net" (see Dorsey, 1957-1958,
p.322) --  in other words, feedback arrangements. An assessment
of these aspects might indicate to us the overall strength and 
viability of the institution, and help us to evaluate the 
communication processes operating in and around the Supreme Soviet 
organs.
3. Mobilization.
J.P. Nettl viewed mobilization as a process which involves:
(1) a commitment to action, and (2) a means of translating this 
commitment into action or observed behaviour (Nettl,1967, pp.32-33). 
"Mobilization" in the Communist sense is best described as aiming 
at informing people what has been decided and what responsibilities 
will be involved for the country as a whole and for special groups, 
and at building a positive attitude of acceptance of the decision 
adopted by the Party and government. Mobilization as we understand it, 
however, means not only attempting to inspire and motivate people 
to carry out the leaders' policies, but also making clear to those 
in relevant subordinate positions of authority, precisely towards 
what ends the leadership desires activity to be concentrated, and how 
this is related to overall goals and existing patterns of obligation.
The salience of mobilization in the Soviet system appears to be 
related to the organizational interlocking of the various sectors 
of society (i.e., the duplication and overlapping of functions) and 
the multiplication and interweaving of offices - particularly, the 
Party, government and economic apparatus. Our proposition is,therefore,
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that under such a system the Supreme Soviet organs perform 
mobilizatiuon function at two levels. The first is related to 
"public relations" in the broad sense in Soviet society. A 
communication system embracing both downward and upward communication 
could foster better public relations by making the government more 
responsive to the complaints of citizens. One could argue that 
on this level the Supreme Soviet organs are acting as part both of 
the political and the social systems. The second level is that of 
administrative mobilization. J,G. March and H.A. Simon argue that 
the capacity of an organization to maintain a complex highly inter­
dependent pattern of activity is limited in part by its capacity to 
handle the communication required for co-ordination. The greater 
the efficiency of communication within the organization, the 
greater the tolerance for interdependence (see March and Simon,
1958, p.161). Our investigation aims, therefore, to identify the 
part played by the Supreme Soviet organs in co-ordination in the 
highly complex Soviet administrative system. The Supreme Soviet 
organs' administrative mobilization also relates to rule-enforcement. 
More precisely, they are engaged in canalizing activity. Here,
A.G. Frank's "Conflicting standards analysis" perhaps provides 
the most helpful analytical framework. This is summarized by 
Frank as follows:
More than one hierarchical channel of communication is 
maintained. Multiple and, at least in part, conflicting 
standards are set by superiors for subordinates. Conflict 
may arise among standards set within each hierarchy as well 
as among those set by different hierarchies. Subordinates 
are free to decide which of the conflicting standards to
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meet if any. However, subordinates are responsible to 
superiors for their performance with respect to all 
standards; and subordinates may be held responsible for 
failures to meet any standards. The relative importance of 
standards is neither well, nor completely defined, nor 
is it entirely undefined. The priority among standards is 
ambiguous. Subordinates make their assessment of priority 
to guide their decision making and task performance. Each 
subordinate appeals to those standards which are most in 
accord with his incentives and the circumstances of the 
moment and to those which are most likely to be invoked by 
superiors in evaluating his performance. Superiors in turn 
make their assessment of priority to guide performance and 
enforcement of standards. The entire process is continuous: 
superiors modify the set of standards to comply with their 
objectives; subordinates adapt their decisions to changing 
standards and to changing circumstances; superiors enforce 
standards in accordance with the changing priority (see Frank, 
1958-1959, pp.8-13).
The essential part of this model is that multiple standards 
allow a wide latitude of discretion to subordinates, resulting in 
the decentralizing of decision making. However, subordinates 
have to remain sensitive to the wishes of their superiors, for 
selective evaluation and enforcement permit superiors to convert 
potential authority into real authority at any given time.
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We do not apply the totality of this model to the Supreme 
Soviet organs. We investigate here the extent of the canalizing 
activity and the way it was carried out by the Supreme Soviet 
organs.
4. Interest articulation.
Interest articulation presupposes the existence of groups 
whose members are concerned to advance their shared interests, 
often in competition with these of other groups. In order to 
sensitize ourselves to possible interest articulation in the 
Supreme Soviet organs, we may hypothesize the existence of four 
types of groups operating in these bodies: namely, 1) functional 
groups; 2) echelon groups; 3) social groups; and 4) institutional 
groups. The first refers to professional groups such as teachers, 
engineers, academics, doctors, artists and administrative (functional) 
officials. Echelon groups refer to administrative levels, and 
these in turn may reflect geographical and ethnic differences.
The third type of group refers to broad social groups such as workers, 
farmers, office workers, students and pensioners. The final type 
refers to institutional interest groups such as Party, TUC, Police 
and Military.
Jerry Hough has argued against the hypothesis put forward by 
Almond and Powell that the political sub-structures in the totalitarian 
system are to be viewed more as mobilizational structures contributing 
to regulative, extractive, and symbolic capabilities than as sub­
structures creating the basis for a responsive capability. (See his 
counter argument in Hough, 1971, pp.88-91). The present writer is 
inclined to agree with Hough's argument. It should also be noted 
that in recent years a growing number of Western scholars have 
expressed their dissatisfaction with the concept of the totalitarian 
system as an analytical system of the Soviet political system. H.G. 
Skilling, for example, states that "the concept of a totalitarian 
system ... was challenged by an approach that took account of the 
conflicting groups that exert an influence on the making of policy 
by the Party" (see Skilling and Griffiths, 1971, p.17).
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One might hypothesize that all these collectivities or 
"groups" based on divisions or levels of the formal structures 
may advance their shared interests through their co-opted fellow 
members in the processes of legislation and implementation of 
acts and through the processes of legitimation, communication 
and mobilization. Indeed, some of the functions of the Supreme 
Soviet organs such as communication may serve the role of 
reconciling differences of interest in addition to furthering 
particular group interests. For instance, the differences of 
interest between the centre and lower levels and between the 
administratively responsible members of the political elite may 
be reconciled in the process of communication. Certainly, there 
is abundant evidence of unconcerted interests which require 
reconciliation between and among the groups.
Apart from the interests of the collectivities mentioned, the 
interests of additional informal groups also deserve consideration. 
For instance, one aspect of the mobilization process in the 
Supreme Soviet may be to help the centre to nip "localism" 
(mestnichestvo) in the bud. Local patronage tends to grow around 
the first secretaries of district, regional and republican Party 
committees (see Hough, 1969; and 1972, p.34). The politics of 
collusion among officials subordinate to different echelons, but 
working in the same locality is not the monopoly of the Soviet 
political system. The French have long experienced this phenomenon 
in the relations between the central government and regional 
prefects (see Worms, 1966). In a vertical society such as Japan, 
the formation of informal groups centred on influential men is
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considered to be a natural phenomenon. In India, the theory of 
moving top officials of local administration around in order to 
prevent contamination by contacts which are likely to be established 
in any particular city or region appears on the surface to achieve 
its purpose (see Rosenthal, 1966, pp.201-215). There is no need 
here to discuss other types of informal groups whose interests 
may be advanced or reconciled in the Supreme Soviet organs, but 
this example is given to indicate that we should be alert to 
indications of such informal group activity in exploring our 
data.
Of course, an individual member may not exclusively "belong" to 
one group, because of his multiple career background in different 
organizations and regions, and also because he may shift his group 
identity depending on the questions at issue. We should also 
bear in mind that the furtherance of group interests may be pursued 
"esoterically" and "parasitically" upon the performance of other, 
legitimate activities, i.e. assigned tasks (see Rigby, 1972, pp.443- 
444). Thus, for the outside observer, it may be extremely difficult 
to generalize about the dimensions of group politics deployed in 
the sittings of Supreme Soviet organs.
Because it was difficult to characterize even the aggregate
^ According to R.P. Dore, "(in Japan) the individual surrenders a 
part of himself not to a group of which he is a member, but to 
particular individuals whose leadership he accepts, with whose 
fortunes he identifies himself, on whose help he depends for securing 
his own advancement or happiness, on whose goodwill he depends for his 
emotional security, and on whose approval he depends for his self- 
respect" (see Dore, 1958, p.389).
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group and its role in the formation of policy, Franklyn Griffiths 
emphasized issues rather than groups, the process of tendency 
conflict on these issues rather than the conflict of structures 
invested with purposes and power of their own. He suggests, 
therefore, that:
Given the condition of system-dominance in Soviet society, 
it is to be assumed that certain dominant tendencies of 
articulation will emerge from the total system of interaction 
and form effective alternate directions of policy. On the 
basis of the available evidence, then, the investigator will 
have to make a judgement as to which patterns of articulation 
represent effective variants of policy on the issue in question. 
The Soviet policy-making process is thus to be regarded as 
one in which interaction among participants at different 
levels of the political structure generates a conflict of 
dominant tendencies of articulation, through which alternate 
lines of policy are identified, authoritatively decided, and 
implemented with regard to specific values. To state this in 
another way, policy on a given issue is likely to be internally 
contradictory and may be understood as the interaction among 
conflicting tendencies of articulation prior to, during, and 
after the taking of official decisions; similarly fluctuations 
in value allocation or in the policy "line" may be seen as 
shifts in the relative influence of conflicting tendencies.
(see Skilling and Griffiths, 1971, pp.360-361).
We should, therefore, seek to investigate how far the Supreme 
Soviet organs articulate group interests in the process of their
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activities and/or how far some of their processes may be seen 
rather as contributing to the articulation of tendencies in 
Griffiths' sense.
Institutional development.
Under this theme, we shall need to consider what are the 
elements facilitating institutional development.
The federal and republican Supreme Soviets came into existence 
long before the period covered in this thesis, but existed for a 
long time in a virtually moribund state. In recent years, new life 
has clearly been breathed into this apparently moribund structure, 
and this requires explanation. Such institutional revival is by no 
means without historical precedent. The history of the "estates- 
general" in the majority of European kingdoms and principalities 
may be quoted here as an example. With the rise of strong states 
and the beginning of bureaucratic, centralized government in the 
12th century, as the personal, dominal and feudal revenues of the 
rulers were no longer adequate, consultation with the important 
sections of the population became indispensable. Thus, the 
assemblies of estates came into being in the course of the later 
middle ages and won political power at the crown's expense till the 
15th and even the 16th centuries. With the subsequent rise of 
absolutism, however, conflict arose between the assemblies and the 
crown, and usually ended in victory for the ruler, so that in the 
17th and 18th centuries the estates save Württemberg and Poland 
were generally convened only to give formal assent to taxes and to 
listen passively to the government's decisions. In 1789, the French 
"6tats generaux" was convoked with double representation for the
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third estates. The etats generaux constituted themselves a National 
Assembly abolishing the estates, and heralded a revival of European 
representative institution (see Encyclopedia Britanica, Vol.8,1969, 
pp.725-726). The degree of success achieved by the establishment 
of modern parliaments in Europe in the 19th century is historically 
related to that previously achieved by the estates in the several 
countries. Indeed, in France, making up the deficit was out of the 
question only because it was impossible to tax the wealth of the 
aristocracy and clergy. This refusal on the part of the privileged, 
the attitude of the Parlements which sustained this rebellion 
against the State, and the just dispeasure of public opinion at the 
unconcern of the public authorities have led to the convocation of 
the &tats g^nlraux and resulted in tranferring power from one class 
to another (see Maurois, 1949, pp.252-286).
A more obvious and direct analogy can be found in the experience 
of the East European Parliamentary Assemblies, which we hope to outline 
later. The aspect of reactivisation can also be better appreciated 
if one considers some recent developments in the role of shareholders' 
meetings in certain Western business corporations.
It can be generalised that, although shareholders have great 
formal powers, such as to call extraordinary meetings, dismiss directors 
change articles of association and approve dividends, in fact the 
overwhelming number of shareholders do not even turn up. Those who
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do are usually either silent or ignorant. There have been numerous 
cases where the public has lost its money without shareholders 
taking any of the possible actions vis-ä-vis the company's 
directors open to them. In these cases, the shareholders have either 
lacked the necessary power or have not used their powers effectively. 
In order to make shareholders' control more realistic, there have 
been recent moves in Britain to set up shareholders' committees 
under certain circumstances."^ Some of the factors which have promoted 
this movement lie in the environment of the company management, which 
has changed significantly in the recent past; in particular institu­
tionalised pressure groups such as consumers' associations, trade 
unions and, for that matter, government bodies, for example those 
concerned with planning and environmental control,have become active 
in putting pressure on company managements. In these changed 
environmental conditions, institutional shareholders, such as banks 
and insurance companies and the managers of investment trusts, have 
also realised the advantages of forming shareholders' committees
See House of Commons Bill, No.166, 1st reading, 21 May, 1969, 
subsequently amended in Standing Committee on 16 July, and renumbered 
House of Commons Bill, No.200. Sections of the Bill stipulate that 
once the shareholders' committees are constituted, they need pro­
fessional advice in the shape of independent management consultants 
who may be instructed to carry out a thorough management audit into 
all or part of the company's business. Their audit would not be 
carried out to check the accuracy and probity of companies' accounts, 
but to report to the committee on the efficiency with which the 
company is using its resources. Thus, the Bill meets the usual ob­
jections to such committees: how could its members have the kind of
access to Ihe company's innermost affairs in such a v/ay as to enable 
them, without disclosure harmful to the company's and therefore their 
own interests, to pronounce upon the merit or otherwise of the board's 
management? See Shonfield, 1971, pp.161-162.
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mainly with a view to improving the efficiency of companies when 
they were suspected of operating substantially below their potential 
(Shonfield, 1971, p.161; and Sykes, 1972). In Germany, it appears 
that shareholders can now exert influence on the company board, in 
cooperation with other pressure groups, through a "supervisory 
board". The supervisory board is composed of representatives of 
various groups (consumers, creditors, workers and shareholders)
(see Shonfield, 1971, p.160; and Fogarty, 1969). This type of 
supervisory board has important advantages for the board of directors, 
because the pressure groups represented in it have to balance their 
interests one against another before they exert their concerted 
pressure on the company board. In effect, the co-ordination and 
interest articulation processes in the supervisory board serve as 
restraints on the behaviour both of the company board and of the 
individual pressure groups.
We suggest that the federal and republican Supreme Soviets, 
in a process analogous to the revival of shareholders' meetings, 
may also have reconstituted their structures and processes, permitting 
new functions, values, and techniques to be introduced, diffused and 
assimilated (institutionalized). M.J. Esman and H.C. Blaise in an 
attempt to conceptualize institution building, have identified the 
following four key elements for the analysis of the institution 
building process - leadership, doctrine, organization, and 
environment.^ Let us briefly consider the situation of the Supreme
^ According to Esman and Blaise, the four elements were defined as 
follows: (a) "'leadership' refers to all those persons who are
actively engaged in the formulation of the doctrine and programme of 
the institution and who direct its operation and relationships with 
the environment; (b) 'doctrine' refers to the specification of the 
values, objectives, and operating methods of the institution; (c)
(cont)
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Soviet organs in relation to each of these elements, adding a 
further one, namely politics, which, we will argue, has also been a 
factor in the institutional development of these bodies.
1. Doctrine
In terms of Marxist-Leninist theory, the raison d'etre of the 
Supreme Soviet organs is closely related to the doctrine of the 
state. Both Marx and Lenin regarded the state as a temporary 
phenomenon which was destined to wither away when the higher stage 
of socialist society, communism, had been achieved (see Churchward, 
1968, pp.88-89). Insofar as the need persists for a government 
apparatus and its ramified system of organization, the socialist 
society is, according to Marxist-Leninist theory, political in 
nature. ("Organization" is understood here as the process of 
consciously guided development of society.) The Party, the soviets, 
the trade unions, the cooperatives, the Komsomol and various forms 
of volunteer organization are seen as the particular organizational 
forms in which the people are united and which, in their totality 
and interaction, comprise the system of political organization of 
society (see Platkovsky, 1961, pp.6-7).^
(cont)
'organization' is the vehicle of change, in which and through which 
the leadership embodies, fosters and protects the new values, norms, 
and technologies; (d) 'environment' refers here to the set of 
organizations and individuals in the society with which the subject 
institution is interdependent in performing its functions and 
services." See Esman and Blaise, 1966, pp.3-4.
In the case of the Soviet Union, the unity of this theoretical form 
is based primarily: 1) on the community of the major task facing all 
the interacting components of this system - the task of building 
communism; 2) on the unity of leadership - leadership provided by 
the CPSU; 3) on the unity of the principles underlying the structure 
of the organizations comprising the system of political organization 
of Soviet society; and 4) on the joint implementation of functions 
by organizations comprising the system of political organization 
of Soviet society (see Yampol'skaya, 1961, p.37).
26
At all stages of development of the socialist state, the soviets 
as part of the political organization are held to be intimately 
involved in the activity of the Soviet state apparatus, which is 
directed towards the accomplishment of the tasks and functions of 
the dictatorship of the working class (the latter has now been 
superseded by the "state of the whole people" according to the 
1961 doctrinal change), and is an instrument to transform the old 
society into a new one, communism (see Denisov and Kirichenko, 1960, 
p.190; and also Gaidukov, 1969, p.ll). Since, further, the working 
class dictatorship is led by its "vanguard", namely, the Party, the 
soviets devote their efforts to implementing the latter's policies.
As communist construction progresses, the soviets, which combine the 
features of a government body and a mass organization of the people, 
operate more and more like social organizations, with the masses 
participating extensively and directly in their work. The soviets, 
thus, become the basis of communist social self-administration 
(see Kotok, 1963, pp.12-13).
The main underlying principles upon which the soviets are held 
to base their activities are the democratic principle and representative 
principle.
Democratic principle. Soviet theoreticians speak of a gradual 
process of transformation into "communist social self-administration',' 
a process linked with "the creation of the necessary socio-economic 
prerequisites and, above all, with the building of the material and 
technological basis for communism, and - what is exceedingly important - 
with the expansion, by every possible means, of socialist democracy
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and the involvement of all citizens in managing the affairs of 
society" (see Kostin, 1969, p.37).
The notion of democracy, as I understood it, is a device for 
making popular control over national government policy in some 
measure practicable for communities too extensive for direct 
democracy. In Soviet doctrine, by contrast, socialist democracy 
means the actual sovereignty of people who exercise broad and 
comprehensive control over all state organs, and participate 
directly in their activities. Thus, the Supreme Soviet organs 
are assigned the task of advancing and developing various forms 
of public participation in state affairs. It is important 
throughout our investigation to keep in mind that it is this, and 
not some other, doctrine of democracy that has informed the 
evolution of the Supreme Soviet organs.
Although, as the above implies, Soviet notions of democracy 
place far less emphasis on procedural aspects which tend to be 
salient in Western liberal democracy, such aspects are not treated 
as totally insignificant, and concern to act (or to appear to act) 
"democratically" may, therefore, be expected to affect such matters 
as the selection of members of the federal and republican Supreme 
Soviet organs, the proceedings of the meetings and the conduct of 
the operations of the Supreme Soviet organs.
Representative principle. To bring out the distinctive Soviet 
notion of representation, something should first be said about 
corresponding Western notions.
Representation can be defined as a relation between two persons, 
the representative and the represented, with the representative 
holding the authority to perform various actions that incorporate
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the agreement of the represented. According to Alfred de Grazia, 
writing in the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences,
"the relation is by no means simple, since practically every type 
of human communication and perception can be shown to be intrinsic 
to representation. The relation is socio-psychological. Essentially 
subjective, it may, however, be affected by numerous objective 
conditions and events". He goes on to say that "representation is 
a concept of social interest largely in the contexts of power
relations among leaders (representatives) and followers --  whether
in government, church, school, business, or the family" (see the 
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 1968 edition, 
Vol.13, pp.461-462). The modern system of political representation 
is usually linked with the notion of democracy. There is, however, no 
agreement among political scientists as to the proper way to secure 
a system of selection which ensures the choice of representatives 
who reflect as completely as possible the varieties of interests 
and opinions among the people. Nevertheless, in the last fifty to 
one hundred years, Western systems such as the British Parliamentary 
system have managed to combine representation, which has come in 
practice more and more to mean pressure group representation, and 
bureaucratic (rational-legal) administration, on the assumption 
that both pressure groups and administrative organs may be organized 
and interact on the basis of interest. Although not all Western 
political scientists agree with this assumption, an increasing 
number of political scientists in recent years have related the 
discussion of representation to the role of interest groups. Be 
that as it may, this assumtion is alien to the Soviet system.
What is then the Soviet concept of representation ?
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Soviet scholars claim that the Soviet concept of representation 
is quite different from that of Western bourgeois countries. They 
specifically reject the notion that the groups drawn from the 
society interact on the basis of interest. As the Soviet notions 
of democracy imply, the soviets are founded on the masses. Each 
soviet constitutes social and national units of the Soviet society, 
which reflect the microcosm of the latter (see Barabashev and 
Sheremet, 1965, p.27). The masses constitute, therefore, not only 
industrial workers and kolkhozniks, but also all the classes of 
socialist society, all its social strata, all nations and nationalities, 
all trades and professions, men and women, and Party and non-Party 
members. All these units represent not individually but collectively 
the masses in the soviets (see Saifulin, 1967, p.8; and Vasil'eva,
1967, pp.214-215).
Lenin, following the Marx's formulation, envisaged the Supreme 
Soviet (or its then equivalent, the All-Russian Congress of Soviets) 
as being at all stages in the development towards communism a 
"working" institution largely modelled on the Paris Commune, in which 
the elected representatives of the people themselves must work, 
themselves execute their laws, and themselves check up on what 
becomes of them in practice (see Towster, 1948, p.184). Despite 
the emergence of a vast bureaucratic state machine in the meantime, 
Stalin and Khrushchev continued to use similar formulas, as well as 
Lenin's formula that the soviets act as a school of administration for 
the workers, peasants and intelligentia, so that work on government 
staffs eventually ceases to constitute a profession (see Stalin,
Voprosy Leninizma, 1924, pp.32-33; and The Road to Communism,
Documents of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, Moscow, 1962, p.548).
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Thus, the idea of elected professional Parliamentarians is not 
compatible with the concept of Soviet representative bodies 
formulated by Marx, elaborated by Lenin and followed by their heirs. 
The elected deputies to the Supreme Soviet, whether executive, 
specialist or rank and file, are all members of various organizations, 
through whom the Supreme Soviet can perform the legislative functions 
and execution of laws. It is through them that the channeling of 
the functions of administration to different social organizations is 
supposed to be made, and through them the masses will become "active 
co-masters of the state".
One should emphasize again that the Supreme Soviet is not a
legislative body of the kind found in British and American systems,
but has in theory a variety of legislative, administrative and
executive functions;its activities are, or appear to be, unduly
complex, unavoidably overlapping and deceptively irrational^- from
our point of view. The Soviet system, though bureaucratic, is
based, formally at least, purely on the concept of division of
labour, conceived of as a purely technical and functional way of
distinguishing different sections (for managerial purposes) of
what is fundamentally all the one socio-economic productive process,
an approach which assumes a general identity of interests. This
conception makes it impossible for us to assume the differentiations
and distinctions that occur in the Soviet system as equivalent
to those, or even as early forms of those, that occur in British
and American systems. The independence that is fundamental to the
articulation and representation of interests, in relation to
^ According to Jerry Hough, the Soviet leadership seems to believe 
quite deeply that a Weberian-type of organizational structure with 
a clean line of command and clearly defined spheres of competence is 
not, in fact, the best form of organization for producing optimal 
decisions from a rational-technical point of view. See Hough, 1969,
pp.96-98 and 282-318.
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bureaucracy, in the British and American systems, is lacking in the 
Soviet system. That is to say that the concept of representation, 
especially in relation to the administration, is organized on a 
different principle.
Finally, it should be noted here some dynamic aspect of the 
Soviet concept of representation. By the 22nd Congress in 1961, 
the Soviet state is said to have advanced from the "dictatorship 
of the proletariat" to the second stage termed "the state of all 
the people". From our point of view of studying the Supreme Soviet 
organs, this doctrinal change can be expected to have some significance, 
since the state of all the people is held to express the will and 
interests of the people as a whole. At present, thus, the elected 
deputies are held to be the most authoritative and respected men 
and women representing all sections and groups of society (see 
Gaidukov, 1969, p.9), although the actual composition of deputies 
does not strikingly differ from the make-up of deputies before 
1961. One could interpret nonetheless that the doctrine allows the 
flexible adaptation of the representation principle to changing 
social conditions. This view has been taken by at least one of the 
Soviet scholars, Yu.A. Tikhomirov. His argument may be summarised 
as follows (see Tikhomirov, 1967). The process of specialization 
and increasing complexity of management of the economy necessitates 
the broadening of the sphere of application of the principle of 
representation so as to express the diversity of socio-economic, 
organizational and other ties in society. However, the view 
expressed by other scholars (Cf. Pertsik, 1963, pp.285-288; and 
Grigorian, 1965, pp.33-45) that the entry of the soviets (the 
Supreme Soviets and local soviets taken together as a unity) into some
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particular sphere of administration is a desirable prospect for 
their activity, is not acceptable from the point of view of practice. 
Instead, he argues that the representative agencies should make 
judgements about all aspects of the socio-economic process, to see 
the social ramifications and consequences of the solutions adopted, 
and to guide, co-ordinate and dovetail all the ramified components 
of the administrative apparatus, rather than to concern themselves 
with purely operative-technical day-to-day tasks of administration.
In order to reinforce the position of the soviets along the lines 
mentioned above, he suggests, the following approach should be made:
1) to enlarge the sphere of activity of the soviets, 2) to provide 
them more fully with information, 3) to strengthen their connections 
with scientific and technical institutions, scholars and specialists, 
4) to activate further the Standing Commissions which make it possible 
for them to acquire gradually the character of leading branch centres 
of administration, closely associated with corresponding government 
agencies and 5) to strengthen ties with production collectives in 
selecting the candidates of the latter for posts as deputies.
We are not certain, however, how many Soviet scholars agree with 
the Tikhomirov's view. Later analysis of the Supreme Soviet organs 
should nonetheless enable us to see the practice of representation 
in relation to the actual functions performed in the Supreme Soviet 
organs.
The brief discussion of the Soviet doctrine of the state gives 
little idea of the theoretical complexities of this problem or the 
doctrinal clashes it has proved over the half century and more of 
the Soviet regime. Since we are confining ourselves to studies of 
the Supreme Soviet organs, we must be content with our attempt to
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answer a few of the questions which have emerged from the outlines 
of the doctrine, namely:
1) To what extent have the Supreme Soviet organs been acting as 
"working" institutions ?
2) Does the doctrine truly impel the Soviet leaders to commit 
themselves to constant improvement of the activities of the 
Supreme Soviet organs, or are they motivated by entirely 
different principles little related to the doctrine itself ?
3) Are the Supreme Soviet organs acting as transient bodies on 
the way to direct democracy ?
2. Organizational structure.
Organization is a means to attain perceived goals. The shape 
of the organizational structure would thus affect the execution of its 
prescribed tasks. Our research into organizational structure will 
be centred on 1) relations between the Supreme Soviet organs, 2) 
relations between the federal Supreme Soviet organs and the republican 
Supreme Soviet organs, 3) leadership structure in the Supreme Soviet 
organs, 4) size, composition and continuity of membership of the 
Supreme Soviet organs, 5) constitutional power and rules of procedure, 
6) permanent staff members of the Presidium, 7) expertise of the 
members, and 8) relations with other organizations.
We would hope to identify the changes and continuity of the 
organizational structure, and examine the causes of these changes and 
their impact on the actual functions of the Supreme Soviet organs.
3. Power structure of Soviet leadership.
In systems where succession is not institutionalized, the course 
of development of some of the institutions may be affected by changes
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in the structure of leadership. One might think that this factor is 
a special aspect of another factor - "politics". The difficulty of 
incorporating this to "politics" is that, as we see it later, "politics" 
places much emphasis on the sources and participants of politics.
The Soviet leaders are a group of, though important, participants 
among others in politics. Secondly, one needs to examine the 
structure of leadership separately in relation to its impact on the 
process of institutionalization. This is particularly so, when the 
structure of leadership, during the period studied (1958-1972) at 
least, has not been firmly established: it has been defined or 
redefined. Indeed, during this period, the pattern of leadership 
has changed: from one of transient oligarchy to a dominant leader 
pattern; and from the latter to one of relatively stable oligarchy.
One point for us to consider is whether any consistency or re­
inforcement related to those changes can be observed in the organization 
and operations of the Supreme Soviet organs during the period studied. 
The last of these leadership phases offers particular interest in 
view of the acceleration of changes in the Supreme Soviet organs 
since 1965. T.H. Rigby has argued that the Soviet leadership has 
adopted a number of arrangements since the removal of Khrushchev, 
to entrench the oligarchical structue of power and to prevent a 
recurrence of one-man dominance. In his opinion, one of the 
things they have done to this end is to permit and even encourage 
a degree of countervailing power, among an inner group of leaders.
In this system of countervailing power, particular importance 
attaches to the mutual relationships of the foremost senior men
in the oligarchy --  Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgorny and Suslov (see
Rigby, 1970). A major concomitant of this view is that Podgorny, or
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Suslov for that matter, must take steps to strengthen his position 
by institutionalising his own role. In this context, interest 
attaches to the role of Podgomy as the putative initiator of moves 
to strengthen the Supreme Soviet organs'^ (leaving aside the question 
of evidence for the moment). On the other hand, it is possible 
that the leadership pattern has operated in some more complex and 
indirect manner to influence these developments. For instance, 
each leader may be interested in checking information obtained from 
one of his fellow leaders relating to an apparatus over which he has 
no jurisdiction. To illustrate this aspect in concrete terms, Leonid 
Brezhnev might conceivably like to see the Supreme Soviet organs 
developing as a sort of check on the information about the activities 
of local government bodies supplied by the federal Council of Ministers. 
If this were to happen, the Supreme Soviet organs could be regarded 
as countervailing bodies via-a-vis the Council of Ministers. On 
the other hand, the role of supervision exercised by the Supreme 
Soviet organs over the local government would in fact assit the 
Council of Ministers to reassure itself on the validity of
One might draw an analogy from the oligarchic power structure 
existing briefly at an early period of Meiji government in Japan.
When two pillars of oligarchy, Kido and Okubo (who supported the 
creation of an elected assembly, though Kido differed from Okubo about 
the powers which an assembly should be given) died in 1877 and 1878 
respectively, three of the four remaining oligarchs, Ito, Yamagata 
and Iwakura reached an agreement on a number of propositions, con­
cerning the creation of the assembly. They envisaged the future 
national assembly as the effective means of political control, rather 
than as the institution which makes or unmakes the government. Okuma, 
the last member of this inner circle, made no contribution to these 
decisions at that time. Okuma knew, as did the others, that the 
constitutional movement was rapidly gaining strength in the country. 
When he made his views known in March 1881, he did so as a move in his 
struggle for power with Ito, who had succeeded Okubo in the key office 
of Home Affairs in 1878 and showed every sign of becoming Okubo1s 
successor. Okuma's memorandum of March 1881 was an attempt to redress 
the balance by putting himself at the head of the popular rights 
movement and securing the type of constitution which would give the
(cont)
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information supplied by its own administrative apparatus. A 
reverse argument may also be applied to the Party Central Committee. 
It may be possible, therefore, that the Supreme Soviet mechanism 
is of some value to certain top leaders as a control on the 
performance of structures directed by fellow-oligarchs, while at 
the same time alerting them to shortcomings in their own apparatus.
4. Environment.
We may list the following environmental factors as possible 
contributory factors to changes in the Soviet political system:
- growth in complexity and sophistication of the economy and 
administration;
- great educational changes;
(cont)
leader of the elected representatives --  in anticipation, himself
--  real authority. "This would involve", Okuma said, "party
governments and a cabinet responsible to parliament in the English 
manner, matters far more important than a sterile analysis of forms". 
His proposals were subsequently rejected and, thus he failed in 
the struggle for power. (See Beasley, 1963, pp.121-123). Okuma's 
move is different from that conjecturally attributed to Podgorny in 
that Okuma directly challenged Ito (a primus inter pares) by way 
of introducing a democratic institution, whereas Podgorny's 
initiative may be regarded by other oligarchs as a stabilizing factor 
in the leadership structure. On the other hand, if Podgorny pushes his 
concern too hard to the extent that his move disturbs the existing 
power structure of the Soviet leadership, he may suffer the same fate 
as Okuma.
 ^ A.S. Suyumbaev, chairman of the Kirgiz Council of Ministers, for 
instance, reported to the eighth session of the Kirgiz Supreme Soviet 
that there are many instances in which ministries, departments, 
enterprises and organizations have adopted decisions at variance with 
the law, decisions that exceed their powers, infringe upon the housing, 
labour and property rights of citizens, etc. There are executives who 
discharge and transfer workers and office employees without the consent 
of the factory and plant trade union committees. This reproach 
applies to enterprises and organizations of the Ministry of Automobile 
Transportation and Highways, the Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of 
Trade and the Ministry of Public Education. However, local soviet 
agencies frequently overlook such instances. Moreover, certain local 
soviet executive committees themselves make illegal decisions. See 
Sovetskaya Kirgizia, 24.5.1970
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- virtual disappearance of terror as an instrument for securing 
compliance;
- "liberal developments" in other communist countries and parties. 
The socio-economic environment perhaps deserves particular
attention for our purposes, since changes here inevitably affect the 
system of government in a heavily circumscribed political system.
Some Soviet writers have observed and commented on this relationship. 
For instance, the constitutional lawyer Yu.A. Tikhomirov, in an 
article entitled, "State power, Democracy and Professionalism" 
argues that the administrative process is becoming more complicated 
and its functions are undergoing specialization. He was speaking 
chiefly of the changes in the division of social labour in administra­
tion, changes which reflect those in the socio-economic administrative 
system. The changing pattern of administration, according to his 
view, necessitates the singling out of a special group of persons 
to exercise the functions of the State. This is to say that the 
complex administration requires massive information, decisions and 
co-ordination, which might bring in democratic elements (see 
Tikhomirov, 1968, pp.24-25). Another Soviet scholar, A.N. Vinogradov, 
speaking of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, stated that the 
strengthened activity of the Supreme Soviet organs is objectively 
called forth by the growth of economic and cultural construction in 
the republic which requires a further democratization of the social 
and state system of the country (see Vinogradov, 1967, p.58). Such 
statements, of course, cannot be taken at face value, but we should 
also beware of excluding in advance the possibility that perception 
of some real relationship lies behind them.
It appears that, as a society undergoes industrialization and 
modernization, its instruction of the young becomes extensively
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differentiated, internally complex, and elaborately connected with 
other features of society. Education becomes more necessary for 
the economy and linked closely to it as a prime mediator between 
manpower demand and labour supply. According to the returns of 
the USSR census of January 1970, illiteracy had been eradicated 
throughout the Soviet Union, whereas before the Russian Revolution 
nearly 75 per cent of the population was illiterate. In 1939, among 
1000 employed people, only 123 had received higher or secondary 
education, but the figure had increased by 1970 to 653^ per 1000 
employed people (see Izv., 17.4.71). In this connection, it is worth 
recalling that the Soviet government has used education as an 
instrument for legitimizing particular forms of government and reform. 
At the same time, the Soviet Union, like any other modern society, 
requires a versatile education system - general and specific. Higher 
education is not only an ideological need but a sheer economic 
necessity for industrially advanced societies. It is involved in 
technological advance, as the centre for scientific work and for the 
training of modern research students and technologists. The number of 
scientists increased from 11 thousand in 1941 to 712 thousand in 1966 
(see SSSR: Entsiklopedicheskii spravochnik, 1967, p.280). Some 
social scientists argue that in modem society, education becomes a 
prime source of differences in political perspectives across large 
populations. The more highly educated are more aware of the impact 
of government and are more likely to consider themselves free to 
engage in political discussions, and more competent to influence 
governmental affairs (see Almond and Verba, 1963, p.318).
During Stalin's reign, the Party's leading role became identified 
with the person of its General Secretary. With such enormous, 
if not total, power concentrated in his hands, and with the entire 
1 The figure includes not only those with complete secondary education 
(i.e. 10 years)/ but also those with incomplete secondary education 
(i.e. 7 years).
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communication media at his disposal, Stalin utilized the 
Party as if it were his personal servant, and in doing so, dis­
covered that it was merely one instrument through which he could 
work his will. Western scholars are agreed in seeing the army, the 
government, the economic apparatus, and the secret police as other 
vital instruments of control, at least one of them (the secret 
police) becoming in some respects more powerful than the Party due 
to the nature of its tasks and the resources Stalin placed at its 
disposal. This is not to deny that the Party retained a crucial 
role in such areas as co-ordination at various levels to all other 
territorially based organizations (see Rigby, 1964b, p.551).
During the Stalin era, terror was extensively used by the secret 
police both to remove alienated individuals and to instil patterns 
of unquestioning conformity in the population. It should be remem­
bered that terror has a deterrent effect when it. is used inter­
mittently and a unifying function when used sparingly at critical 
moments. After the death of Stalin, the Soviet leaders, particularly 
Khrushchev, placed the secret police apparatus under Party command, 
and made conscious efforts to eliminate systematic and widespread 
terror as a control instrument. The result is that some progress 
appeared to have been made towards personal security, the rule of 
law, limited intellectual freedom, and partial access to the West, 
although those who criticise doctrines and symbols and the authority 
of the top leadership are still regarded by the Party leadership 
as beyond tolerance and run the risk of severe repression. The 
limited liberal atmosphere created by the virtual disappearance of 
the terror may incite Soviet citizens to press the Soviet leaders
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to create some forum where public interests may be made articulate.
Such pressure or perceived potential pressure, might therefore be 
seen as one of the factors impelling the leadership to adapt and 
institutionalize the erstwhile moribund Supreme Soviet organs in 
such a way as to serve as a kind of mobilizing instrument.
In certain East European countries, a measure of reconciliation 
of the people with the leaders has been achieved in the past, and 
more actively in recent years, and this has resulted in tragedy in 
Czechoslovakia (1968), change of leadership in Poland (1970), and 
slow but persistent reforms in Hungary. It should be of interest 
to consider whether "liberal" developments seen in Eastern Europe 
may have influenced the Soviet leaders to initiate such reforms 
in their own country as well.
It is against this background that we will attempt to invest­
igate how far changes in environment are reflected in the structure 
and functions of the Supreme Soviet organs.
5. Politics.
Among organizational theorists, it was long taken for granted 
that politics is dysfunctional. However, some theorists such as 
Michel Crozier and Charles E. Lindblom have seriously studied political 
system in organizations (see Crozier, 1964; and Lindblom, 1965).
More recently, some have argued that politics can serve in two
ways; it can facilitate or inhibit the organization's productivity, 
stability or adaptability depending on the nature of politics (see 
Pondy, 1972, p.369). The organization in the process of institutiona­
lization may be called "organic" type of organization. In terms 
of Burns and Stalker, the "organic" type of organization is a fluid
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type of organization often with blurred lines of authority and free 
flows of information. Although Burns and Stalker categorized the 
organizations into two basic models, namely "mechanistic" and 
"organic" models of organizations for the study of the management 
of technical innovation, their study indicates that the "organic" type 
of organization accommodates more political activities than the 
"mechanistic" type (see Burns and Stalker, 1961, p.6). Our supposition 
is, therefore, that politics is an inherent part of the process 
of institutionalization.^ While new functj , values and techniques 
are to be introduced to the Supreme Soviet c .ans, and while divergent 
values as to the operations of the Supreme Soviet organs are held by 
individuals or groups of participants (participants do not mean only 
the members of the Supreme Soviet organs but also the outsiders who 
participate in the politics of the Supreme Soviet organs), politics 
such as when a group or an individual tries to gain an advantage 
over another in order to pursue its concerns is thus inevitable.
We have earlier speculated on the possible group politics in the 
articulation of their interests.
We should perhaps list the likely sources of politics as follows: 
Through the processes of the Supreme Soviet organs, groups or 
individuals a) compete over available resources such as status, power 
to influence the behaviour and position of others, planning decisions
 ^ One of a few scholars who studied this aspect empirically is 
H.M. Sapolsky. Having done research into the institutionalization 
of the so-called "Special Projects Office" in the U.S. Department of 
Navy (which is responsible for the design, development and commissioning 
of the Polaris missile), Sapolsky argues that the basic ingredient 
for its success as an institution is not the management control system 
known as PERT (Programme Evaluation and Review Technique) invented by 
the agency, but rather political techniques like inter- and intra- 
departmental politics (so as to avoid entanglement with other agencies), 
incentive contracts and ensuing competition between subordinates 
(see Sapolsky, 1972).
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and financial sources; b) establish authority relations among
themselves or define their role in the operations of the Supreme
Soviet organs; c) compete to formalize functional values of the
operations of the Supreme Soviet organs; and d) strengthen their own
identity by way of establishing functional power relations with
other organizations. Because the common denominator of formal
interests among participants, i.e. building communist society, is
so great, and because politics such as described above is doctrinally
unacceptable, these political activities are likely to be conducted
esoterically. Nonetheless, we would hope to throw some light on the
above mentioned aspects of politics in the course of our studies.
✓
The themes discussed above are not examined consecutively in 
the chapters that follow, but rather permeate and inform the whole 
account and analysis. In presenting our data, we focus on the 
structure and operation of the Supreme Soviet organs - the 
Presidium and Standing Commissions, and on the changes undergone 
in these in the last ten years. In this context that we shall 
seek to explore and clarify the source of institutional development 
as well as examining various organizational aspects. Some related 
subsidiary themes will also emerge in the course of our analysis.
A final section attempts to bring together the arguments presented 
in the various chapters, with a view to assessing the actual
functions and the development of institutions studied.
^ Larry B. Hill defines institutionalization as a process that 
occurs over time in which the organization creates authority 
relationships vis-a-vis the environmental factors{ see Hill, 1974, pp. 
10075-10076). In our view, identifying the political process with the 
creation of authority relationship is too narrow, i.e. it is just 
one of many aspects of the political process.
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Period studied: 1958-1972
The time limits to the period covered by the thesis were set 
on the one hand by the structural changes in the republican 
Standing Commissions which started in or around 1958 and by the 
availability of the source material (in particular the full 
biographical information for the deputies of the federal Supreme 
Soviet has appeared since 1958), and on the other by concern to 
avoid excessive overlap with studies on the membership of the 
federal and republican Supreme Soviets conducted by other scholars 
Berson and Juviler, for instance, covered the pre-1958 period in 
their studies.) As Juviler has pointed out, the few studies 
reported of research on the inner organs of the Supreme Soviet 
relate to the period 1939-1955 (see Juviler, 1960, pp.386-390).
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Sources. Biographical data on the members of the federal 
Supreme Soviet organs since the fifth convocation (1958-1970) 
have been obtained primarily from the series: Deputaty Verkhovnogo
Soveta SSSJR augmented by information available in Soviet personnel 
card-files compiled in the Department of Political Science, ANU.
The data on the selected republican Supreme Soviet organs are drawn 
primarily from the republican newspapers. Compilations similar to 
those in the Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSr series are known to 
exist for the Supreme Soviets of at least two republics (Azerbaidzhan 
and Armenia), but efforts to obtain these proved unsuccessful. The 
republican newspapers generally publish lists of candidates 
registered for the respective Supreme Soviets, and also election 
returns. These lists provide information on the posts held by 
deputies, and in some cases also their age and whether or not they 
are Party members. The tables on the composition of the republican 
Supreme Soviet membership are produced by simple head counts, since 
the information is limited to a few variables. Those on the federal 
membership, where a large number of variables are involved, have 
been produced by computer analysis (see Appendix A: list of variables).
The primary sources of information for the structure and 
operation of these organs are the Soviet central press and part­
icularly, Izvestia which is the official organ of the Presidium of 
the Supreme Soviet as well as the Council of Ministers, the 15 
principle Russian-language republic newspapers (1958-1972), the 
official gazettes Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR (1958-1972),
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Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR (1963-1972), Vedomosti Verk- 
hovnogo Soveta Estonskoi SSR (1966-1972), and Vedomosti Verkhovnogo 
Soveta i Pravitel* 1 23stva Latviiskoi SSR (1964-1972), Soviet 
scholarly and 'organizational' journals, of which the most useful 
proved to be Sovety deputatov trudyashchikhsya (available 1958- 
1972), and finally a certain number of Soviet monographs and 
informational compilations.
Plans to supplement work on printed materials by a field study 
in the Soviet Union proved not to be practicable. Interviews were 
held with three members of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR during 
a visit to Australia in 1972.
Republics selected for study. Data on the members of the
republican Presidia and Standing Commissions have been collected 
for nine republics (RSFSR, Ukraine, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, . 
Uzbekistan, Estonia, Latvia, Armenia and Georgia), the selection 
aiming at sampling not only different sizes of republic, but also 
the main regional divisions of the country and types of administrat­
ive structure in the republics. This may be illustrated as 
follows:
Republics chosen as most comparable to the federal Supreme Soviet.
(1) RSFSR
Republics with regional divisions.
(A) Europe (B) Central Asia
(2) Ukraine (4) Kazakhstan
(3) Belorussia (5) Uzbekistan
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Republics without regional divisions.
(C) Baltic area (D) Transcaucasia
(6) Estonia (8) Armenia
(7) Latvia (9) Georgia *
Note * = Georgia however has two autonomous republics and
one autonomous region (oblast).
In studying the operation of the Supreme Soviet organs, we 
have covered the newspaper reports on the activities of the RSFSR, 
Belorussian,Kazakhstan, Estonian, and Latvian Presidia and Standing 
Commissions since 1958, and in addition those of all republics for 
the period of the 7th convocation (1967-1971). It should be noted 
again that public reports on the activities of these organs in 
the pre-1966 period in the republics studied were extremely in­
frequent. Ideally, empirical studies of all 15 republican Supreme 
Soviet Presidia and Standing Commissions would have been preferable. 
This proved impracticable for two reasons: the limits of the
research period; and the risk of having one's material made obsolete 
in a short time. It is hoped that the general findings that have 
emerged have been sufficient to permit certain generalizations 
based on these republics.
Transliteration of Russian words follows the style used by 
the Current Digest of the Soviet Press. Throughout the thesis, the 
adjective "federal"is used to cover "All Union", and also "republican" 
is used for the "Union Republican" level of administration. "ASSR"
is used for the autonomous republics.
P A R T I
RECENT STRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENTS AND 
THEIR HISTORICAL ANTECEDANTS
Our major object in this part is to record recent structural 
changes undergone in the Supreme Soviet organs. We will first 
explore the nature and standing of the pre-1936 Congress of Soviets, 
and then recent developments in the activities of comparable East 
European Assemblies, both of which may have relevance to the changes 
that have occurred in the Supreme Soviet and to our examination 
of the structure and processes of the Supreme Soviet organs.
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CHAPTER 2
FROM CONGRESS OF SOVIETS TO SUPREME SOVIET 
The Supreme Soviet constitutes a structural cross between the pre- 
1936 Congress of Soviets and its Central Executive Committee.
Some account of its predecessors, therefore, may be of value for 
our present purposes. It should also be pertinent to note the 
process of evolution and decline of these bodies between 1917 and 
1936 and also between 1937 and 1957, for this exhibits familiar 
problems of institutionalization. We have relied, however, exten­
sively on some secondary source for this section.
In 1917, the Soviet structure comprised the three levels of
(1) the All-Russian Congress and the Central Executive Committee 
at the top,
(2) city and district soviets, with their executive committees, in 
the middle, and
(3) factory, army, and other vocational bodies at the bottom.
The first Congress of Soviets was composed of representatives
of city and district soviets. This first 'All-Russian Congress of 
Soviets' was held in June 1917 in Petrograd, while the Provisional 
Government was still in power, and while Bolsheviks were in a 
small minority in the Congress (105 out of 777) . The Congress 
elected the members of the Central Executive Committee which exer­
cised all powers of Congress when it was not in session, that is, 
the Central Executive Committee was entrusted with the task of 
legislative, administrative and supervising activities in the periods 
between the meetings of the Congress of Soviets. The second Congress 
of Soviets coincided with the Bolshvik seizure of power in
October 1917. On 15 November, 1917, the Central Executive Committee
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adopted a project that provided for,
(1) "large" and "small" sessions of the Central Executive Committee, 
the latter to be held when one quarter of the members were 
present, though the former alone was to be considered a super­
vising and directing organ,
(2) a Presidium, which was to be a "representative as well as 
executive organ", and
(3) 11 Commissions or "working organs of the Central Executive 
Committee , with fields of activity not dissimilar to some of 
the Commissariats, such Commissions to account weekly to the 
Presidium and to be subject to the veto of the latter (see 
Towster, 1948, p.225, footnote 82).
These and subsequent changes in the structure and activities 
of the Central Executive Committee thus reflected the fact that they 
were now part of a new system of state power. Since the Constitu­
tion of 1918 did not offer a description of the Presidium's struct­
ure, functions and prerogatives, much of these were to be formulated 
on the basis of experience. The Council of People's Commissars 
(Sovnarkom) which was approved by the second Congress of Soviets 
and which was exclusively Bolshevik in composition was to concern 
itself with the general administration of the affairs of the 
country, but also extended to the issuing of "decrees, orders and 
instructions" .
Already in this early period (1917-1922), the nature and 
standing of the Congress and the Central Executive Committee changed 
rapidly. The Congress of Soviets held four sessions before the 
adoption of the first Soviet Constitution (the Constitution of 
RSFSR adopted on 10 July, 1918). Five more Congresses were called
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between that date and 30 December, 1922, when the USSR was formed 
and the second Constitution was introduced. The debates at 
sessions of the Congress were often characterised by sharp clashes 
up to the end of 1919, when there were members of other socialists 
parties present. It might perhaps not be going too far to compare 
its performance at this period to a British type parliament, with 
the big difference that the opposition could not comport itself as 
an "alternative government". Since then, as the Bolsheviks 
increased their majority in the Congress, the debates became muted 
and the frequency of its session fell off. Much of its power was 
in effect already exercised by the Central Executive Committee and 
its Presidium. At the fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets in 
July 1918, Sverdlov even said that the Central Executive Committee, 
being the "supreme organ of state power between the sessions of the 
Congress", could not only repeal but override decrees of the 
Congress (see Carr, 1966 - Penguin edition, p.156).
At the time the Bolsheviks were fighting for the dissolution 
of the Constituent Assembly significant power had been vested in 
the Central Executive Committee and also local executive committees 
of the soviets. Senior Bolsheviks were nearly all assigned to key 
posts in the hierarchy of executive committees of the soviets. As 
Bolshevik power came to be exercised almost exclusively through the 
soviet apparatus, the local Party committee was reduced almost to 
the status of a propaganda department of the soviet executive 
committee (see Rigby, 1964b, p.546). There appeared to be two major 
reasons for this. The chairman of the Central Executive Committee 
of the Congress, Yakov Sverdlov, who was also then the executive 
secretary of the Central Committee of the Party, was an extremely
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energetic and capable organizer who had rich and varied experience 
in the underground revolutionary days (see Fainsod, 1962, p.178).
As the civil war developed, Sverdlov avoided his lines of command 
and found it more convenient to channel nearly all matters through 
the large, centralized and better staffed soviet apparatus (see 
Rigby, 1964b, p.546). The second factor for this was the financial 
dependence of the local Party bodies upon the soviet executive 
committees which made difficult the Party committees' task of super­
vising the work of the executive committees (see Schapiro, 1960, 
p.243). This situation created some concern in the Party, and 
when Sverdlov died suddenly in March 1919, the Bolshevik leaders 
set out to strengthen the Party apparatus both at the centre and 
locally. The Party hierarchy increasingly supplanted the executive 
committees of soviets as the leadership's principal chain of 
command, through which it came to co-ordinate the administration 
of the whole country.
The Central Executive Committee in its earlier existence 
assumed executive government functions. One reason for this was the 
lack of a clear definition concerning its duties and its relations to the 
Party apparatus and the Council of People's Commissars, which at 
the time had no effective local apparatus of its own. The other 
reasons included the conditions of the civil war, and the existence 
of well-structured apparatus directed by an able senior Bolshevik, 
Sverdlov. At the same time, it should be noted that the early 
importance of the Central Executive Committee vis-a-vis the govern­
ment was in line with widespread views on the proper relationship 
of these bodies in the Soviet regime. After the death of Sverdlov 
in March 1919, the civil war intensified, resulting in a drive for
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centralised authority, which multiplied the number of enactments, 
and increased the need for prompt decision and action, and so worked 
forcefully in favour of the small executive body - the Council of 
People's Commissars which was headed by Lenin until January 1924.
A further reason for the decline of the soviet apparatus (and its 
"apex" the Central Executive Committee and its Presidium) during the 
civil war was the importance of such "extraordinary" bodies as the 
Cheka and the central and local Military Revolutionary Committees, 
as well as the rapid emergence of the Party apparatus.
The seventh All-Russian Congress in December 1919, adopted a 
constitutional amendment by which the Presidium of the Central 
Executive Committee acquired specific functions, including the right 
to ratify the decisions of the Sovnarkom as well as to suspend the 
execution of such decisions in the intervals between the sessions of 
the Central Executive Committee. At the eighth Congress, the further 
right was conferred on the Presidium to annul resolutions of the 
Sovnarkom and to issue through administrative channels necessary regu­
lations in the name of the Central Executive Committee. While these 
innovations weakened the Central Executive Committee by giving its 
Presidium powers to act on its behalf, they also underline the 
recognition of the increased executive and legislative powers of the 
Sovnarkom. Despite repeated protests in and from the Central Exec­
utive Committee against the growing authority of the Sovnarkom, the 
provision in the 1918 Constitution that "a measure of extreme urgency 
may be put into force on the sole authority of the Sovnarkom" helped 
the latter, in a period of civil war and national emergency to elude 
the unwieldly supervision of the Central Executive Committee.
Indeed, at first, the powers of the Presidium were more formal than
53
real, whereas the powers of the Sovnarkom were real. When the Central 
Committee of the Party thwarted efforts of the Presidium of the 
Central Executive Committee to set up the Workers' and Peasants' 
Inspection as a department of the Central Executive Committee rather 
than as a Commissariat of the Sovnarkom, several members of the 
Presidium of the Central Executive Committee complained loudly that 
this was intervention and constituted a curtailment of the scope of 
work of the Presidium, contrary to the decision of the seventh 
Congress (see S 'ezdy Sovetov RSFSR, p.176).
In a report at the ninth Party Congress on 29 March, 1920, the 
Central Committee stated that "when a given decision of the Sovnarkom 
must be annuled or suspended, the Central Committee does it through 
the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee. Therein lies the 
fundamental aim of this right of confirmation and suspension, and not 
in any independent power of decree concerning decisions of the 
Sovnarkom given by the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee 
at the seventh Congress" (see Protokoly IX S 'ezda RKP (b) , 
pp. 45-47). The frank statement that the significance of the 
Presidium of the Central Executive Committee lay in its use by the 
Party as an instrument of legitimation of Party control over the 
government should not lightly be dismissed. For our present purpose and 
for a student of contemporary Soviet institutions in general, the 
Party's attitude taken in this period towards this particular state 
organ is extremely significant.
Thus, during the civil war, the frequency of the sessions of the 
Central Executive Committee became progressively less, and many of its 
powers fell away to its Presidium and subsequently to the Sovnarkom.
However, when the civil war was over, the Congress of Soviets and the
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C e n t r a l  E x e c u tiv e  C om m ittee made e f f o r t s  t o  f i n d  a p l a c e  o f  t h e i r  own
i n  th e  sy s te m  by s t r e n g th e n i n g  t h e  P r e s id iu m 's  s t a n d in g .  A r e s o l u t i o n
was p a s s e d  by  th e  C e n t r a l  E x e c u tiv e  C om m ittee on 31 May, 1921 , and  a
d e c re e  was a d o p te d  by i t s  P re s id iu m  a s  an o rg a n  f o r  c o n s ta n t  c o n ta c t
w i t h ,  and  g u id a n c e  o f ,  t h e  l o c a l  e x e c u t iv e  c o m m itte e s . T hese
r e s o l u t i o n s  e m p h a s ize d  t h a t  t h e  P re s id iu m  was t o  u t i l i z e  m em bers o f
th e  C e n t r a l  E x e c u tiv e  C o m m ittee , as  w e l l  as  o f  t h e  k o l l e g i i  o f  t h e
c e n t r a l  c o m m is s a r ia ts ,  f o r  t h e  p u rp o s e  o f  i n s t r u c t i n g  t h e  l o c a l
e x e c u t iv e  c o m m itte e s . S e c o n d ly , t h e  n i n t h  C o n g ress  o f  S o v ie t s  i n
D ecem ber 1921 , p ro v id e d  t h a t  th e  d e p a r tm e n ts  o f  th e  C e n t r a l  E x e c u tiv e
C om m ittee  s h o u ld  b e  h e a d e d  by  m em bers o f  t h e  P r e s id iu m . I n  a d d i t i o n
t o  t h e s e  i n n o v a t io n s ,  th e  members o f  th e  P re s id iu m  s e t  up a s m a l l
c h a n c e l l e r y ,  w h ich  c o n s i s t e d  o f  f i v e  t o  s i x  e x p e r t  members so  a s  t o
r e n d e r  a s s i s t a n c e  i n  s o lv in g  some o f  th e  p ro b le m s  a r i s e n  from  th e
in c r e a s e d  f u n c t io n s  o f  t h e  Sovnarkom .^  S in c e  t h e n ,  t h e  P re s id iu m  h ad
i n c r e a s e d  i t s  a c t i v i t i e s .  I n  th e  se c o n d  h a l f  o f  1921 , t h e  P re s id iu m
h e l d  62 s e s s i o n s ,  t h r e e  t im e s  m ore th a n  i n  th e  f i r s t  h a l f  o f  1921 .
I n  t h e  f i r s t  h a l f  o f  1922 , th e  P re s id iu m  re d u c e d  i t s  m e e tin g s  t o  30
w h ere  th e y  d i s c u s s e d  639 q u e s t i o n s ,  o n e - t h i r d  o f  w h ich  r e l a t e d  t o  th e
im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  th e  New E conom ic P o l i c y .  I n  th e  se c o n d  h a l f  o f
1922 , th e  P re s id iu m  s l i g h t l y  i n c r e a s e d  th e  num ber o f  m e e tin g s  t o  35 ,
2
and  ex am in ed  834 q u e s t i o n s .  A lth o u g h  3.3% o f  t h e  834 q u e s t io n s  
o r i g i n a t e d  i n  t h e  P r e s id iu m , t h e  f a c t  i s  t h a t  th e  g o v e rn m en t b o d ie s
^ U n t i l  m id -1 9 2 1 , t h e r e  was no s e c r e t a r i a t  o r  c h a n c e l le r y  a t t a c h e d  
t o  th e  P r e s id iu m . (T here  was th o u g h  i n  th e  w eeks f o l lo w in g  th e  
O c to b e r  1917 r e v o l u t i o n ) .
2
Of 834 q u e s t i o n s ,  136 w ere  c o n c e rn e d  w i th  f in a n c e  and  t a x a t i o n ;  87 -  
p ro b le m s  o f  l o c a l  s o v i e t  s t r u c t u r e ;  58 -  a g r i c u l t u r e ;  48 -  i n d u s t r y  and  
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n ;  46 -  a r b i t r a t i o n  p ro b le m s ; 26 -  communal econom y; and  
176 q u e s t io n s  o f  c i t i z e n s h i p  ( se e  P i e t s c h ,  1969 , p .1 3 0 )..
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referred the problems relating to the administration to the Presidium 
to be examined.'*' For this purpose, the Presidium set up Commissions, 
the number of which was 14 in 1921 and 25 in May 1922, and further 
increased to 31 in the second half of 1922. These Commissions con­
sisted of members of the Central Executive Committee or its Presidium, 
together with experts from the corresponding Commissariats and 
Departments. Officials of the Sovnarkom and the members of the 
kollegii of the individual Commissariats generally participated in 
the work of the Commissions (see Pietsch, 1969, p.131). The above 
illustrations are indicative of increased activities of the Presidium, 
although they are not necessarily indicative of increased influence 
upon the activities of the Sovnarkom. Nevertheless, the Presidium 
acquired powers to deal with problems resulting from the relations 
between the central Commissariats and the provincial and district exec­
utive committees, and from the Party's policy to use it as an instru­
ment of legitimation of Party control. Another reason for the 
"resuscitation" of the Central Executive Committee and Presidium in 
1921-1922 was the concern to re-establish constitutional legitimacy at 
the end of the civil war, which expressed itself in a drive to curb 
the "extraordinary organs" and "revive" the soviets. Towster argues 
that "the Presidium came to be looked upon as one of the best sources 
of information on local sentiment and as best suited for the role of 
judge and adjuster between the local and central Soviet organs. And
See Pietsch,1969,pp. 130-1. He also stated that 26.3% of the 834 
questions were originated in the Internal Affairs Commissariat; 9.1% 
in the Sovnarkom; 7.7% in the executive committees of soviets; 5.5% 
in the Central Executive Committee: 4.8% in the Commissions of the 
Presidium; 3.3% in the Presidium itself; 3.3% in the Commissariat for 
Nationality guestions; and 3.0% in the Finance commissariat (see 
Pietsch, 1969, p.130).
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this conception resulted in the vesting of supervising directive, 
judicial, and pardoning powers in the Presidium" (see Towster, 1948, 
p.224). On the other hand, one could argue in perspective that the 
Presidium had played a role in mediating the centre and the local­
ities, but by doing so it was essentially assisting the centralization 
(see Durdenevsky, 1922, pp.48-50).
As under the 1918 Constitution, the first Union Constitution of 
1924 conferred legislative power upon both the representative and 
executive branches of government: the Congress of Soviets, the Central
Executive Committee, the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee 
and the Sovnarkom. A special feature of the 1924 Constitution was 
the changed structure of the Central Executive Committee. It now 
became a bicameral organ, consisting of a Soviet of the Union, 
designed to represent the general interests of all nationalities of 
the USSR and a Soviet of Nationalities, whose function was to repre­
sent specific interests of the various nationalities. Each Chamber 
had its own Presidium which arranged the agenda for its sittings and 
dealt with current matters between the sessions. In the intervals 
between sessions of the Central Executive Committee, its Presidium, 
which included representatives of both Chambers, exercised the auth­
ority vested in the Central Executive Committee.
Throughout the succeeding period (up to 1936), both the Congress 
and the Central Executive Committee increased their numbers, while the 
length and frequency of their sessions decreased. The number of 
agenda items also fell (these were devoted exclusively to domestic 
policy though until 1929 reports and communications dealing with 
foreign policy were also made at the sessions). Like the Congress, the 
Central Executive Committee made use of only a fraction of its powers.
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As for the Presidium, it is difficult to assess, in the absence of 
detailed research, the exact role it played during this period. It 
remained significant during the middle 1920's, but subsequently 
much of the power previously acquired quietly faded away to either 
the Party apparatus or government bodies. For example, in the 
matter of requests to annul decisions of the federal organs on grounds 
other than constitutionality, the Central Executive Committees of the 
constituent republics and their Presidia had a right to appeal to 
the federal Presidium against decrees of the federal Council of 
People's Commissars (Article 42, 1924 Constitution). For a time the 
constituent republics, especially the Ukraine, made very extensive 
use of these appeal rights, seeking their implementation through the 
medium of the federal Presidium. At the session of the Central 
Executive Committee on 19 April, 1928, however, the Article was 
amended to prevent the constituent republics from exercising the right 
on the ground that it caused disharmony and delays in the execution 
of federal decisions (see Towster, 1948, p.248, footnote 16). During 
this period, the Presidium tended to concentrate more and more on 
such matters as the preparation and conduct of the Central Executive 
Committee sessions, the representation of the Central Executive 
Committee in the interim between sessions and the management of its 
Commissions and Committees, the exercise of the pardoning and amnesty 
powers, and the award of orders. The Presidium became, however, 
involved with the work of local soviets. The federal Constitution 
of 1924 did not stipulate the system of the local bodies, although 
some of the republican constitutions^ dealt with this question.
^ E.g. Ukrainian, RSFSR, Turkmenian, Belorussian and Uzbek Constitu­
tions.
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During the period from 1924 till 1930, the Presidium promulgated a 
number of decrees on the organizational problems and matters of 
competence of the local soviets.^
As for the Commissions of the Central Executive Committee, again, 
it is difficult to assess the exact role played by them during this 
period in the absence of detailed research. In the situation where 
the power of the Central Executive Committee was declining, the 
services of the Commissions may have mainly been required by the 
Presidium rather than the Central Executive Committee. During the 
period between 1924 and 1930, it can be said that as the Sovnarkom 
further consolidated its power and the Party apparatus developed 
as the supervising and co-ordinating body over the activities of the 
former, the Central Executive Committee and its Presidium (gradually 
in the case of the latter) lost their significant role in executing 
government functions. One factor in this period was that the chair­
man of the Sovnarkom, Rykov, was not a Stalin stooge, whereas the 
chairman of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee, Kalinin, 
became such a stooge. Therefore, there was advantage to Stalin in 
building up the Presidium as a counterweight to the Sovnarkom. 
However, this did not seem to have happened.
The Constitution of 1936 not only introduced a uniform organi­
zational pattern in the construction of the system of soviets as a 
whole but also prescribed functional differentiation to the soviet 
organs operating on the same level, by dividing state bodies into 
four categories - the organs of state power (central and local),
 ^E.G. decrees on the municipal soviets on February 8, 1928 and 
on the communal soviets on February 3, 1930.
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administrative organs (central and local), the judiciary, and the 
procurators' office, each group having its own hierarchial structure. 
The Constitution also defined the competences of these four groups 
of organs. For instance, it conferred the right of legislation 
exclusively upon the supreme organ of state power, i.e. the Supreme 
Soviet, while earlier the legislative functions had been exercised by, 
as it were, the entire central organisation. Article 14 of the 1936 
federal Constitution enumerated indeed the competences of the Supreme 
Soviet. However, it should be noted that a delimitation of the 
competences of the Supreme Soviet in relation to its Presidium and the 
Council of Ministers, or government departments is far from being 
perfect. Otto Bihari argues the problems of delimitation as follows: 
When in the Constitution this organ (Supreme Soviet) assigns 
authority to other organs, it in fact restricts its own 
scope of authority. It may proceed along this path when by 
a legislative act it assigns further competences to organs 
of other types, to the administrative organs, to the judic­
iary, or to the procurators' offices. The supreme organ 
may even withdraw these rights, restrict or extend their 
scope at will. The problem is that practically often the 
line of demarcation between the supreme representative organ 
and the government - the supreme organ of public administration 
- becomes blurred. We can hardly pronounce of a specific 
function with absolute certainty that it comes within a 
purely representative, or purely administrative scope, and 
there is very little hope that such a theoretical delimitation 
could be carried through in the future. (Bihari, 1970, p.92-94).
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What Bihari is saying here is that the functions to be performed by 
the Supreme Soviet, or the Council of Ministers, or by the both 
organs together will have to be defined separately depending on the 
question at issue.
Under the 1936 federal Constitution and the subsequent republican 
constitutions, each of the Supreme Soviets has two major organs —  
the CHAMBER (two Chambers in the case of the federal Supreme Soviet) 
and the PRESIDIUM, and auxiliary organs —  STANDING COMMISSIONS.
In Soviet constitutional law, the Presidium of the Supreme 
Soviet is specifically considered a collegiate president (see Shlifer, 
1938, p .37; and Vyshinsky, 1948, p.330). According to the federal 
and republican constitutions, the Presidium is also accountable to 
the Supreme Soviet for all its activities. In many of its actions it 
is supposed to be deputizing for the Supreme Soviet in the intervals 
between the sessions of the latter: the Presidium acts generally
as "theoretical head of state".
The activities of the Standing Commissions during this period 
(1936-1955) received, like those of the Presidium, little publicity 
in the national press. The Supreme Soviet had generally four 
Standing Commissions: Credentials; Legislative Proposals; Budget;
and Foreign Affairs Commissions."*' The Chairmen of the federal and 
republican Credentials Commissions always reported on the deputies 
elected at the first session of their Supreme Soviet following the 
elections. However, no activities between the elections were reported 
in the national press. As far as we know about the remaining three
1 As of 1955, however, 8 republics (Armenia, Azerbaidzhan, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Kirgizia and Moldavia) still 
lacked a Foreign Affairs Commission.
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types of Standing Commissions, it appears that their operations 
had been nominal during this period. The federal Legislative Proposals 
Commissions amended only three draft laws (see Juviler, I960, p.392). 
The federal Supreme Soviet adopted, however, on 25 February, 1947 
regulations defining the rights and duties of the Legislative 
Proposals Commissions (see Izv. , 26.2.47).''" The role of the federal 
Budget Commissions in formulating or scrutinizing the federal budget 
seems to have been insignificant, judging from the fragmentary evid­
ence on their meetings and deliberations. This appears to be true 
also in the case of republican Budget Commissions (see Berson, 1962, 
p.32). Nevertheless, the federal Budget Commissions of both Chambers
did practise the setting up of sub-commissions for the examination
2of the annual budget. On the Foreign Affairs Commissions there is 
virtually no information as to their actual functioning.
On the whole, the Supreme Soviet institutions were relatively 
active before the war, lapsed during the war, and then after a brief 
post-war gesture at revival, subsided into a fairly formal role until 
after Stalin's death. Table 1 indicates clearly the marked changes 
occuring within the period between 1938 and 1957.
TABLE 1
NUMBER OF SESSIONS OF THE CHAMBERS OF 
THE FEDERAL SUPREME SOVIET
No. of Meetings Meetings Joint 
sessions of the Sov.of the Sov.meetings 
of the Union of Nat, of the
Chambers
1st convoc.(1938-1945) 12 38 37 31
2nd convoc.(1946-1949) 5 20 20 7
3rd convoc. (1950-1953) 5 15 15 8
4 th convoc. (1954-1957) 9 26 27 26
source: see Gaidukov (1969), p .70
Some of the republican Commissions for Legislative Proposals such as 
Latvia have introduced similar regulations as that of the federal Comm­
issions for Legislative Proposals in the following years. See,e.g. 
Postanovlenie Verkhovnogo Soveta Latviiskoi SSR, 12 April, 1949 in 
W S  Lat., No.40, 1949.
2 In 1939, each Budget Commission sets up 10 sub-commissions, each
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Concluding remarks
It is remarkable to observe how during the formative "nation­
building" period of government functions shifted from one channel to 
another while operational authority was first delegated from the 
centre to the provinces and then recentralized. Since the NEP was 
liquidated, and since the era of five-year plans began, industrial­
ization and militarization directed by Stalin had gradually trans­
formed the existing Soviet regime into the regime of totalitarian 
features (see Fainsod, 1962, p.109). The Central Executive Committee 
and its Presidium in later 1920's and 1930's, and the Supreme Soviet 
and its organs played no vital role except perhaps legitimizing 
role of the regime's existence. But the publicity even for the 
latter purpose, remained insubstantial. The Supreme Soviet and its 
organs became thus nominal and moribund institution. Throughout 
the period examined, the fate of these institutions evidently 
depended largely on the situation in which it had to operate under 
different leaderships.
2 cont.
consisting 5 to 7 members. In 1940, the number of the sub­
commission increased to 12. See Vasil'ev, A., 1940, p.47.
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CHAPTER 3
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLIES
Any attempt at a comprehensive enquiry here based on original
sources would be beyond the scope of this study. Instead, we are
relying on the secondary literature."1'
After the Second World War, the East European countries acquired
the status of "people's democracies", being subjected to the political
and ideological domination to the Soviet Union and its Communist Party.
In contrast to the Soviet system, the people's democracies maintained
a number of political parties as arms of the regimes and in "alliance"
2with the Communist Parties. By adopting the Soviet Constitution of 
1936 as their model (see Bihari, 1970, p.70; and Kase, 1968, p.83), 
the East European countries set up nominally supreme but actually 
feeble assemblies. The assemblies appeared simply as the rubber 
stamp of the ruling Communist Parties and this situation persisted 
for many years. Then, from the 1950's onwards more and more East 
European countries began to form organizations departing from the 
Soviet model.
The articles and books written by the following authors have been 
found of particular value: 0. Bihari; A.H. Brown; V.C. Chrypinski;
J.C. Lowenstein; W.M. Fisk; A. Makhnenko; and E. Taborsky (see 
bibliography for publication details).
2 F.G. Kase stated that "by this method the communists forced all 
legitimate forces in the people's democracies to accept political 
responsibility for certain far-reaching political and economic 
decisions. Political parties and their leaders who participated 
in such decisions were compromised by their collaboration with the 
communists and thus became even more dependent on them. At the same 
time, the inclusion of other political parties in various people's 
fronts facilitated the communist penetration of such strata of the 
population which otherwise were difficult to reach." (See Kase, 1968, 
p.96) .
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The Polish regime has sought in a series of measures to reassure 
the people that the Parliament - the Sejm - is a guardian of their 
interests. The development of the Sejm started soon after the death 
of Stalin in 1953 and culminated in Poland in the "October Revolt" 
of 1956. When Gomulka came to hold the reins of government in 1956, 
the Sejm increased the number of its Commissions to 19 (there were 
7 Commissions in 1952 and 11 in 1955) , and adopted regulations on the 
Commissions (see Makhnenko, 1963, p.107). Gomulka then proposed the 
creation of a small number of deputies who, taking unpaid holiday 
from their jobs, would be able to devote themselves entirely to 
parliamentary activities. They were to be compensated by a monthly 
salary. The Communist Party which evidently monopolized the selection 
of full-time deputies, is said to have started with thirty four in 
1961, but later reduced the number to twenty-one. Each Commission 
has at least one full-time deputy who generally chairs the Commission 
(see Chrypinski, 1965, p.20). The creation of the full-time deputies 
is contrary to the concept of a "working" institution, whose entire 
membership should be constituted of members of other organizations.
It was, however, a compromise since the group of full-time deputies 
consists of only 8 per cent of the total deputies elected, who could 
then devote themselves entirely to the work resulting from the 
increased activities of the Sejm.
In Yugoslavia, where the "workers' self-management" system was 
introduced in 1950, the processes of liberalization and decentralization 
have gradually began to affect significantly not only the work of the 
Federal Assembly, but also of the six National and two Provincial 
Assemblies in the country. This development was reflected in the 1963 
constitutional scheme for the Federal Assembly, and the April 1967 and
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December 1968 amendments. The new Standing Rules of the Yugoslav 
Federal Assembly passed on 25 June, 1970, for instance, provide greater 
freedom and independence for deputies in all five chambers of the 
Assembly. They are empowered to demand a vote of confidence in the 
government if they believe that the latter is not capable of solving 
the country's problems. On the other hand, the Prime Minister, as 
well as individual members of the government, may resign if he does 
not agree with the decisions of the Assembly. These Standing Rules 
seem to be based on the theory of dual responsibility formulated by 
Kardelj (former President of the Federal Assembly), according to 
which Communists should be responsible to the Yugoslav League of 
Communists in one capacity, but if and when acting an an administra­
tive capacity, or within a state organ, they should be responsible 
to those who elected them. This theory thus reasserts the independ­
ence of the organs of state and society. The representatives of the 
people have a responsibility of their own. This can even lead to 
revocation of mandates, both of the deputies, and of the governments 
themselves (see RFER, 22.4.70 and 29.7.70). There have been instances 
where a republic government has resigned or been defeated as a result 
of the deputies' pressures.’*’
In Hungary, it appears that a measure of political reform, i.e.
In December 1966, the government of Slovenia was the first to 
resign after the Social-Health Chamber of the Slovenian National 
Assembly rejected a draft law proposed by the Slovenian government 
(see RFER, 17.5.70). Another recent instance involved a little 
known deputy's success in Yugoslavia's politically most powerful 
parliamentary chamber, the Council of Nationalities, in the face 
of the central government's adamant opposition. (see RFER, 
31.5.72).
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an "expansion of socialist democracy" has gained acceptance as an
2organic part of the "New Economic Mechanism." Though the reforms 
so far carried out in the National Assembly remain quite modest, they 
nevertheless seem pertinent to our topic. The National Assembly 
has three organs - the House (unicameral), the Presidential Council, 
and the Standing Commissions. The improvement so far noticeable in 
the Assembly's work has not impinged upon the plenary sittings of 
the House. Instead, such efforts have been concentrated in the 
Standing Commissions of the National Assembly. The Standing Commissions 
now meet much more frequently than the Assembly (the latter holds 
generally four sessions a year, i.e. 10 - 14 workdays a year), and 
they are given drafts of legislation proposed by the government well 
beforehand.
On 11 July, 1960, the Czechoslovak National Assembly approved a 
new socialist constitution replacing the previous people's democratic 
constitution of 1948. In the new constitution, while the Communist 
Party was given official status as the "vanguard of the working class"
"Socialist democracy" means here, first of all, a greater role for
elected bodies -- the Party, the National Assembly, local councils,
and trade unions --  in the decision-making process and in the super­
vision of their executive and administrative organs. Among the 
elected bodies listed the Party has taken by far the most significant 
steps, for instance, the preservation of the collegiality of Party 
leadership and the promotion of the growing influence of the ordinary 
members in Party affairs. Secondly, it means further decentraliza­
tion of authority in general, and further transfer of the competence 
to decide matters at a proper level, i.e. among those whose interests 
are primarily affected and whose knowledge of the situation is great­
est. Finally, it entails the right and ability of the various inter­
est groups in society to be heard and to influence the course of 
legislation. This is to be accomplished, however, by creating a 
system of relatively equal opportunities within which they may function 
without any one becoming dominant.
2 This New Economic Mechanism, which contained a considerable degree 
of liberal aspects, had been drafted and formally enacted on 1st 
January, 1968. Its significance lies in the fact that it accompanied 
or will be accompanied by social, political and judicial reforms which 
are the corollary of the NEM reform.
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and the "leading force in society and the state", a plurality of 
political parties in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic was 
preserved, at least for the time being (see its Article 6). Prior 
to January 1968, however, the National Assembly came close to 
moribund institution. In the post-January period, particularly 
following the appointment of Josef Smrkovsky as chairman of its 
Presidium, the National Assembly became active institution where 
the governments proposals were rigorously scrutinised. Since the 
Soviet intervention, however, the National Assembly has once again 
been playing a more subordinate role (see Brown, 1972).
Having glanced at the activities of the some East European 
assemblies,we now extend our observations to the operations of the 
presidia or presidential councils and of the committees of the 
assemblies.
The functions of the presidia or presidential councils of the 
East European assemblies appear to be overwhelmingly of an advisory 
nature. In conformity with the standing orders, the presidia organize 
the activities of the assemblies. The Presidium of the Czechoslovak 
National Assembly, on the other hand, was conferred three functions 
under its 1960 Constitution: first, a presidential function; secondly, 
it organizes, co-ordinates, and ensures the operations of the National 
Assembly and its committees; and thirdly, during the period when the 
National Assembly is not sitting, it exercises the functions of the 
latter (see Bihari, 1970, p. 94).These formal functions were strik­
ingly similar to those vested in the Central Executive Committee of 
the All-Russian Congress of Soviet (see Chapter VII of the 1918 
Constitution) and the Presidium of the federal Supreme Soviet under
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the 1936 Constitution. The presidia or presidential council in other 
East European countries appear to perform/ in practice, similar functions 
to those of the Czechoslovak Presidium. The Hungarian case may be 
worth somewhat closer examination. In recent years in Hungary, most 
legislation has been processed by the Presidential Council acting 
as the working organ of the National Assembly between its plenary 
sessions. In exercising the functions of the National Assembly, the 
Presidential Council has at times passed "decree-laws" which have 
the force but not the form of normal laws. The "decree-laws" have 
to be presented for approval to the next session of the National 
Assembly and this is duly done at the beginning of each session of 
the Assembly; this has never amounted to more than a mere rubber- 
stamping, however. The excessive legislative activities of the 
Presidential Council has opened up two main lines of criticism. The 
first is that, since most of its members have full-time jobs the 
work of the Presidential Council is presumably carried out by the 
various organs of the Council of Ministers, the chief offices of 
government, and the staff of the Presidential Council itself. The 
second criticism is that there has been no sign of the Assembly's 
Standing Commissions over having discussed the drafts of the "decree- 
lav/s". A Hungarian constitutional scholar, Gyorgy Antalffy, stated 
that the Presidential Council's exercise of its power to legislate 
by "decree-laws" will be watched much more closely than in the p§LSt 
by the Standing Commissions of the Assembly. Antalffy said that it 
would be perfectly feasible for the Presidential Council to ask in 
advance for the opinions of these Commissions before promulgating 
"decree-laws" (see Radio Budapest, 25.4.72, as reported in RFER,
28.7.72). It remains to be seen, however, whether the Standing
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Commissions will succeed in assuming this power. In the case of 
Hungary, against this background, the emphasis is now being placed 
on the sessions of the House and on their exercise of greater control 
over executive bodies and the appointed administrative apparatus. 
During 1966, the law was altered to create single-member constit­
uencies for National Assembly elections and allow the possibility of 
multiple candidates in each such district. In 1970, the Central 
Committee plenum adopted also a resolution calling for an improvement 
in the electoral mechanism so that all candidates might campaign on 
an equal basis. The purpose of these changes was not only to stimu­
late greater popular interest and participation in national affairs, 
but also to form closer links between the individual deputy and his 
constituents, so that the deputy would be forced to listen more 
attentively to their views and complaints. It was also construed as 
an opportunity to raise the standard and level of the National 
Assembly by electing more suitable and expert people, even if every­
one was obliged to support one and the same programme (see Magyar 
Hirlap, 4.7.70, as quoted in PFER, 3.8.70). Unfortunately the 1967 
and 1970 elections fell far short of these expectations (see PFER, 
3.8.70). Apart from the changes introduced into the electoral 
machanism, modest improvement is nevertheless noticeable in the 
activities of the National Assembly. It has only been since mid-1967 
that the Prime Minister, the President of the Supreme Court, the 
Supreme Prosecutor, and other top state officials have been giving 
detailed reports of their activities to the National Assembly, an 
indication that its supervising role has been given at least pro 
forma acknowledgement (see PFER, 18.7.67; 5.4.68; and 3.7.70). On the
Legislative side, Gyula Kallai, while he was a Politburo member as
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well as the Speaker of the National Assembly, promoted in statements 
in April 1967 and May 1971 his old idea on one area of the Assembly's
responsibility --  the suppression of obsolete laws (see Nepszabadsag,
21.4.63 as quoted in KFER, 28.7.72). As a result, during his term 
of office, the National Assembly enacted a few important laws which 
modernized legislation in a number of important sectors. Until 1968 
approval of the implementation of the budget by a "decree-law" of 
the Presidential Council was the normal rule, but since July of that 
year it has been the National Assembly's prerogative. The revised 
Constitution of 1972 has now recognized this as established practice 
(see KFER, 22.12.69; 28.7.72). The rules of procedure adopted in 
April 1968 allowed the deputies to vote on draft bills by the para­
graph instead of in toto, but resulted so far in only one negative 
vote on a legislative item (see Neps z ab ads ag, 13.12.69 as quoted in 
RFER, 27.7.70). It is possible, however, that there is more criticism 
on the floor of the House, as well as in the corridors during 
recesses, and in the Standing Commissions, than one is able to notice, 
for one of the recent complaints about the work of the National 
Assembly is the lack of sufficient publicity, especially with respect 
to the debates and discussions which follow the various reports and 
questions, and the presentation of draft legislation (Robinson, 1970, 
p.71) .
The two Houses of the federal Supreme Soviet had a relatively 
small number of commissions at least until 1966. The East European 
people's assemblies, on the other hand, have had a number of commi­
ssions since the early 1960's. Many of these commissions are formed 
in line with the actual principal division of state administration.
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But some assemblies such as the Polish Sejm formed, together with 
the commissions based on government departmental divisions, commi­
ssions of an interdepartmental character. For example, the Commi­
ssions for Agriculture and Industry, for Labor and Welfare, and for 
Public Health and Physical Training set up by the Polish Sejm would 
be able to concern themselves with the problems of related but 
separate branches of state administration.
Most of the standing orders of the assemblies on commissions 
specify the role of drafting legislation, the supervisory and invest­
igatory rights of the commissions, and the organization of discussions 
by them in the presence of experts. The commissions have no independ­
ent competence, for they are corporate organs subordinate to the 
assemblies.
It is said that the commissions' work has grown extensively in 
the People's Republic of Poland (Bihari, 1970, p.243). Rozmaryn 
stated that the Sejm commissions have acted as the preparatory organs 
of legislation and as the fact-finding, supervisory organs of the 
Sejm (see Rozmaryn,* 1961, pp.33 and 35). Indeed, in the four years 
period between 1957 and 1961, for example, the commissions held no 
less than 1,203 meetings, and adopted 2,466 recommendations concerned 
with supervision over government activities (see Makhnenko, 1963, 
p.114). In the legislative field some bills proposed by the Council 
of Ministers are believed to have been redrafted as a result of the 
examinations at the Sejm commissions (Chrypinski, 1965, p.22).
In Hungary, too, the commissions of its National Assembly hear
reports by the various ministries and their subordinates, and, on
the basis of their growing expertise, suggest changes and additions
which are allegedly reflected in the final drafts (see SDT, No. 2,
* Rozmaryn, S. (1961) Sejm und Volksrate in der Volksrepublik Polen, 
Warsaw.
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1963 , p p . 1 0 4 -1 0 7 ) . The l a t t e r ,  m o re o v e r , a s  i n  th e  c a s e s  o f  la b o u r  
code  and  t h e  p r o d u c e r s ' c o o p e r a t iv e  law , a re  a l s o  o c c a s i o n a l l y  s e n t  
b a c k  t o  th e  g o v e rn m en t w i th  th e  demand f o r  f u r t h e r  a l t e r a t i o n  b e f o r e  
b e in g  p r e s e n t e d  t o  th e  p le n a r y  s e s s io n  o f  th e  H ouse ( se e  R o b in so n ,
1971 , p . 7 1 ) .
I n  Y u g o s la v ia ,  t h e r e  h av e  b e e n  some c a s e s  w here th e  C om m issions 
h a v e  r e j e c t e d  g o v ern m en t p r o p o s a l s  i n  t o t o  o r  i n  p a r t .  I n  F e b ru a ry  
197 3 , t h e  Y u g o slav  F e d e r a l  A ss e m b ly 's  Com m ission f o r  J u d i c i a l  A f f a i r s ,  
f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  r e j e c t e d  o r  amended a m a j o r i t y  o f  th e  p ro p o s e d  ch an g es  
i n  th e  p e n a l  code p u t  fo rw a rd  r e c e n t l y  by  th e  Y u g o slav  g o v e rn m e n t.
The C om m ission members f e a r e d  t h a t  th e  ch an g es i n  p e n a l  code w ould  
b r i n g  a  t i g h t e n i n g  o f  p r e - t r i a l  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  p r o c e d u r e s  ( se e  V us- 
V je s n ik  n s r i j e d u , 7 .2 .7 3  a s  q u o te d  i n  RFER, 2 7 .2 .7 3 ) .
A lth o u g h  d e f i n i t i v e  e v a lu a t i o n  o f  t h e  c o m m iss io n s ' p r o c e s s e s  
l i e s  b e y o n d  th e  sc o p e  o f  t h e  p r e s e n t  s tu d y ,  o u r  b r i e f  o b s e r v a t io n  
s u g g e s t s  t h a t  th e  com m issions m u st o p e r a te  u n d e r  c e r t a i n  c o n d i t io n s  
i n  o r d e r  t o  f u l f i l  t h e i r  fo rm a l  l e g i s l a t i v e  and  s u p e r v i s o r y  r o l e s .
F i r s t ,  t h e  com m issions s h o u ld  b e  a b le  t o  convene m e e tin g s  r e g u l a r l y ,  
i n s t i t u t e  i n q u i r i e s ,  s tu d y  p ro b le m s , i f  n e c e s s a r y ,  on t h e  s p o t ,  and 
a n a ly s e  and  d i s c u s s  th e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  t h e  g o v e rn m en t b o d ie s  t o  g r e a t e r  
d e p th s .  S e c o n d ly , t h e  members o f  t h e  com m issions m u st hav e  e x p e r t i s e  
i n  t h e  f i e l d s  th e  i n d i v i d u a l  co m m issio n s a r e  w o rk in g  f o r .  T h i r d l y ,  
t h e  co m m issio n s s h o u ld  m o b i l iz e  s c i e n t i f i c  and  s o c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
f o r  t h e  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  o f  p ro b le m s  r e l a t i n g  t o  l e g i s l a t i o n  and  s u p e r ­
v i s i o n  o v e r  th e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  g o v e rn m en t b o d i e s .  F o u r th ly ,  th e  
co m m iss io n s  m u st e n s u re  t h a t  t h e i r  reco m m en d a tio n s  a r e  t o  b e  im p lem en ted  
by  th e  a s s e m b l ie s ,  g o v e rn m en t b o d ie s  and c i t i z e n s .  And f i n a l l y ,  t h e  
r e s u l t s  and  e x p e r ie n c e s  o f  th e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  t h e  com m issions m u st
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receive a wider publicity. One of the major criticisms of the 
commissions' processes has been concerned with the relationship 
between the ministries and the standing commissions. In Hungary, 
it has been alleged that the commissions' deliberations resulted in 
commission sponsorship of the draft legislation agreed upon by the 
two sides (see Robinson, 1971, p.71). When presented as such on the 
floor of the House, these tactics would hinder effective and const­
ructive debate on the merits of the bill. A similar criticism has 
been heard in Poland: "The deputies often do the job of ministries. 
Unfortunately, it does happen at commission meetings that the 
deputy's report has been written by the Ministry in question. ...A 
deputy most generally acted as a substitute for a government member 
explaining the policy of the government or of a particular ministry..." 
(This criticism was appeared just after the "December crisis" see 
Tygodnik Demokratyczny, 11.4.71 as quoted in KFER, 6.5.71). Another 
criticism voiced in Poland was about the validity of the press report 
on the activities of the commissions.1 The press coverage and its 
validity are worth bearing in mind as we consider the structure and 
processes of the Supreme Soviet organs.
Concluding remarks.
These brief observations on developments in certain of the East
Deputy W. Wisniowski also added that "the weekly Rzemieslnik stated 
that the Commission on the Economic Plan, Budget, and Finance amended 
the draft according to suggestions made by the Commission of Light 
Industry, Crafts, and Work Co-operatives. This was not true. 
Rzemieslnik published false information. Kurier Polski, on the other 
hand, reported on the matter correctly. I was also happy to see that 
the Sejm Information Bulletin also presented the suggested amendments 
correctly". (See Tygodnik Demokratyczny, 11.4.71).
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European parliamentary assemblies have given the impression that 
these assemblies have acquired or are beginning to acquire their 
own role-acting as social and political control bodies as well as 
counterchecking organs against the powerful government organs.
Although we do not know in detail of the structure, processes and 
functions of the East European assemblies, the evidence emerging 
from this study would bear some comparison with that on the Supreme 
Soviet organs. One of the most pertinent questions common to both 
(the Supreme Soviet and the East European assemblies) is that of the 
process of institutionalization. Studying the process of institut­
ionalization of the East European assemblies, Ghita Ionescu argues 
that a changing dictatorial regime often allows the formation, 
within the structure of its dictatorship, of institutions contrary to 
its own principles on condition that for a longer or shorter period it 
can keep political control. Regimes which, under the pressure of 
public opinion, grant rights, laws and institutions contradictory to 
their basic principles, always hope that these will remain ineffectual 
and empty of substance. But institutions can have a life of their 
own and more often than not they survive the regime which established 
them as a facade only (see Ionescu, 1967, p.183). The main line of 
his argument is thus that the inevitable forces of opposition, that 
is public opinion, in the complexity of the modern state, make for 
the gradual democratiziation and institutionalization of the existing, 
though moribund, assemblies. Restricting as it does the variables for 
institutionalization to only one, namely public opinion, (a rather 
intangible variable at that), Ionescu's approach may have limited 
application in an analysis of the Supreme Soviet organs. We have 
already observed that East European assemblies (with the exception 
of Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia for a short period) are not yet
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turning into genuine debating bodies where public opinion is freely 
articulated. It seems true that the Sejm, if not its committees, 
has been less effective as a result of the weakened contact between 
the political and government leadership and the public, and more 
specifically as a result of the unwillingness on the part of the 
government to cooperate in the work of the Sejm. We have also 
observed that there was more than one causal factor for the instit­
utionalization of the assemblies, though all factors are interrelated 
with one another. Indeed, in Hungary, the motives and intentions of 
the leadership as well as the economic reforms, rather than public 
opinion, were reflected in the development of the National Assembly. 
If not totally ill-conceived, moreover, Ionescu's interpretation of 
the function of these bodies (reducing them to interest articulation) 
appears narrow and somewhat cursory, failing to note other possible
functions such as communication and mobilization.
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CHAPTER 4
STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN THE FEDERAL AND 
REPUBLICAN SUPREME SOVIETS
The structural changes which have occurred since 1955 have 
primarily affected the Standing Commissions. We shall begin, however, 
by describing the relatively minor changes in the Chamber and the 
Presidium. It should be stressed that the description of the struct­
ural changes in this chapter is confined to the formal machinery and 
formal procedures, without examining the character and content of 
their operation.
Section 1
The Chamber and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet 
Chamber
The Supreme Soviet of the USSR is elected every four years and 
has two Chambers —  the Soviet of the Union which is elected on a 
popular basis from single-member constituencies according to density 
of population, and the Soviet of Nationalities which is formed by 
representatives of the constituent federal units (the republics) as 
well as subordinate nationality-based politico-administrative units 
within the basic constituent units (autonomous republics, autonomous 
regions, etc.). in the 1970 election there was a total of 1517 deputies, 
as compared to 1347 in the 1954 election (see Table 2).
Supreme Soviets of the republics consist of only one Chamber, 
elected on the basis of one deputy for a given number of inhabitants, 
which may vary from one republic to another. The average number of 
deputies elected to each republican Supreme Soviet was 392 in the 1971 
elections, as compared to 310 in the 1959 election (see Table 3). The 
deputies are elected for four years, as are those to the Supreme Soviet
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of USSR, elections being held in the year following those for the 
federal Supreme Soviet.
Under the federal and republican Constitutions, the Supreme Soviets 
are supposed to be convened in ordinary session twice a year, but until 
recently they did not normally meet more than once a year. Their 
sessions usually lasted for no more than a few days, and their only 
major work was to ratify the budget for the following year and approve 
appointments made by their Presidia since they themselves last met.
The meetings of the republican Supreme Soviets were so standardised 
and so much a matter of routine they all took place at approximately 
the same time, within a month of the meeting of the federal Supreme 
Soviet.
Starting with 1957, the federal and republican Supreme Soviets 
began to meet their constitutional requirements of convening at least 
twice a year. In particular, during the period between 1957 and 1960, 
a majority of republican Supreme Soviets held sessions three to four 
times a year. At the sessions, the deputies of the republican and 
federal Supreme Soviets have the constitutional right to address 
inquiries to the respective government or any ministry therein. Replies 
to such inquiries must be given in the respective Chamber within a 
period not exceeding three days. This instrument for supervising 
the activity of the government was always available to the deputies, 
but had not been much used during the Stalin period. In the years 
following Stalin's death, groups of deputies at both federal and 
republican sessions began to address questions on various aspects of 
state activity. It has become almost customary in recent years for 
the spokesmen of the respective government or a particular ministry 
to appear before the Supreme Soviets either to introduce draft laws
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and resolutions and request their approval or to answer questions 
put forward by the deputies.
Further significant change in the Supreme Soviets is that some 
republican ones have since 1960 adopted, or attempted to adopt, regu­
lations on the Supreme Soviets. The Latvian Supreme Soviet was the 
first to adopt this kind of regulation of 16 March, 1959. It con­
sisted of 89 articles, divided into a number of sections —  convo­
cation of sessions, rules of procedure at sessions, rights and duties 
of the Chamber, right and duties of the deputies, councils of seniors, 
Standing Commissions,rights and duties of the chairman of the Chamber, 
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, formation of the government, and 
election of the Supreme Court. There were similar attempts to 
establish a comprehensive regulation on the Supreme Soviet in the RSFSR. 
In 1961 a group of jurists at Leningrad University published a working 
draft of such a regulation on the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR (see 
Tyul'panov (ed.), 1961). This was not, however, enacted by the Supreme 
Soviet of RSFSR. Recently, similar moves have occurred in the 
Lithuanian and Uzbek SSR, whose Supreme Soivets subsequently adopted 
such regulations in 1969 and 1970 respectively (see Kozlov, 1971, p.89). 
Further, in September, 1972, the federal Supreme Soviet adopted a 
"federal and republican Law on the Status of the Deputies", which applies 
to the deputies of all levels of soviets. This law may reflect a 
concern on the part of Soviet leaders to standardize and strengthen 
the activities of the deputies not only in the Chambers, but also in 
their constituencies.^
 ^ According to V.A. Pertsik who conducted a survey on the interrelations 
between deputies and their constituents in Irkutsk city, deputies to city 
and city district soviets are better known than deputies to the Supreme 
Soviet of the Russian Federation (see Pertsik, 1967, p.17). The "Law on 
the Status of the Deputies in USSR" adopted in 1972 is divided into four 
parts —  1) general regulations, 2) activity of the deputy in the soviet, 
3) activity of the deputy in the electorate, and 4) basic guarantee of 
the deputy's activity (see SDT, No.10, 1972, pp.3-12).
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Presidium
The structural changes in the federal and republican Presidia, 
unlike those in the Standing Commissions, may have taken place 
implicitly and covertly. The description and speculations below 
mainly concern potential organizational power, partly as a result 
of explicit changes taken place in the Standing Commissions.
As will be observed later, the changes in the relationships 
between the Standing Commissions and their parent bodies - the 
Supreme Soviet and its Presidium - as well as with ministries, 
departments and other state agencies, and a comparison between 
the old and new regulations, might give the impression that the 
power of the Presidium has been somewhat curtailed.
On the other hand, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet still 
figures as the core organ of this (in formal constitutional 
terms) representative body. As one of the "Supreme organs"
(vysshie organy) of the State, it is vested with a wide range of 
both ceremonial and substantive and judicial functions. The 
Presidium is empowered, between the sessions of the Supreme Soviet, 
to decide any questions relating to the jurisdiction of the federal 
Supreme Soviet. However, active, if somewhat scholastic, discussions 
have taken place among Soviet constitutional lawyers as to the 
concept of the Presidium's relationships with the Supreme Soviet, 
owing to the constitutional ambiguities in the Presidium's status.
One group of scholars, including I.P. Trainin (1938,p.90), B. Kravtsov
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(1954, p.78), I.T. Bespalyi (1959, pp.8-12), O.Ye. Kutafin (1966, 
p.36) and P.T. Vasilenkov (1967, p.12) on the whole argue that 
the Presidium is the standing supervising organ and executive 
committee for the preparation of legislation, and that it is 
an independent organ of state power, whose activities are ultimately 
accountable to the Supreme Soviet as are those of other appointed 
organs - the Council of Ministers, the Supreme Court and the 
General Procuracy. On the other hand, another group of scholars, 
including N. Mishin (1962, p.431), L.V. Lazarev (1965, p.63) and 
L. Mandel'shtam (1966, p.3) state that the Presidium is an organic 
part of the Supreme Soviet and not a substitute for the Supreme 
Soviet between sessions. The prevailing view at the moment appears 
to be the one expressed by a third group of scholars, including 
D.A. Kerimov (1955, p.100), S.M. Ravin (1957, p.87), A.V. Mitskevich 
(1967b, p.90), A.G. Kirichenko (1968, p.217), I.N. Kuznetsov 
(1969, p.93) and R.V. Yengibaryan (1970, p.28). They stress that
Having studied the legal nature of the Presidium of the 
Central Executive Committee, Bespaly places the Supreme Soviet 
Presidium (federal or republican), like its predecessor, in the 
system of state organs: "A republican Supreme Soviet Presidium 
is not an organic part or an organ of the Supreme Soviet.
The contrary assertion not only clearly distorts this point, 
but is also in conflict with the republican Constitutions, 
according to which a republican Supreme Soviet Presidium is a 
higher organ of state power of the republic." (See Bespaly, 
1959, pp.9-10)
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the Presidium is a "higher organ of state power" which executes 
a part of the Supreme Soviet's functions but only in the period 
between the Supreme Soviet sessions. Unlike the first group, 
therefore, this group does not claim explicitly that it is an 
independent organ of state power. Furthermore, this group rejects 
the notion that the Presidium is the standing organ.
Having noted the various interpretations of the status of 
the Presidium, our immediate interest will be to see how far 
the Presidium seems in practice to act as a substitute for the 
Supreme Soviet, and which of the latter's formal functions it 
performs. Our second point of interest will be to find out what 
is the actual nature of the relationships between the federal and 
republican Presidia and also between those and the local executive 
committees. In relation to these enquiries, an obvious question 
arises as to what are the Presidium's organizational resources, 
and to what extent and how far the Presidium makes use of its 
own resources. This would involve quite elaborate research into 
the structure and operation of the Presidium, which we propose 
to carry out in Part II.
A further important point we should briefly note here is the 
relationship between the Presidium and the Standing Commissions.
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There are some reasons to suspect that changing situations have 
strengthened the working relations between the two bodies. Until 
1947, the Standing Commissions of the federal Supreme Soviet elected 
small collegiate organs which directed their activities. For instance, 
in 1946, the Legislative Proposals Commissions of both Chambers 
elected one executive organ called a "Commission Bureau" which con­
sisted of the chairmen, deputy chairmen and secretaries of the two 
Legislative Proposals Commissions. The Commission Bureau prepared 
the work plan and agenda for the Commission's meetings, and allocated 
duties among the members of the Commissions. When the regulation on 
the federal Legislative Proposals Commissions was adopted on 25 
February, 1947, the Commission Bureau was not provided for and ceased 
(see Makhnenko, 1964b,pp.60-61). Since then, the Presidium 
has probably been assigned, to a greater degree, the task of 
co-ordinating and guiding the activities of the Standing Commissions. 
This task must have been required strongly when the number of the 
Standing Commission was increased in both the federal and republican 
Supreme Soviets (see Kalinychev and Luk'yanov, 1966, p.7). As we 
shall see later, the new federal and republican regulations on the 
Standing Commissions stipulate that the Presidium has the right to 
co-ordinate the work of the Standing Commissions, but not to direct 
it. Before the adoption of these regulations in 1967, there were 
also lively discussions among the constitutional lawyers as to the 
relationship between the Presidium and the Standing Commissions. The 
arguments started when the regulation on the Latvian Supreme Soviet, 
adopted in 1959, prescribed the relationship as follows: "the Standing 
Commissions are accountable to the Supreme Soviet, but in the period 
between the sessions accountable to the Presidium of the Supreme
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Soviet" (see its Article 60, emphasis added). Other early republican 
regulations on the Standing Commissions in Belorussia, Kirgizia and 
Estonia, adopted around 1960, also defined the Presidium in relation 
to the Standing Commissions as the co-ordinating and directing body. 
Scholars such as S.G. Drobyazko supported the notion of accountability 
of the Commissions to the Presidium (Drobyazko, 1961, p.8). L. Mandel'­
shtam even argued that the legal nature of a Presidium decision 
(postanovlenie) has a directing power rather than recommendatory 
nature (see Mandel'shtam, 1966). O.Ye. Kutafin, on the other hand, 
maintained that there existed no relations of accountability and res­
ponsibility between the Presidium and the Standing Commissions. Thus, 
the Presidium can only render its assistance to the Standing Commissions 
for the fulfilment of their own (sobstvennye) activities, but cannot 
direct (napravlyat') the activites of the Commissions’*' (see Kutafin, 
1966, pp.36-37; and 1971, p.18). In the light of this dispute, it 
would be interesting to consider how far the Presidium made use of and 
gave birth to the functions of the Standing Commissions in the course 
of co-ordinating their work. In his report to the first session of 
the seventh convocation on 2 August, 1966, the chairman of the Presidium 
of federal Supreme Soviet commented on this issue as follows: 
the formation of new Standing Commissions ... makes it 
necessary to increase the work done to co-ordinate the 
work of all the Commissions and to achieve purposeful 
utilization of their forces and capacities. This work, 
as we know, is conducted by the Presidium of the federal 
Supreme Soviet which co-ordinates and guides the work of
M.O. Muradyan, member of the federal Standing Commission for 
Industry, interviewed by the present author in 1972 stated that the 
Presidium’s co-ordinating task necessarily involves directing the 
activites of the Commissions.
84
the Standing Commissions of the chambers in the period 
between the sessions. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet 
will continue to sustain and develop the initiative of the 
Standing Commissions in every possible way, and it will 
help them in their practical work. When necessary, the 
Presidium will take measures to ensure implementation of 
the recommendations and proposals offered to the ministries 
and departments by the Commissions.
(Izv., 3.8.66, emphasis added)
What this means in practice is, then, a further issue on which 
empirical evidence must be sought.
Section 2
• Standing Commissions
Under Stalin the Soviet public probably had little or no aware 
ness of even the existence of the Standing Commissions. Not a 
single report appeared in the national press on the meetings of 
the federal Budget Commission between 1940 and 1955. Since 1957 
accounts of the meetings and activities of the federal and repub­
lican Commissions have appeared in the press with increasing 
frequency. Meanwhile, over the same period, large changes have 
occurred in the number, range, membership and rules of procedure 
of the Standing Commissions.
Table 2 shows that there was no increase in the number of 
Standing Cohesions until the seventh convocation (1966), although 
in the same period there were some increases in their average 
membership. From the sixth to the seventh convocations, however, the
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number of commissions was sharply increased followed by a further
substantial increase during the eighth convocation. As a result,
60 percent of the deputies (912) are now members of Standing
Commissions. The Credentials, Foreign Affairs, Budget and
Legislative Proposals Commissions existed since the first convocation,
while the Economic Commission^ of the Soviet of Nationalities was
formed in 1957 in the wake of the 1957 reorganization of the economic
administration, which involved substantial decentralization to the
republics. In addition to the already existing Commissions, the
2following Commissions (generally called “branch Commissions") were 
set up in 1966: Agriculture; Education, Science and Culture; Public
Health and Social Security; Construction and Industrial Building 
Materials;Transport, Communications and Industry; and Trade, Communal 
Economy and Everyday Services (Bytovoye obsluzhivaniye). In 1971, 
two further Commissions were added, namely, Youth Affairs, and 
Conservation. The Commission of Transport, Communciations and 
Industry is now divided into two Commissions, for Industry and for 
Transport and Communications.
At the seventh convocation, it was renamed Budget and Planning, 
and absorbed the Economic Commission of the Soviet of Nationalities. 
2 The existing Commissions, particularly the Budget, Economic and 
Legislative Proposals Commissions had a wider range of activities. 
They used to have a number of permanent sub-commissions which now 
have become independent as branch Commissions.
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TABLE 2
STANDING COMMISSIONS OF FEDERAL SUPREME SOVIET
4 th 5th 6 th 7th 8 th
(54-58) (58-62) (62-66) (66- 70) (70-74)
U* N* U. N. U. N. U. N. U. N.
1. Number 4 5 4 5 4 5 10 10 13 13
2. Average 
ship in
member-
each 18 20 28 29 28 29 35 35 35 35
St. Com.
3. Percentage of
deputies elected 13.1% 18.8% 17.9% 46.1% 60.1%
to the St. Com.
(Number of deputies
elected to the 1347 1378 1443 1517 1517
Supreme Soviet)
*1 Soviet of the Union
*2 Soviet of Nationalities
Sources: Izvestia (1955-71)
The republican Standing Commissions, on the other hand, had 
begun to change their structure a decade earlier than in the case of 
the USSR. Table 3 shows the sharp increases which have occurred in 
all three aspects. Between the fourth and fifth convocations, the 
number of Standing Commissions doubled in all republican Supreme 
Soviets. In addition to the existing Commissions (identical with the 
original Commissions of the federal Supreme Soviet), almost all 
republican Supreme Soviets set up new Commissions for Industry and 
Transport; Agriculture; Education and Culture; and Public Health and 
Social Security. The average size of their membership increased 
twenty to thirty percent, and the proportion of all deputies elected 
to the Standing Commissions almost trebled. From the fifth to the 
sixth, and from the sixth to the seventh convocations, however, the
rate of increase was proportionately lower.
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TABLE 3
STANDING COMMISSIONS OF REPUBLICAN SUPREME SOVIETS
4th 5th 6th 7th 8th
(55-59) (59-63) (63-67) (67-71) (71-75)
1. Average number
of St. Com. in 4 8 10 12 14
each republic
2. Average member­
ship in each St. 10 13 17 19 21
Com.
3. Average percent­
ages of deputies
elected to the 11.7% 32.9% 45.6% 61.9% 70.4%
St. Com.
Average number of 
deputies elected to
each republican 310 354 384 389 392
Supreme Soviet )
Sources: 15 Republican newspapers
(1955-71)
Since the adoption of regulations on the federal and republican 
Standing Commissions appears to have brought a major structural re­
inforcement to their activity, it may be worth noting the salient 
facts about this development, though the details of these regulations 
are best left for later consideration. As Table 4 shows, the process 
started at the republic level between 1957 and 1960, and was resumed 
between 1966 and 1968. (As a matter of convenience for comparison, 
we' shall call these two phases of adoption of regulations the "first" 
phase and "second" phase). The republican regulations adopted in 
the first phase were all, except for the Estonian regulations, 
revised in the second phase.
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TABLE 4
YEARS OF ADOPTION OF REGULATIONS ON STANDING 
COMMISSIONS BY FEDERAL AND REPUBLICAN SUPREME
SOVIETS 1
1957 1958 1959 1960 - 1966 1967 1968
U S S R *
Uzbek SSR * *
Georgian SSR * *
Moldavian SSR * *
Latvian SSR * *
Azerbaidzhan SSR * *
Kirgiz SSR *
Belorussian SSR * *
Estonian SSR * *(1973)
Ukrainian SSR *
Lithuanian SSR *
Tadzhik SSR *
Armenian SSR *
Turkmen SSR *
Kazakh SSR *
R S F S R  *
These regulations define the tasks and operational procedures, 
rights and duties of the Standing Commissions as a whole, and the 
sphere of activity of each of them. Those regulations adopted during 
the first phase show considerable variation. Those adoptedNduring 
the second phase conform far more closely to each other, as well as 
to the 1967 regulation on the federal Standing Commissions, and 
their texts are more extensive, complex and detailed than those 
adopted in the first phase.
 ^ For further information on these developments and comment by Soviet 
constitutional lawyers —  see S.G. Drobyazko, 1961, p. 5; A.Kh. 
Makhnenko, 1969, p.4; and D.L. Zlatopol1 sky, 1967, pp.26-27.
89
In the following two Parts of this study, we shall consider, 
within the limitations of available information, the institutional 
arrangements and processes of the federal and republican Presidia 
and Standing Commissions. This will provide a basis on which we 
may attempt some explanation of the structural changes outlined
above.
P A R T  II
FEDERAL AND REPUBLICAN PRESIDIA
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CHAPTER 5
STRUCTURE AND MEMBERSHIP
Section 1
Composition of the membership of federal and 
republican Presidia
The membership of the federal Presidium consists of a chairman, 
fifteen deputy chairmen, a secretary and twenty ordinary members.
The members do not generally hold positions simultaneously in bodies 
which are accountable to the Presidium - the Council of Ministers, 
the Supreme Court and the Procuracy-general of the USSR. According 
to Article 48 of the federal Constitution, the fifteen deputy chair­
men of the Presidium are selected one from each republic. In practice, 
the federal Supreme Soviet elects to these posts the chairmen of 
the Presidia of the republican Supreme Soviets. The membership 
levels of the republican Presidia are at present as follows: Latvia
and Estonia - 13; Azerbaidzhan, Kirgizia, Lithuania; Tadzhikstan and 
Turkmenia - 15; Moldavia and Uzbekistan - 17; Armenia, Belorussia 
and Georgia - 19; Kazakhstan - 20; Ukraine - 23; and RSFSR - 33.
The deputy chairmen of the republican Presidia are either chairmen 
of the republican Presidia of autonomous republics (where such 
exist), or chairmen of the executive committees of local soviets.
In the case of the Presidium of the RSFSR, there are 16 deputy 
chairmen, one from each of the autonomous republics (see Vinogradov, 
1967, p. 47).
Officially the members of the Presidium are elected from among 
the deputies of the Supreme Soviet (see Saifulin, 1967, p.77). Our 
assumption is that they are coopted, the selection reflecting the 
leadership's view of what kind of composition will be enable 
them to carry out their functions. Indeed, according to a constit-
92
utional lawyer, P.T. Vasilenkov, proposals on the composition of the 
Presidium are formulated in conformity with the recommendation of 
the Central Committee of the CPSU or the Council of Seniors of the 
Chambers (Vasilenkov, 1967, p.17). The chairman of the Estonian 
Presidium, A.Myurisep, has commented as follows on the manner of the 
election of members of soviet executive committees, "It is no secret", 
he said, "that the election at the session of the soviets is some­
times a mere formality. It would be expedient for the candidates 
for heads of the departments of the executive committees to be 
discussed more thoroughly at the session"(see Izv.,14.3.67). Although 
he cautiously inserted the word "sometimes" and was speaking about 
the executive committees of the local soviets, it is a reasonable 
a priori assumption that his assertion about the merely formal 
election by the soviet is no less applicable to the federal and 
republican Presidia.
1) The Composition of the federal Presidium
The distribution of membership by nationality presents over 
the years a generally constant picture. Russians, though under­
represented in proportion to size of population, account for the 
biggest single ethnic group - usually ten in number - followed by 
Ukrainians. The Belorussian, Uzbek, Kazakh, Georgian and Armenian 
nationalities are usually represented by two each. The remaining 
basic republican ethnic groups, plus the Tartars, are represented 
by one each. Two or three places are left for representatives of 
the many "minor" nationalities, although the Jews, Poles and Germans, 
who are the largest of these, seem never to be represented (see
Table 1).
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TABLE
NATIONALITY COMPOSITION OF THE MEMBERSHIP OF
THE FEDERAL PRESIDIUM
5th.convoc. 
N=33
6 th convoc. 7th convoc. 
N=33 N=37
8th convc 
N=37
Russian 10 10 10 11
Ukrainian 4 3 5 5
Belorussian 2 2 2 2
Uzbek 2 2 2 2
Kazakh 1 2 2 2
Georgian 2 2 2 2
Azerbaidzhani 1 1 1 1
Tadzhik 1 1 1 1
Lithuanian 1 1 1 1
Moldavian 1 1 1 1
Latvian 1 1 1 1
Kirgiz 1 1 1 1
Armenia 1 1 2 2
Turkman 1 1 1 1
Estonian 1 1 1 1
Tartar 1 1 1 1
Other 2 2 3 2
Needless to say, almost all1 the members of the federal 1
are Party members. The composition by age groups in the federal 
Presidium is noticeably different from that in the Supreme Soviet or 
that in the Standing Commissions (see Table 2). Close to 80% of the 
members of the Presidium at the 8th convocation are over 50 years old, 
compared to only about 40% of the members of the Supreme Soviet and 
the Standing Commissions.
Those who are non-Party membefs in the Presidium, generally one 
in each convocation, are people such as academics and writers who are 
engaged in non-political and non-production work.
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TABLE 2
AGE COMPOSITION OF THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE 
FEDERAL PREDISIUM
5th 6 th 7th 8 th
convoc . convoc. convoc. convoc.
N=33 N=33 N=37 N=37
% % % %
under 30 0 3.0 2.7 0.0
31 - 40 3.0 12.1 13.5 5.4
41 - 50 45.5 36.4 16.2 16.2
51 - 60 33.3 27. 3 37.9 46.0
61 and over 18.2 21.2
TABLE 3
29.7 32.4
AGE COMPOSITION OF THE SUPREME SOVIET
AND STANDING COMMISSIONS 
(8th convocation only)
Supreme Soviet Standing Commissions 
N=1517 N=912
under 30 18.5 % 11.5 %
31 - 40 23.0 20.8
41 - 50 25.5 31.9
51 - 60 21.7 26.4
61 and over 11.3 9.4
The Presidium contains a predominance of Party and government 
officials, who have constituted more than 80% of the whole membership 
at every convocation. A major factor here is of course that the 
fifteen deputy chairmen of the federal Presidium out of a total 
membership of 37 are the chairmen of individual republican Presidia.
If one considers only the ordinary members, the proportion of Party 
and government officials drops to about 50%. The government officials
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securing places on the Presidia have for the most part been chairmen 
of regional, district and city executive committees —  at present, 
two out of four government officials in the Presidium belong to 
this group. It should be noted that the government officials have 
increased markedly: 0 (5th) - 1 (6th) - 3 (7th) - 4 (8th). One should
also note that presence of Permanent Representatives of republican 
Council of Ministers is perhaps an indication that the Presidium is 
of some relevance as a political arena, since the task of these 
officials is to act as "watchdog" of their republics' interests in 
central government activities. Until the seventh convocation (1966) 
with the exception of the fourth convocation (1954), at least one 
secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU had been included. The 
names of the secretaries are as follows: G.M. Malenkov (2nd convo­
cation); P.K. Ponomarenko and M.A. Suslov (3rd convocation); A.I. 
Kirichenko (5th convocation); and P.N. Demichev and F.R. Kozlov 
(6th convocation). It was only at the fourth convocation (1954) 
that the first secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, N.S. 
Khrushchev was included. Since 1966, L.I. Brezhnev became a member of 
the Presidium for two convocations consecutively. No other secretary 
of the CC, CPSU has been included. Nevertheless, those Party secret­
aries, who were members of the Presidium in the past and whose sphere 
of responsibility was mainly ideological or organizational could have 
some relevance for assessing the role of the Presidium.
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TABLE 4
REPUBLICS IN WHICH THE ORDINARY MEMBERS'
CURRENT OCCUPATIONAL POSITIONS ARE LOCATED
5th convoc.6th convoc.7th convoc.8th convoc
(N=18) (N=18) (N=22) (N=22)
USSR * 5 6 6 7
RSFSR 7 7 11 10
Ukraine 2 2 2 2
Belorussia 2 1 1 1
Uzbekistan 1 1 1 1
Kazakhstan 1 1 1 1
* Note - Includes central Party organs, federal government 
bodies, and other organizations at federal level.
Members holding executive posts in their various organizations
are in the majority, averaging 75% of the Presidium membership in
every convocation. Of these, a little more than half is engaged in
1the field of political affairs , while the rest hold positions in 
foreign affairs, agriculture, education, industry, the military and 
publications. As one might expect, very few of these positions are 
located in rural areas.
Table 5 reveals not only the field of current responsibility of 
Presidium members but also the nature of the executive and functional 
experience they bring to the Presidium's activities. The fields most 
strongly represented are political affairs followed by industry, 
education, science and agriculture. While this overall pattern has 
been constant, certain changes deserve comment. First, there has
 ^ Actual categories of posts covered by the rubric "political affairs" 
comprise the first secretary of Party committee in each level, chairman 
of the Council of Ministers or local executive committee, organizational 
Party or government official, and those engaged in agit-prop activities.
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been a marked growth in the number of those with experience in 
education-science-culture and in industry. However, at the 8th 
convocation, those who gained experience as operatives in these 
fields are more numerous than those who obtained experience as 
managers or specialists. Secondly, there have been fluctuations in 
the numbers with experience in agriculture and publications. Finally, 
there has been a declining trend in youth affairs and military 
experience.
(See Table 5)
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Some significant trends in the educational backgrounds of members 
of the federal Presidium are also visible. The proportion with a 
higher education has increased from 61% at the fifth (1958) convocation 
to 73% at the eighth convocation (1970). As the proportion with a 
higher education has increased, the field of current responsibility 
of Presidium members in Industry has been strengthened, while in agri­
culture and political affairs declined and also the scope of the field 
has been widened. In between these two convocations, however, the
proportion with a higher education has fluctuated markedly, to an 
extent that could only partly be accounted for by the differences in 
the number at the "unknown" level over the convocations. The remaining
members have had a partial or complete secondary education. The 
number of members who have received higher Party education has steadily
declined from 33% at the fifth (1958) convocation to 19% at the eighth 
(1970) convocation.
TABLE 6
(A) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION OF MEMBERS OF 
FEDERAL PRESIDIUM
unknown
primary
secondary
incomplete
secondary
incomplete
higher
higher:
diploma
candidate
5th convoc. 
(N=33)
%
• 12.1
3.0
6.1
15.1
3.0
60.6
(54.6)
( 3.0)
( 3.0)
6th convoc. 
(N=33)
%
3.0
9.1
6.1
3.0
78.8
(66.6)
( 6 .1)
( 6.1)
7th convoc. 
(N=37)
%
8.1
16.2
8.1
67.6 
(54.1) 
( 5.4) 
( 8.1)
8th convoc. 
(N=37)
%
2.7
2.7 
16.2
5.4
73.0
(59.5)
( 5.4)
( 8.1)doctorate
1Ö1
TABLE 6
(B) HIGHER PARTY EDUCATION
5th convoc. 
(N=33)
%
6th convoc. 
(N=33)
%
7th convoc. 
(N=37)
%
8th convoc. 
(N=37)
%
33.3 33.3 27.0 18.9
Finally, the increasing age of members of the Presidium (see 
Table 2) is explained by its high rate of continuity of membership 
through successive convocations with the exception of the sixth con­
vocation. This is particularly marked with respect to the deputy 
chairmen of the Presidium. With regard to Table 7, a few points 
deserve mention here. First, the big turnover between the fifth 
(1958) and sixth (1962) convocation reflects generally high rates of 
personnel change at this time.'1' Secondly, the exceptional continuity
between the seventh (1966) and eighth (1970) convocation reflects
2the present leadership's policy of "stability of cadres".
TABLE 7
RATE OF HOLDOVER OF THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE 
FEDERAL PRESIDIUM
5th convoc. 6th convoc. 7th convoc. 8th convoc.
(N=33) (N=33) (N=37) (N=37)
57.6% 39.4% 48.7% 64.9%
^ High turnover of leading personnel - full members of Politburo, full 
members of Central Committee, Secretaries of Central Committee, members 
of federal Council of Ministers, republican first secretaries, and 
regional first secretaries (RSFSR) - was recorded in the period between 
1956 and 1961. See Jerry F. Hough, 1972, p.32.
2 After Khrushchev's fall, turnover rates among top officials took a 
sharp downturn. See Hough's Table 1 in his article, op.cit. According 
to T.H. Rigby's interpretation, the official policy of "stability of 
cadres" appears to be formulated on the basis of fairly explicit under­
standing both within the oligarchy and between the oligarchy and the 
secondary leadership level. Those at the secondary leadership level 
are asked to curb any ambition they might have for rapid advancement 
into the oligarchy in exchange for reasonable security of tenure and 
protection against encroachments from subordinate echelons. (See 
T.H. Rigby, 1970, p.179).
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2) The composition of the republican Presidia.
It is regretable that complete information on the composition of 
the republican Presidia is available only for the current occupational 
positions of members. The fragmentary information obtainable on other 
variables is insufficient to permit any general conclusions. Never­
theless it is possible to discern a pattern of organizational part­
icipation in the republican Presidia, although it is difficult to 
discern trends in occupational positions as was done with the federal 
Presidium.
Table 8 indicates a widespread uniformity, if only in the part­
icipation of the Party and government apparatus in the Presidia. The 
exception is Estonia, which has consistently excluded government 
officials from membership of the Presidium. The Estonian case pres­
umably reflects a strict view of the Presidium as an impartial body 
exercising control over the organs of government. Generally speaking, 
differences in the pattern of organizational participation other than 
that of the Party and government apparatus in the Presidia are quite 
marked, not only between different republics but also between the 
Presidia elected by different convocations in the same republic.
On an average a third of the members in the republican Presidia 
are Party or government officials. Most of these hold posts at the 
regional level (see Table 9), although certain of the Party officials 
work at the republican level as first secretary, organizational 
secretary or head of the Party organs department of the republican 
Central Committee. The RSFSR is, however, an anomalous case, because 
the republic itself has no central Party bodies. Thus, certain CPSU 
Central Committee officials have been represented in the RSFSR
Presidium.
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TABLE 10
PARTY AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN THE
RSFSR PREDISIUM
5th 6 th 7th 8th
(N=31) (N=31) (N=33) (N=33)
Party officials
CPSU,CC - sec. 1 1
CC,Bureau for RSFSR
- dep.chm. 1 2
Regional committee
- 1st sec. 1 3 1
- 2nd sec. 1 3 2
District & city ctte.
- 1st sec. 1 1 1
- 2nd sec. 1 2 1
- sec. 1 1
Government officials
Reg. exec. ctte. - chm. 2 1 2 3
Dist. & city exec. ctte. chm. 1 1
The holdover rate of the members of the republican Presidia also 
shows considerable variation. Some republics such as the RSFSR have 
increased the rate progressively, whereas by contrast the Ukraine has 
decreased it. Only Estonia shows a constant rate of holdover, though 
not a high one (see Table 11).
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TABLE 11
RATE OF HOLDOVER OF MEMBERS OF
REPUBLICAN PRESIDIA
5th convoc. 6th convoc. 7th convoc. 8th convoc.
RSFSR N=31 N=31 N=33 N=33
16.1% 25.8% 36.4% 45.4%
Ukraine N=19 N=23 N=23 N=23
52.6% 43.5% 39.1% 17.4%
Belorussia N=19 N=19 N=19 N=19
36. 8% 26.3% 21.0% 15.7%
Kaz akhs tan N=20 N=20 N=20 N=20
20.0% 4.7% 5.9% 20.0%
Uzbekistan N=17 N=16 N=17 N=17
41.2% 18.8% 23.5% 20.4%
Estonia N=ll N=13 N=13 N=13
27.3% 30.7% 30.7% 30.7%
Latvia N=13 N=13 N=13 N=13
38.4% 7.7% 46.1% 23.1%
Armenia N=15 N=15 N=17 n. a.
33. 3% 26.7% 35.3%
Georgia n. a. N=17 N=19 N=19
23.5% 47.4% 36.8%
One major conclusion that may be drawn from this analysis of
the composition of the federal and republican Presidia is that
each Presidium includes occupants of the highest positions 
in the republic level bureaucracy. We have also observed 
that a majority of the members of the federal Presidium hold senior 
posts in their respective organizations, and have had, at some stage 
of their career, experience with political affairs. This is probably 
reflected on the overall trend towards a marked ageing, especially 
since the seventh convocation (1966-) (See Table 2). These 
characteristics may prove significant when we come to consider their 
powers and actual activities. First, however, let us examine the 
staff of the Presidium, whose role in facilitating the Presidium's 
operations is clearly an important one.
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Section 2
Staff of the Federal and Republican Presidia
Each Presidium has a staff of specialists engaged in various 
fields. For the most part the staff provides organizational and 
technical services: prepares the necessary data, reference and other
materials on questions considered by the Presidium, the Standing 
Commissions and the Chamber (or Chambers) of the Supreme Soviet. These 
officials (see Appendix B) are organized into functionally divided 
departments: the secretariat, administrative affairs, on the work
of soviets, the reception office, judicial affairs, foreign relations, 
awards, service for the Standing Commissions, publications, and 
financial and economic service. Each department has a staff consist­
ing of head, deputy head and consultants. It has its own quarterly 
work plan, which is drafted in conformity with the Presidium's annual 
work plan (see Tikhomirov and Stepanov, 1960, p.153). It appears 
therefore that the main function of these departments is to maintain 
the operations of the Supreme Soviet as a whole in good running order. 
Among these departments, those whose activities are best publicized 
are the Reception Office and the Department on the Work of Soviets.
Soviet citizens are entitled to apply to the Presidium of the 
Supreme Soviet either by letter or personally on questions of importance 
to them. The Reception Office of the Presidium processes letters, 
complaints and petitions from citizens (see e.g., Kazakhstanskaya P., 
18.7.63). The staff of the office are supposed to check up on the 
facts cited in the letters and applications, and then the letters are 
referred to the relevant bodies such as ministries, departments and 
other government bodies (see P. 22.5.66). A Soviet citizen is also
given a chance to state his case at the Reception Office. Visitors 
are interviewed by members of the staff and are said to be given
Ill
necessary consultations, explanations and advice. Visitors may also be 
received by one of the deputy chairmen of the Presidium and other 
members of the Presidium1 2 (see Saifulin, 1967, p.92). Each Presidium 
has a time-table for the reception of visitors to the Office. The 
Georgian Reception Office, for example, is open daily 9 a.m. to 8 p.m., 
except on Monday when it is open only from 3 p.m. to 8 p.m. (see SDT,
No. 6, 1973, pp.76-77).
In July, 1959, the Information and Statistics Department of the 
federal Presidium was renamed the Department on the Work of Soviets 
(see Tikhomirov and Stepanov, 1960, p.19). The new department, how­
ever, performs much the same function as the previous one - the 
collection of statistics and information relating to the organization 
and activities of the local soviets. The Department on the Work of 
Soviets of the federal Presidium occasionally publishes data collected 
in the Soviet press and periodicals (see, e.g. its latest statistical 
data on the local soviets in SDT, June 1972, pp.84-88). One of the 
differences between the working operations of these departments in 
the federal and republican Presidia is that the latter send staff 
out to the localities and are thus able to familiarize themselves 
directly with local situations (see Izv., 26.1.68). The republican 
departments also seek the assistance of specialists working in other 
bodies. The reception office of the Kazakhstan Presidium has even
set up a group of voluntary consultants, who are regularly dispatched
. 2 to the various localities to obtain necessary information. Available
1 See very good accounts of the activities of the Reception Office of 
the Ukrainian Presidium in Zverev, 1972, pp.69-77.
2 In 1964, about 12 members of this group were identified. The majority 
of these voluntary consultants appear to be pensioners with past exper­
ience in various fields of state activity, but some are currently working 
government officials such as legal consultants attached to ministries.
(See the detailed description on the operation of the group in Kryukova, 
1964. The author was then the deputy chairman of the Kazakhstan Presidium).
112
information does not permit a precise estimate of the size of Presidia 
staff or the extent of their expertise in specific activities, the 
description above being deduced from fragmentary data collected from 
various press and other references.
In some of the republics, permanent commissions have been set up 
to examine problems peculiar to the republics concerned, and have 
been administered by the republican Presidia. For instance, in 
Belorussia a republican Commission for the Issuance of the Certificate 
of Partisan is attached to its Supreme Soviet Presidium. The meetings 
of such commissions are generally held at the capital city and chaired 
by a member of the Presidium. The main function of republican comm­
issions of this kind seems to be to keep records up to date and to 
co-ordinate the work of corresponding regional and city commissions 
(see Sovetskaya Bel., 27.8.69).
Section 3
Constitutional Powers
Article 49 of the federal Constitution stipulates the sphere of 
the Presidium’s powers (see 18 sub-articles of Article 49). The 
various republican constitutions contain provisions similar to those 
of the federal Constitution. Our research, however, shows that, gen­
erally speaking, all but a very few of the decrees (ukazy) and 
decisions (postanovlenia) reported in Vedomosti verkhovnogo soveta 
can be classified under one or other of the following six headings.'*’
The republican Presidia occasionally issue decisions (postanovlenia) 
about the organizational aspects of the local soviets which cannot be 
classified under any one of these six categories. See also Yengibaryan's 
classification of the acts of the Armenian Presidium in his article,
1970, pp.29-30.
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(1) organization of the Supreme Soviet, (2) change in administrative 
and military personnel, and institution of titles, (3) international 
relations, (4) national defence, (5) awards, and (6) other executive 
and judicial powers. However, one should not assume that this provides 
a reliable guide to what the Presidium does. The exercise of the 
powers defined under Article 49 appears to be largely a formality, 
and many of the reported acts relating to these powers were undoubtedly 
decided by other bodies (particularly the Politburo) and perhaps by 
the departments of the Presidium themselves. There is certainly no 
substantive evidence to indicate the Presidium's physical involve­
ment’*’ in making decisions on these various matters.
On the other hand, we have a fair amount of evidence that the 
Presidium has conducted various other activities than those of a mere 
rubber stamp variety. While some of these are linked with certain 
of the powers mentioned above, many of them in fact lie outside the 
spheres of jurisdiction defined in Article 49. One of the tantalizing 
aspects of Presidium behaviour is that resolutions passed under 
Article 49 seem to be treated, as it were, as the only acts of the 
Presidium, whereas other resolutions (largely classed as postanovlenia) 
adopted by the Presidium are not formally promulgated as acts of the
Physical involvement means here that the Presidium actually 
convenes a meeting, discusses and examnines the problem at issue, and 
subsequently adopts the resolution. Some of these powers may actually 
be exercised by a few officials of the Presidium. Indeed, D.R. Little 
believes that the awarding of medals to prominent Soviet leaders is 
one of the prerogatives granted to the Presidium and exercised solely 
by the chairman of the Presidium - see his article, 1971, pp.70-71.
In the absence of concrete evidence in this regard, however, we are not 
in a position to confirm this supposition, though some Soviet literature 
partially supports it, e.g. M.G. Kirichenko states that the Presidium 
as a whole, though not its chairman only, has the exclusive right to 
award medals and titles to citizens (see Kirichenko, 1958, p.45).
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Presidium (leaving aside, for the moment, the question of the "true" 
decision-makers). The same applies to the republican Presidia. The 
explanation may lie partly in a formal distinction between decisions 
issued under Article 49 of the Constitution and other decisions of 
the Presidium, the constitutional basis of which would appear to 
be Article 14 of the federal Constitution, and corresponding articles 
of the republican constitutions. This article prescribes that the 
jurisdiction of the USSR is represented by its higher organs of 
state power and organs of state administration. That is to say, it 
postulates no demarcation of authority between the various state organs. 
In other words, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, as one of the 
higher organs of the state, is vested with a wide range of constit­
utional powers defined under not only Article 49, but also under 
Article 14 which combines executive, administrative, legislative and 
judicial functions. Comments by a Soviet Constitutional lawyer, S. 
Sultanov, lend support to this interpretation. Referring to the 
Presidium of the Uzbek Supreme Soviet, he states that the competence 
of the Presidium, which is the permanent higher organ of state power, 
is closely related to the competence of the Supreme Soviet (see 
Sultanov, 1959, p.77).
The fact that the powers listed under Article 14 are shared be­
tween the Presidium and other state bodies, and are not exclsuive 
to the Presidium, may be the reason why Presidium decisions made under 
those powers are not promulgated as acts. There is little point here 
in detailing these powers. Instead, in the following chapter the 
activities of the Presidia are considered in more concrete terms, 
and it will then be possible to establish more clearly how far these 
do or do not relate to powers granted them under the Constitution.
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CHAPTER 6 
PROCESS
Studies on the activities of the federal and republican Presidia 
suggest that these activities are of three main types: which we shall 
label pseudo-executive; legislative; and supervisory.
We shall investigate what these activities consist of in 
practise and how they are carried out, as well as the interrelation­
ship between the federal and republican Presidia, and between the 
latter and the local soviets.
The federal Presidium is convened, as a rule, at least once in 
two months (see Vasilerikov, 1967, p.23) . Meetings have, however, been 
reported infrequently in the past, although the number reported in 
the current convocation (the eighth) roughly corresponds with the 
stated frequency."*"
The republican Presidia appear to meet more frequently than the 
2federal Presidium.
Though the picture of the conduct of meetings is incomplete, 
a certain amount may be gleaned from scattered sources. Information 
on agenda questions is distributed to members of the Presidium a few 
days before the scheduled meeting (see Vinogradov, 1967, p.55). The 
chairmen of the Chamber or Chambers of the Supreme Soviet and the 
Standing Commissions, and deputies and representatives of State 
bodies and mass organizations may be invited to attend and to address
Number of reported meetings of the federal Presidium: (1) 4th, 5th
and 6th convocations (1954-66) - 14; (2) 7th convocation (1966-1970) - 
13; and (3) 8th convocation (19 70 & 1971 only) - 10. Sources - W S  
and Izvestia (1954-1971).
2 The Azerbaidzhan Presidium, for instance, is said to meet once a 
month (see Izv. 26.1.68). I.T. Bespaly also states that the Presidium 
of the republican Supreme Soviet meets as a rule once a month (see 
Bespaly, 1959, p.20).
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meetings, without the right to vote. Resolutions of the Presidium 
are taken by simple majority vote (see Vinogradov, 1967, p.49).
There is, however, no evidence that a vote has ever been taken.
Meetings are also said to be conducted by an interrogatory (oprosny) 
method, which means questioning by telephone or letter (see Yengibaryan, 
1970, p.32). All resolutions are entitled either "decree” (ukaz) 
or "decision" (postanovlenie), but never "law" (zakon) which the 
Constitution makes the exclusive prerogative of the full Supreme 
Soviet. Certain resolutions passed by the Presidium (particularly its 
decrees (ukazy) which are called "conditional" or "transitional" laws 
by Soviet jurists'^) need to be endorsed by the Chamber. In practice, 
however, all decrees and decisions of the Presidium become operative 
ten days after publication in Izvestia or the Vedomosti (Gazette) of 
the Supreme Soviet. There is no single case recorded where the 
Chamber of the Supreme Soviet has subsequently rejected an act duly 
passed by the Presidium between sessions of the Supreme Soviet. The 
same practice applies to all republican Presidia. Nevertheless, the 
Constitution (Article 48, para. 2 in the case of federal Constitution) 
stipulates that the Presidium is accountable to the Supreme Soviet for 
all its activities.
The problem however, from the point of view of this study, is 
less the nature of the resolutions adopted by the Presidium, than the 
way they have arrived at the decisions.
Section 1
Pseudo-executive Function
It has already been observed that the Presidia issue decrees
1 A.V. Mitskevich, 1967a, p.62. See also I.N. Kuznetsov, 1969, p.130.
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of an executive kind. We have also suggested that the Presidia in 
this regard seem frequently to act merely as formalizing agents.
Examples may be cited, however, where the Federal Presidium goes 
beyond the mere rubber-stamping of certain decisions and at least 
subjects the matter in question to lengthy discussion. Such cases 
have usually involved administrative questions or international 
relations.
Administrative questions
An example of a manifestly "rubber stamping" meeting is that 
of the federal Presidium held on 15 October, 1964 to discuss the 
question of the chairman of the federal Council of Ministers. The 
report ostensibly gave the information that the Presidium granted 
the request made by N.S. Khrushchev for his discharge as chairman of 
the federal Council of Ministers on the grounds of his old age and 
ill health. The Presidium then appointed A.N. Kosygin as the new 
chairman of the federal Council of Ministers (see W S , No.43, 1964, 
p.747). The case suggests that the Presidium has no genuine executive 
power of its own, nor in this instance even right of full discussion.
It merely endorses the decision taken elsewhere, probably, by the 
Politburo.
In some cases, meetings develop into a sort of ceremonial 
formality, for instance in decisions effecting changes in administrative 
boundaries between the republics (see Federal Constitution, Article 14, 
(e)). Thus, in February 1954, the Presidium was convoked to discuss 
the transfer of the Crimean region (oblast) from the RSFSR to the 
Ukraine republic. The "discussion" consisted of a series of statements 
in support of the change by the following people: K.Ye. Voroshilov
(chairman of the federal Presidium); D.S. Korotchenko (chairman of the
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Ukrainian Presidium); M.p. Tarasov (chairman of the RSFSR Presidium);
Sh.R. Rashidov (chairman of the Uzbek Presidium); O.V. Kuusinen 
(chairman of the Karelo-Finnish Presidium); and N.M. Shvernik (chair­
man of the Party Control Committee). All speakers, whose statements 
were reported in full, approved this decision unequivocally and 
justified it by arguing that the Crimean region was socially and 
economically an integral part of the Ukrainian republic rather than 
the Russian republic. The speakers characterised this occasion as 
a sign of fraternal action on the part of the Russians, and a sign of 
the strength and indestructibility of the friendship between the 
Russians and the Ukrainians.^
International Relations
Another instance of ritual formality is the ratification of 
international treaties. Discussion of such measures by the federal 
Presidium is usually preceded by discussions at joint meetings of 
the Commissions of Foreign Affairs of both Chambers. At the Presidium 
meeting, one of the Commission chairmen summarises the results of 
the discussions held in the joint meetings of the Commissions. Another 
regular speaker at the Presidium's meeting is, naturally, the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs. In addition, however, it is customary to invite 
certain top Soviet leaders to speak at the meetings. So, in the 
case of the Soviet - Czechoslovak friendship treaty which was ratified 
on 1 June, 1970, L.I. Brezhnev (general secretary of the Party CC),
A.N. Kosygin (chairman of the Council of Ministers), B.N. Ponomarev 
(CC secretary concerned with foreign relations), Yu.I. Paletskis 
(chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities), V.V. Grishin (first sec-
 ^See W S , No.4, 1954, pp.170-176. It is said that the federal Presidium 
issued about 20 decrees on these questions between 1953 and 1966 - 
see Saifulin, 1967, p.83.
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retary, Moscow city committee, CPSU), A.P. Lyashko (chairman of the 
Ukrainian Presidium), P.M. Masherov (first secretary of the CC of the 
Belorussian CP), and S.B. Niyazbekov (chairman of the Kazakhstan 
Presidium) attended and spoke at the meeting (see W S , No. 23, 1970, 
pp.263-260). Here again, all the speakers spoke in support of 
(approved) the treaty concluded by the two governments and requested 
the Presidium to ratify it. The purpose was presumably to demonstrate 
to foreign countries and perhaps the Soviet people the solidarity of 
the leaders backing the treaty, and at the same time to justify the 
actions taken by the leaders to the Soviet people.
At certain of its meetings, the Presidium also hears reports, 
on foreign relations in matters not requiring formal resolutions, 
such as reports of Soviet delegations to foreign countries, and on the 
reception of foreign statesmen and delegations. The chairman of 
the federal Presidium, N.V. Podgorny, claims that between 1966 and 
1970 the heads of state of more than 20 capitalist and developing 
countries as well as 37 parliamentary delegations visited the Soviet 
Union, while 24 delegations of the federal Supreme Soviet went abroad 
in the same period (see Izv, 12.6.70). During this time, Podgorny 
himself visited a number of developing countries as well as several 
countries in Eastern and Western Europe. Thus the Presidium plays 
a significant part of the formal aspects of foreign contacts as well 
as providing a context within which personal interchange may conven­
iently be structured. As Podgorny puts it, "communication with 
foreign countries (referring particularly to the Western countries) 
is necessary in order to overcome incorrect, distorted views and to 
display a more realistic approach toward relations with our country" 
(see Izv., 12.6.70). Despite Podgorny's formal position as chairman
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of the USSR's "collective head of state", it should not be assumed 
that his journeys abroad are mere courtesy visits. For instance, his 
visit to Austria in 1966 was widely interpreted by Western observers 
in political terms. His main purpose as one of the top Politburo 
members, may have been to remind the Austrians of their neutrality 
obligations at the time when Austria was completing her association- 
negotiations with EEC officials.1 It should be noted, thus, that 
this particular case says more about his position as Politburo 
member, perhaps, than as chairman of the Presidium. The latter position 
gives him formal status as head of state.
The above examples in the fields of administration and 
international relations indicate how the federal Presidium may be 
employed by the Soviet leaders as a useful publicity mechanism first 
to legitimize the decisions of the leaders, and, secondly, to demon­
strate the strength of national unity.
Section 2
Legislative Function
With respect to the national economic plan and the budget, the 
legislative role of both federal and republican Presidia is confined 
to co-ordinating, organizing and servicing the work of the Standing 
Commission for Budget and Planning and the branch Commissions. The Presidia, 
however, play a kind of legislative role in fields other than the 
national economic plan and the budget.
Vladimir Bazh, special correspondent of Izvestia, addressing the 
Vienna International Cultural Centre on "EEC and Austria from the Soviet 
standpoint", stated that Austria must carefully think over the political 
implications of association, for even association, whatever its form, 
would eventually violate Article 4 of the Neutrality Treaty. See Agence 
Europe, Luxembourg, 5.6.65. In his report at the meeting of the fed­
eral Presidium, Podgomy presented Austrian reconfirmation of the 
Neutrality Treaty without mentioning the question of the EEC and Austria 
(see VVS, No, 51, 1966. pp.1034-1035).
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Federal Presidium
When questions arise of a legislative nature other than those 
dealing with the national economic plan and the budget, the federal 
Presidium may set up ad hoc working commissions headed by a deputy 
chairman, the secretary or one of the members of the Presidium. The 
federal Presidium is said to have formed a total of 18 such commissions 
between 1938 and 1967^ (an average of only one every year).
The right to appoint commissions of inquiry and audit is con­
ferred on the Supreme Soviet (which connotes, strictly speaking, its 
Chambers) under Article 51 of the federal Constitution. The right 
has, however, been exercised by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. 
Article 51 stipulates that it is the duty of all institutions and 
officials to comply with the demands of such commissions and submit 
to them all necessary materials and documents.
Since 1967, there have been three such commissions formed: (1) 
"Commissions on Questions relating to Settlement and Village Soviets", 
formed in May 1967 and headed by a deputy chairman of the Presidium, 
S.B. Niyazbekov; (2) "Commission on Questions relating to District 
and City Soviets", formed in April 1968 and headed by a deputy chair­
man of the Presidium, M.A. Yasnov; and (3) "Commission on the 
Examination of Citizen's Letters and Organization of Reception" formed 
in April 1968 (chairman's name not reported).
In order to help evaluate the legislative role played by the 
Presidium and its Commissions mentioned above, we shall trace through 
a particular case as an illustration of the legislative process,
 ^ See Saifulin, 1967, p.78. It says that commissions may also be 
set up to deal with matters of other than a legislative nature, such 
as awards, citizenship and pardon.
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namely the law on the Basic Rights and Obligations of the Village 
and Settlement Soviets which came into force on 19 November, 1969. 
The main concern in our description will be to establish where the 
legislation has been initiated and how it has been processed.
The Communist Party has been making efforts to strengthen the 
local soviet organizations, particularly since the Twentieth Party 
Congress (Lobanova, 1970, p. 7? and Churchward, 1968, p. 188). 
Indeed, as the following statements^ show, concern to strengthen the 
local soviet organizations has been a constant theme of successive 
Soviet leaders (though it is worth noting that Brezhnev speaks in 
relatively more concrete terms than Khrushchev).
N.S. Khrushchev's speech at the 21st Party Congress:
"With a view to improving the work of the soviets re­
inforcing their ties with the masses, further develop­
ing Soviet democracy and drawing the working people more 
widely into the practical functioning of the soviets, the 
republican Supreme Soviets deemed it necessary to increase 
substantially - by approximately 350,000 - the number of 
deputies to the local soviets at the coming elections to 
the soviets in February and March."
(P, 28.1.59)
Many spokesmen of the federal and republican Supreme Soviet Presidia 
made similar statements. See e.g. M. Georgadze - secretary of the fed­
eral Presidium -in SDT,No.1967, p.7; G. Dzotsenidze - chairman of the 
Georgian Presidium ~in SDT',No. 10, 1967, p.20; V. Kozlov - chairman of 
the Belorussian Presidium - in SDT, No. 3, 1964, p.19; A. Klychev - 
chairman of the Turkmenian Presidium - in SDT, No. 2, 1966, p.19; and 
A. Myurisep - chairman of the Estonian Presidium,No. 11, 1964, p.24.
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N.S. Khrushchev's speech at the 22nd Party Congress;
"The powers of the soviets will be broadened....
Many of the questions that today fall within the 
competence of executive agencies of authority and 
administration will be handled directly by the 
soviets and their Commissions."
(P, 19.10.61)
L.I. Brezhnev's speech at the 23rd Congress:
"Improvement of the activity of the soviets must be 
effected on the basis of their further democratization.
It is necessary to raise still higher the importance 
of sessions of the soviets of working people's deputies, 
to grant the local soviets greater independence in deciding 
economic, financial and land questions and in guiding 
enterprises of local industry and everyday and social- 
cultural services for the population, and also to step up 
the work of the Standing Commissions and to report to 
the voters by the deputies..."
(P, 30.3.66)
During the Khrushchev era, a number of steps were taken by the 
Party in furtherance of the leadership's policy of enlivening the 
soviets, the most notable one being the Central Committee's Resolution 
of January 1957 concerning the improvement of the activities of soviet 
deputies and their contact with the masses.^ However, as in other
In the years immediately following (1957 and 1958), almost all 
republics adopted regulations on the local soviets. For example, the 
Ukrainian Supreme Soviet adopted a regulation on all local soviets, 
the Belorussian and Uzbek Supreme Soviets adopted regulations on 
village and district soviets, and all except the Tadzhikistan Supreme 
Soviet adopted regulations on village soviets (see Kirichenko, 1958, 
p.47).
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matters, current Soviet comment (see Izv., 14.5.67; and Lobanova,
1970, p.ll) takes the line that real improvement had to await the 
fall of Khrushchev and the installation of the new leadership. The 
October and November plenums of the Central Committee in 1964 took 
up the problem of complications which had largely resulted from 
Khrushchev's November 1962 reforms of the regional soviets, which had 
reorganized them according to the "production principle", resulting 
in serious anomalies in local administration (see Churchward, 1968, 
pp. 174-177). This was reversed by a decision of the November 1964 
Plenum, on Podgomy's Report on "the unification of the industrial 
and rural regional Party organizations and soviet organs" (see 
Yezhegodnik - B.S.E., 1965, p.14). In 1965, the Party Central 
Committee issued a decision on the village and settlement soviets 
in the Poltava region of the Ukraine, and instructed the Poltava 
regional Party committee to strengthen the performance of their 
rural and settlement soviets (see Partiinaya zhizn1, No. 23, 1965, 
pp.16-19). Like other such CC decisions based on the example of a 
single region, this decision was intended to provide guidelines 
applicable throughout the country, and has frequently been referred to 
in this sense.'*'
S. Boiko, then the chairman of the Poltava regional executive comm­
ittee, later wrote an article, saying that "the resolutions of the 
CPSU, CC in 1965 became a programme for all of our activity. We 
began with analysis of the work of the regional executive committee 
itself. We concluded that some things in the arsenal of the methods 
of leadership had to be changed and on some sectors matters had to 
be conducted in entirely new ways. At the same time, we reviewed the 
system of planning the sessions of the exeuctive committee, the 
organization of check-up on decisions adopted, the time limits for 
handling correspondence, co-ordination between departments and admin­
istrations, and much else. We pursued a single goal: to make the
apparatus smooth running" (see Izv., 14.4.68).
125
In March 1967 the CPSU Central Committee adopted a further 
resolution towards improving the work of village and settlement soviets 
in "fulfilling the programme set by the 23rd CPSU Congress in the 
fields of economic, social and cultural construction and in enlisting 
the masses in the administration of state affairs" (P.,
11.3.67) .
It was shortly after this Central Committee resolution that the 
federal Presidium was convoked to discuss the problem of improving 
the work of the village and settlement soviets. At a meeting on 12th 
May, 1967, the Presidium heard a report delivered by S.B. Niyazbekov 
(deputy chairman of the federal Presidium, and chairman of the Kazakhstan 
Presidium) on the experience of the village and settlement soviets in 
Kazakhstan. The Presidium stressed the primary role of the republican 
organs in the improvement of the role of the local soviets. Podgorny 
concluded by stating that it would be expedient if the republican 
organizations could render material and technical assistance to the 
local soviets and create necessary conditions for the improvement of 
their activities. A Commission was then formed headed by Niyazbekov, 
to prepare proposals on the possibilities of expanding the rights of 
village and settlement soviets (W S , No.20. 1967, pp.301-302).
It should be noted that, apart from Kazakhstan, whose Supreme 
Soviet adopted a decision (postanovlenie) on.strengthening the work of 
local soviets in July 1966, similar measures had also been adopted 
in a number of other republics: in the Azerbaidzhan Supreme Soviet
in September 1964, the Kirgiz Supreme Soviet in May 1966, and the 
Tadzhik, Georgian and Uzbek Supreme Soviets in 1967. As mentioned 
in an earlier footnote almost all republics had also adopted regul­
ations on local soviets between 1957 and 1958.
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It is not clear, therefore, why the Kazakh Presidium chairman 
was singled out to present the report at this meeting. Was it 
simply that Kazakhstan was generally regarded as something of a 
model republic with regard to the work of village and settlement 
soviets; or could it reflect the fact that Kazakhstan was a republic 
in which General Secretary Brezhnev’s influence was particularly 
strong and its leaders could therefore be relied on to remain 
sensitive to the latter's views on the proper relationships between 
Party and government bodies?
At the time the Presidium took the matter up, there existed more 
than 100 enactments regulating various questions to do with the work 
of village and settlement soviets. However, these enactments lacked 
clear definitions in the field of planning, the expenditure of budget 
funds, control over the construction of public centres, etc. (see Izv., 
12.4.68). The confusion over the interpretation of existing enactments 
came partly from the fact that in the territory there were many 
enterprises, institutions and other organizations which were not under 
local jurisdiction. One can readily appreciate the difficulties this 
could create for local government agencies.
Against this background, the Presidium and in particular its 
ad hoc Commission appear to have been assigned the task of assisting 
in the codification of new legislation. It was in a position to survey 
the operation of local soviets and the various existing regulations, 
and to weigh up the possibilities of new unified legislation.^ It is 
claimed that the new legislation was adopted after careful study of 
the work of the soviets, of the normative enactments which regulate
 ^ According to F.I. Kalinychev, in the past 30 years the Presidium has 
handled 10 such cases to eliminate discrepancies between federal and 
republican regulations (see Kalinychev, 1969, p.41).
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their activities and of proposals that had come in from the Presidia 
of republican Supreme Soviets, ministries and departments, scientific 
institutions, and the press (see Izv., 12.4.68)
Unfortunately, we do not know the composition of the Commission, 
which might have thrown some light on the operation of the Presidium 
in this matter. But we do know the composition of a similar Commission 
set up by the Presidium to examine the possibility of expanding the 
rights and duties of district and city soviets. It consisted of the 
spokesmen of a number of ministries, departments, and republican 
and local soviet organs (see W S , No. 15, 1968, p.197). If the 
membership of the Commission concerned was similar, the individual 
members would have been able to draw on the organizations in which 
they actually worked as sources of information.
Be this as it may, nearly a year after the Presidium took up 
this problem, it adopted, on 8 April, 1968, a decree on "The Basic 
Rights and Duties of Village and Settlement Soviets" and also approved 
a "Model Statute on the Republican Village and Settlement Soviets", 
while, on the same day, the federal Council of Ministers adopted a 
resolution on "Measures to Strengthen the Material and Financial 
Base of Village and Settlement Soviets" (see Izv., 9.4.68).
In this example of the legislative process, the CPSU Central 
Committee clearly acted as prime mover in implementing the wishes 
of Soviet leaders for legislation of this kind. Indeed, it has been 
said that the document adopted by the CPSU Central Committee in March 
1967 "played an exceptional role in enhancing the prestige of the 
lower soviet bodies that...directed them at resolving tasks of 
economic, ... financial and land questions and ... of the management 
of social and cultural services to the public " (see editorial article
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in Izv., 12.4.68). At a certain stage of the legislative process, the
Presidium became a convenient intermediate organ which performed
the role of information gathering, opinion tapping and publicity as
well as drafting and legitimation.
It should be remembered, however, that this case illustrates only
one of the types of legislative process in which the Presidium is
involved one way or another. In other types, as we have already
suggested, the Presidium may simply operate as a "rubber stamp", may
transfer the main scene of action to the appropriate Standing
Commissions of the federal Supreme Soviet (which operate similarly to
the Presidium but with a stronger orientation to publicity^), or
2may share operations with the Standing Commissions.
Republican Presidia
Information about Presidium legislative function is even sparser at
the republic than atthe federal level. One important determinant
here is that in most major new legislation a federal law is first
enacted which lays down basic patterns, and only then do the republics
take up the matter, taking up matters of detail; in so doing they
3are supposed to take local conditions into consideration. The
The publicity attaching to the Standing Commissions is directed at 
the masses as well as particular groups. See Chapter 8, section 2.
2 For instance, the Presidium formed an ad hoc Commission in 1966, 
entrusted with studying the question of improving various regulations on 
the existing criminal code. At a meeting on 12 April, 1968, the 
Presidium approved this Commission's findings. Then, the Legislative 
Proposals Commissions of the Supreme Soviet were instructed to prepare 
the draft law, taking into account the amendments suggested by the 
Presidium's Commission (to the existing criminal code) (see Izv.,
13.4.68).
3 For instance, in the federal law on Marriage and Family, the republics 
were granted the right to lower the marriage age in individual legislation 
(see Izv., 27.7.68). Another example on the federal law on the Rights 
and Obligations of District and City Soviets - see P. Pigalev (depart­
ment head on the Work of Soviets of the federal Presidium)'s article,
1972, pp.15-24.
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limited information on the legislative function of the republican Presidia 
suggests, nevertheless, that the republican Presidia perform their 
operations in much the same way as does the federal Presidium. For 
instance, the Estonian Presidium studied, in June 1970, the intro­
duction of republican Land legislation (federal Land legislation 
having come into force on 1 July, 1969), and instructed its juridical 
department to draft the legislation. The Land legislation drafted 
by the latter was further elaborated by a Commission formed for 
this purpose, headed by E. Tynurist (Estonian Minister of Production 
and Procurement of Agricultural Products and first deputy chairman 
of the Estonian Council of Ministers) and consisting of specialists, 
scholars and agriculturalists. When this Commission had completed 
its work, the juridical department of the Presidium checked the 
revised Land legislation with reference to the federal Land legis­
lation already in force in order to ensure conformity with the latter 
(see Izv., 27.6.70). Another organizational form for ensuring 
conformity with relevant federal laws is that the federal Presidium 
sets up an ad hoc consultative group (Konsultativnaya gruppa)at the 
request of the particular republican legislative organs. The member­
ship of such groups generally consists of spokesmen of relevant federal 
ministries and departments, and of social organizations, most of 
whom have previously worked as members of the sub-commissions formed 
by the federal Legislative Proposals and other Standing Commissions 
for the preparation of the draft federal law in question. These groups 
also contain specialists and spokesmen of the republican ministries and 
departments who are taking part in the elaboration of the draft repub­
lican law. Staff members (mainly from the juridical departments and
the departments on the work of soviets) of the federal Presidium and
130
the republican Presidium concerned usually also participate. This 
type of organizational arrangement, which appears to be a relatively 
recent innovation (see Novikov, 1969, pp.123-124) might be regarded 
as providing a setting where related federal and republican officials 
can directly reconcile conflicting views from their different stand­
points, though it could equally be interpreted as a device for 
streamlining the imposition of federal laws on the lower administrative 
levels.
The republican Presidia like the federal Presidium also hand 
some pieces of legislation to the Standing Commissions for detailed 
elaboration. As a rule, however, they do not publish draft legislation 
for public discussion. Exceptions have been limited to a few draft 
decrees. The RSFSR Presidium, for instance, published a draft decree 
on measures against home-made spirits in August 1959, and subsequently 
claimed that in elaborating the draft decrees the suggestions and 
proposals made by the people and social organizations were taken into 
consideration (see SDT, No. 8, 1959, p.99), thereby seeking to 
substantiate its legitimacy in the public mind.
Section 3
Organizational Function
What is involved here is largely organization of the work of 
the Supreme Soviet by its Presidium.
In the absence of rules of the procedure of the Presidium, there 
is some difficulty in describing the formal responsibilities of the 
federal and republican Presidia with respect to organization of the 
work of the corresponding Supreme Soviets. We have thus attempted to 
establish the responsibilities of the Presidium on the basis of Soviet
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writers* studies^ which enabled us to list the following responsibilities 
of the Presidium vis-a-vis the Supreme Soviet, and it seems reasonable 
to assume that these apply to both the federal and republican levels.
The Presidium:
- convokes sessions of the Supreme Soviet
- submits proposals on the agenda for each session 
gives preliminary consideration to the draft laws to be 
submitted to the Supreme Soviet, and in some cases passes 
them to the Standing Commissions for examination, and 
considers the findings of the Standing Commissions on such 
draft laws
in the period between sessions of the Supreme Soviet, 
instructs the Standing Commissions of the Supreme Soviet 
in the elaboration of the draft laws which are later 
subject to approval by the Supreme Soviet or the Presidium, 
and also in the examination of particular problems
- in the period between sessions of the Supreme Soviet, 
co-ordinates and assists the work of the Standing 
Commissions of the Supreme Soviet
is responsible for the publication of the laws and 
decisions of the Supreme Soviet and decrees and decisions 
of the Presidium.
Some of these responsibilities need to be explained here.
First, as we have noted earlier, the federal and republican Supreme 
Soviets began to meet their constitutional requirements of convening at 
least twice a year only from 1957. The Presidium,having been granted
See e.g. Bespaly, 1959; Kalinychev, 1959; Saifulin, 1967, pp. 77-93; 
Shnaidman, 1938; Schlifer, 1938; Vinogradov, 1967, pp.49-58.
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the right to convoke the sessions of the Chamber (sea e.g. Article 49a 
of the federal Constitution), may have seen the usefulness of the 
sessions for increasing the image of the Supreme Soviet as an 
instrument for supervising the activity of the government and for 
popular participation in drafting acts and regulations of the country.
One item which has always been included in the agenda of sessions 
of the Supreme Soviet is the report of the Presidium's secretary on 
its activities. The main part of the secretary's function at the 
sessions is to submit to the Chamber for its approval the decrees 
issued by the Presidium in the period between the sessions of the 
Supreme Soviet and to get them promulgated as laws of the Supreme 
Soviet.^
The lateral relations between the Presidium and the Standing
Commissions appear to be one of the most important organizational
duties of the Presidium. As we have seen in considering legislative
activity, the Presidium hands over certain of its legislative
responsibilities to the Standing Commissions. The practice indicates,
according to O.Ye. Kutafin's observations, that the questions of
whether or not a Standing Commission is to be given the opportunity
of considering a draft law, subsequently to be submitted either to
the Presidium or to the Supreme Soviet, is determined by the Presidium
2(see Kutafin, 1966, p.35; see also Vasil'ev, V. 1959, p.25).
^ e.g. In the period between 1938 and 1969, the federal Supreme Soviet 
adopted 319 laws and decisions which had been adopted previously by 
the Presidium as decrees (see Kulik, Luk'yanov and Tokmakov, 1970,
p.28.)
2 Kutafin also illustrated that during the 6th convocation (1962-1966), 
for example, 241 proposals were introduced into the legislature, only 
53 of which had been examined by the Standing Commissions and in the 
whole history of the Supreme Soviet only one bill has ever gone 
directly to a Standing Commission without having been considered first 
by the Presidium (see Kutafin, 1966, pp.36-37).
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The Presidium is also involved in the task of supervising the 
activities of the Standing Commissions. This aspect has become 
more apparent since the proliferation of the Standing Commissions and 
the introduction of regulative instruments aiming at making "rational 
and harmonious" use of the newly created Standing Commissions. We 
shall not, however, pursue here the question of the actual activities 
of the Standing Commissions as these are to be considered separately 
in the following chapters.
The Presidium customarily refers international treaties subject 
to ratification by the Presidium to the Foreign Affairs Commissions 
for their "consideration". The Presidium also refers to the Standing 
Commissions questions related to the implementation of acts by govern­
ment bodies and other organizations, such as the annual economic plan. 
The Presidium occasionally convokes meetings of the chairmen of the 
Standing Commissions for the purpose of enabling the latter to "exchange 
their work experience" and of familiarizing itself with their decisions, 
assisting them in the formulation of their work plans, and "giving 
advice" on the organization of their activities. At its meeting on 
12 April, 1968, for instance, the Presidium surveyed the work of the 
Standing Commissions and adopted a work plan for some of the branch 
Commissions for 1968; the Commission for Industry, Transport and 
Communications of the Soviet of the Union was to discuss the problem 
of the mechanization of stock-raising; the Commission for Construction 
and Industrial Building Materials of the Soviet of Nationalities to 
examine the question of the fulfilment of the plan of building 
material production in 1968 and further development of this industry; 
on 17 April, 1968 the Commission for Trade and Everyday Services of 
the Soviet of Nationalities to examine the question of the improvement
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of retail trade and public eating facilities (see W S , No. 16, 1968, 
p.236). The Presidium is also kept informed of progress in implement­
ation of the Commissions' resolutions, since all resolutions addressed 
to government bodies and other organizations are recorded in the 
Presidium (see Izv., 30.7.70; and Zlenko, 1960, p.18). Thus, the 
Presidium is in a position to reinforce the Commissions’ resolutions, 
if the latter fail to receive a satisfactory reply from the bodies 
addressed. Soviet jurists such as F. Kalinychev and A. Luk’yanov go 
so far as to state that the Presidium's instructions to the Standing 
Commissions and its examination of their proposals at its meetings, 
its consultations with the chairmen of the Standing Commissions, and 
its general supervision of the Standing Commissions, are all essential 
procedures for the Standing Commissions' recommendations to be 
implemented by the ministries and departments (see Kalinychev and 
Luk'yanov, 1966, p. 12).
The Presidium is very likely to intervene in the work of the 
Commissions when there is a problem requiring participation by more 
than one Commission (see Kutafin, 1971, p. Ill) or a problem which has 
remained unsolved by the Commissions.^ This is particularly likely 
when the annual economic plan and the budget are to be examined by the 
Commissions (almost all the Standing Commissions are involved in this 
work). In these cases, some members of the Presidium are generally 
present at the meetings of the Commissions (see e.g. Ukrainian in­
stances in Zlenko's article, 1960, p. 18). An important concern of 
the Presidium may be to keep the recommendations of the Standing 
Commissions within bounds, and if necessary to restraint excessive 
recommendations. For instance, in the case of the national economic 
plan and the budget, as we see later, the Standing Commissions
 ^ A federal Standing Commission member informally interviewed by the 
author on 6 March, 1972, pointed out this aspect.
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can demand appropriation increases, though only marginal in quantity 
(less than 0.1% of the total federal budget), in the social welfare 
sectors of the economic plan. It may be part of the Presidium's 
concern to ensure that the recommended appropriation increases are 
well within the established norm or whatever new norm is set by the 
planners. The same role may be exercised with respect to particip­
ation by the Standing Commissions in the drafting of legislation.
To this point we have merely noted the scope of the relation­
ships between the two bodies, without giving full supporting evidence; 
more concrete evidence will be presented at a later stage. Never­
theless, the above descriptions indicate something of the nature of 
the relationships between the two bodies. In terms of influence, 
the Presidium is very much the de facto parent body of the Standing 
Commissions: the work of the latter is to be co-ordinated and
directed by the Presidium.
Finally, to help improve the organizational work of the Supreme 
Soviet, a republic Presidium may organize delegations to other 
republics. For example, at least two such delegations have been 
formed by the Estonian Presidium: one was sent to Lithuania in
June 1967? and one to Armenia in May 1969.^ Estonian delegates
The duration of the delegation's stay in the host republic is four 
to five days (see Sovetskaya Est., 1.8.67; and Kommunist-Arm., 23.5.69). 
The composition of the Estonian delegation to Armenia in May, 1969 
was as follows: 1. head of the delegation - deputy chairman of the
Presidium, A. Ya. Ansberg; 2. deputy chairman of the Standing Commi­
ssion for Public Health and Social Security, M.A. Kalev (doctor); 3. 
member of the Standing Commission for Legislative Proposals, A.A.
Karu (chairman of Tartu City Executive Committee); 4. secretary of the 
Standing Commission for Education and Culture, A. Kh. Kroon (deputy 
director, technical school); 5. deputy chairman of the Standing Comm­
ission for Trade and Everyday Service, K.M. Nymi (first secretary 
Pyl'va Regional Party Committee); 6. member of the Standing Commission 
for Construction and Communal Economy, E.K. Pappel (excavator); 7. 
member of the Standing Commission for Industry, Transport and Communi­
cations, N.D. Serebryannikov (chief engineer); 8. deputy chairman of the 
Standing Commission for Agriculture, I. Yu. Yurison (director, Scient­
ific-research institute; 9. Department staff member of the Presidium, 
A.Kh. Il'vest.
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acquainted themselves with the work of the Lithuanian and Armenian 
Presidia and Standing Commissions, and also those of local soviets.
Section 4
Supervisory Function
jIn some respects, supervisory activity may be regarded as the 
most important resonsibility of both the federal and republican 
Presidia. The principal objects of their supervision are implement­
ation of the acts of the Supreme Soviets and of the Presidia,
"socialist legality", mass-organizational work and organizational 
work of local soviets. Although,as we shall see, different spheres 
of influence exist for the federal and for the republican Presidia, we 
shall consider the supervisory function of the federal and republican 
Presidia together. The main reason for doing so is that it is not 
only convenient to examine jointly certain activities such as the 
mass-organizational work on elections, which requires a vertical chain 
of action from the federal Presidium right down to the local soviets, 
but also appropriate to study jointly the communication aspect.
1) Implementation of the acts of the Supreme Soviets and their Presidia
The federal Presidium's concern here is to expose shortcomings 
in the implementation of those enactments of the federal Supreme Soviet 
and its Presidium which are currently in force. Its criticisms are 
usually directed not at a particular agent, but at the whole body of 
agents collectively responsible for the implementation of the acts 
concerned. In June, 1970, for instance, the Legislative Proposals 
Commissions of the Chambers reported to the Presidium that they had 
completed a study of the practical application of the decrees on the 
Procedure for Examining Citizen's Proposals, Petitions and Complaints
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promulgated by the Presidium on 12 April, 1968. At the meeting of 
the Presidium, reports of the Procurator-General and the People's 
Control Committee were heard on this matter. Then, the Presidium 
adopted a resolution ordering ministries, departments and heads of 
enterprises, institutions and organizations to enact additional measures 
to guarantee the observance of the decree. The Procurator-General 
and the People's Control Committee were also ordered to intensify 
surveillance and supervision of the observance of the decree in 
question (see Izv., 3.6.70). In this case, the Presidium is concerning 
itself with shortcomings in the conduct of two sets of bodies: one 
actually implementing tire act, and the other supervising the perform­
ance of those who carried it out. In the case of the implementation 
of the " law on Marriage and Family” , the Presidium criticised the 
implementing bodies, namely the federal Supreme Court, the federal 
Ministry of Justice, and the federal Ministry of Internal Affairs, 
for their shortcomings in applying the legislation. The Presidium 
also criticised the extra-supervisory body,the Procuracy-General, 
for its shortcomings in supervision over the strict fulfillment of 
the requirements of the Law (see Izv., 27.3.71). It should be noted 
that such Presidium instructions are horizontal ones, that is they are 
directed at other federal bodies. Therefore, the Presidium appears to 
be co-ordinating activities of the other supervising bodies. The same 
approach to checking on the implementation of acts seems to be 
practised by the republican Presidia as well, despite the differences 
in setting. Speaking of the RSFSR Presidium in this regard, a Soviet 
constitutional lawyer, A.N. Vinogradov, described such operations as 
a "programme of work" which requires "a number of organizations to
inform the Presidium of the progress of their implementation and super-
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vision" (see Vinogradov, 1967, p. 54).
Among the active participants assisting the Presidium in this 
operation are, as we have seen, the Standing Commissions, in part­
icular, the Legislative Proposals Commissions of both Chambers. They, 
survey, examine and summarise the problems of implementing particular 
acts. The Legislative Proposals Commissions may take action in keeping 
with their work plan (and this presumably and at least partially on 
their own initiative), or at the request of the Presidium. The 
federal Legislative Proposals Commissions also keep surveillance on 
the state of implementation at republican level. For instance, with 
a view to intensifying supervision over the implementation of the 
labour law concerning enterprises operating under the various federal 
ministries, the federal Presidium resolved to forward a note with 
recommendations from the Legislative Proposals Commissio'ns of the 
federal Supreme Soviet to the republican Presidia, ministries and 
departments (see Izv., 3.6.70). On another occasion, the federal 
Presidium discussed the question, raised by the federal Legislative 
Proposals Commissions, of the practice of applying the Law on Marriage 
and the Family in the republic. Having noted various shortcomings 
in executing the Law, the Presidium recommended the republican Presidia to 
examine at their sessions the practice of applying the Law on Marriage 
and the Family and to give attention to strict observance of the 
Law's requirements regarding establishment of paternity, child support 
judgements, and divorce in court agencies and civil registration 
agencies (see Izv., 27.3.71).
By way of mobilizing the republican Presidia in this operation, 
the federal Presidium augments the communication flow vertically from 
the federal Presidium down to the local soviet organs. In practice
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some information also flows upwards back to the federal Presidium.
For instance, it was reported that, since the Law on Marriage and 
the Family had gone into effect, civil registration agencies had been 
receiving petitions from citizens who wished to change their patron­
ymics. (Under the Law's new regulations, the civil registration 
agencies have the right to determine paternity of children born out 
of wedlock). The agencies refused to consider these petitions, 
however, since no procedure for changing patronymics was provided by 
law. (The Law as enacted provides a procedure for changing surname 
and given names only). Consequently, acting on representations by 
the RSFSR and Belorussian Presidia, the federal Presidium considered 
the establishment of a procedure whereby citizens might change their 
patronymics. Thus, the vertical co-ordination by the federal Presidium 
in the implementation of acts results in a degree of feedback, and 
may lead to readjustment indirectly, if not directly, of acts currently 
in force in the light of their application. Naturally, the Standing 
Commissions of the Supreme Soviet and the apparatus of the Presidium 
also facilitate this feedback to the Presidium (see Izv., 27.3.71).
It has been noted already that republican Presidia survey the
1state of implementation in the republics of particular acts issued 
by the federal Presidia. They adopt a number of decisions (postanov- 
lenia) independently of the federal Presidium, and periodically check 
the state of implementation of these decisions. For example, on 26 
June, 1969, the Latvian Presidium adopted a decision concerning the 
provision by schools of general education in the 1969-70 school year
 ^ For example, reports on successive check-ups by the Belorussian 
Presidium of fulfillment of the decree, "The Examination of Citizen's 
Complaints, Proposals and Statements" adopted by the federal Presidium 
on 12 April, 1968 (and to be seen in Sovetskaya Bel., 28.2.69; 30.5.69; 
and 10.2.71) and also by the Kazakh Presidium (see SDT, No. 3, 1972,
p.60).
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(see Sovetskaya Lat., 28.6.69). Then, on 29 August, 1969, the 
Presidium examined the fulfillment of the decision in the republic 
(see Sovetskaya Lat., 30.8.69).
At the republic level, a preliminary check may be conducted by 
a department of the Presidium itself (see e.g. Izv., 17.3.64; and 
Sovetskaya Lat., 30.8.69), or by the Standing Commissions (see Zorin, 
1967, p. 24) or in co-operation with the republican Procurator and 
People’s Control Committee (see e.g. SDT, No. 12, 1969, p.75). When, 
for instance, the Latvian Presidium examined the implementation by 
local bodies of the decree on "The Examination of Citizen's Complaints, 
Proposals and Statements" in the field of everyday services in the 
republic, participants in the meeting expressing dissatisfaction 
included Presidium member,0. Rudnev (second secretary republican Komsomol 
Central Committee), a member of the Legislative Proposals Commission,
V. Laivin (republican Procurator), and a member of the Education,
Science and Culture Commission, I. Ivert (newspaper editor) (see SDT,
No. 12, 1969, p. 75). This indicates that such overall supervision 
conducted by the Presidium is of interest to other supervisory bodies 
as well. It was reported as early as 1957 that some republican 
Presidia carried out a supervision based on the recommendations of the 
Standing Commissions, and adopted, together with the Council of Mini­
sters, measures to reinforce the activities of the ministries (see 
Arushanyan, 1957, p. 21). In recent years, the Presidia have a 
tendency to carry out more and more supervision based on the recommend­
ations of the Standing Commissions. In this regard, Z. Kvachadze, 
secretary of the Georgian Presidium, stated that during the period 
between 1967 and 1968, recommendations of the Commissions were included,
on fourteen occasions, in the agenda of his Presidium (see Kvachadze,
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1968, p. 42). When the supervision of the fulfilment of acts in a
locality are to be carried out by the officials of the Presidium,
the latter is said to have mobilized the lawyers and other specialists
for this purpose (see SDT, No. 3, 1972, p. 61). On other occasions,
if the Presidium deems it necessary to survey the overall state of
implementation of particular acts, selected numbers of local soviet
executives will be called to report to the Presidium.^ As a further
way of obtaining information on the implementation of acts and to
help improve implementation, the Presidium may also convene seminar-
conferences for related working officials of the republican and
2local governments in the republic.
2) Socialist Legality"
This phrase is not a soviet equivalent of the concept of "rule 
of law", but rather, without limiting the prerogatives of the Party, 
is concerned with observance by official and unofficial organizations 
and citizens of existing rules of procedure. Stalin and his successors 
have continued to claim that law and the state will "wither away" under 
true communism, but in the meantime they are supposed to reach their 
highest peak of development (Kamenka, 1965, p. 13).
See e.g. Kommunist (Armenia), 24.10.68. On 22 October, 1968, the 
chairman of the Armenian Presidium, N. Arutyanyan, received ten 
chairmen selected from village executive committees to hear of their 
activity with a view to implementing the decree, "Basic Rights and 
Obligations of Village and Settlement Soviets" adopted by the federal 
Presidium on 8 April, 1968.
2 E.g. in relation to implementation of the decree, "Establishment of 
Citizen's Complaints, Statements and Proposals", the Kazakhstan Presidium 
held on July 1968 a seminar-conference for the heads of the complaints 
bureaus of the ministries and departments, instructors for supervision 
over the implementation of workers' complaints, inspectors for cadres, 
and working officials of the Alma-Ata regional, city and city district 
executive committees (see further Kazakhstanskaya P., 21.7.68 and SDT,
No. 3, 1972, p. 60).
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The federal Presidium is one of several bodies concerned with 
ensuring "socialist legality", and is supposed to act as a watchdog 
on its observance by central, republican and local governments, which 
serve to mobilize the masses behind the activities of the State. To 
a large extent, however, this task is carried out by the Standing 
Commissions of the federal and republican Supreme Soviets (with 
regard to the activities of the federal and republican governments) 
and by the republican Presidia (with regard to the activities of the 
local soviets and their organs). Thus, the federal Presidium's role 
here is in effect to strengthen and facilitate the supervisory work of 
the individual republican Supreme Soviets. The federal Presidium seeks 
to keep itself informed of the current state of the supervising 
activities on "socialist legality" conducted by the republican Presidia, 
relying largely on statistical information provided by its Department 
on the Work of the Soviets. The Standing Commissions of the federal 
Supreme Soviet may investigate the work of local soviets with respect 
to "socialist legality". For instance, on July 9, 1969 the federal 
Presidium examined a report presented by the Legislative Proposals 
Commissions concerning the principle of socialist legality in decisions 
adopted by the local soviets of Kazakhstan and Lithuania and the 
Astrakhan and Pskov regions of the Russian republic (see W S ., No. 29, 
1969, p. 140). The republican Presidia also keep the federal Presidium 
informed on the work of the local soviets and soviet organs with 
respect to such matters as deputies' reports to their electorates and 
the fulfillment of the mandates given by the electorates (see Sovet- 
skaya Est., 13.4.68). Some republican Standing Commissions for 
Legislative Proposals such as in Armenia were renamed in 1968 Commissions
on Questions of Legislation and Socialist Legality. It was reported
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that the new name "is confirmed by the new functions of this Commission, 
which is, the right to study the activity of ministries, departments 
and other republic agencies in the sphere of the strengthening of 
socialist legality and the safeguarding of citizen's rights and 
interests". (see Izv., 16.4.69). On the basis of such information, 
if it deems it necessary, the federal Presidium may inform the 
republican Presidia to take measures to remove shortcomings in 
ensuring "socialist legality" (see W S , No. 29, 1969, p. 401).
The republican Presidia are particularly concerned with activ­
ating the Commissions of local soviets for Socialist Legality and the 
Defence of Public Order, which study problems in individual cases such 
as industrial and agricultural enterprises, relating to the violation 
of socialist law, order and legality, dissemination of legal knowledge 
among workers, and struggle against violations of the law. Their 
findings may be discussed not only in the executive committees of 
the soviets concerned, but also in the republican Presidia (see e.g. 
Sovetskaya Bel., 12.3.71). On occasions the republican Presidium will 
also issue postanovlenia, which generally stipulate that the following 
bodies should take appropriate action within their various spheres of 
responsibility - the executive committees of local soviets, the 
Standing Commissions for Socialist Legality and Defence of Public Order 
of local soviets republican Procuracy and Courts, and federal Ministry 
of Internal Affairs (see e.g. W S , RSFSR, No. 11, 1970, pp. 139-143; 
and also Sovetskaya Bel., 1.9.68). As in the case of implementation of 
laws and acts, therefore, one decision (postanovlenie) of the Presidium 
may produce directives to as many as four or five bodies, which must 
be reminded of the importance of the particular aspects of "socialist 
legality" at a given time and place. Simultaneous action is required 
from these bodies and so is co-ordinated by the Presidium. The primary
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function of the republican Presidia in the activity concerned with 
"socialist legality" appears, therefore, to be to mobilize these 
agencies, which are most directly involved in fostering public order 
by disciplining, guiding, training and educating Soviet citizens 
under the banner of "socialist legality".
3) Mass-organizational work
"Mass-organizational work" has as its most important single 
aspect the use of machinery of the soviets to mobilize the masses 
behind Party and government programmes.
One of the mass-organizational tasks which have been actively 
enforced and supervised by the federal Supreme Soviet Presidium is 
the preparation for elections to the federal Supreme Soviet. For 
carrying out the elections, the federal Supreme Soviet Presidium 
confirms the election regulation, fixes the date of the elections, 
forms the electoral districts, and approves central and district 
electoral Commissions. Meanwhile, each republican Presidium sets up 
by its own decree a republic electoral Commission and district 
electoral Commissions for the election of the Soviet of Nationalities 
of the federal Supreme Soviet. Each electoral Commission compiles 
lists of the electors in the district. The federal Presidium keeps 
an eye on the election preparations right up to the election date, 
although much of the supervisory work is actually carried out by the 
republican Presidia. Each republican Presidium surveys the progress 
of the election preparations in the republic convoking for this purpose 
conferences in which 'the ministries, chairmen of the state committees,
heads of departments, working staff of the republican Presidia and the
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republican Council of Ministers participate.'1' a republic Presidium also 
examines the election preparations conducted in the particular dist­
ricts. The RSFSR Presidium, for instance, having heard a report by one 
of its Deputy Department Heads, G.M. Sazhina, on the progress of the 
election preparations to the federal Supreme Soviet in 1970, criticised 
the conduct of the election preparations by the Moscow City Executive 
Committee, Buryat Autonomous Republic Presidium, and the Ryazan 
Regional Executive Committee, at a Presidium meeting attended by 
spokesmen of these bodies (see W S , RSFSR, No. 22, 1970, pp. 349-351.
See also Sovetskaya Rossia, 11.2.61; Sovetskaya Est., 31.5.66;
Sovetskaya Bel., 17.2.63 and 28.2.69; and WS, RSFSR, No. 9, 1967,
pp. 208-210).
In the same way, the federal Presidium supervises elections to 
the republican Supreme Soviets and local soviets. At a 1971 meeting 
of the federal Presidium, for instance, its secretary, M.P. Georgadze 
presented a report on the election of deputies to the republican 
Supreme Soviets, autonomous republics and local soviets, expressing 
general satisfaction with the work of the republican Presidia and 
local executive committees (see W S , No. 27, 1971, p. 371) .
One intriguing question concerning the election to the federal 
Supreme Soviet is what part, if any, is played by the federal and 
republican Presidia in the process of selecting the candidates.
E.g. the Kazakhstan Presidium convoked a conference on 5 June, 1970, 
to examine the state of the election preparations to the federal Supreme 
Soviet in the republic. The following people attended at the conference: 
Minister of Communications; Deputy Minister of Geology; Deputy Mini­
ster of Agriculture; Head of the Kazakhstan Railway Administration; 
Chairman of the State Committee for Forestry; Deputy Minister of 
Internal Affairs; and Chairman of the State Committee for Radio and 
Television. V.H. Titov (second secretary of the Kazakhstan CPCC) and 
S.B. Niyazbekov (chairman of Kazakhstan Presidium) spoke at the 
conferences urging the participants to carry out close supervision of 
election preparations and to ensure well-ordered conduct of the 
elections. (See Kazakhstanskaya, P., 6.6.70).
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Western scholars usually attribute a dominant role to the Communist
Party in the nomination of candidates, ensured by the control it 
exercises over the various organizations enjoying the formal right 
of nomination. The Communist Party, even if it does not initiate 
all the nominations, is believed to screen them closely (see 
Churchward, 1968,p.105). The proliferation of Standing Commissions 
since 1966 introduces a new factor which may influence the nomination 
of candidates. The Standing Commissions of the federal Supreme Soviet, 
which now constitute as much as half the total number of deputies, 
appear to have acquired certain distinct functions (see Chapter 9).
The composition of the Supreme Soviet may thus have to take into 
account the objectives of the Standing Commissions, and thus may 
influence the selection of the deputies. In other words, a new 
criterion may have been added to the original criteria - whatever 
they may be - of nominating the candidates. Thus, it is conceivable 
that in elections to the federal Supreme Soviet, general guidelines 
for the composition of the Supreme Soviet are formulated by the top 
Soviet leaders, and that the candidates nominated by the various 
organizations may be screened by the lower Party organs first, then 
examined by a group consisting of the higher Party and government 
officials and working officials of the Presidium at republican level, 
and finally examined at federal level. This does not mean that more 
than one nominee per electorate reach the republican and federal 
Presidia. It may be safe to assume that the Presidia make, in the 
process of screening, requirements known to whoever decides on the 
sizes of categories to be elected to the soviets.
Apart from their possible indirect participation in the selec­
tion of candidates, it is clear that the federal and republican Presidi 
play a major role in helping to organize and supervise the conduct 
of elections, which constitute one of the most important types of 
mass-organizational activity under the Soviet system.
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The republican Presidia also supervise the conduct of the 
election preparations to the People's Courts at district and city 
levels. Thus, they often investigate the state of the election pre­
parations in particular regions, and issue decisions to the regional 
executive committees for improving the latter's activity in the 
election preparations (see e.g. Kazakhstanskaya P ., 2.12.70).
Turning now to more general aspects of the supervision by 
republican Presidia of the "mass-organizational work" of local soviets, 
we may first note the use they make of conference-seminars to this end. 
For instance, the Belorussian Presidium organized in November 1970 
a three-day seminar attended by the secretaries and heads of organi­
zation-instruction departments of regional executive committees, and 
secretaries of district and city executive committees. At this 
seminar, a number of reports were read, .such as: "Conduct and
preparation of sessions of the soviets" by the secretary of the 
Belorussian Presidium, Ye.P. Chaginoi; "Work of deputies" by deputy 
head of the Department on the Work of Soviets of the Belorussian 
Presidium, Ye.P. Pyl'nikov; "Observation of socialist legality in 
the activity of local soviets" by the republican Procurator, I.P. 
Pastrevich; and "The international situation" by a lecturer from 
the Belorussian Central Committee, G.F. Shmygov (see Sovetskaya Bel., 
29.11.70 and 24.3.70). A similar conference-seminar organized by 
the Armenian Presidium, in February 1970, indicates that many of the 
participants in this sort of conference may be organizational officials 
of local government bodies. Such conferences seem to be intended as 
schools for learning the forms and methods of mass-organizational 
work of soviets, and as centres for dissemination of "advanced" 
experience to the organizational practitioners at the loca level (see
Kommunist Arm., 8.2.70).
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Republican Presidia also scrutinize the supervising activity 
of deputy groups (deputatskie gruppy) of local soviets. Each deputy 
group is composed of no less than three deputies and is formed either on 
the basis of a territorial or productive unit(see Sovetskaya Mold.23.8.74).
They comprise deputies to various soviets at different levels but located 
in the same area,e.g. a deputy group may comprise deputies living in a 
particular city but serving in the city soviet, regional soviet 
and republican Supreme Soviet. Their main activity is to supervise 
the work of cultural, everyday and medical services, trading enter­
prises and public eating facilities. Presidium members may also 
conduct meetings of deputy groups in each Supreme Soviet electorate. 
Deputies of the federal Supreme Soviet and the chairmen of the 
district and city executive committees may participate in the meeting.
The purpose of this meeting, according to Soviet sources, is to 
assist the deputy group to cpt a better understanding of current 
economic and cultural developments, to strengthen supervision over the 
fulfillment of acts of the republican Supreme Soviet, and to facilitate 
communication not only among the deputy groups but also between the 
Presidium, Standing Commissions and deputies of the republican 
Supreme Soviet (see SDT, No. 1, 1961, p.97).
At the republic level, many deputy groups are formed on the 
basis of the electoral units, comprising the deputies to the republican 
Supreme Soviet and to the local soviets. Each group adopts a work 
plan defining the duties of individual deputies for implementing the 
nakazy (mandates) of the electorates. The group meets regularly to 
examine related problems (see Tikhomirov and Stepanov, 1960, p.136).
 ^ in Kazakhstan, e.g. in 1963, there were more than 500 deputy groups 
of local soviets which comprised 2600 deputies (see Izv_. , 5.12.63) in 
Turkmenia in 1969, there were 505 such groups comprising more than 3000 
deputies (see Turkmenskaya Iskra, 28.12.69).
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The practice of working out a joint work plan might have been en­
couraged in order to avoid duplication of their efforts to implement 
the mandates, proposals and complaints of the electorates, and of 
their communications with the apparatus of the republican Presidium 
(see SDT, No. 11, 1960, pp.100-101).
Activity oriented to the nakazy and proposals of the electors 
constitutes one of the important assignments of the republican Presidia 
in the field of mass-organizational work. Soviet writers on the soviets 
present these nakazy and proposals as statutory rights of electors,1 
enabling them to seek satisfaction of their various needs. Nazaky 
are instructions presented by the electors to the deputies of all 
categories of soviets at election time, normally in the course of 
pre-election meetings or election campaign meetings; "proposals" 
are less binding suggestions usually voiced at meetings held in the 
electorates where the deputies periodically give public accounts of 
their activities. Both nakazy and proposals have some genuine value 
in helping meet local grievances and aspirations (thereby possibly 
contributing to confidence between the authorities and the masses, 
and perhaps deserve a few words here.
The majority of nakazy and proposals represents local needs 
such as the construction and repair of roads, provision of public 
amenities, schools, housing and trading shops, alteration of shop 
working hours, planting trees in the streets, change in bus time­
tables etc. These matters are generally within the range of admini­
strative jurisdiction by the local soviet organs.
At the pre-election meetings, or at the election-campaign 
meetings, or at the meetings with the deputies, the electorates are 
said to adopt the work plans for implementing the nakazy and proposals.
 ^ A resolution adopted by the Presidium of the Kazakhstan Supreme Soviet 
on 27 May,1960 stipulates that "only those proposals from constituents 
that have been approved by a majority vote at a meetings of electors
(cont.)
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The executive committees of the local soviets then submit the work 
plans to the soviet sessions for their approval. In this way the 
majority of deputies are believed to be informed of all the nazaky 
and proposals of the electors as well as the possibility of their 
success (see Sovetskaya Est., 30.8.67; and Kommunist Arm., 17.8.69).
These work plans usually assign the Standing Commissions of local 
soviets the primary task of supervising the fulfillment of the mand­
ates, and an active role here is also prescribed for the deputy groups.
It is the latter who generally direct the nakazy to the relevant 
executive and administrative government bodies, both local and repub­
lican. This procedure has been criticised as too mechanical: many
deputy groups are said to resort to it without paying much attention 
to the nature of individual nakazy. Some of the local needs which 
are demanded in the nakazy could allegedly be implemented by the 
deputies themselves (see Sovetskaya Est., 5.12.64). A report by one 
republican Presidium goes further and states that not -only deputies 
through their personal efforts, but also the soviet aktivy, voluntary 
organizations and the Standing Commissions of local soviets may make 
themselves responsible for the implementation of various nakazy (see 
Kommunist Arm., 17.8.69). This is to say that the republican Presidia 
employ the soviet machinery and voluntary organizations in order to 
maximize the satisfaction of local needs within their available 
resources. The obligation of self-help might thus help to regulate 
the number of electors' nakazy since they themselves are likely to 
be involved in efforts to carry them out.
On the other hand, when the mandates are such as need to be 
fulfilled by the executives of the local and republican government, 
these may be reminded of the actions required of them by statements 
(cont.)
are deemed to be nakazy"(see Kaz.P.,28.5.70) . Thus, other proposals 
(predlozhenia) than those stated above should be distinguished from nakazy
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made at Presidium meetings (see e.g. Izv., 31.5.68). The official 
attitude is well expressed in a statement of the Presidium of the 
Supreme Soviet of the Bashkir A.S.S.R., which reminded the executives 
of the republican government that nakazy are not petitions (chelobitiya) 
not applications, but state documents and that the responsibility for 
executing them is not borne by the deputies alone (Izv., 10.7.68).
Thus, a republican Presidium occasionally puts pressure on government 
bodies to take action in response to certain local needs, but only 
such as are beyond the capacity of available local resources to meet, 
and within limits which do not disturb the official order of priorities. 
On the other hand, as we noted, the Presidium imposes on Soviet 
citizens active involvement in community affairs with a view to 
satisfying some of the local needs by making use of whatever resources 
are available on the spot. This would appear to allow scope for a 
measure of bargaining between the electors and the authorities. In 
this situation the Presidium, standing as it does between the two 
"bargainers", may to some extent play the role of honest broker.
While the evidence for this is somewhat tenuous, this "broker" role 
may be one means whereby the Presidia contribute both to the rule 
enforcement and integrative functions of Soviet society.
In much the same way, the republican Presidia have the respon­
sibility of checking whether electors' proposals to the People's Courts 
have been fulfilled. Here the Presidium's decisions include 
measures such as instructional lectures in industrial and agricultural 
enterprises and various institutions organized by the Ministry of 
Justice and People's Courts, and may do something to allay popular 
concern about the work of the law-enforcement agencies (see e.g.
SDT. , No. 11, 1958, p. 107).
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4) Work of Local Soviets
The republican Presidia focus most of their attention on the 
performance of the local soviets and their organs. Indeed, the 
chairman of the Belorussian Presidium, S.O. Pritytsky, has stated 
that one of the chief tasks of the Presidium is to perfect the work 
of the local soviets (see Sovetskaya Bel., 6.8.69). The republican 
Presidium has also been referred to by Soviet constitutional lawyers 
as the "organizational centre" for the activities of the local 
soviets (see Tikhomirov and Stepanov, 1960, p. 138). The Presidium 
constantly scrutinizes the work of the soviets in the republic 
through its Dspartment of the Work of Soviets and periodically takes 
stock of the overall performance situation at sittings of the Presidium 
itself.^
We have already observed that the supervising activity of the 
individual Presidium, whether focussed on the implementation of acts, 
on "socialist legality" or on mass-organization work, is usually 
directed towards the performance of the local soviets in general. The 
supervision of the Presidium may, however, also be directed towards a
E.g. the Estonian Presidium heard in January 1971 the information 
submitted by the Head of the Department on the Work of Soviets, Ye. 
Sil'veta, on the organizational work of the local soviets in 1970 - 
see Sovetskaya Est., 27.1.71. In another instance, the RSFSR Presidium 
heard the statistical report for 1968 at its meeting in March, 1969, 
bearing on several questions of the organizational work of the local 
soviets. It was noted that almost all soviet executive committees 
(99.7%) had in the past year called sessions in compliance with the 
requirements of the RSFSR Constitution. In 1968, a majority of 
deputies had reported to the electorates (60.5% once, and 34.5% two or 
more times). Almost all executive committees had reported to the 
soviets (99.1%) and the population (96.9%). See WS, RSFSR, No. 10, 
1969, pp. 189-190. While it is conceivable that the report does not do 
justice to the discussion at the Presidium, as it stands it suggests 
that the Presidium's approach is a rather formal and superficial one.
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particular locality in the republic. In this case, attention to the 
different aspects of supervising activity tends to be mutually 
stimulating. For example, if the presidium detects shortcomings in 
the implementation of a particular act in some locality, it is 
likely to attribute such shortcomings to the lack of organizational 
work on the part of the local soviet concerned (i.e. its deputies, 
Standing Commissions or executive committee).
In the following pages, we will first glance at recent trends 
in the activities of the local soviets, that might facilitate our 
understanding of the supervising activity of the republican Presidia, 
and, secondly, will consider supervising activity directed at part­
icular localities (treating the different aspects of supervision 
simultaneously.) It should be pointed out, however, that adequate 
evaluation of the efficacy of Presidia activities in this field would 
require detailed research on the operation of the local soviets which 
would lie outside the scope of this study. Our main object here is 
then to indicate the scale, character organization and methods of 
relevant Presidia activities. This approach is unavoidable owing 
to the fact that all Soviet accounts will seek to give the impression 
that in general Soviet institutions (including the Presidia) perform 
effectively the functions officially attributed to them.
The laws relating to the rights and obligations of village and 
settlement soviets, and the rights and obligations of district and 
city soviets, enacted on 19 November, 1969 and 19 March, 1971 res­
pectively, were chiefly aimed at enhancing the status of the local 
soviets. In the case of the village and settlement soviets, their 
"right of control" over certain ranges of activity of the collective 
and state farms is believed to have been strengthened, and their
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opportunities for participating in the planning of agricultural 
production, and especially of cultural and everyday construction, 
are said to have been expanded. For the first time, the rural and 
settlement soviets have been given the statutory authority to 
suspend the implementation of orders and instructions issued by 
executives of higher ranking enterprises, institutions and organiz­
ations if these orders and instructions are at variance with legis­
lation on such questions as land use, the provision of public 
services and amenities, community construction, conservation and the 
protection of cultural monuments. A similar authority has been 
conferred on the district and city soviets (see P_. , 20.3.71). A 
special characteristic of the present-day development of the local 
bodies of authority stressed by Soviet writers (see e.g. Izv., 6.2.71), 
is the intensification of their planning and co-ordinating functions 
in the sphere of the management of the economy, and of social, cul­
tural, communal and everyday construction; this is held to ensure 
the rational combination of branch and territorial planning. For 
instance, in the RSFSR, the regional soviets have the right to submit 
proposals to the republic State Planning Committee and to the respect­
ive ministries on draft plan assignments for the enterprises located 
within the region, as well as on schemes for the development and 
siting of industry and so on. Apart from the regional and city 
soviets, however, the organizational structure of the lower local 
soviets (district, village, settlement and other small soviets) has 
long been neglected. This may be illustrated by a couple of examples. 
The chairman of the Khasavyurt District Executive Committee in Dagestan 
ASSR, B. Batyrov, complained in 1969 that the staff of the Executive 
Committee consisted only of the chairman, a deputy chairman, two
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instructors and a secretary. He pointed out that "our deputy chairman 
is at the same time the chairman of no less than 11 committees. The 
latter are set up according to decisions of superior agencies;each such 
decision carries a clause demanding that the deputy chairman of the 
district soviet executive committee be confirmed without fail as the 
chairman of some committee or another" (Izv.,4.1.69). The ostensible 
versatility of the chairman symbolises how empty the power of the 
executive committee is, although other reports assert some improvement 
in the composition of the lower local soviet executive committees (see 
WS,RSFSR No.10, 1969, p.189). M. Nurmagomedov, chairman of the Executi­
ve Committee of the Buinaksk District Soviet of the Dagestan ASSR, on 
the other hand, expressed a different complaint. "We are held strictly 
responsible for the development of agriculture in the district. But 
not a single member of the Executive Committee's staff deals specifi­
cally with this sector." He called, therefore, for the transformation 
of the district agricultural administrations into agricultural depart­
ments of the district soviet executive committees, under the jurisdic­
tion of both the district soviet and the superior agriculture agency 
(Izv., 4.1.69). Such demands, however, are likely to meet with resist­
ance. P. Pulyayev, head of the Menzen district agricultural production 
administration of Arkhangel region, expressed his apprehension of the 
idea of subordinating the district agricultural production administra­
tions to the district soviet executive committees. He said, "We would 
be condemning the specialists of these administrations to paper work" 
(Izv., 14.11.69). Although district soviet executive control over 
agricultural boards was made effective from the beginning of 1970 (see 
SDT,No.3,1970,pp.34-36), K. Karpov, Head of the Organization and 
Instruction Department of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, pronounced 
his grievances on similar problems as follows, " in certain
regions, a small circle of persons, without the participation
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of interested departments and the administrations of local soviets, 
is carrying out preparations for the transfer of enterprises, organi­
zations and institutions of regional subordination to district and 
city soviet executive committees" (Izv., 7.7.71). In his view, the 
transfer of departmental housing and the facilities of the regional 
economy to district and city soviets is a difficult task and the 
district and city soviets ought therefore "to seek advice from RSFSR 
ministries and departments" (Izv., 7.7.71).
It is apparent that if the two laws which have been introduced 
are to be duly implemented, the activities of the lower local soviets 
will need to be accelerated, co-ordinated with the higher local soviets 
(regions) and supervised by the republican Supreme Soviet Presidia. 
Thus, the republican Presidia may in a circumscribed manner, influence 
the outcome of these issues."'" In any case, these are issues which the 
republican Presidia have to bear in mind when they are carrying out 
their supervisory activity.
Case Studies of republican Presidium decisions on the work of local 
soviets
A Presidium may give its attention to the implementation of a 
particular act dealing with a specific locality, to mass-organizational
E.g. at the session of the Armenian Supreme Soviet in April 1968, 
a member of the Armenian Presidium, S. Matnishayan (chairman of Lenin- 
akan City Executive Committee) argued that such enterprises as 
bakeries, confectionery factories and regional power networks ought 
to be returned to the city and district soviets. At the end of the 
discussion, the Armenian Supreme Soviet instructed the republican 
Council of Ministers to examine and decide the gradual transfer of 
civil construction to the city soviets, and the extension of the rights 
of the local soviets to the management of the local industry (see 
further Izv., 16.4.68). In another instance, the Turkmenian Presidium 
held a press conference to inform the journalists of the new form and 
method on the works of the soviets, and asked them to draw more attent­
ion to the activities of the local soviet executive committees (see 
further Turkmenskaya Iskra, 28.12.69).
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work relating to particular issues such as education, everyday 
services, construction, etc. in the specific locality, and finally 
to mass-organizational work as a whole in the locality. Its 
objectives in doing so are evidently to expose misconduct, and, in 
general to critically evaluate the performance of the local soviet 
organs concerned. The resulting decisions taken by republican 
Presidia vary considerably in character.
The first type of decision is focussed on co-ordinating the work 
of related supervisory bodies, along lines already noted in the 
examination of the federal Presidium's supervisory function. For example, 
the RSFSR Presidium, after examining the implementation of the Law on 
State Pensions in the Lipetsk and Sverdlovsk regions, adopted a 
decision which instructed the executive committees of these regional 
soviets to take necessary measures to remove various admitted short­
comings, but at the same time asked the republican Ministry of Social 
Security, the Ministry of Finance, the Supreme Court and the Procurator 
to strengthen their surveillance over the implementation of the Law 
on Government Pensions (see SDT, No. 10, 1960, pp. 99-100). In 
another case, the RSFSR Presidium reviewed organizational work in 
the city of Leningrad relating to the re-education of persons exempted 
from punishment and released on parole. The Leningrad City Executive 
Committee was instructed to eliminate shortcomings by organizing and 
stepping up the relevant work of the city districts, workplace 
"collectives", public organizations and supervisory commissions.'*'
 ^ These commissions (nablyudatel*nye komissii) were established by the 
Presidium in the districts and cities to supervise the behaviour in 
production and at their place of residence of individuals who had been 
given suspended sentences and released on parole or who had returned 
from places of detention. The republican Presidium is supposed to 
scrutinize systematically the activity of the supervisory commissions. 
Some republican Presidia organize conferences of the chairmen of these 
supervisory commissions in their republic. See W S , RSFSR, No. 29, 1965, 
p. 594; SDT, No. 7, 1960, pp.103-104; and Sovetskaya Est., 22.5.62.
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The Presidium also instructed the RSFSR Supreme Court to take steps 
to improve the activity of the republic's courts in involving the 
public in the correction and re-education of individuals sentenced to 
measures of punishment not involving deprivation of freedom. Also 
the Supreme Court was asked to intensify the work of the courts in 
exercising control over the behaviour of persons given suspended 
sentences or released on parole (see WS, RSFSR, No. 31, 1968, pp. 
703-707). The necessity of co-ordinating the activity of suj:>ervisory 
bodies is evidently a frequent concern of the republican leaders. 
Speaking of the struggle against crime and violations of socialist 
legality in the Kirgiz republic, A.S. Suiumbaev, chairman of the Kirgiz 
Council of Ministers, stated that while agencies of the Procuracy, 
the Courts and the Internal Affairs Departments shared the same goal, 
"the struggle for the observance of socialist legality", they none­
theless still act in isolation from one another, and this is an 
important cause of many shortcomings in their work.'1’ The influence 
of republican Presidia towards increasing co-ordination in this area 
is therefore probably welcomed by the leaders of the republican 
Councils of Ministers. There are indications that the same applies 
to regional Party committees. For instance, A.K. Kasymkanov, second
Sovetskaya Kir., 24.6.70. Although we are speaking here of co­
ordination between supervisory bodies, the Presidium may also concern 
itself with co-ordination at the government executive level. This is 
largely owing to the fact that local soviets share jurisdiction in 
some spheres with other local bodies over which they have no control. 
The lack of co-ordination at regional level was particularly prevalent 
between 1962 and 1964, when the regional administration was generally 
divided into two - for industry and agriculture. To help alleviate 
the situation, where separate agriculture and industry executive 
committees existed in a region, a representative of each should attend 
the meetings of the other, in order to keep his executive committee 
informed of the business transacted there (see furhter Izv., 19.8.69).
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(organizational) secretary of the Kustanai obkom, gave the major 
report at a meeting of the Kazakhstan Presidium on the preservation of 
state and public housing resources in Alma-Ata city, and the result­
ant decision, apart from recommending that the republican Ministry 
of Community Economy, Ministry of Everday Services, and State Committee 
on Professional and Technical Education render assistance to the 
Alma-Ata Executive Committee, was that the organs of the Militia,
Courts and republican Procuracy take stronger action against infringe­
ments of the housing regulations, as well as commissioning the republican 
People's Control Committee to check systematically the returns on the 
state and public housing resources submitted by the large cities of 
the republic (see Kazakhstanskaya P., 14.8.69).
The second type of decision to be considered is also ostensibly 
levelled at a particular region but in fact is intended to serve as 
indirect criticism of local soviets of the republic as a whole.
In reviewing the performance of a particular region relating 
to the fulfillment of a certain act or mass-organizational work, the 
republican Presidia, particularly those of bigger republics (RSFSR, 
Ukraine, Belorussia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan) may be primarily 
concerned with the subordinate cities and districts in the region.
To take an example, the Belorussian Presidium heard reports, at its 
meeting in April 1964, submitted by the Minsk Regional Executive 
Committees (industrial and agricultural) on the accounts of the 
activity of the lower local soviets in the region. In its decision 
on the reports, as is usual in such cases, the Presidium acknowledged 
progress achieved, but went on to note shortcomings associated with 
the organizational work of the soviet organs in some of the localities 
in the region such as Borisov and Chervensk cities, Borisov, Molodechno,
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and Cherven' districts, Berezinsky settlement and Lyuban' village.
The Presidium required both the regional committees to take measures 
to improve the situation in the localities mentioned (Sovetskaya Bel., 
28.4.64). In other cases, the Presidium may by-pass the higher level 
local soviet, and consider directly a report of the chairman of a 
lower soviet. Thus, at its meeting in July 1961, the Kazakhstan 
Presidium heard the chairman of the Ush-Tobe Settlement Executive 
Committee on the form and methods of organizational work of the 
executive committee and its soviets, finding it on the whole satis­
factory, but inadequate in the matter of school construction. It 
instructed the Kazakhstan Gosplan and the Alma-Ata Regional Executive 
Committee to examine the problem of school and hospital construction 
in the Ush-Tobe Settlement Soviet (see SDT, No. 7, 1961, p. 101).
A republican Presidium will occasionally hold up the performance 
of the particular region as a model to be studied by the entire local 
soviets in that region. For instance, the RSFSR Presidium heard a 
report from the chairman of the Ryazan Regional Executive Committee, 
N.S. Priezzhev, on the problem of organization of the implementation 
of the decisions adopted by the local soviets in the Ryazan region. 
According to his report, this problem had been investigated by the 
RSFSR Presidium's Department of the Work of Soviets and was discussed 
at a Ryazan Regional Soviet session, which took appropriate measures. 
The RSFSR Presidium issued a note (zapiska) on "The organization 
of implementation of decisions adopted by the local soviets and 
their executive committees in Ryazan region", taking Priezzhev's 
report into consideration. This note was distributed to the Presidia 
of the autonomous republican Supreme Soviets, regional executive 
committees, and Moscow and Leningrad city executive committees. At
the same time the Ryazan Regional Executive Committee was asked to
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present a report on the progress made in this matter by January 1,
1966 (W S , RSFSR, No. 27, 1965, pp. 594-595. Similar cases may
be seen in SDT, No. 2, 1959, p. 107; and No. 7, 1972, p. 41;
Sovetskaya Est., 1.2.59; and Sovetskaya Bel. , 8.12.64). Sometimes, 
the republican Central Committee approves and recommends the case, 
at the request of the Presidium to the local Party and government 
bodies in the republic (see SDT, No. 4, 1973, p. 14).
As a way of improving the organizational work of lower
local soviets, the republican Presidia may instruct the regional
executive committees to convene regular conferences of officials of
lower local soviets in their respective regions. In April 1969,
for instance, the Uzbek Presidium instructed the Kashkadar'ya and
Fergana regional executive committees to convene conference seminars
for the secretaries of the district and city executive committees once
every two months, and for the secretaries of village and settlement
executive committees once every month (P. Vostoka, 26.4.69. See
similar examples in Turkmenia - Izv., 26.7.63). Conference-seminars
of this type are even more widely held below the district level.^
While the distinction between two types of decision suggested
above is useful for analytical purposes, cases may certainly be cited
where it becomes obscured in practice. For instance, referring to an
earlier decision (postanovlenie) adopted by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet
 ^ The Presidium often sets a time-limit in individual cases for 
the submission of the report to the Presidium (see SDT, No. 3, 1973, 
p.70) .
2 The chairman of the Rogachev district executive committee reported 
to the Belorussian Presidium that in his district a number of confer­
ence-seminars were organized by the District Executive Committee, 
for the district officials of government, judicial and voluntary 
bodies. See furhter Sovetskaya Bel. , 21.5.71.
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(in July 1965) on "Further improvement of trade and public catering 
in the RSFSR", the RSFSR Presidium examined, in November 1966, the 
activity of the regional organs of the Ministry of Trade and the 
Consumer's Association in Altai and Kaluga regions. As a result, a 
number of Ministries (Light Industry, Local Industry, Construction, 
Agriculture, and Automobile Transport and Highways) and also the 
republic Gosplan were asked to co-operate more effectively to improve 
the situation in these regions studied. At the same time, the RSFSR 
Presidium recommended that the autonomous republican Supreme Soviet 
Presidia and Councils of Ministers, regional executive committees, 
and Moscow and Leningrad City Executive Committees examine the prob­
lem of implementing the decision of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet in 
question (see WS, RSFSR, No. 45, 1966, pp. 969-971). Such "mixed" 
types of decisions tend to be adopted by the republican Presidia 
in the larger republics with relative frequency.
One noteworthy feature of meetings of the republican Presidia 
(and this applies also to the federal Presidium) is the nature of 
the rapporteurs at the meetings. When the Presidium is to examine 
problems of particular localities, the spokesmen of the local govern­
ment bodies concerned will customarily present reports on the subject, 
while at the same time there will be as it were "counter-reports" 
presented, usually by a department head of the Presidium or one or 
more of the chairmen of Standing Commissions of the Supreme Soviet.
In the absence of detailed accounts of these reports in Soviet 
publications, it is reasonable to assume that the reports presented 
by the former will tend to be of a defensive nature, while the latter's 
reports will include critical elements. The departments of the 
Presidium and the Standing Commissions of the Supreme Soviet are
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essentially fact-finding bodies/ serving to facilitate the operations 
of the Presidium. Their investigations may also be conducted with 
the help of other supervisory bodies. For instance, in 1958 a group 
consisting of staff of the judicial department of the Moldavian 
Presidium and the republic procurator's office investigated problems 
relating to "socialist legality" in certain localities (Tikhomirov 
and Stepanov, 1960, p. 147). In another instance, staff of the 
Reception Office of the Latvian Presidium together with representat­
ives of the republican Procurator's office investigated in March 
1970 the adequacy of implementation of the decree on "Organization 
of citizen's Complaints, Statements and Proposals" adopted by the federal 
Supreme Soviet in April 1968, in the housing and communal services 
department, department of internal affairs, district consumer's 
association, and other such organizations in Kuldiga district (see 
SDT, No. 3, 1970, p. 83). Where the Presidium requires information 
on organizational aspects in particular localities, this will be 
investigated and supplied by the Presidium's department on the work 
of soviets (Sovetskaya Est., 27.1.71; and WS, RSFSR, No. 11,
1970, p. 142). If, however, the organizational problem is associated 
with other fields such as construction, education, everyday services 
and so on, then the problem will usually be investigated by the 
Standing Commissions of the Supreme Soviet. A number of Soviet 
constitutional lawyers has suggested the establishment of Standing 
Commissions for the Wbrk of local soviets, covering all aspects of 
their organizational work.^
 ^ This type of Standing Commission has been operating in Czechoslovakia 
since 1953, in GDR since 1957 and in Bulgaria since 1966. See further 
Tikhomirov and Stepanov, 1960, p. 34; Safarov, 1966, p. 170; and 
Makhnenko, 1968, p. 23.
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In smaller republics, much of the Presidium's supervising 
activity is directly levelled at particular localities, rather than 
at intermediate administrative levels, which are in any case usually 
lacking in these republics. This may be regarded as a third type 
of republican Presidium decision connected with the smaller republics.
In the case of Estonia, the direct approach to the localities takes 
an extreme form: the members of the Presidium conduct on-the-spot
investigations as well as meetings (vyezdnye zasedania). The main 
advantage according to certain Soviet writers, is the opportunity 
given for face-to-face communication between people and the Presidium, 
and between local and higher organs of State power (see Tikhomirov 
and Stepanov, 1960, p. 146; and also Izv., 14.3.67).
It is worth looking in detail at one such meeting conducted by 
the Estonian Presidium. An on-the-spot meeting was held in Tartu 
city in October 1970 to examine the problem of everyday services. In 
the word of A. Ansberg, deputy chairman of the Estonian Presidium,
"the meeting was held there, not because the everyday services in 
Tartu city are worse than in other cities, but because a decision on 
this problem is urgently needed". Prior to the meeting, the members 
of the Presidium spent a few days in Tartu city visiting many facilites 
of everyday services, shops and dining halls, meeting people and talking 
to the local executives. As a result, according to a press report 
(Sovetskaya Est. , 7.10.70), members were able to form a clearer 
understanding of the problems involved by the time the meeting was 
convened. The meeting began with a report by the chairman of the 
Tartu City Executive Committee, A. Karu. Then, the chairman of the 
Estonian Presidium, A. Myurisep, opened the discussion by asking
Karu whether he had considered at length the question of training of
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cadres for catering services. Karu replied that many young people 
would be trained as foremen on the spot. Shoman, chairman of Tartu 
city trade union for local industry and communal everyday services 
industry, supported Karu's statement. Undoubtedly, he said, the 
opening of a recreational club in Tartu would create more favourable 
conditions for would-be trainees. While subsequent discussion moved 
away from the question of training, ultimately this aspect was 
asserted to have the highest priority. The chairman of the Commission 
for Everyday Services of the Estonian Supreme Soviet, A. Madrik, 
underlined the fact that clients of the services industries were 
often overcharged. For instance, though lower fees for hairdressing 
were introduced on 29 May, 1970 "we found on 19 August, 1970 that 
hairdresses were still charging the old fees". The leader of a 
"deputy group", Seene, expressed a number of grievances on trading 
practices in the city. The republican Minister of Trade, K. Todeson,
criticized the municipal organizations, alleging that many trade 
enterprises were operating "in the old fashion", and had no plan to
build new trading shops in the near future, nor to introduce new 
self-service techniques. Municipal organizations were criticised 
for always attributing their bad performance to the limited shop 
floor space, old accommodation, shortage of labour, etc. A member 
of the Presidium, P. Neerot (chairman of republican TUC) added,
"Tartu City Soviet deputies are also failing to take this matter into 
consideration. The Ministry of Everyday Services has made every 
possible effort to break out of this impasse. But what have the 
municipal organizations done so far? It is true that shop floor 
space is limited, but what matters really is the better organization 
of labour." I. Lott, first secretary of Tartu City Party Committee,
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who spoke next, returned to the question of personnel, stressing 
the necessity of strengthening vocational training at the everday 
service combines and trading enterprises. In its decision, the 
Presidium placed major emphasis on the training of cadres for these 
services. The Ministry of Everyday Services and Tartu City Executive 
Committee were also asked to examine the possiblity of expanding 
a well-organized service network in larger city districts and the 
installation of self-service laundries in new residential districts 
(Sovetskaya Est., 7.10.70).
Unlike the meetings of other republican Presidia, such on-the- 
spot meetings have been well reported in the Estonian national press. 
It is also noticeable that the instructions of the Estonian Presidium 
are far more specific. It is uncertain when this type of meeting 
came into existence in Estonia, but one was held as far back as 
December 1959, in Kunda city (Sovetskaya Est., 5.12.59). This example 
also indicates that such meetings have been held not only in bigger 
cities (Tartu has a population over 50,000) but also in small cities 
such as Kunda (less than 10,000 population). Such exercises in face- 
to-face contact with local people and local leaders should indeed 
provide Presidium members with greater opportunities to come to grips 
with problems of administration in different localities, while at 
the same time giving the impression to the local people in general 
that their grievances are being transmitted to higher officials.
This may contribute to their political identification with the 
republican leadership.
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Throughout this Chapter, we have noted some differences in 
the ways the federal and republican Presidia carry out their 
operations. For instance, within certain areas, notably supervision 
over the work of local soviets, some discretion has been left to the 
republican Presidia as to the kind of issues they examine and the 
way they exercise their power. As to this power, indeed, there are 
quite substantial differences among the republican Presidia in the 
way they carry out their operations. In larger republics, the 
Presidia act more or less as the co-ordinating body for the activi­
ties of the autonomous republican and regional executive bodies.
In smaller republic, the operation of the individual Presidia is 
generally more direct and pervasive, and in the case of Estonia,
also more mobile.
P A R T  III
THE FEDERAL AND REPUBLICAN
STANDING COMMISSIONS
169
CHAPTER 7
STRUCTURE AND MEMBERSHIP
We have observed in Part 1 that much of the structural change 
in the federal and republican Supreme Soviets has been initiated in
their Standing Commissions since 1957 —  the proliferation of the
Standing Commissions, the number of their membership and introduction 
of the rules of procedure. In this Chapter, we shall examine, as 
far as possible, the changing institutional arrangements of the 
Standing Commissions.
Section 1
Membership
The chairman of the Armenian Presidium, N.Kh. Arutunyan stated 
that the effectiveness of a deputy's activity is largely dependent on 
life experience, work previously engaged in, organizational skills, 
level of education, breadth of view, or simply the inclination to 
engage in civic activity (see Izv.,3.4.69). Indeed, a careful study 
of the membership of the Standing Commissions for each convocation 
reveals certain trends in their composition suggestive of changes in 
the conception held by the Soviet leaders of the kind of personnel 
required by these bodies. Here, however, we shall describe only the 
major changes which occurred in the following aspects of membership: 
age groups, current positions, organizational representation, and 
educational and career backgrounds (information on certain of these 
variable at the federal level only).
The distribution of age groups of the members of the federal 
Standing Commissions has changed considerably. In particular, the 
high proportion of members in the age groups 41-50 and 51-60 has 
gradually been reduced and the membership is progressively spreading 
over all age groups. Nevertheless, despite an increase in the lower 
age groups, the group between 41 and 60 still constitutes 58% of the
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total membership of the federal Standing Commissions at the eighth 
convocation (1970)
TABLE 1
AGE GROUPS - MEMBERS OF THE FEDERAL STANDING COMMISSIONS
5th convoc. 6th convoc. 7th convoc. 8th convoc
(N= 259) (N= 259) (N= 700) (N= 912)
Under 30 1.6% 
(N= 4 )
4.6% 
(N= 12)
4.0% 
(N= 28)
11.5% 
(N= 105)
31 - 40 13.1% 
(N= 34)
14.7% 
(N= 38)
21.7% 
(N= 152)
20.8% 
(N= 189)
41 - 50 47.5 % 
(N=123)
41.3%
(N=107)
34.0%
(N=238)
31.9% 
(N= 291)
51 - 60 33.2% 
(N= 86)
32.8% 
(N= 85)
33.4%
(N=234)
26.4% 
(N= 241)
61 and over 4.6% 
(N= 12)
6.6% 
(N= 17)
6.9% 
(N= 48)
9.4% 
(N= 86)
1 Changes in the distribution of age groups of the entire member­
ship of the Supreme Soviet correspond roughly to the changes in that 
of the members of the Standing Commissions. However, the age group 
between 41 and 60 in the federal Supreme Soviet constitutes a lesser 
proportion than that in the federal Standing Commissions, whereas the 
age group under 40 in the Supreme Soviet constitutes a greater 
proportion than that in the federal Standing Commissions.
Age groups - deputies of federal Supreme Soviet
5th convoc. 6th convoc. 7th convoc. 8th convoc
(N= 1378) (N= 1443) (N= 1517) (N= 1517)
Under 30 7.7% 14.7% 12.0% 18.5%
31 - 40 21.8% 28.1% 28.6% 23.0%
41 - 50 40.5% 30.1% 27.7% 25.5%
51 - 60 25.2% 22.9% 25.4% 21.7%
61 and over 4.8% 4.4% 6.3% 11.3%
Source: Verkhovny Sovet SSSR - vos'mogo sozyva, Moscow, 1970.
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The increase in Komsomol members from the seventh to the eighth 
convocation of the federal Supreme Soviet corresponds to the increase 
in the age group under 30. This age group has always been mainly 
comprised of members employed in agriculture and industry. Thus, the 
increase in the group in the eighth convocation (105 members as against 
28 members in the seventh convocation) has meant a greater intake from 
these occupational groups (98% of 105 members). A progressive increase 
of agricultural and industrial groups has also been observed in the 
age group between 31 and 40: the agricultural and industrial groups
made up 50% of the 34 members in the age group 31 to 40 at the fifth 
convocation, whereas at the eighth convocation they accounted for 72% 
of the 189 members.
The age groups over 41 include a large proportion of Party and 
government officials (and other occupational groups). In the age 
groups between 41 and 50 at the eighth convocation, agricultural and 
industrial occupational groups, largely managerial, constitute 43% of 
the 291 members. On the other hand, the age groups between 51 and 60 
have always consisted mainly of Party and government executives (over 
60% of this age group).
Along with the changes in the distribution of age groups, we see 
from Table 2 that in both federal and republican Standing Commissions 
there was a drastic reduction in the overall proportional participation 
of the Party and government apparatus, especially in the latter, even 
though in absolute numbers the Party apparatus had more than doubled 
its earlier participation. On the whole, the government participation 
has therefore declined vis-a-vis Party participation. The proportional 
and absolute increases in agricultural and industrial participation 
were much greater than either those of government or Party, and the 
participation of other organizations was also increased although not
to the same extent.
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TABLE 2
ORGANIZATIONS IN WHICH CURRENT POSITIONS OF THE MEMBERS ARE LOCATED 
(A) Federal Standing Commissions
5th convoc. 6 th convoc. 7th convoc. 8th convoc
(N= 259) (N= 259) (N= 700) (N= 912)
Party 37.5 % 40.5% 30.4% 24.0%
apparatus (N= 97) (N= 105) (N= 213) (N= 219)
Government 29.3% 25.9 % 15.0% 10.5%
apparatus (N= 76) (N= 67) (N= 105) (N= 96)
Agricultural 8.9% 6.6% 15.6% 20.4%
enterprise (N= 23) (N= 17) (N= 109) (N- 186)
Industrial 8.9% 10.4% 18.4% 25.3%
enterprise (N= 23) (N= 27) (N= 129) (N= 231)
Others 15.4% 16.6% 20.6% 19.7%
(N= 40) (N= 43) (N= 144) (N= 180)
(B) Republican Standing Commissions*
(N= 981) + (N= 1798) (N=2411) (N=2470)++
Party 30.7% 22.7% 22.4% 20.3%
apparatus (N= 301) (N= 408) (N= 541) (N= 501)
Government 20.3% 17.4% 9.9 % 9.3%
apparatus (N= 199) (N= 312) (N= 239) (N= 232)
Agricultural 15.7% 18.7% 24.7% 28.6%
enterprise (N= 154) (N= 336) (N= 595) (N= 706)
Industrial 12.3% 21.8% 24.2% 24.5%
enterprise (N= 121) (N= 392) (N= 583) (N= 606)
Others 20.0% 19.4% 18.8% 17.2%
(N= 206) (N= 350) (N= 453) (N= 425)
Notes: * The figures relate to nine republics examined - RSFSR, Belorussia
Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Estonia, Latvia, Armenia and 
Georgia.
+ eight republics only - information on Georgia is not available 
++ eight republics only - information on Armenia is not available
One can also readily recognise the widened scope of occupational 
positions, despite the fact that the total number of the organizations 
involved remains virtually unchanged.
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TABLE 3
NUMBER OF ORGANIZATIONS AND OCCUPATIONAL POSITIONS
(federal Standing Commissions only)
5th convoc. 8th convoc.
Number of organizations 18 17
Number of occupational positions 76 99
Changes in occupational fields of positions roughly correspond 
with changes in organizational representation.
TABLE 4
OCCUPATIONAL FIELD OF POSITION 
(federal Standing Commissions only)
5th convoc. 6th convoc. 7 th convoc. 8th convoc
(N= 259) (N= 259) (N= 700) (N= 912)
Political affairs 39.4%
(N= 102)
44.0%
(N= 114)
35.1%
(N= 246)
27.9%
(N= 254)
Agriculture 12.4%
(N= 32)
11.6%
(N= 30)
17.1%
(N= 120)
21.9%
(N= 200)
Industry 15.4%
(N= 40)
14.3%
(N= 37)
21.0%
(N= 147)
28.7 %
(N= 262)
Other 32.8%
(N= 85)
30.1%
(N= 78)
26.8%
(N= 187)
21.5%
(N= 196)
Note: Occupational field of position should not be identified with
the organizational categories in the following manner: e.g., 
political affairs - Party; agriculture - agricultural enter­
prise; industry - industrial enterprise, etc. The categories 
of occupational field indicate the fields of responsibility 
in any organizations. To take an example, some officials of 
Party and government may be responsible in the fields of 
agriculture, or industry, or any others.
The figures in Table 5 which show the educational background of 
members of federal Standing Commissions reveal that the substantial 
improvement in average educational level between the fifth and sixth
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convocations has not been maintained since then, and a significant
reversal was noticeable at the eighth convocation. Although more
than half of the total members have received higher education, the
percentage of members who have only completed secondary increased
from 12% at the seventh convocation to 27% at the eighth. This has
resulted from the large instake from the agricultural and industrial
groups.'*' At the same time, one should not undermine the impact of
educational policy, drive to make ten-year schooling obligatory by
1970. This is explained by the fact that if members with incomplete
secondary education were added then the jump between 1966 and 1970
would only be from 40.8% to 46.1%. Changes in the distribution of
the highest level of education of the members of federal Standing
Commissions correspond roughly to the changes in that of the deputies
2of the federal Supreme Soviet.
Agricultural and industrial groups who have completed secondary 
education: 6 of the 25 members of agricultural and industrial groups 
at the fifth convocation; 95% of 246 members of agricultural and 
industrial groups at the eighth convocation. Completed secondary 
education is now the norm for deputies from these groups, whereas 
previously their educational levels tended to be inferior to this.
2 However, the members who received higher education constitute a 
lesser proportion in the federal Supreme Soviet than in the Standing 
Commissions.
Highest level of education in the federal Supreme Soviet
5th convoc. 6th convoc. 7th convoc . 8th convoc
(N= 1378) (N= 1443) (N= 1517) (N= 1517)
Primary 19.3% 10.5% 5.9% 2.5%
Secondary
incomplete 20. 2% 20.2% 22.7% 16.6%
Secondary 11.8% 16.6% 18.1% 29.5%
Incomplete
higher 5.8% 3.9% 3.1% 3.0%
Higher 42.9% 48.8% 50.2% 48.4%
Source: Verkhovny Sovet SSSR - vos'mogo sozyva , Moscow, 1970.
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TABLE 5
HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION
(federal Standing Commissions only)
5th convoc. 6th convoc. 7 th convoc. 8th convoc
(N= 259) (N= 259) (N= 700) (N= 912)
Unknown 0.8% 
(N= 22)
1.2% 
(N= 3)
0.4% 
(N= 3)
0.3% 
(N= 3
Primary 5.4% 
(N= 14)
3.5% 
(N= 9)
2.3% 
(N= 16)
1.3% 
(N= 12)
Secondary
incomplete
7.7% 
(N= 20)
5.0% 
(N= 13)
11.3% 
(N= 79)
10.1% 
(N= 92)
Secondary 9.6 % 
(N= 25)
8.1% 
(N= 21)
12.2% 
(N= 85)
27.0% 
(N= 246)
Incomplete
higher
6.2% 
(N= 16)
6.2% 
(N= 16)
2.7% 
(N= 19)
3.5% 
(N= 32)
Higher: 70.3% 
(N= 182)
76.0% 
(N= 197)
71.1% 
(N= 498)
57.8% 
(N= 527)
- diploma (56.7%) (64.1%) (60.8%) (47.6%)
- candidate ( 8.5%) ( 6.9%) ( 3.9%) ( 4.6%)
- doctorate ( 5.1%) ( 5.0%) ( 6.4%) ( 5.6%)
Inquiries into the career background of the members of the 
Standing Commissions, together with their current positions, indicate 
in part the official emphasis on the requirement of certain careers 
and experiences.
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TABLE 6 - A
CAREER EXPERIENCE*
(federal Standing Commissions only)
Elements of Career 
Experience**
5th convoc. 6th convoc. 7t.h convoc. 8th convoc,
(N=259) (N=259) (N=700) (N=912)
Top-line executive 79.1%
(N=205)
63.7%
(N=165)
63.3%
(N=443)
53.4%
(N=487)
Executive 80.7%
(N=209)
76.1% 
(N=197)
69.3%
(N=485)
57.3% 
(N=523)
Specialist 22.0% 
(N= 57)
29.3% 
(N= 76)
34.1%
(N=239)
29.6%
(N=270)
Operative 72.0% 
(N=187)
61.0%
(N=158)
67.3%
(N=471)
78. 7% 
(N=718)
Notes: * The total exceeds 100%, because many members have served
during their careers in more than one role.
** Top-line executive means the top executive and administrative 
positions in particular bodies in different levels, e.g. first 
secretary of Party committee, chairman of the Council of 
Ministers or executive committee, chairman of social organiz­
ation, chairman of industrial or agricultural•enterprise and 
director of any other organization. The area of responsibility 
varies thus widely from,e.g. obkom first secretary to kolkhoz 
chairman. Despite vast differences in the degree and kind 
of responsibility among themselves, the top-line executives 
at different levels and in different organizations should 
all have basic managerial skill and organizational competency. 
Executive means middle-level managerial positions in any orga­
nization. Specialist means technically qualified people such 
as engineer, economist lawyer, medical doctor, pedagogue, 
mathematician, etc. And also journalist and artistic and 
literary people, e.g. writer, poet, painter, film director, 
designer, etc. are included as specialist. Operative means 
largely rank and file working in any organization, which 
includes unskilled worker and also skilled operative such as 
driver, school teacher, typist, policeman, clerk, professional 
soldier, etc.
The figures in Table 6 present a rather striking picture of the 
changes occuring in the overall pattern of career backgrounds. The 
proportion of members who have had top-line or other executive experience 
has declined consistently since the fifth convocation, although the abso­
lute number of executives has increased considerably.lt should be noted
that more than half of the members at the eighth convocation has still
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had some managerial experience. Members who have experience as 
operatives or experts of any kind have both increased marginally 
in their ratio. However, the proportion of members who have had 
only operative experience has increased dramatically since the 
fifth convocation (see Table 6-B). The members who have had a 
combination of more than two experiences have either decreased or 
remained low in their ratio.
TABLE 6-B
INTER-ROLE CIRCULATION OF CAREER 
(federal Standing Commissions only)
5th convoc. 6th convoc. 7th convoc. 8th convoc,
(N=259) (N=259) (N=700) (N=912)
TLE
(top-line executive)
0.8% 0.1%
E (executive) 1.2% 1.9% 1.0% 0.1%
S (specialist) 1.2% 1.5% 2.6% 2.0%
0 (operative) 8.9% 13.9% 21.1% 32.3%
TLE+E 14.3% 10.8% 6.4% 2.9%
TLE+S 0.7% 1.9% 1.9% 1.6%
TLE+O 7.3% 4.2% 2.7% 2.7%
TLE+E+S 7.3% 16.2% 16.4% 12.2%
TLE+E+O 41.3% 27.8% 29.0% 26.8%
TLE+S+O 0.4% - 1.3% 1. 3%
TLE+E+S+O 6.9% 1.5% 6.3% 7.4%
E+S 2.7% 5.4% 4.7% 3.3%
E+0 5.0% 11.2% 4.7% 5.0%
E+S+O 2.7% 1.9% 1.2% 1.2%
S+0 0.8% 0.6% 1.2%
One thing that emerges from this general outline of the composi
tion of the Standing Commissions is that, as far as the federal 
Standing Commissions are concerned, changes in one aspect of their 
composition tend to be systematically related to the changes in other 
aspects —  current positions, organizational participation, education 
and career experience. For instance, reduction in the overall 
proportional participation of the Party and government officials
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in the federal Standing Commissions is closely related to the 
changes in age composition, current occupational field, career 
experience and inter-role and inter-organizational circulation.
TABLE 6-C
INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL CIRCULATION OF CAREER
5th convoc. 6th convoc. 7th convoc. 8th convoc.
G/T
(N=259)
0.8%
(N=259)
2.3%
(N=700)
0.3%
(N=912)
(Government/TUC)
P/K 2.7% 3.9% 2.6% 1.1%
(P arty/Koms omo1)
o,„ 27.4% 29.0% 43.3% 55.1%
other than
G/T & P/K )
P/K + G/T 3.5% 5.8% 4.7% 2.2%
P/K + 0 19.3% 15.4% 16.7% 15.0%
G/T + 0 17.4% 17.0% 9.6% 7.9%
P/K + G/T + 0 28.2% 26.6% 22.7% 18.6%
Unknown 0.8% 0.1% 0.1%
The alleged Soviet concept of representation ,i.e. enlisting the
masses in the administration of state affairs (Cf. Introduction, 
Doctrine) may have influenced the determination of the guidelines for 
the composition of the Standing Commissions. We have also discerned 
evidence of a policy of widening the range of characteristics 
represented. In the absence of a detailed breakdown of the 
composition, however, it would be a mistake to draw any far-reaching 
conclusions from these observations. For example, in view of the 
fact that a much smaller proportion of Party and government officials 
has now been elected to the Standing Commissions, the institutional 
weight of the Standing Commissions has declined correspondingly.
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One should not, however, overlook the fact that a great majority 
of the membership of Standing Commissions still holds Party member­
ship , and the proportion of the Central Committee membership 
holders among the members of Standing Commissions at the seventh 
convocation (1966) was only a fraction less than that of the Central 
Committee membership holders at the sixth convocation. This was 
despite that total membership of the Standing Commissions at the 
seventh convocation having increased almost three times over that 
at the sixth convocation. The proportion of the Central Committee 
membership holders has again declined as a result of the further 
increased total membership of the Standing Commissions at the eighth 
convocation (1970). It should be noted, however, that since the 
seventh convocation, about 40% of the total full-membership of the 
CC, CPSU has been included in the federal Standing Commissions. At 
the fifth and the sixth convocations, the proportion was only about 
28%. The inclusion of a large number of Central Committee members 
in the Commissions as members means that the federal Standing 
Commissions have been upgraded since the seventh convocation.
(See Table 7)
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TABLE 7
PROPORTION OF PARTY AND NON-PARTY MEMBERS IN THE 
STANDING COMMISSIONS AND SUPREME SOVIET
Party members
Standing
Commissions
5th
convoc.
6th
convoc.
7th
convoc.
8th
convoc.
91.9% 90.7% 85.9% 80.7%
Supreme
Soviet 76.1% 75.8% 75.2% 72.3%
TABLE 8
CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS IN THE FEDERAL 
STANDING COMMISSIONS
5th convoc. 6th convoc. 7th convoc.8th convoc. 
(N = 259) (N = 259) (N = 700) (N = 912)
CC CPSU
Full 39
Candidate + 20
59
% to the Stand.Comm, 
membership 22.8%
CC repub.CP
Full 72
Candidate +__ -
72
% to the Stand.Comm, 
membership 27.8%
48 77 98
+ 26 + 71 + 62
74 148 160
28.6% 21.2% 17.5%
86 193
+ 1 + 3 n. a.
87 196
33.6 28.0%
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Section 2
Rules of Procedure
We shall begin by identifying the main tasks of the Standing 
Commissions as set out in the regulations and then attempt to describe 
the development of built-in operational principles which are designed 
to facilitate the performance of these tasks.
The first regulation adopted on 17 July, 1957 by the Presidium 
of the Uzbek Supreme Soviet defined their main tasks as follows:^
- carrying out of laws (zakony) and decisions (postanovlenia), 
decrees (ukazy) and decisions of the Presidium, and decisions of 
the Council of Ministers.
- organization of supervision over the fulfilment of laws and 
decisions of the Presidium of the Uzbek Supreme Soviet.
- supervision (kontrol’) of the activity of the ministries and 
departments of the Uzbek SSR, and submission of proposals for 
examination to either the Supreme Soviet during its sessions, or the 
Presidium of the Uzbek Supreme Soviet in between sessions.
- issuing resolutions, and making reports on problems coming within 
the competence of the Standing Commissions to the Supreme Soviet 
or its Presidium.
- identification of problems resulting from cultural and economic 
construction and also everyday services for the people, to be 
put forward before the Supreme Soviet, its Presidium or the 
Council of Ministers of the Uzbek SSR.
- ensuring the involvement of the deputies of the Supreme Soviet 
and local soviets of the Uzbek SSR in the work of the Standing 
Commissions, and also of activists . and specialists in carrying
1 Istoria Sovetskogo gosudarstva i prava Uzbekistana - ’1939-58', Vol.3 
pp.531-532
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out measures directed at speedy fulfilment of the tasks of 
economic and cultural construction.
The tasks described above may be viewed in comparison with those 
set out in the latest RSFSR regulation on the Standing Commissions 
19 July 1968 (see Article 2 of the regulation, in Sistematicheskoe 
Sobranie Zakonov RSFSR, Vol. 1, p.376), which are listed as follows:
- elaboration of proposals to be examined at the Supreme Soviet 
of the RSFSR and its Presidium
- preparation of findings on the issues which were submitted to the 
Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR and its Presidium
- rendering assistance to the state organs and organizations and 
also deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR in their work 
for implementing the acts of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR and 
its Presidium
- supervision of the activities of the ministries and departments 
of the RSFSR, other republican organizations, and also local 
state organs and organizations for realising the Constitution of 
the RSFSR, laws of the RSFSR and other acts of the Supreme Soviet 
of the RSFSR and its Presidium.
For fulfilling these tasks, the Standing Commissions were 
called upon, during and in between the sessions of the Supreme 
Soviet, to participate in the work of the Supreme Soviet 
uninterruptedly and effectively as a higher representative organ 
of state power of the RSFSR.
The above comparison indicates that there is little change in 
the official concept of the basic tasks of the Standing Commissions: 
they initiate and draft proposals on any matter coming within their
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competence at any time; operate as working organs of the. Supreme 
Soviet; and supervise and assist state bodies in the realisation of 
the federal or republican Constitutions and the acts of their respective 
Supreme Soviet and Presidium.^ The phrases appearing in the old 
regulations such as "making report to the Supreme Soviet and Presidium"; 
"statement of issues..."; and "ensuring the engagement by the deputies..." 
are now incorporated in other sections of the regulations such as 
operational procedure, and rights and duties of the Commissions.
With regard to the operational principles of the Standing Commissions, 
two major aspects, a "democratic" aspect and a "bureaucratic" aspect, 
can be observed in the regulations.
A. Democratic Aspect 
1) Selection of members
The regulations adopted in the "first phase" (see Section 2 of 
Chapter 4), provided that the chairmen, deputy chairmen and members of 
the Standing Commissions should be appointed by the Chamber of the 
respective Supreme Soviet. The secretary of each Standing Commission 
(in the case of the Latvian Standing Commissions, both deputy chairman 
and secretary are included) was to be elected from the members. The 
new regulations, however, have eliminated this distinction. All these 
positions are now appointed by the Chamber of the respective Supreme 
Soviet. The reasoning behind this is stated to be to emphasize the 
responsibility of the chairmen, deputy chairmen and secretaries of the 
Standing Commissions to the Chamber. The members of the Standing
1 In the latest regulations, the acts of the Council of Ministers are 
omitted.
184
Commissions are required to be deputies of the Supreme Soviet, but required
not to be members either of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet or of the 
Council of Ministers, which organs are accountable to the Supreme 
Soviet. At a session of the Estonian Supreme Soviet on 20 August,
1960, deputy A.E. Kotov proposed that some members of the government 
should be elected as members of the Standing Commissions. This 
arrangement could, in his belief, assist the Commissions to investigate 
matters related to the activity of the government. His proposal was, 
however, rejected on the ground that this would undermine impartial 
and objective supervising functions of the Standing Commissions over 
the activity of the government organs (see Sovetskaya Est., 21.8.60).
The present regulations exclude from membership not only members 
of the Council of Ministers and the Supreme Soviet Presidium, but 
also the Procurator-General (in the case of the republics, Procurator) 
and members of the Supreme Court whose work is likewise accountable 
to the Supreme Soviet.
2) Legislative initiative
In the old republican regulations, the right to initiate 
legislation was conferred only on the Commission for Legislative 
Proposals (except in the case of Moldavia where it was conferred on 
the Budget Commission as well, and the cases of Belorussia and Estonia 
where it was accorded to all Standing Commissions). Under the new 
federal and republican regulations, all of the Standing Commissions 
have the right to initiate legislation (see e.g. Article 18 of the 
federal regulation).
3) Conduct of meetings
The old regulations stipulated that a regular meeting should be 
held no less than once every three to four months (varying from
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republic to republic). The quorum for meetings was to be two-thirds 
of the members, except in the Estonian Standing Commissions where only 
the presence of a simple majority of members was required. Meetings 
were to be convened, organized and directed by the chairman of each 
Standing Commission according to its own work plan. All resolutions 
were to be adopted by simple majority votes. Protocols of the 
meetings signed by the chairman and secretary were to be lodged in 
each Standing Commission. The present federal and republican regulations 
have laid down, by contrast, that a quorum of the meetings requires 
the presence only of a simple majority of the members and resolutions 
are to be adopted also by a simple majority of members present at the 
meetings.^ Meetings may be convened by the chairman of each Standing 
Commission during or in between the sessions of the Supreme Soviet 
as it requires, but as a rule no less than once in three to six months 
(varying from republic to republic).
4) Participants in the work of Standing Commissions
A deputy who is not a member of the Standing Commissions of the 
respective Supreme Soviet is entitled to participate in any meeting 
of the Standing Commissions with the right to speak but not to vote.
A Standing Commission may itself invite deputies of the respective 
Supreme Soviet who are not members of the Standing Commissions, and in 
addition deputies of local soviets of the respective republic, activists 
(obshchestvenny aktiv)and specialists, to take part in the work of the 
Standing Commission. A Standing Commission can, in the new regulations, 
extend invitations to the chairmen of state organs, social organizations
1 This is to say that all motions could be carried out by the positive 
votes of one-fourth of the total membership. For instance, the meeting 
of the federal Commission for Budget and Planning of either House 
could be held in the presence of 26 members out of its total membership 
of 51. The resolutions at the meeting could in effect be adopted by 
a simple majority of 14 votes.
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and scientific institutions, and also to scholars. The new regulations 
added that the Standing Commissions establish close collaboration with 
the Standing Commissions of the local soviets and with social organizations. 
(This provision is, however, found in the old Estonian and Kirgiz 
regulations.) This is to emphasize the open character of the Commissions 
towards non-members of the Commission and officials of government and 
other organizations.
5) Arrangements to facilitate active participation by members 
Both the old and new regulations provided that a Standing 
Commission member should be released from his official duties during 
his term of membership for work in the respective Standing Commission, 
at the same time retaining his occupational position, that is, while 
the Commissions are actually at work. In addition, however, the new 
regulations contain a number of provisions aimed at guaranteeing the 
Standing Commission member the conditions for active participation in 
the decision of all issues coming before his Standing Commissions. He 
has the right to acquire necessary documents and material. He can 
submit such of his proposals as have not gained the support of the 
respective Standing Commission to the Supreme Soviet or its Presidium. 
Furthermore, it is suggested that each Standing Commission member, on 
behalf of his Commission or on his own initiative, should study local 
issues coming within the competence of the respective Commission and, at 
the same time, crystallise proposals put forward by government bodies, 
social organizations and citizens. It is worth adding that under the 
new federal and republican regulations, the Credentials Commissions 
are charged not only with verifying the powers of the elected deputies 
but also with considering certain questions relating to the implementation
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of these, powers —  the work of the deputies in their electoral districts, 
their reports to the voters, verifying the existence of proper grounds 
for the recall of a deputy, etc. It is not certain, however, whether 
the Credentials Commissions are expected to supervise the work of 
deputies as Standing Commission members in addition to their ordinary 
constituency work.
6) Publicity
Both the old and new regulations provided that the public 
were to be informed of the activity of the Standing Commissions. Thus, 
summaries of their work should be published in the gazette (vedomosti) 
of respective Supreme Soviets, as well as in federal and republican 
newspapers. In addition to this, the new regulations prescribe that 
the Standing Commissions shall submit proposals to the respective 
Supreme Soviets or its Presidium for public debate, if the draft laws 
and issues to be examined are of national significance.
B. "Bureaucratic" Aspect 
1) Accountability
Article 60 of the Latvian regulations adopted on 16 March, 1959, 
laid down that "the Standing Commissions are accountable to the 
Supreme Soviet during the sessions, but in between the sessions to 
the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet". This made the Standing Commissions 
de jure auxiliary organs of the Presidium in between the sessions.
The Latvian Supreme Soviet, however, amended this provision in 1968.
We have already noted that there have been discussions on this point 
among Soviet constitutional lawyers. The other old republican 
regulations, and the new federal and republican regulations all lay 
down that the Standing Commissions are accountable and responsible
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for all their activities to the Chamber of the respective Supreme 
Soviet.
2) Co-ordination of the work of Standing Commissions
The old regulations prescribed that the work of the Standing 
Commissions was to be co-ordinated and directed by the Presidium of 
the respective Supreme Soviet between sessions. The new federal and 
republican regulations have eliminated the word "to direct" (napravlyat1). 
This again reflects the concept that Standing Commissions are de jure 
working organs of the respective Supreme Soviet and not of its 
Presidium. Both old and new regulations stipulate, however, that the 
Presidium of the respective Supreme Soviet shall render all material 
and technical assistance to the work of the Standing Commissions.
Such services are to be provided by the staffs of the Presidium (see 
e.g., Article 38 of the federal regulation). At first sight, therefore, 
the Presidium gives an appearance of a mere service organ of the 
Standing Commissions. It is worth noting, however, that (despite the 
Latvian case mentioned above) provisions insisting on the exclusive 
responsibility of the Commissions to the Supreme Soviet rather than 
its Presidium are a feature of earlier regulations rather than the 
current ones. For instance, the regulation on the federal Legislative 
Proposals Commission of each Chamber adopted on 25 February, 1947 
prescribed (Article 11) that during the period between sessions of 
the Supreme Soviet, each Commission is accountable for its activity 
to the chairman of the Chamber. This clause has been omitted in the 
new federal and republican regulations. According to Kislitsyn, this 
signifies that the Standing Commissions are in fact subject to the 
Presidium rather than to the chairman of the Chamber. In the period 
between sessions, the chairman of the Chamber can assist the
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Commissions in their organizational work, but unlike the Presidium, 
has no right to co-ordinate the activities of the Standing Commissions 
(see Kislitsyn, 1968, pp.100-102).
3) Information
It is laid down in both old and new regulations that the Standing 
Commissions have the right to demand necessary material, plans and 
information from all accountable higher organs or state power, and 
local organs, institutions, plants and social organizations. All 
state organs, organizations and officials must fulfil the requirements of 
the Commissions and present the latter with necessary documents, 
findings and other material on the problems specified by the Commissions. 
They have the right to acquaint themselves directly with the activities 
of the state organs, institutions, plants and social organizations, 
and to demand explanation for non-fulfilment of particular laws (zakony) 
and decisions (postanovlenia) of the respective Supreme Soviets and 
decrees (ukazy) and decisions of its Presidium. At the request of the 
Standing Commissions, the chairmen of the above-mentioned bodies must 
attend the meetings of the Commissions and give explanations on the 
matters specified by the respective Commission.
t
4) Implementation of Standing Commission resolutions
It was stated in the old regulations that the decisions, proposals 
and recommendations of the Standing Commissions had no obligatory 
force, and could be realised by acts of the respective Supreme Soviets 
and its Presidium. Coupled with the provision^" that the Standing 
Commissions are not legal persons and have no judicial responsibility
1 This provision is rescinded in the new regulations
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for the material produced by them, this has militated against the 
Standing Commissions acquiring independent authority of their own. 
Nevertheless, their actions to bring matters before their parent 
bodies were preceded by other actions —  directing particular 
proposals to be examined by ministries, department, institutions, 
plants and organizations. The latter must examine them and report 
back on them within the fixed periods (varying from 5 days —  
Azerbaidzhan and Moldavia, to one month —  Estonia). This clause had 
therefore guaranteed them obligatory examination by the bodies 
mentioned above. In his report, however, to the session of the 
Moldavian Supreme Soviet on 16 January, 1959, the chairman of the 
Legislative Proposals Commission, A. S. Kazanir, said that there were 
cases where certain ministries and departments did not reply to the 
respective Commissions on the measures adopted by the latter. For 
instance,, he said, the Ministry of Agriculture had not yet replied 
to the Commission for Agriculture on its recommendations addressed 
to that Ministry (see Sovetskaya Mold., 18.1.59). In this light, 
the new regulations prescribe that, while the Standing Commissions 
direct their recommendations to the state organ and organizations, 
they also report these matters to the Presidium of the respective 
Supreme Soviet and, in necessary cases, to the respective Council 
of Ministers. The periods fixed for examination by the state organs 
and organizations have generally been extended, in the new regulations, 
to a little longer —  varying from 20 days (Uzbekistan) to two months 
(federal and RSFSR), the differences evidently being related to such 
factors as the size of the territory, population and scope of state 
administration. The periods fixed in previous regulations were 
criticised as having no practical basis (see Makhnenko, 1969, p.49).
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If the Commission does not agree with the results of the 
examination of one of their proposals, they can refer the matter to 
the respective Supreme Soviet and, between sessions, to its Presidium, 
and in necessary cases to the Council of Ministers. These bodies, 
after careful examination, are supposed to adopt measures which have 
obligatory force. A further example for the implementation of the 
Commission’s recommendations is referred to in the Armenian regulation 
adopted on 29 March, 1968, Article 8 of which states that "the 
Standing Commissions co-ordinate the corresponding Standing Commissions 
of the local soviets, organs of People's Control and social organizations". 
The importance for Standing Commissions to co-ordinate their activities 
with those of the Committees of People’s Control, if they were to 
achieve effective implementation of their decisions, has also been 
stressed by a leading soviet legal authority on the Standing Commissions 
(see Krivenko, 1970b, p.141).'*
1 The People’s Control Committee is in practice an economic police 
force, which supervises the work of all the other agencies under 
the federal Council of Ministers (see Berliner, 1957, pp. 289-291).
In Stalin’s day it was a full-blown Ministry of State Control, but 
Khrushchev first downgraded it in 1957 to a Commission of Soviet 
Control, and then upgraded it in 1961 to a Commission of State Control. 
In 1962 it was merged with the equivalent Party body as the Committee 
of Party-State Control, and that organization was split up again in 
1965, the State Control division being renamed "People's Control". 
Certain aspects of the 1962 reorganization were, however, retained, 
notably the large role played by groups of volunteer auxiliaries 
at workplace.
As early as in 1962, I. Sharipov, then chairman of the Presidium 
of the Kazakhstan Supreme Soviet stated that the State Control 
Commission, provided it were entrusted with greater powers, could 
take decisions on requests of the Standing Commissions of the republican 
Supreme Soviet, which would facilitate the supervisory tasks of the 
Standing Commissions on the implementation of the laws and acts in 
the republic (see Izv., 27.10.62).
192
5) Division of Labour
As we have noted earlier, each Standing Commission has the task 
of studying the state of and prospects for the economy and public 
welfare in its sphere of responsibility, of analysing the work of 
ministries and departments and of uncovering the reasons for existing 
shortcomings. In order to carry out these tasks, the new regulations 
delimit the sphere of activity of particular Commissions. Organizational 
divisions are intended to enable each of the Commissions to examine 
effectively the problems coming within its specific field of activity, 
and prevent overlap with the activity of other Standing Commissions.
Regulations adopted in the Stalin era were limited to those for the 
Legislative Proposals Commissions of the Armenian Supreme Soviet (11 July, 
1947), the federal Supreme Soviet (18 July, 1947) and the Latvian 
Supreme Soviet (12 April, 1949). The post-Stalin regulations adopted 
in the "first phase" mostly limited their definition of the activities 
of individual Standing Commissions to those for Credentials, Budget, 
Foreign and Legislative Proposals. Only the Belorussian and Kirgiz 
regulations also defined the sphere of activity of other branch 
Commissions. The "second phase" federal and republican regulations 
pay greater attention to this matter. The organizational division 
of labour is, in the opinion of A. Kh. Makhnenko, one of the 
essential preconditions for successful control of the observance 
of the laws and decisions passed by the Supreme Soviets and the 
Presidia, as well as for drafting new laws, decisions and decrees 
submitted to the Supreme Soviets for their approval (see Makhnenko,
1969, p.22). The present regulations which lay down the sphere of 
activity of all individual Commissions have in effect strengthened the 
principle of division of labour, and at the same time, extended the 
activity of some of the key Standing Commissions, namely those for
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Credentials, Legislative Proposals, and Budget and Planning.
6) Establishment of ad hoc commissions, sub-commissions and working 
groups.
As the federal and republican Constitutions stipulate that each 
Supreme Soviet, when it deems it necessary, should appoint commissions 
of inquiry and audit on any matter, one could presume that the Supreme 
Soviet might set up Commissions for drafting laws and editorial work 
on an ad hoc basis. The new regulations have given each Standing 
Commission the right to organize its own sub-commissions and working 
groups. The members of the sub-commissions and working groups are 
appointed by the respective Commissions. As a rule, working groups 
consist of special groups of deputies, representatives of the Party, 
trade union and other mass organizations, scientists, experts, and 
the representatives from ministries and departments (see Saifulin,
1967, p.56). To elaborate problems jointly with other branch (otrasl') 
Standing Commissions, joint sub-commissions or working groups of deputies 
may also be set up.
The overall comparative analysis on the regulations adopted in 
different periods revealed that those regulations adopted during the 
"first"phase show more variation than those adopted during the "second” 
phase. The regulations of the "second" phase are more extensive, 
complex and detailed than those adopted in the "first" phase.
Section 3
Relations between the Presidium and the Standing Commissions, and 
statutory power of the Standing Commissions
As we observed earlier, the main tasks officially assigned to 
the federal Standing Commissions under the 1967 regulation are to initiate
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and draft proposals on any matter coming within their competence at 
any time, to operate as permanent working organs of the Supreme 
Soviet, and to supervise (exercise kontrol*) and assist state organs 
in the realization of the Constitution and the acts of the Supreme 
Soviet and Presidium.
Since their jurisdiction collectively covers almost all State 
activities, the regulation formally confers the power of both policy 
initiation and policy decision. One should remember, however, that 
the Commissions contain a hierarchy of Party and government officials 
who themselves take various initiatives and decisions elsewhere at 
different levels. One should equally remember the position of the 
Presidium which stands at the top of the Soviet pyramid. It is the 
Presidium which co-ordinates and substantially directs the activities 
of the Standing Commissions. At all events, it is extremely difficult 
to conceive that higher Party officials, and the Presidium could be 
expected to tolerate a situation in which they were faced by the 
Standing Commissions with a fait accompli. If any initiative is to 
be taken on policy issues, it would probably come from higher Party 
and government officials in the Commissions and they are, furthermore, 
under discipline in their respective organizations. It may be safe 
to assume, therefore, that where the Commissions act by virtue of powers 
delegated to them by the Presidium, the Presidium will be in a position 
to delimit the area within which the Commissions make decisions on its 
behalf, while reserving other matters for decision by the Presidium 
itself. The two other tasks assigned to the Commissions under the 
regulation appear to have a more realistic basis. In his recent book, 
a Soviet constitutional lawyer, 0. Ye. Kutafin, places his main
emphasis on two Commission activities which he labels preparatory
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work and supervisory activity. He even admits that in the case of 
the federal Standing Commissions supervision assumed significance 
only after the 22nd Party Congress (1961), and was invigorated further 
when the new branch Commissions were set up in 1966.^
Section 4
Leadership
If anything is to be accomplished by the Standing Commissions, 
effective communication must exist not only between them and the 
Presidium but also among the chairmen of the Standing Commissions.
The latter must also understand along what lines of enquiry they 
may lead the Commissions, irrespective of the fact that they receive 
information, guidance and technical services from the Presidium. It 
would thus be worth investigating the composition of the chairmanship, 
particularly in the light of the conformity of their career experience 
and extent of expertise in management and other areas. The following 
analysis makes use primarily of the extensive biographical information 
available about federal Standing Commission chairmen; on aspects 
on which data is also accessible on the republican Standing Commission 
chairmen, the analysis is extended to them as well.
The chairmen of the federal Standing Commissions were nearly always 
Russians and Ukrainians until 1966. Since the seventh convocation 
(1966), however, some other nationalities have been represented. The 
nationality distribution of the chairmen at the 8th convocation (1970)
1 Kutafin breaks down the "tasks" of the Commissions into the following 
five categories: preparatory work; activities assigned by the State
organs and organizations, and also deputies of the Supreme Soviet in 
their activities to implement the acts of the Supreme Soviet; 
supervising activity; information-explanatory work; and intra- 
organizational work. See Kutafin, 1971, pp.128-169.
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is as follows: 11 Russians; 6 Ukrainians; 2 Belorussians; and one
each Uzbek, Georgian, Lithuanian, Kirgiz, Armenian and Estonian. And 
their primary organizational positions are now located in: Moscow 12 
chairmen; Kiev 3; Minsk 2; Frunze 2; and one each in Tashkent, Alma-Ata, 
Tbilisi, Vil’nyus, Riga, Yerevan and Tallin. Therefore, since the 
seventh (1966- ) and, in particular, in the eighth (1970- ) convocation, 
the increased number of chairmen have brought in a number of nationalities 
located in different republican capitals. The chairmen of the Commissions 
are thus in a position to feed into the Commissions information to the 
extent and in the form they deem expedient relative to their ethnic 
groups, or the republics in which they are serving. Viewed in another 
way, this pattern of chairmanship affords potential avenues for 
expression of concerns felt in a number of republics, both large and 
small.
The chairmen of the federal Standing Commissions have 
usually been Party members. If there are exceptions, they would be 
worth specifying. They are middle-aged or older, but the predominance 
of older men is less marked in the Standing Commissions than in the 
Presidium. The largest age-group has generally been that between 51 
and 60 —  44% at the fifth convocation (1958) and 46% at the eighth 
convocation (1970). Standing Commission chairmen mostly hold above mid­
level positions in their basic organizations. The position of chairman 
was held exclusively by Party and government officials up to the 
sixth convocation (1966). It was only at the seventh convocation (1966), 
when branch Commissions were created, that some members who were not 
Party and government officials at the time of election were appointed 
as chairmen of these Commissions. In the republican Standing Commissions, 
a number of similar branch Commissions date back to the period between
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1957 and 1959, and from the outset some of their chairmen were 
employed in organizations other than the Party and government appara­
tuses. A few interesting facts may be observed from Table 9. This 
shows that the great majority of the chairmen of both federal and 
republican Standing Commissions hold executive positions in their 
original organizations. Up to now no military officer has been 
appointed as chairman. Relatively few agricultural executives have 
been selected as chairmen (confined to Belorussian and Kazakhstan 
Commissions), and likewise relatively few industrial-executives 
(confined to Latvian, Armenian and Georgian Commissions). Academics, 
on the other hand, have served regularly as chairmen of some of the 
Commissions in almost all republics.
To pursue further an attempt to evaluate the status and 
qualifications of the chairmen of the Standing Commissions, we will 
now examine more closely the nature and career experience of those 
Party and government officials who have formed their overwhelming 
majority. Tables 10-A and 10-B show us that high-ranking executive 
as well as functional Party officials were present in both the federal 
and republican Presidia. On the other hand, the government officials 
serving as chairmen of both federal and republican Standing Commissions 
have, with few exceptions, held positions at subordinate hierarchical 
levels. The chairmen holding high-ranking Party and government posts 
have generally presided over the "original" Commissions, namely those 
for Commissions for Credentials, Legislative Proposals, Budget and 
Planning, and Foreign Affairs. In fact all chairmen of these "original" 
federal Commissions have been drawn from the upper echelons of the
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Party and government apparatuses, holding positions either at the 
centre or in the largest republics. Furthermore, the Commissions they 
have presided over have been allotted according to their institutional 
interests. For instance, government officials (mainly Gosplan) have 
continuously monopolised the chairmanship of the Budget and Planning 
Commissions of both Chambers, while the rest of the original Commissions 
have been chaired by Party officials with relevant responsibilities.
(see Table 9)
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TABLE 10
(A) PARTY AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AS CHAIRMEN OF
THE FEDERAL STANDING COMMISSIONS
5 th 6 th 7 th 8 th
convoc. convoc. convoc. convoc
Party Officials
sec. CC CPSU. 1 2 2 3
other officials, 9CC,CSPU.
1st sec.rep.CC 2
2nd sec. " 3 2
sec. " " 4 2 2 1
1st sec.reg. 
Party ctte. 2 3 9
Government Officials
chm.rep.CM 1
dep.chm.rep.CM 2 2 2 2
chm. Gosplan (rep.) 1 2
chm.reg.exec.ctte 1 1
8*
Note: * Table 9 gives the total as 9 including 6 party 
officials. This is because a Komsomol official 
is included in Table 11.
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One would also expect, because functional Party and government 
officials are themselves chairmen of the Commissions the members of 
the Commissions will be informed of official policies and unresolved 
problems and will be better placed to discuss them. Thus, the chairmen 
should be able to direct the deliberations in the Commissions in such 
a way as to produce realistic recommendations. One could not, however, 
observe a regular pattern of representation as to which CC secretaries 
chair what commissions. Only the CC secretaries responsible for 
ideology and foreign relations chaired continuously the Commissions 
for Foreign Affairs.
Another qualification of the chairmen of federal Commissions 
(here relevant data are limited to the federal level) is their expertise 
in operating their respective Commissions. Some indication of this may 
be deduced from their level of education. Nearly all chairmen of 
the federal Standing Commissions up to now completed higher education 
(see Table 11). The nature of their highest level of education shows 
the strength of their basic knowledge in particular fields (industry, 
vocational, agriculture and economics). Other supporting evidence on 
the question of expertise can be drawn from their career background. 
Table 12 shows that some had worked as specialists in the fields of 
agriculture or engineering. Others had worked as operatives on farms, 
in industry, educational institutions,the Komsomol or Party apparatus. 
Although all of the chairmen in each convocation had gained managerial 
experience at some stage in their careers, managerial roles to the time 
of the sixth convocation (1966) were almost entirely limited to the 
two fields of political affairs, and industry. However, the chairmen
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appointed since the seventh convocation (1966) have had experience in 
a much wider variety of fields, at all different levels, and with a 
greater variety of organizations. In other words not only do the 
individual chairmen possess more specialized managerial qualifications, 
but they also tend to have acquired managerial experience in several 
fields, at several levels and in several organizations. Looking at 
the current occupational positions of the chairmen elected since the 
seventh convocation, one sees that each of them has engaged in a specific 
area of responsibility in his respective organization relevant to the 
responsibilities of his Commission. This aspect is particularly 
pronounced for those who chair branch Commissions (see Appendix C-2).
TABLE 11
HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION OF THE CHAIRMEN OF 
THE FEDERAL STANDING COMMISSIONS
5th convoc. 
(N= 9)
6th convoc. 
(N= 9)
7th convoc. 
(N= 20)
8th convoc 
(N= 26)
Secondary 11.1% 11.1% - -
Higher: 88.9% 88.9% 100.0% 100.0%
- diploma (88.9%) (77.8%) (70.0%) (88.8%)
- candidate ( - ) (11.1%) (20.0%) ( 7.7%)
- doctorate ( - ) ( - ) (10.0%) (11.5%)
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TABLE 12
OCCUPATIONAL FIELDS AND CAREER BACKGROUND OF 
THE CHAIRMEN OF THE FEDERAL STANDING COMMISSIONS.
Present <occupational Components of career
fields * experience (8th convoc.
only)**
5 th 8 th Manager Special, Oper-
convoc .convoc. Tie. Exec, ative
(N=9) (N=26)
% %
Political Aff 33.3 61.5 15 15 - 2
(N=3) (N=16)
Industry 22.2 7.7 4 9 9 6
(N=2) (N=2)
Publication 22.2 - - - - 1
(N=2)
Economics-Finance- 11.1 15.4 5 2 1 -
Planning (N=l) (N=4)
Agriculture 11.1 3.8 2 5 5 2
(N=l) (N=l)
Education-Sci. - 7.7 3 6 - 6
Culture (N=2)
Transportation- - 3.8 - 1 - -
Communications (N=l)
Total 29 38 15 17
Notes: * It is unnecessary to list the figures of career
background in both the 5th and 8th convocations, 
since the pattern of career background has under­
gone similar changes, if any, to the ones in the 
occupational fields. The figures for career 
backgrounds represent "units of experience", i.e. 
each unit represents experience gained by a single 
member in a particular field and a particular role. 
This device has been employed because members will 
in many cases have obtained experience in more 
than one field and more than one role in particular 
fields.
** The occupational fields of secretaries of Party 
committees were based on their fields of respon­
sibilities in their respective committees. This 
was, however, possible only for those of the CPSU 
and the republican Central Committees. It should 
be stated, on the other hand, that all regional 
Party secretaries who are chairmen of the federal 
Commissions are the first secretaries.
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The Chairman of at least one of each pair of branch Commissions (for 
the two Houses) is always a person who should be well acquainted with 
the subject matter he is dealing with in his Commission. We should 
note, at the same time, that the occupational field we term "political 
affairs" has doubled its proportion from the fifth convocation to the 
eighth convocation. Another way of looking at it is that increasing 
numbers of chairmanships have been assigned to republican and regional 
first and second secretaries with earlier career experience in a variety 
of fields. This may reflect an official intention to counterbalance 
an excess of professionalism in other than political fields. An 
analysis of the chairmen of republican branch Commissions (limited to 
those for Agriculture, Education, Industry, and Public Health and 
Social Security) revealed a similar composition as to the diversification 
of fields and expertise, although there are some variations so far as 
the levels and organizations they are currently working in arc. concerned, 
e.g. the Commission for Industry in the eighth convocation (19/1- ) of the 
Ukrainian Supreme Soviet is chaired by the head of the Department of 
Heavy Industry of the republican Party Central Committee; that for 
Georgia by a factory director and that for the RSFSR by an industrial 
regional Party committee official and so on.
Finally, there has also been greater continuity of incumbency, 
which might help ensure continuity of work, and provide the opportunity 
for accumulating experience in the operation of the Standing Commissions. 
Generally speaking, with the exception of the seventh convocation 
(1966-1970), one of the chairmen in each pair of "original" federal 
Commissions has been serving previously as chairman or member of the
same Standing Commissions.
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Summing up, we may say that the pattern of chairmanship in 
the Standing Commissions has shown a tendency to specialization.
This tendency was particularly strong in the "branch" Commissions, 
although in the republican Standing Commissions there is no uniform 
pattern of composition across the republics examined. Assuming that 
the Commissions have a part in drafting and amending legislation, and 
in supervising its implementation, the fact that their chairmen hold 
relatively high occupational or specialized professional positions, 
and are thus well acquainted with the subject matter or prevailing 
policy of the top Party and government organs, should obviously 
contribute to the effective performance of these formal functions. The 
presence of high officials as chairmen should ensure that the Commissions 
do not stray beyond their terms of reference. They are able to discourage 
certain lines of questioning, if necessary. There are, indeed, also 
potential dangers in having a high official as chairman. His Com­
mission could become captive to the outside body, in which he holds his 
primary position. On the other hand, he may encourage all kinds of 
communication to the extent he considers necessary to make the Commission 
function or for making an impression in view of the presence of a 
large number of the rank and file from various organizations. The 
secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet almost always attends 
the plenary meetings of the Commissions, and this would presumably tend 
to inhibit either of these tendencies. Be this as it may, the fact that 
the chairmen, or at least those of the federal Standing Commissions, 
generally share a common background and therefore talk the same language 
ought to ensure reasonably smooth communications between them.
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Section 5
Involvement of various organizations in the Standing Commissions
The involvement of various organizations in the Standing Commissions 
has been gauged simply by the number of the members of Standing 
Commissions whose basic work affiliation lies with such organizations.
We have examined in these terms the membership of the four "original" 
Commissions and four of the "branch" Commissions (Commissions for 
Industry, Education, Public Health and Social Security, and Agric­
ulture), as samples of federal Standing Commissions. We have also 
examined nine republican Standing Commissions, in an attempt to 
answer such questions as which Commission seems to require the 
involvement of what organization, or what variations of organizational 
involvement exist between the republics.
The following is a brief summary of what emerged from this study. 
First, the federal Standing Commissions have more variety of organ­
izational involvement than the republican counterparts examined.
(This is particularly true of the "original" Standing Commissions). 
Secondly, no organization other than the Party has been involved 
regularly in the federal and republican Commissions studied in all 
convocations. Finally, organizational involvement varies from 
republic to republic, from Commission to Commission and from 
convocation to convocation. Each republic seems to have its own 
criteria of which organization should have members in the Commissions 
at each convocation.
Despite these differences between the federal and republican 
levels and between republics, there are certain organizations, apart 
from the Party, which are always represented in particular Commissions. 
Most of these are predictable enough, for instance, one regularly
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finds involvement of agricultural enterprises in the Commission 
for Agriculture, involvement of academic and educational establish“ 
ments in the Commission for Education, involvement of medical 
institutions in the Commission for Public Health and Social Security 
and involvement of industrial enterprises in the Commission for 
Industry. Thus, the evidence shows that certain organizations, whose 
areas of operation correspond with the fields of specialization of 
these Commissions, are necessarily involved through the presence of 
their members in the Standing Commissions.
Section 6
Expertise of the members of the Standing Commissions
The average proportion of members working at executive level 
has generally declined in each successive convocation in both the 
federal and republican Commissions. Managerial representation in 
the republican Standing Commissions has tended to converge towards 
a similar level (about half), except in the case of the RSFSR, where 
it has remained abnormally high —  even higher than in the federal 
Standing Commissions. The decline in managerial representation in 
the federal Commissions set in later (from the seventh convocation) 
reflecting the later proliferation of "branch" Commissions. Only 
one federal Commission at the eighth convocation (1970) contains more 
than 70% working at managerial level, whereas all but two did in the 
seventh convocation (1966). At the eighth federal convocation, 
the highest proportion employed at managerial level is found in the 
Credentials Commission, followed by those for Youth Affairs, Budget 
and Planning and Agriculture. Because of overall expansion of 
Commission membership managerial level members have retained their
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TABLE 13
MEMBERS OF FEDERAL AND REPUBLICAN COMMISSIONS EMPLOYED AT MANAGERIAL LEVEL
5th convoc. 6th convoc. 7th convoc. 8th convoc.
% % % %
Federal 88.4 87.3 76.1 61.6
RSFSR 68.6 79.0 77.2 67.4
Ukraine 76.7 54.9 41.7 45.4
Belorussia 78.2 34.0 43.3 47.2
Kazakhstan 66.6 49.8 51.6 45.3
Uzbekistan 95.0 67.6 61.6 54.8
Estonia 61.8 50.7 50.7 44.0
Latvia 83.5 61.3 58.9 52.8
Georgia
(4th convoc.) 
68.2 67.0 50.0 41.5
Armenia
(4th convoc.) 
93.5
(5th convoc.) 
77.3
(6th convoc.) 
77.3
(7th convoc 
60.0
absolute numerical strength in the Commissions, but at the same time 
there has also been a substantially increased number of operatives and 
specialists. The relative decline in managerial level members does 
not necessarily mean decline in relevant expertise. Inquiries into the 
occupational fields of positions coupled with information on the career 
backgrounds of the members of the Commissions should give a picture of 
the attributes of the membership. The following Table 14-A collapses a 
series of tables into one for the several Standing Commissions showing 
the occupational fields of positions and career background of the 
membership of the federal Standing Commissions. Each table lists a 
number of occupational fields at the time of appointment, in order of 
strength. For purpose of comparison, the profile of occupational fields 
represented in the latest (eighth) convocation has been set against that 
for the members elected at the fifth convocation (or in the case of 
branch Commissions, the seventh convocation). The data on career back­
ground are limited to the current convocation only. Moreover, the
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strength of career background as executive, specialist, and operative 
has been studied only in the fields to which the members are at 
present most strongly committed. Table 14-B, dealing with the 
republican Standing Commissions is limited to the present occupational 
fields of their members, insufficient biographical information being 
available for an analysis of career background. We have taken three 
republics of varied size and administrative structure. The Commissions 
analysed are still the "original" ones (Credentials; Legislative 
Proposals; Budget and Planning; and Foreign Affairs), and four 
branch Commissions (Agriculture; Education; Industry; and Public 
Health and Social Security). Comparable analysis of the other branch 
Commissions was not practicable because they came into existence at 
different periods, and underwent varying patterns of splitting and 
amalgamation.
The most striking fact observable from Tables 14-A and 14-B is 
that the occupational field of political affairs has been in sub­
stantial decline in almost all the Commissions-1- although in several 
of them it still remains the top occupational field, while there has 
been a compensatory increase in the fields of industry and agriculture, 
with the majority of their representatives being lower ranking employees. 
The differences in the ratio between the several top fields have 
generally narrowed. While a diversification of fields is observable, 
a clear variation of expertise is noticeable in each Commission. In 
some Commissions such as that for Public Health and Social Security, 
however, representation of relevant expertise declined at the eighth 
convocation, due chiefly to the large intake of rank and file industrial 
and agricultural workers. It is also interesting to note that in the
case of the Estonian Standing Commissions, unlike other republican and 
_
Decline in this field roughly correspond with the fall in apparat 
representation and also decline in the proportion of members who have 
experience as top-line executive or executive in the Party and government 
(Cf. Table 2 and 6-A,-B and -C).
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federal Standing Commissions, a diversification of fields of expertise 
was already observable at the fifth convocation, where the occupational 
field of political affairs consisted of less than 23 percent of the 
total membership in all the Estonian Commissions except the Credentials 
Commission. The interpretation which can be given to this is that 
the Estonian Standing Commissions were the first to have become 
functionally divided Commissions through the representation of relevant 
expertise.
A certain degree of expertise may be regarded as one of the 
major prerequisites for members, if they are to discharge their specific 
duties effectively. The presence of the members with experience in 
political affairs might also serve to offset any excessive tendency 
toward a purely technical attitude.
It may be worth commenting specifically on the trends and 
characteristics of expertise in each of the "original" Commissions, 
and the branch Commissions taken as a whole. So far as the republican 
Standing Commissions are concerned, these comments are based not only 
on these three republics reported in Table 14-B, but on the six other 
republics studied as well (Ukraine, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, 
Georgia and Armenia).
Credentials Commission
In the federal Credentials Commission, a large influx of members 
concerned with agricultural and industrial affairs has been registered 
at recent convocations. Accordingly, there are now as many members 
who have gained experience in these fields as managers, specialists, 
and operatives as in all other fields combined. In the republics which 
have regional divisions, managerial personnel of agricultural enterprises
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have been quite frequently selected as members of this Commission. 
There have always been members from the field of publications or 
education, as well as some serving in military organizations.
Legislative Proposals Commission
Although a dramatic increase of industrial personnel in the 
federal Commission was recorded at the eighth convocation (1970) , most 
of the members who gained experience in this field have done so as 
operatives rather than managers. The editor of the principal Party 
newspaper is present in both the federal Commission and a number of 
republican Commissions (Belorussian, Ukrainian, Kazakh, Uzbek and 
Armenian). Also noteworthy is the presence in this Commission of 
KGB or judicial officials. In the latest (eighth) convocation, 
however, none such are to be found in the Belorussian, Uzbek, Latvian 
or Georgian Commissions. On the other hand, in Kazakhstan, a KGB 
official was elected for the first time as member of this Commission. 
In the federal Commission, there was only one KGB official at the 
eighth convocation (1970) , although the number has been greater at all 
previous convocations. Considering the overall specialities of the 
membership, it would appear that organizational skills related to law 
enforcement functions might be regarded as a requirement for this 
Commission, though their absence in certain republics and their recent 
decline in number suggests that these skills are not everywhere and 
always regarded as essential. Recently the trend has rather been 
oriented to acquiring some expertise in other fields, particularly 
propaganda, public relations and education.
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Budget and Planning Commissions
In addition to the large number of members whose current 
occupational field and chief career experience are in industry and 
agriculture, the federal Commission has included some members whose 
speciality is in the field of finance, economics and planning, though 
there is some sign of decline in their numbers in recent cciivocations. 
The Russian, Uzbek, Estonian and Latvian Commissions have, like the 
federal Commission, quite frequently included officials of Gosplan, 
the Gosbank and the Sovnarkhozy (when they were in existence). The 
federal, Russian and Belorussian Commissions have also regularly 
included a small number of members whose speciality is in education 
and scientific research. By and large, this Commission appears to 
require managerial skills of a special kind. Officials of the 
economic organs of government, industrial and agricultural managers, 
heads of economic research institutes may be well equipped to mobilise 
the specialists required, and to organise and preside in the sub­
commissions and working groups of an economic and financial nature.
At least some of the members with experience in these fields would 
clearly be well familiar with the technicalities of the subject matter 
with which the Commission is concerned.
Foreign Affairs Commission
Some republican Commissions such as the Belorussian and 
Ukrainian have steadily limited the number of occupational fields, 
whereas others such as the Uzbek and Georgian Commissions have 
increased it. The federal Commission has kept its number virtually 
unchanged, but the balance between them has shifted considerably. 
Without exception, these Commissions have now acquired a number of
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members whose occupational field and career experience are in industry 
and agriculture, but largely in operative roles. Given the fact, 
however, that the editors of newspapers, executives of academic and 
educational institutions, and chairmen of such bodies as the Writers' 
Union and Council on Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign 
Countries occupy a fair proportion of the membership in both the 
federal and republican Commissions, the Commission's interests and 
expertise appear to be particularly strong in publicity, education- 
culture and propaganda abroad. Since the seventh convocation there 
has been indeed a marked increase in the number of those with experience 
in publicity: 18 (5th)-18 (6th)- 34 (7th)-34 (8th).^
Branch Commissions
It seems that the strength of expertise is more clearly revealed 
in the branch Commissions than in the "original" Commissions. The 
range of expertise in each branch Commission is usually rather limited, 
and more directly relevant to the activities of the respective branch 
Commission. This is particularly pronounced in the Commissions for 
Agriculture and for Industry whose members are overwhelmingly persons 
currently or previously engaged in industry or agriculture. In the 
remaining branch Commissions, there tends to be a larger number of 
functional fields represented other than those directly relevant. Here 
one might surmise that, so long as a substantial nucleus of directly
The figures represent "units of career experience". Each unit 
represents experience gained by a single member in a particular field. 
However, he may have obtained experience in more than one role, as a 
top-line executive, executive, specialist or operative in the field 
of publicity.
231
relevant specialities is present, representation of these other 
specialities may be "functional", helping to secure a flow of infor­
mation relating to their various fields, and into supply checks from 
the standpoint of various kinds of technical and professional evaluation.
Section 7
Levels of Employment of the Party and Government Officials
It is apparent from the Table: Organizations in which current 
positions of the members are located (see Table 2) that the number of 
the Commission members employed in industrial and agricultural and 
other organizations has now surpassed the number of the Party and 
government officials. This has reflected almost entirely an increase 
in members holding rank and file jobs, which is particularly marked 
in the Standing Commissions of republics with regional divisions.
However, this has not meant, at least as far as the federal Standing 
Commissions are concerned, that members of rank and file jobs in the 
various organizations have become numerically dominant. Whether, and 
to what extent the large intake of rank and file members, particularly 
in the republican Standing Commissions, promotes or hampers the 
successful operation of the Commissions’ activities is naturally a 
subject for empirical investigation. It would be a mistake to draw 
the conclusion from the general pattern of the composition of the 
membership, however, that the heart of the membership —  the Party and 
government officials —  has now withered away. It seems fair to say 
that the Party and government officials still form the real political 
centre of the Supreme Soviet but that they may now be faced with a 
variety of opinions in a somewhat less predictable arena than in the past.
232
Federal Standing Commissions
In the eighth convocation (1970) of the federal Supreme Soviet, 
219 out of 243 Party officials and 96 out of 171 government officials 
who were elected as deputies to the Supreme Soviet served as members 
of the Standing Commissions, as compared to 231 out of 395 industrial 
members and only 186 out of 409 agricultural members. But it should 
also be noted that there have been considerable changes in the level 
and type of the Party and government officials represented. One of 
the most significant changes is the consistent increase of Party (and 
to a lesser extent government) officials drawn from regional and 
lower levels. Most of the officials of these levels are top-line 
executives (see Table 15). First secretaries of regional (krai and 
oblast) Party committees were the largest single occupational group 
in the membership up to the seventh convocation (1966) and at the 
eighth convocation (1970), were exceeded only by the industrial workers. 
Furthermore, in the current convocation, every regional first secretary 
elected to the Supreme Soviet became a member either of the Presidium 
or of a Standing Commission,^ whereas only 158 out of 347 industrial 
worker deputies were chosen as members of the Standing Commissions.
1 Of the 147 1st secretaries of regional Party committees elected 
to the Supreme Soviets in 1970, 3 are members of the federal 
Presidium, 139 - members of federal Standing Commissions, and 
5 - members of RSFSR Standing Commissions.
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TABLE 15
NUMBER OF LOCAL PARTY AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS 
IN FEDERAL STANDING COMMISSIONS
A. Regional level (krai, oblast, aut., repub., okrug, etc.)
5th convoc. 6th convoc. 7th convoc. 8th convoc.
Party-
1st sec. 46 64 131 139
others 2 2 4 3
Government
chairman 18 19 42 41
others 2 2 - -
B. City, raion and settlement level
Party
1st sec. 9 8 30 35
others - - 1 1
Government
chairman 5 6 9 7
others 5 1 3 3
Another aspect of the change is that the ratio of republican officials,
both Party and governmental, has declined continuously as against other
levels. However, Table 16 shows that, though the number of republican 
officials is relatively small, their official status is high.
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TABLE 16
NUMBER OF HIGHER PARTY AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS 
IN FEDERAL STANDING COMMISSIONS
5 th convoc. 6th convoc. 7th convoc. 8th convoc
Party
officials, CC CPSU 6 6 11 13
1st or 2nd sec. 
repub. Party CC 14 14 20 22
other repub. official 20 11 16 6
Government
federal gov. official 7 5 11 17
rep. gov. • chra. & 
dep.chm. of CM; 
minister; chm. of 
state cttee. 32 33 35 25
other rep. official 7 1 4 2
Along with these changes, it should be observed that the ratio
of Central Party officials has declined compared with that of lower 
level Party officials, whereas federal government officials have 
increased their ratio since the sixth convocation (1962) (see Table 17). 
One factor probably operating here is the significance of the adminis­
trative reforms. The decentralization of the federal government launched 
in 1957 appeared to result in increased responsibilities being assumed 
by the Central Party apparatus as well as the republican governments.
The slow recentralisation movement which began in the early 1960’s and 
which became especially discernible since the beginning of the economic 
reform of 1965 has, however, shifted much power back to the federal
government.
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TABLE 17
ADMINISTRATIVE LEVELS OF THE PARTY AND GOVERNMENT 
OFFICIALS IN THE FEDERAL STANDING COMMISSIONS
Party officials Government officials
central rep. reg. city-
district
central rep. reg. city-
district
Percentages Percentages
5th convoc. 10 36 45 ' 9 (100) 9 51 27 13 (ioo:
6 th convoc. 6 23 63 8 (100) 6 52 32 10 (ioo:
7th convoc. 5 17 64 14 (100) 10 37 42 11 (ioo:
8th convoc. 6 13 65 16 (100) 18 28 44 10 (ioo:
Republican Standing Commissions
The two major groups identified here could be described as regional 
Party bosses from the( RSFSR and republican government leaders from the other 
republics. In considering the data set out in Tables 18 and 19, we will 
begin by noting a peculiarity of the RSFSR Commissions, namely that, 
prior to the eighth convocation (1971) , they contained no members of 
the republican government. There are two possible explanations for this.
The functions of the RSFSR government interlock in a unique way with those 
of the federal government, and the activities of the RSFSR Supreme 
Soviet seem to be oriented far more to the supervision of regional, rather 
than republican level bodies. On the other hand, it may simply reflect a 
strict view of the Standing Commissions prior to 1971, similar to that 
taken in Estonia with respect to its Presidium, along the lines that 
since part of the responsibility of these bodies is to exercise control 
over the republican organs of government, it would be improper for them 
to contain members thereof. Looking more generally at the Party and 
government officials in the RSFSR Standing Commissions, we see that, although
(cont. p.24q )
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the ratio drawn from the regional level has been declining, this 
level still remains the most strongly represented.
A large majority of the regional Party officials has consisted of 
second secretaries and secretaries of lower rank, apart from the sixth 
convocation (1S63-67) where about half were first secretaries. As for 
the regional government officials, however, the majority have been 
drawn consistently from the chairmen of regional executive committees.
A similar pattern is observable in other republics with regional 
divisions, only here it is even more marked. In the Standing Commi­
ssions of these republics (except the RSFSR), therefore, one finds 
only second secretaries or members of the lower ranks of regional 
Party officialdom. The main reason for not having the first secretaries 
of regional Party committees in the Standing Commissions of these since 
the seventh convocation (1967) is that, as we have observed earlier, it 
has become standard practise for these to be elected to the federal 
Supreme Soviets. The RSFSR is thus a partial exception in that some 
of its regional first secretaries continued to be elected to the RSFSR 
Supreme Soviet. Double representation in both the federal and 
republican Supreme Soviets is avoided. These developments can be seen 
in large part as a reflection of the increased demands for personnel for 
the federal Standing Commissions. At the same time it has established 
a sort of representative hierarchy: the higher one’s official status in a 
regional Party, the higher the "organ of state power" to which one 
will be coopted.
In republics with regional divisions other than the RSFSR, the 
largest group of Party officials has been that working at the city 
and district levels. Party officials employed at republic level here, 
in the current (eighth) convocation, increased their ratio at the
241
expense of regional officials. On the other hand, the government- 
officials in these republics have retained their ratio virtually 
unchanged, keeping the regional officials in a majority.
In the smaller republics, as one might expect lower level Party 
and government officials have been more strongly represented. The 
overwhelming majority of these are first secretaries of Party 
committees or chairmen of soviet executive committees.
A final observation on the data in Table 18 is that the number 
of the functional officials such as the department heads of the Party 
Central Committee has been steadily increasing. (The RSFSR is again 
an exception while in Belorussia, Estonia and Latvia, the increase 
has fluctuated between different convocations.) This reflects the 
heightened demand for functionally specialized officials with the 
proliferation of branch Commissions.
Section 8
Continuity
The extent to which members are re-elected from one convocation 
to the next provides one indication of potential continuity in the 
operation of the Standing Commissions. In the federal Standing 
Commissions (except those for Foreign Affairs), the rate of holdover^ 
remained rather low until the seventh convocation (1966) (average 
rate was 18% at the fifth convocation and 21% at the sixth convocation). 
At the seventh convocation, the average ratio even declined to 10%, 
owing to the creation of new Standing Commissions, although 35% of the 
total membership of the Standing Commissions of the sixth convocation 
(1962-1966) had retained their membership in either existing or newly
1 The term "holdover" means here the proportion of the new membership 
who were in the old membership.
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created branch Commissions at the seventh convocation (1966). At 
the eighth convocation (1970) , the average rate has increased to 
26%, despite the creation of two additional branch Commissions (those 
for Youth Affairs and Conservation).
What categories of members have tended to retain their member­
ship? Some interesting facts emerge from consideration of the federal 
Standing Commissions at the eighth convocation (1970). (A comparable 
satisfactory study cannot be done for membership of the seventh 
convocation because of the vast expansion in total Standing Commission 
membership due to the creation of new Commissions.) There are 234 
members who were members of the same Standing Commissions at the 
seventh (1966) and eighth (1970) convocations. Of these 234 "holdovers",
61 are first secretaries of regional Party committees, which means that 
44% of the first secretaries of regional Parry committees who are members 
of federal Standing Commissions at the eighth convocation (1970) were 
members of the same Standing Commissions at the seventh convocation (1966). 
The second largest group, comprising 19 members, consists of chairmen 
of regional executive committees, followed by 17 managers of agricul­
tural enterprises, 11 operatives of industrial enterprises, and 8 each 
of chairmen of city executive committees and deputy chairmen of republican 
Councils of Ministers. The remaining 110 "holdovers" fall into 49 
occupational groups. The total number of occupational positions "carried 
over" thus amounts to 55. However, the "holdover" rate is far from 
being proportional to the number of seats which each of these positions 
represents in the Standing Commissions. Indeed, only 7% of 158 
industrial operatives, who are by far biggest group in the Standing 
Commissions were members of the same Standing Commissions at the 
previous (seventh) convocation. The first secretaries of regional
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Party committees will obviously remain the largest holdover group so 
long as the overwhelming majority of them continue to be selected as 
members of federal Standing Commissions. In other words, their holdover 
ratio in the Commissions is directly related to their occupational 
turnover ratio, although it could be reduced by transfers from one 
Commission to another. First secretaries of regional Party committees 
held over from previous convocations are to be found in all of the 
federal Standing Commissions. They constitute the largest group of 
holdovers in all Standing Commissions except those for Foreign Affairs 
and for Transport and Communications.
By and large, the rate of holdover in the nine republics 
examined has remained rather low. Up to the eighth convocation (1971) , 
only one republic (the Ukraine) has reached an average holdover rate 
of 20%. At the eighth convocation, the Standing Commissions of all 
nine republics have moderately increased the ratio of holdover, with 
the average level in the P.SFSR, Belorussia, Uzbekistan and Latvia also 
reaching 20%. In the Ukrainian Standing Commissions, a sharp increase 
was registered between the sixth (10%) and seventh (31%) convocations, 
and it was sustained over the eighth convocation. In the republican 
Standing Commissions, the pattern of occupational positions among hold­
overs appears to be rather different from that in the federal Commissions. 
The number of Party and government officials retaining Standing Com­
mission membership in successive convocations has been quite small.
In the Ukrainian Standing Commissions, for instance, Party and govern­
ment officials constituted only 17 out of 103 holdovers at the eighth 
convocation (1971). The distribution of Party and government positions 
for the 17 members is as follows: second secretary, regional Party
committee - 6; chairman, regional executive committee - 5; first
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secretary, city or district Party committee - 4; department head 
in the republican CC - 2. The occupational positions held by other 
holdovers are generally ones that have particular relevance to the 
work of the branch Commissions. For instance, in the Ukrainian 
Commission for Agriculture, nine of the ten holdovers at the eighth 
convocation (1971) were persons working in agricultural enterprises 
either as director, specialist or operative, the other being first 
secretary of a district Party committee. A similar pattern was 
observed in the other branch Commissions.
Nevertheless, a certain degree of stability in membership and 
in the kind of people re-elected ought not only ensure the continuity 
of the particular work in each Commission beyond their tenure of office 
but also facilitate the accumulation of experience gained during
successive convocations.
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CHAPTER 8 
OPERATION
Section 1
PROCEDURE
At the beginning of the year, the Presidium of each Supreme Soviet 
generally convokes a conference of the chairmen of the Standing 
Commissions, at which, we are told, the results of the Commissions' 
activities in the previous year are analysed, activities for the 
current year are discussed, and guidelines for all Commissions are 
decided. (See a recent example in Sovetskaya Est., 23.1.71). We can 
well understand the necessity for such conferences if there is to be 
concerted action by the Standing Commissions.^  Each Commission then 
examines organizational aspects of projected activities for the 
current year, with the participation of the spokesmen of corresponding 
ministries and government departments. Related discussions are also held 
with deputies of the Supreme Soviet and working officials of the 
Presidium, and, in the case of republican Standing Commissions, with 
deputies of local soviets in the field with which the Commission is 
concerned. After these preliminaries, a formal annual work plan for 
each Commission is drawn up (see e.g. Drobyanzko,1961, p. 16; Izv., 
15.12.66; and W S , RSFSR, No. 16, 1967, p. 404). This work plan may 
be reviewed and adjusted in the course of its operations (see e.g. 
Sovetskaya Est., 7.7.63 and 6.9.63).
This schedule may, from time to time, be disrupted by new elections 
to the Supreme Soviet, which have always been held in the middle of the
 ^ L. Kulichenko, then the chairman of the RSFSR Commission for Agriculture 
noted in the press the lack of lateral communications between the chair­
men of the Standing Commissions which resulted in unco-ordinated actions 
by the RSFSR Standing Commissions. (See Kulichenko, 1965).
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year. In these cases, however, the out-going or reappointed chairman 
will generally inform the newly appointed membership of the Commission 
at their first meeting of the activities of the previous Commission.
We are told that the Commission then renews the work plan for the 
remainder of the year, but whether they always or usually do is not 
entirely clear (see e.g., W S  Est., No. 19, 1967, p. 422 and pp. 459- 
460). In any case, there is evidently an intention here not only to 
inform the members of the experience of the previous Commission but 
also to encourage continuity in Standing Commission activities.
Information on the plenary meetings of Standing Commissions 
is extremely defective. We do not even know whether all such meetings 
are actually reported in the relevant official Gazette (Vedomosti) 
or in the press. The secretary of the Presidum of the federal Supreme 
Sovet, M.P. Georgadze, claims that there were 170 plenary meetings of 
the federal Standing Commissions during the seventh convocation 
(1966-1970) (see Georgadze, 1970), yet only two-fifths
of this number were publicly reported - 70 to be precise. On the other 
hand, A.Kh. Makhnenko stated that, at an earlier period, the federal 
Commission for Legislative Proposals held their meetings infrequently 
and well below the statutory requirement.^ During the fifth convocation 
(1958-1962), for instance, only 11 plenary meetings were held instead 
of the required number of 16 plenary meetings(see Makhnenko, 1966, 
p. 59).
Nevertheless, information is available on a sufficient number of 
plenary meetings of both federal and republican Standing Commissions. In
 ^ The regulations of the Commissions for Legislative Proposals of the 
Soviet of the Union and Soviet of Nationalities (Article 8, and Article 
7 respectively) stipulate that the Commissions should convoke the 
meetings at least no less than once in every three months.
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the case of the federal Standing Commissions, joint meetings are held 
of the corresponding Commissions of both Chambers, and also other 
Commissions. This practice is particularly prevalent in the meetings 
organized by the Commissions for Budget and Planning and for Legislative 
Proposals. To take an example, of 11 meetings of the Legislative 
Proposals Commission (or Commissions) held during the fifth convocation 
(1958-1962), 9 were joint meetings of both Chambers, or meetings with 
other Commissions (Makhnenko, 1966, p.31). In recent years, joint 
meetings have become an increasingly common practice. In the seventh 
convocation (1966-1970), 45 out of 70 meetings were held jointly. In 
1970 and 1971, 19 out of 22 meetings of the Commissions were held 
jointly. In 1972, all 12 meetings of the Commissions were reportedly 
held jointly. Joint meetings with other Commissions are held by the 
republican Standing Commissions as well. According to the chairman 
and secretary of the Uzbek Commission for Science and Culture, M. 
Vakhabov and G. Nadzhimov, "this type of joint meeting allows members 
to examine the problem from all aspects and to adopt better, correct 
and effective measures" (see Nadzhimov and Vakhabov, 1969). In some 
republics such as Estonia, the Standing Commissions hold meetings 
jointly with the corresponding Standing Commissions of the local soviets 
(see e.g., Sovetskaya Est., 9.10.64). Such meetings seem mainly to be 
aimed at improving their supervisory capacity over the work of the 
local executive and administrative bodies (see Stepanov and Yunevichyus, 
1962, p.110; and SDT, No. 4, 1973, p. 13). Even where such joint 
meetings between the republican and local Standing Commissions are not 
held direct contact occurs when the former examine problems in part­
icular localities (see Pritytsky, 1971).
Some variety is observable in the location and timing of Commission
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meetings. The federal and RSFSR Standing Commission always hold 
their meetings in Moscow. The RSFSR Standing Commissions moreover tend 
to hold their meetings close together within a limited period of time 
(from 4 to 6 Commissions meeting in 3 to 6 days) even when examining 
problems other than the annual economic plan and the budget: for the
latter, it is quite usual for all the federal and republican Standing 
Commissions to hold their meetings in December. In a republic as 
big as RSFSR, the practice of holding the meetings for a number of 
Commissions at particular times may be aimed at economy particularly 
if these coincide with sessions of the Supreme Soviet, but it may also 
be intended to provide opportunities for informal contact between the 
members attending the different meetings in the same location. Not 
all republican Standing Commissions convene their meetings in their 
respective capitals. In at least five republics (Kazakhstan, Georgia, 
Moldavia, Lithuania and Estonia), local "on-the-spot" meetings have 
been held outside their capitals. Admittedly, however, with the 
exception of Estonia these have only been isolated cases, though they 
stretch back to 1958 (see e.g. Izv., 5.9.62; Zarya Vostoka, 6.1.70 and 
16.1.71; Sovetskaya Mold.,11.11.62; and Sovetskaya Litva, 30.8.69).
The Estonian Standing Commissions appear to have been steadily increas­
ing on-the-spot meetings in successive convocations. There were 3 
reported in the fifth convocation (1959-1963), 8 in the sixth convo­
cation (1963-1967), and 14 in the seventh (1967-1971). It should be 
noted that most such on-the-spot meetings are carried out by the 
Commissions for Public Health and Social Security, Trade and Public 
Eating Facilities and Communal Economy, where facilities are for the 
most part administered locally. In the official report of the conference
of the chairmen of the Standing Commissions organized by the Estonian
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P r e s id iu m  on 23 J a n u a r y ,  1971, t h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h e s e  o n - t h e - s p o t  
m e e t in g s  was s t r e s s e d  and f u r t h e r  i n c r e a s e s  f o re s h a d o w e d ,  t o  be  
h e l d  b o t h  i n  c i t i e s  and d i s t r i c t s ,  on t h e  g ro u n d  t h a t  s u c h  m e e t in g s  
p r o v i d e  a more e f f e c t i v e  s e t t i n g  f o r  l o c a l  spokesm en t o  e x p r e s s  t h e i r  
o p i n i o n s  on q u e s t i o n s  r e l a t i n g  t o  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i n  t h e i r  a r e a  \ w s ,
E s t . ,  No. 3, 1971, p p .  4 4 - 4 6 ) .
L e t  u s  now p a s s  from  t h e s e  g e n e r a l  a s p e c t s  o f  S t a n d in g  Commission 
m e e t in g s ,  t o  s e e  w h a t  we can  d i s c o v e r  a b o u t  how t h e i r  d e c i s i o n s  a r e  
made and im p le m e n te d ,  
a) P r e l i m i n a r y  s t a g e .
As we h a v e  n o t e d  e a r l i e r ,  a l l  Com m issions have  t h e i r  work p l a n s  
made up f o r  e i t h e r  tw e lv e  m o n th ly ,  o r  s i x  m o n th ly  o r  t h r e e  m o n th ly  
p e r i o d s ,  and s p e c i f i c  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h e s e  c o n s t i t u t e  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  and 
s t a r t i n g  p o i n t  f o r  t h e  l a u n c h in g  o f  p r e l i m i n a r y  e x a m in a t io n  by  t h e  
C om m iss ions .  At t h e  same t i m e ,  t h e  g e n e r a l  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h e  R e g u l a t i o n  
on S t a n d in g  Com m issions w i l l  som e tim es  s e r v e  a s  t h e  f o r m a l  b a s i s  on 
w h ich  S t a n d in g  Com m issions may s t a r t  p r e l i m i n a r y  e x a m in a t io n  e i t h e r  
on t h e i r  own i n i t i a t i v e ,  o r ,  as  i s  u s u a l l y  t h e  c a s e ,  i n  p u r s u a n c e  o f  
a d d i t i o n a l  t a s k s  a s s i g n e d  t o  them by  t h e  P r e s i d i u m .  I n d e e d ,  i t  i s  
c l e a r  b o th  from  i n d i v i d u a l  c a s e s  r e p o r t e d  and  t h e  a c c o u n t s  o f  S o v i e t  
s c h o l a r s  t h a t  t h e  P r e s id iu m  n o t  o n ly  s t u d i e s  and g e n e r a l i z e s  t h e  
e x p e r i e n c e  o f  t h e  C om m iss ions ' work and r e n d e r s  them a s s i s t a n c e ,  i t  
a l s o  i n s t r u c t s  t h e  Com m issions and a s s i g n s  them s p e c i f i c  t a s k s  ( S i l ' v e t ,  
1960, p .  52; W S , RSFSR, No. 40 , 1970, p . 5 4 7 ) .  The r e p u b l i c a n  S t a n d in g
1 I n  one o f  t h e  o n - t h e - s p o t  m e e t in g s  ( h e ld  i n  A p r i l  1958 i n  K a ra g a n d a ,  
K a z a k h s t a n ) , i t  i s  s a i d  t h a t  a b o u t  500 p e o p le  i n c l u d i n g  d e p u t i e s  and 
Commission members o f  l o c a l  s o v i e t s ,  o f f i c i a l s  o f  l o c a l  governm en t  
b o d i e s ,  c h a irm e n  o f  t h e  s o c i a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  and  a k t i v  a t t e n d e d  t h e  
m e e t in g  ( see  V a s i l ' e v ,  v, 1959 , p .  1 9 ) .
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Commissions may also act on the basis of directions (postanovlenia) 
from their respective Supreme Soviets. As far as we can establish, 
the first such direction was adopted by the Uzbek Supreme Soviet on 
December 24, 1964 and to its Commissions for Water Economy and for 
Public Health and Social Security. Since then, 16 such directions 
have been issued by various republican Supreme Soviets. Bearing the 
signatures of the chairman and secretary of the republican Presidium, 
they are presumably to be regarded as attempts by the latter to clothe 
its own decisions with greater authority and formality, while at the 
same time emphasizing the formal status of the Supreme Soviet as the 
sole directing organ vis-a-vis the Standing Commissions.
The first plenary meeting of a Commission, begins with a discuss­
ion of the organizational aspects and methods of studying the matters 
before it. In a number of instances, Commissions have then set up 
preliminary examination bodies on an ad hoc basis and referred to 
either as a "preparatory commission " (known as a sub-commission), or 
a"preparatory group of deputies". The only permanent preliminary 
examination bodies were set up by the federal Economic Commission.^ 
Preparatory commissions are usually set up for preliminary examination of 
appropriate sections of the draft national economic plan and budget. 
Towards the end of every year, the federal Budget and Planning and 
branch Commissions have annually set up 16 sub-commissions in each 
Chamber, recently increased to 18 (see W S , No. 48, 1968, p. 809 and 
No. 49, 1970, p. 694). Each such sub-commission is made up of 5 to 7
 ^ In April, 1962, the Economic Commission of the Soviet of Nationalities 
set up four permanent sub-commissions: Culture, Public Health and Hous­
ing-Communal Construction; Industry, Construction, Transport and Comm­
unications; Agriculture and Procurement; and Trade. When the Economic 
Commission was incorporated into the Budget and Planning Commission in 
1966, these four permanent sub-commissions were dissolved. See W S ,
No. 17, 1962; and Makhnenko, 1966, p. 34.
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Commission members and in addition co-opts 20 to 30 specialists from 
the government apparatus and scientific-research institutes (Izv., 
21.11.65; and Kutafin, 1971, p. 176). In the republican Standing 
Commissions for Budget and Planning, the number of the sub-commissions 
varies from republic to republic: Belorussia - 11; Tadzhikstan - 9;
Kazakhstan - 8; Kirgizia - 6; and Estonia - 3. All these sub-commissions 
(except those of Estonia) were set up in 1970 by the respective 
Standing Commissions for Budget and Planning for the examination of the 
annual economic plan and the budget (see Sovetskaya Bel., 11.12.70; 
Communist Tadzh., 9.12.70; Kaz. P. , 6.12.70; Sovetskaya Kir., 13.12.70; 
and Sovetskaya Est., 8.12.64). Preparatory commissions are also set 
up for preliminary examination of particular draft legislation. For 
instance, the federal Legislative Proposals Commissions,acting on its 
own or in conjuction with branch Commissions set up 11 such sub- 
commissions during the seventh convocation (1966-1970). Each sub­
commission consists of either 8 to 10 members or 30 to 40 members 
depending on the complexity of the draft law. It generally comprises the 
members of the Legislative Proposals and branch Commissions, spokesmen 
of the Procuracy, Supreme Court, Juridical Commission under the 
Council of Ministers, related ministries and departments and also 
scientific institutes (see Novikov, 1963, p. 58 and 1966, p. 80). The 
membership of sub-commissions set up by republican Legislative Proposals 
Commissions generally has a similar composition. In association with 
the work of legislation, the Commissions may also set up an editorial 
body to assist in reframing draft legislation in case it is in need of 
amendments and addenda. The preparatory groups of deputies, consisting 
of 5 to 8 members, are evidently of lesser standing than the preparatory 
commissions, being formed for preliminary examination of particular
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supervisory tasks. In addition to these, the Commissions may set up 
groups of specialists for the examination of specific problems. For 
instance, in 1960, the Ukrainian Standing Commission for Industry and 
Transport formed 12 groups of specialists, each headed by a Commission 
member, for the examination of different branches of industry and 
transport in the republic (see Zlenko, 1960, p. 14).
The length of mandate given to these preliminary examination 
bodies varies according to the nature of the investigation. The sub­
commissions created for the examination of the annual national economic 
plan and the budget usually last the very short period of two or three 
weeks (see Smirnov, 1963, p. 97), whereas those for the examination 
of draft legislation tend to continue for two to four months, and the 
preparatory groups of deputies for supervisory work run on an average 
for four months. During the periods mentioned above, the meetings 
of these preliminary examination bodies may be more frequently held 
than those of the Standing Commissions. During the fifth convocation 
(1958-1962), it is said that the sub-commissions of the federal Budget 
and Planning and branch Commissions held 240 meetings and the sub­
commissions of the Legislative Proposals and branch Commissions held 
400 meetings, while the latter held 300 meetings in the years 1962 to 
1965 (Kutafin, 1971, p.182; and Novikov, 1963, p. 58 and 1966, p. 81). 
That is, the sub-commissions of the Legislative Proposals and branch 
Commissions hold on average 100 meetings per year.
The preliminary examination bodies are supposed to survey, examine 
and analyse materials gathered by the members themselves'*' or submitted
The preparatory groups of deputies have in the past visited various 
localities to acquaint themselves with problems and obtain fresh material 
relating to the problems investigated.
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by government bodies and the public. Their findings are finalized
in the form of written reports which are then submitted for discussion
in plenary session of their Commissions. Recommendations contained
2in the reports may evidently be amended in the plenary meetings.
At the same time, these findings may be passed on with comments and 
suggestions to the appropriate government bodies.
Nevertheless, significance attaches to these preparatory commissions 
and preparatory groups of deputies in view of the fact that they 
perform the bulk of the work of preliminary examination of problems 
and therefore are likely to be the main focus for the reconciliation 
of positions and any possible conflict, 
b) Decision-making stage.
The plenary meetings of the Commission at this stage begin 
with the reports of the chairmen of the preliminary examin­
ation bodies (in some republican Standing Commission, they are given 
by the chairman or deputy chairman of the Commission) and the spokes­
men of government bodies. The plenary meetings of the Commission may 
be held alone, or jointly with the same Commission of the other House, 
or jointly with the branch Commissions of both Houses. If there are 
a number of reports to be heard such as in the case of the national 
economic plan and the budget, the hearings of these reports will be 
held in several plenary meetings (see e.g., WS, RSFSR, No. 52, 1970,
This is particularly so, at least on the surface, in the case of the 
sub-commissions for the preliminary examination of draft legislation.
In recent years, the federal Legislative Proposals and branch Commissions 
jointly published various precis of draft legislation for public de­
bate —  e.g. draft laws on Marriage and Family (April 1968); on Land 
Legislation (July 1968); and on Public Health (November 1969). In all 
of these cases, the sub-commissions examined comments and suggestions 
submitted by the public.
2 This was stated by F.I. Panin, one of the deputies interviewed by 
the author on March 6, 1972.
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pp. 940-942). When the final points of divergence are identified 
between the rapporteurs, this may be followed by discussion between 
the Commission members, government spokesmen and other participants.
At the end of discussion, the Commission finally adopts the formal 
resolutions which will normally contain suggestions and proposals. 
Resolutions related to legislation are generally submitted to the 
Presidium and sometimes to the Supreme Soviet Chamber (or Chambers). 
Resolutions related to supervision are submitted to the Presidium 
and Council of Ministers, and/or are sent directly to the relevant 
ministries, departments and lower government bodies as well as other 
relevant organizations (see Vasil'ev, V. 1966, p. 79; and Eldarova, 
1972, p. 9).
c) Decision Implementation stage.
We have noted earlier that although the Commissions' resolutions 
addressed to the ministries, governments, institutions, plants and 
other organizations have no obligatory force, they do impose com­
pulsory replies to the Commissions' recommendations (see e.g., federal 
Regulation on Standing Commissions - Article 23). It appears, however, 
that some government bodies violate this clause, treating the Comm­
issions' resolutions simply as importunate complaints. The chairman 
of the Belorussian Commission for Communal Economy, Public Service and 
Housing Construction, M.F. Zavorotny , reported at the June 1969 
session of the Belorussian Supreme Soviet that the ministries and 
departments accorded the Commission’s recommendations the due formal­
ities, but gave little effect to them. For instance, he said, in 
conformity with the annual housing construction plan for 1969, the 
Commission submitted a recommendation to the Ministry of Finance in 
favour of making use of 650,000 roubles earmarked for the housing 
construction fund and other related purposes. The Ministry, however,
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not only did not accept the Commission's recommendation but did not 
bother to inform the Commission of the reasons for its non-compliance.^ 
While Zavorotny illustrated a number of non-compliance cases in his 
republic , A. Agranovsky, a special correspondent of Izvestia, has 
commented as follows on the treatment of the federal Commissions' re­
commendations by government bodies: "I was somewhat alarmed by the
number of violators (of Standing Commission recommendations ) —  seven
ministries and one state committee (on cinematography) were listed.
So they have already become accustomed to it. At first a summons to 
a Commission was an event for everyone, but now it has become such a 
custom that some department heads come here as though it were their 
own board" (see Agranovsky, 1970).
This situation has prompted various measures aimed at more general
and effective implementation of the Commissions' recommendations. First,
the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet may intervene, on its own initiative
or at the request of a Commission, if the latter has not received a
reply or does not agree with the report on the response of the government
or other bodies addressed. In recent years, both federal and republican
Presidia seem to have been intervening more frequently in the implement-
2ation of the Commissions' recommendations by government bodies. Indeed,
See other example cited by Zavorotny in Sovetskaya Bel., 14.6.69. 
Generally speaking, the chairmen of the Belorussian Standing Commissions 
make good use of the sessions of the Supreme Soviet for publicity concern­
ing the implementation of the Commissions' recommendations by the bodies 
addressed. In this connection, see, e.g. the report addressed by the 
chairman of the Belorussian Commission for Agriculture, V.V. Prishchepchik 
to the June 1973 session of the Belorussian Supreme Soviet (see Sovetskaya 
Bel., 30.6.73).
2 E.g. following an appeal to the Presidium by the Commission of Indust­
ry, Transportation and Communications of the Soviet of Nationalities, the 
Presidium adopted a resolution which embodied the Commission's proposals 
on accelerating electrification in rural areas, which was then forwarded 
to the Council of Ministers with a suggestion that it take necessary 
measures (see Izv.,30 May, 1969). At republican level, there is also a 
number of similar examples. For instance, at a meeting on 25 September, 
1970, the Uzbek Presidium discussed an account by the- Ministry of Automo­
bile Transport and the Ministry of Communal Economy on the fulfillment of 
recommendations adopted earlier by the Budget and Planning and branch 
Commissions. The Presidium adopted an instruction obliging both Ministries 
to take proper measures for eliminating the stated shortcomings (P_.
_ii„ r.4-^1. ^ u  q ~7m __________________
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S.G. Novikov, a Soviet constitutional lawyer, interprets the relation­
ship that has evolved along the lines that while the Standing Commissions 
exercise the function of supervision over executive organs in conformity 
with the proposals of the Presidium, it is the latter that takes 
measures to achieve the objectives of supervision (see Novikov, 1963, 
p. 125).^ Secondly, the Commissions' recommendations may be reinforced 
by decision of the respective Supreme Soviet itself. For instance, the 
Uzbek Supreme Soviet issued an instruction (postanovlenie) on 6 June,
1969, to the chairman of the Uzbek Council of Ministers, requiring him
to report back to the Supreme Soviet on the state of the implementation
2of the Commissions' recommendations. Upon the request of the Supreme 
Soviet or the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the Presidium of the 
Council of Ministers may, after examining the Commissions' resolutions, 
instruct government ministries and departments to take necessary 
measures (see Izv., 19.10.69; Sakhibaev, 1963, p. 19). A similar action 
may be taken by the Presidium of the Council of Ministers upon the 
direct appeal to the latter by the Standing Commissions (see Vasil'ev, V. 
1966, p. 80).
The Commissions may find that co-ordination with the People's Control 
Committees (which are supervisory organs of the Council of Ministers)
 ^ See similar statements made by Kvachadze, 1968, p.42 and K. Zorin,
1969, p. 24.
2 The instruction also included that the Uzbek Council of Ministers 
should execute strict observation over the implementation of the 
recommendations by the ministries, departments, local governments and 
government officials; the Commissions' recommendations must be examined 
by the kollegii (boards) of respective ministries and departments; and 
the Standing Commissions must strengthen supervisory activity over the 
implementation of federal and republican laws, instructions(postanovlenia) 
of the Supreme Soviet, and over the work of the ministries and economic 
organizations. It should be noted that the instruction of the Supreme 
Soviet was issued with the signatures of the chairman, Ya. Nasriddinova, 
and the secretary, Ya. Sakhibaev, of the Uzbek Presidium.
257
might enhance the implementing ability of the Standing Commissions. 
According to one Soviet scholar, L.T. Krivenko, some experience in 
collaboration between the Commissions and the organs of the People's 
Control Committee has already accumulated. This has been done by 
inviting working officials of the People's Control Committee to meetings 
of the Commissions, co-ordinating the work plans of both organs and 
making available to each other material and information related to 
supervising activities (see Krivenko, 1970a,p. 40). It may be recalled 
that some of the chairmen and members of the republican Standing Comm­
issions are working officials of the republican People's Control Comm­
ittees. Apart from the People's Control Committees, the Commissions 
may also attempt to reinforce their supervisory capacity by collaboration 
with the kollegii (boards) of the individual ministries which enjoy 
advisory as well as supervisory functions (see Pobezhimova, 1971; and 
Davitnidze, 1972). Indeed, the Estonian Standing Commissions have held 
a number of joint meetings with the kollegii of ministries, issuing in 
joint recommendations; a point we shall return to later. It is also 
reported that the Armenian Standing Commissions are informed of the 
decisions of the kollegii of the ministries (see V. Vasil'ev, 1966, p. 8).
Finally, it is suggested that the Commissions may be able to put 
their recommendations into operation if related government officials 
have been invited to prepare the recommendation for it. This would ensure 
the workable and realistic recommendations to be adopted by the Standing 
Commissions (Kulichenko, 1965). On the other hand, this could be used 
by government bodies to emasculate Commission supervision. It may be 
also noted that in at least some republics individual Standing Commissions 
appear to send copies of their resolutions to their respective republican 
Party Central Committee as well as to the Supreme Soviet Presidium (see
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Drobyazko, 1961, p. 50), presumably in the hope of securing Party 
backing in getting their recommendations implemented.
Section 2
PERFORMANCE OF THE FEDERAL AND REPUBLICAN 
STANDING COMMISSIONS
We will now attempt an evaluation of their ability to effectively 
exercise their two formal functions - participation in legislation and 
kontrol' - through the three-staged proceedings described above.
a) Legislative Function
We shall begin by illustrating the whole process of so-called 
legislative activity on issues other than the national economic plan 
and the budget. In December 1966, the Presidium of the federal Supreme 
Soviet instructed the federal Legislative Proposals Commissions of 
both Chambers to study the draft Principles of the Land, Water, Forest 
and Mining Codes. The Legislative Proposals and branch Commissions 
set up preparatory commissions to study this Legislation in 1967. In 
the case of the draft Principles of Water Legislation, the relevant 
preparatory commission examined amendments proposed by 30 different 
organizations. It appears that the work-load of this sub-commission, 
consisting of 25 deputies, was quite heavy. In the period July-August 
1967, for instance, it held 20 sittings and examined 400 proposed amend­
ments. On the completion of its preliminary study of the Legislation, 
the Commission for Legislative Proposals and eight branch Commissions 
proposed to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, in April 1970, to 
publish the draft Principles for public debate. A report on the ensuing
public discussion was considered by the Presidium on December 7, 1970.
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This report was presented jointly by the chairmen of the Commissions 
on Legislative Proposals, Agriculture, Industry, Transport and Communi­
cations, Construction and Industrial Building Materials, and Conservation. 
Finally, the federal and republican Principles of Water Legislation 
were promulgated by the federal Supreme Soviet on 10 December, 1970, 
and came into effect on 1 September, 1971. In the following years, this 
law served as the basis for corresponding legislation adopted by each 
of 15 republican Supreme Soviets (see Trud, 14.6.70; W S , Ho. 50, 1970, 
p. 733; and Sovetskaya Bel., 5.12.70). The Commissions' legislative func­
tion generally begins with the instruction of the Presidium.'1" It is 
not certain, however, what action the Presidium has taken during the 
process of the draft law preparation by the Commissions, apart from the 
fact that prior to the promulgation of the particular law by the Supreme 
Soviet, the findings of the Commissions concerning the draft laws were 
generally submitted to the Presidium. The Presidium may supervise the 
activities of the Standing Commissions, so as to ensure proper 
attention (whatever that may mean) is paid by the Standing Commissions 
to the process of legislative drafting by the Supreme Soviet organs.
Consideration of the above case indicates that consultations with
and the canvassing of opinions of various interested parties start
generally in the preparatory commissions before the publication of the
draft laws. Consideration of the composition of the Legislative
Proposals Commissions of the federal and republican Supreme Soviets also
lends support to the proposition that the consultations with the various
interested parties actually take place through the membership of the 
___________________ (cont. p.268)
1 See another example, on the draft law on the Status of the Deputies 
of Soviets, which was prepared jointly by the Legislative Proposals and 
Credentials Commissions upon the instruction of the Presidium (W S , No. 25, 
p. 379).
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TABLE 20
POSITION HELD AT THE TIME OF APPOINTMENT (7th convocation).
(A) Commissions for Legislative Proposals of federal Supreme
Soviet.
U. Nat. Total
N=31 N=31 N=62
1. Party apparatus 
C.C., CPSU
Secretary (heavy industry) 1 1
C.C. Republican Party 
Secretary 1 1
Chairman, Party Commission 1 1
C.C. Republican Komsomol 
1st secretary 1 1
Area (kray) Committee 
1st secretary 2 2
Regional Committee (obkom) 
1st secretary 14 8 22
District Committee (raikom) 
1st secretary 1 2 3
State apparatus
Federal Council of Ministers
1st deputy chairman of the Committee 
for State Security 1 1
Republican Council of Ministers 
1st deputy chairman 1 1
Ministry
Minister of education 1 1
State Committee (rep.)
Chairman of the Committee 
for State Security 2 2 4
Regional Executive Committee 
Chairman 2 2
Total (1-2) 23 17 40
74.2% 54.9% 64.5%
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TABLE 20 - A (1-2) cont.
Republics in which the above Party and State positions 
(Republican level) located:
Party Rep. C.C. Rep. Council of Ministers
Sec. Party Komsom. 1st Mini- State
Com.Chm. 1st sec. dep. ster Security.Chm.
RSFSR 1
Ukraine 1
Belorussia
Uzbekistan 1
Kazakhstan
Georgia
Azerbaidzhan
Lithuania
Moldavia
Latvia 1
Kirgiz
Tazhikstan
Armenia
Turkmenia
Estonia
1
1
1
1
1
Republics in which the above Party and State positions (below 
Republican level) located:
Area Ctte. Regional Regional District
1st Sec. Exec. ctte. Party ctte Party ctte
RSFSR 2 2 9
Ukraine 6
Belorussia 2
Uzbekistan 2
Kazakhstan 2
Georgia 1
Azerbaidzhan
Lithuania
Moldavia
Latvia
Kirgiz
Tadzhikstan 1
Armenia
Turkmenia
Estonia
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TABLE 20 A (cont)
U. Nat.
3. Social organizations
Trade Union Council (federal)
Secretary 1
Union of Writers (federal)
Secretary 1
Trade Union Council (rep.)
Chairman 1
Union of Writers (rep.)
Secretary 1
Chairman 1
4. State farm (sovkhoz)
Director 1 1
5. Collective farm (kolkhoz)
Staff executive 1
Chairman 1
6. Industry (plants, combines etc.)
Worker 2 2
Specialist 1
Staff executive 1
Director 1
7. Educational and academic 
establishment
Academy of Science (rep.)
President 1 2
Academic institute
Head of department 1
Rector 1 1
Total
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
4
1
1
1
3
1
2
Total (3-7) 8 14 22
25.8% 45.1% 35.5%
We have chosen four republics as example (one Russian, one
Central Asian, one Caucasian and one Baltic).
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TABLE 20 (cont)
(B) Commission for Legislative Proposals of the RSFSR Supreme 
Soviet, 7th convocation
N~21
1. Party apparatus
2nd secretary regional Ctte. 7
1st sec. district and city ctte. 1
sec. district ctte. 1
2. Government apparatus
chm. regional executive ctte. 3
department head, Protection of Public
Order, regional executive ctte. 1
head, Leningrad regional Ctte. for State
Security 1
chm. Moscow city People's Control Ctte. 1
3. Social organization
chm. Trade Union Council (rep.) 1
4. Industrial enterprise
director 2
worker 1
5. Agricultural enterprise
worker 1
6. Academic establishment
rector, agricul. institute 1
(C) Commission for Legislative Proposals of the Uzbek Supreme 
Soviet, 7th convocation.
N=21
1. Party apparatus
sec. regional ctte 1
1st sec. district ctte 4
2. Government apparatus
1st deputy chm. rep. Ctte. for State Security 1
department head, rep. Ctte. for State Security 1
chm. regional executive ctte. 1
deputy chm. regional executive ctte. 1
264
TABLE 20 (C) cont.
N=21
3. Military
military commissar (rep.) 1
4. Publication
editor 1
5. Social organization
chm. rep. Artist Union 1
6. Industrial enterprise
worker 3
7. Agricultural enterprise
chairman 3
worker 3
(D) Commission for Legislative Proposals of the Armenian 
Supreme Soviet, 7th convocation
N=15
1. Party apparatus
chm. Party Commission, rep. CC 1
department head, admin, organ, rep. CC 1
1st sec. city and district ctte. 4
2. Government apparatus
department head, rep. Ministry of Protection 
of Public Order 1
3. Law enforcement
chm. rep. Supreme Court 1
rep. Procurator 1
4. Publication
editor 3
worker 1
5. Industrial enterprise
worker 2
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TABLE 20 (cont)
(E) Commission for Legislative Proposals of the Estonian 
Supreme Sovietf 7th convocation
(N=15
1. Party apparatus
department head, administ. organ., CC 1
2. Government apparatus
chm. district executive ctte. 1
3. Lav/ enforcement
rep. Procurator 1
4. Agricultural and fishing enterprise
chairman 1
department head 2
specialist 1
worker 3
5. Industrial enterprise
worker 4
6. Academic establishment
rector, State Univ. 1
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Commissions (see Table 20). The legislative operations have been 
largely conducted by the deputies holding membership in the Commissions 
with outside spokesmen and observers contributing to their deliberations 
mainly in the role of informants. This is facilitated by the fact that 
a greater number of the members are well informed and experienced in 
the problem area with which their Commissions are concerned, and 
spokesmen of many related organizations and of selected regions are 
also Commission members (a fact which is true to a lesser extent in 
the republican Standing Commissions).
We should also speculate on what the public discussion is meant to 
do, which is one of the Commissions1 outward activities. According 
to Soviet spokesmen, it is aimed at consulting the public at large.
At this juncture, it would be worth looking into the nature of public 
discussion. However, we shall begin writing the official claims re­
lating to the extent of "discussion". The draft Principles of Legis­
lation on Marriage and Family, for instance, were published in April 
1968, for public discussion "in view of the importance and nationwide 
significance of the new legislation" (see Izv., 9.4.68). Izvestia 
reported that hundreds of thousands of people has been involved in 
discussing it. Izvestia alone received 8,000 letters from its readers 
who expressed the most varied wishes and proposals and offered pert­
inent observations with regard to the draft. More them 6,000 proposals^ 
and observations came by mail to the federal Supreme Soviet (Izv.,
22.6.68). A number of surveys of letters were published by Literat- 
urnaya gazeta and the magazine Rabotnitsa. Articles and observations 
about individual provisions of the draft were printed in the newspaper 
Trud and magazines Sovety deputatov trydyashchikhsya, Sotsialistiche^skaya 
zakonnost1, Sovetskaya yustitsia, Agitator and Ogonyok. Discussions also
.a-- —  - — --- 1-----------------
Strictly speaking, all these 6,000 letters were sent to the Secretariat
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ran in the pages of republican newspapers. During the discussion of 
the draft law, debates took place at a number of Moscow enterprises 
and at enterprises in Leningrad, Kiev, Minsk, Alma-Ata, Tbilisi,
Tashkent, Baku, Vilnyus, Kishinev and other cities. In Karaganda 
oblast, Kazakhstan, the draft law was discussed at more than 30 enter­
prises, and more than 5,000 took part in discussing it. The draft law 
was also approved at the public meeting held in the kolkhoz - "Political 
Department" - in Uzbekistan's Tashkent region, in which 950 people 
participated (see Izv., 27.6.68; and SDT, No. 6, 1970, p. 12).
It would be extremely naive to make any general comments on the 
nature of the "public discussions" based solely on the official claims.
Only a detailed case study could hope to evaluate this discussion, as 
to whether, for example,this is to popularize official policies or rather 
it is to contribute seriously to the framing of legislation. Although 
limitations of scope and time did not allow the author to undertake such 
case studies, some observations can be noted here. First, the range of 
communication of the Commissions legislative activities is not confined 
to the Commissions, but may (for some types of legislation) go beyond, 
reaching to major cities, regions, and districts all over the country.
The Commissions, in this case, may have acted as channels for communic­
ation between the soviet authorities and the public at large, mainly for 
mobilizing the public to endorse the law drafted by Soviet authority. The 
question is whether the amendments and addenda were made as a result of 
public debate. One wonders what guidelines the editors of publications hac 
on the selection of letters to be printed. Letters were also analysed by
1 (cont)
of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. In such cases, the 
Secretariat often acted as the service office of the Commissions (see 
WS, No. 16, 1968, p. 234; and Trud, 14.6.70).
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the preparatory commission which was (in the case of the draft law on 
Marriage and Family) headed by N.T. Kozlov (chairman, Moscow Region 
Executive Committee), which is reported to have "deemed it expedient" 
to take a number of the proposals into account and introduce the 
necessary changes and additions in the draft lav/. Other proposals 
were deemed unacceptable by the editorial group, on the grounds that 
they were "insufficiently valid or did not improve the editorial draft"
(Izv., 22.6.68). Here, one could conceive that the citizen's proposals 
might be manipulated by either the editorial group or preparatory 
commission, or both. At the same time, one should remember that the 
Standing Commissions have been "apprised of the opinions of many 
ministries, departments and other organizations, including the federal 
Ministry of Education, federal Ministry for Safeguarding Public Order, 
the RSFSR Ministry of Education, the RSFSR Ministry of Social Security, 
the federal Soviet Women's Committee, executive committees of local 
soviets, scientific and educational institutions, and members of courts 
and prosecutors and law offices (Izv., 22.6.68).1 It should be rem­
embered that consultations with various interested parties had started 
well before in the preparatory commission as in the case of the 
draft Principles of Water Legislation, prior to the publication of the 
draft law. One might conclude, therefore, that the preparatory commission 
and editorial group have dovetailed the "acceptable" wishes of Soviet 
citizens into the demands of interested parties concerned. For instance, 
Article 16 of the draft law on Family and Marriage was ostensibly
 ^ In the case of the draft lav; on Land Legislation published for public 
debate in 1968, 17 federal sind 13 republican ministries and departments, 
and seven Presidia of autonomous republican Supreme Soviets submitted 
their opinions to the Commissions (Izv., 5.12.68).
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amended as a result of public discussion. The press report said that 
the discussion of this article aroused the greatest amount of comment 
(Izv., 27 and 28.2.70). Without further evidence, however, it is 
hard to believe that these amendments were made entirely as a result 
of public debate. At any rate, the period of mandate given to the 
preparatory commission for the examination of public opinion is so 
limited (two months after the publication) that the preparatory 
commission may not have had enough time to allow the interests of the 
public at large to be made articulate. Taking this factor into consider­
ation, the sub-commission may have placed the highest priority on the 
examination of the opinions of the interested parties (i.e., the 
official organs listed earlier). It should be noted that not all 
laws have been published for public debate before their promulgation, 
and equally not all of the lav/s promulgated by the federal Supreme 
Soviet have been referred to the Legislative Proposals Commissions.
During the fifth convocation (1958-1962), 27 laws were promulgated 
by the federal Supreme Soviet, only 14 of which were examined by the 
Legislative Proposals Commission (see Makhnenko, 1966, p. 39). Un­
fortunately, we are not able to identify these 14 laws referred to 
the Legislative Proposals Commissions, owing to the inadequate report­
ing in the Vedomosti (gazette) and the press. On the other hand, R. 
Sakhibaev stated that almost all laws promulgated by the Uzbek Supreme
In the original draft, this Article stipulated that when a child 
is born to unmarried parents who have not submitted a joint application, 
paternity can be established in certain circumstances (underline added) 
through court proceedings. The amended Article specified the circum­
stances as follows "in establishing paternity, the court takes into 
account cohabitation and the maintenance of a common household at the 
time of the child's birth or their joint rearing or support of the 
child, or evidence that reliably establishes the respondent's own 
acknowledgement of paternity".
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Soviet were prepared by its Legislative Proposals Commission (see 
Sakhibaev, 1963, p.19).
It appears that the laws promulgated by the federal Presiduum 
referred to the republican Legislative Proposals Commissions for the 
preparation of corresponding republic legislation are processed in the 
same way as in the federal Supreme Soviet. For instance, the Latvian 
draft law on Land Legislation was prepared by a preparatory commission 
headed by V. Ya. Punga, chairman of the Latvian Commission for Agri­
culture and head of the Yelgava district agricultural production 
administration. In the course of the preparation of the draft, Party, 
Trade Union, and Komsomol officials, specialists from ministries and 
departments, scholars, economists, agronomists, and jurists are said 
to have participated. Thus, at an early stage of the legislative pre­
paration, as in the case of the federal legislation, the sub-commission 
already consults and canvasses opinions of interested parties, and when 
it comes to the plenary meetings of the Standing Commissions, the meetings' 
purpose appears to be to inform the related organs that the laws are 
about to be enforced and to reaffirm support for the implementation of 
the new law. This may be illustrated by the report of a joint meeting 
in April 1970 of the Latvian Commissions for Agriculture, Legislative 
Proposals, Industry, Transport and Communication, and Construction and 
Industrial Building Materials was held to examine the draft Land 
Legislation. The head of the juridical Department of the Latvian 
Presidium, A.K. Berzin1sh, reported on the preparation of the draft 
law. This was followed by the speeches of the following Commission 
members: A. Azan, chairman of the Latvian Supreme Court; Yu. A.
Belyavnieks, director of a sovkhoz; and A.K. Lazdynya, chairman of a 
district executive committee, all of whom were said in the press report
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to have underlined that the draft law was elaborated in full conformity 
with the federal and republican I.and Legislation which had already been 
promulgated by the federal Presidium. Other participants such as the 
Minister of Forest Economy, V.N. Samolev; 1st deputy Minister of Agri­
culture, L. Ya. Borzunya; deputy chairman, Riga city executive committee, 
I. N. Ulmanis; and department head of agriculture, Latvian, CP,CC,
K.S. Anspok all "acknowledged the significance of the draft law"
(see Sovetskaya Lat., 15.4.70). The Legislative Proposals Commission 
then submitted the agreed draft law to the Latvian Presidium, which in 
turn submitted it to the Latvian Supreme Soviet for approval. It 
should be noted that, in the republics examined, very little new 
legislation has been published for public discussion. Since republican 
legislation simply makes detailed adaptions of federal legislation, 
which has often been "publicly discussed", a second round of "public 
discussion" in the republics would in any case be superfluous. However, 
after approval by the Supreme Soviet bodies, the Commissions do set 
out to inform the public as widely as possible of new laws and acts.
For instance, the Uzbek Commission for Protection of Socialist Legality 
and Public Order engaged in efforts to inform the public about the 
decree (ukaz) of the federal Presidium on "the struggle against hooli­
ganism" adopted on 26 July,1966, moblizing for the purpose working 
officials of the republican procuracy, people's courts and district 
militia. The latter bodies disseminated the juridical significance 
of the decree in simplified legal terms, and delivered lectures and 
reports about the decree to the employees of production enterprises, 
institutions and construction projects (see P. Vostoka, 20.7.67).
Finally, the republican Legislative Proposals Commissions also examine
certain parts of existing legislation with a view to amendments and
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additions at the request of the respective republican Presidium, 
Procuracy, Supreme Court, or the Council of Ministers (see Drobyazko, 
1961, p. 26; Kairyalis, 1968, p. 48; and P . Ukr., 11.5.69 and 23.5.69). 
Although little information is available on such cases, the Commission's 
role appears to be, as in other legislative operations, to tap opinions 
as well as to inform related bodies of the amended parts of the 
existing legislation.
With respect to the public information aspect of the Standing 
Commissions' legislative activity, a special position is occupied by 
the federal Commission for Foreign Affairs. The chief actor at 
meetings of the Foreign Affairs Commission is either the Minister or 
deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs who gives an account of particular 
developments in this field. The meetings are generally set for 
occasions when the Soviet government has concluded international treaties 
requiring ratification by the federal Supreme Soviet. There is, however, 
no evidence that the Commission for Foreign Affairs examines the 
treaties in depth. Unlike other Commissions, the Foreign Affairs 
Commission has never been reported to have set up any preparatory 
commissions for the examination of treaties. Its meetings take the 
form of speaker after speaker, evidently selected carefully to represent 
all sections of Soviet society, simply expressing unreserved approval 
of the government's foreign policy activities. Editors of national 
newspapers, heads of higher academic and educational establishments, 
and agit-prop secretaries of republican Party Central Committees are 
the most frequent speakers at these meetings. Speeches made by these 
speakers indicate clearly that aim is not to bring to light shortcomings 
on the part of government (supposedly the main formal function of the 
Standing Commissions), but rather to make a propaganda impact on the
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public at large and possibly people abroad as well, by demonstrating 
the ostensible solidarity of the Soviet people behind their own 
government.* A number of Commission members whose occupational field 
are in publicity, education-culture and international cultural 
relations would certainly assist this operation (see pp.231-232) 
Although there has recently been some changes in the way the accounts 
of the meetings reported were recognizable, the nature of the 
meetings themselves did not seem to have changed at all.'^
The republican Commissions for Foreign Affairs, on the other hand, 
appear to be actively engaged in more practical aspects of public 
relations. For instance, they go into matters relating to foreign 
tourism in the republics such as the organization of tourist reception 
and services, souvenir manufacturing, renovation of historic buildings, 
etc. Information on these matters is generally supplied at plenary 
meetings of the Commission by the spokesmen of the department of 
Foreign Tourism, and the Intourist agencies of the republican Council 
of Ministers (see e.g., W S , RSFSR, No. 22, 1965, p. 457'; Sovetskaya 
Bel., 27.12.64; P. Vostoka, 5.6.69; Bak.Rabochii, 15.8.70). The 
republican Commissions for Foreign Affairs also concern themselves with 
the distribution of documentary and art films abroad, international 
conferences which are to be held in the republics concerned, and 
development of official contacts of Soviet cities with the foreign
E.g. when the federal Foreign Affairs Commissions of both Houses 
met on 12 April, 1972 to examine the ratification of the treaty be­
tween the USSR and the German Federal Republic, which had been agreed 
upon by both governments on 12 August, 1970, some of the Commission 
members raised specific questions. In the Vedomosti (gazette), some 
of these questions and the Foreign Minister's answers to them were 
reported. Although such interpellation concerning foreign affairs 
reported in Vedomosti is a new departure, the Commission members' 
questions can hardly be interpreted as criticisms of the Soviet gov­
ernment's conduct on this issue. (See W S , No. 16, 1972, pp. 201-216).
* A similar appraisal of these activities in the federal Presidium was 
given earlier - see pp. 109-110.
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cities (see Sovetskaya Lit. , 30.12.70; WS, RSFSR, No. 52, 1963, p.1054; 
and SDT, No. 6, 1973, pp. 76-77). An additional sphere of activity 
of the Armenian Commission for Foreign Affairs is the fostering of 
contacts with Armenians abroad, and the repatriation of Armenians 
from other countries (Izv., 16.4.68). None of these activities of 
the republican Foreign Affairs Commissions, however, relate either 
to legislation or to the other formal function assigned to Commissions - 
supervision.
So far we have described the legislative process and the nature 
of the legislative role in spheres other than those relating to the 
national economic plan and the budget. Both federal and republican 
Budget and Planning and branch Commissions examine annually the 
existing and forthcoming legislation on the national economic plan 
and the budget. This usually begins 30 to 40 days before the budget 
session of the respective Supreme Soviet (Smirnov, p. 96). As we 
noted earlier much of the preliminary study work in the Supreme Soviet 
relating to the draft plan and the budget is carried out by the 
preparatory commissions. In the case of the federal sub-commissions, 
about 200 to 300 Commission members have engaged in the work of the 
sub-commissions every year (W S , No. 48, 1968, p. 809; and No. 51,
1969, p. 691). In the case of the republican Standing Commissions, 
taking the year 1970 as an example, 70 members of Standing Commissions 
worked in the Belorussian sub-commissions, 69 in the Kazakhstan sub­
commissions, and 50 in the Tadzhik sub-commissions (Sovetskaya Bel., 
11.12.70; Kaz. P., 16.12.70; and Kommunist Tadzh., 9.12.70). Each of 
the sub-commissions is supposed, first of all, to acquaint itself with 
the draft plan of development of a given branch of the economy sub­
mitted by the Gosplan and the Ministry of Finance (Izv., 4.11.71). It
is then supposed to consider this draft critically and in some depth,
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in the process of which it will invite to its meetings spokesmen 
of the relevant ministries and departments, as well as of the planning 
and finance agencies. In the case of the republican sub-commissions, 
spokesmen of the local executive committees may also be asked to 
appear (see. e.g. Kommunist Tadzh., 13.12.69).
To illustrate this process we will take as an example the work 
of one of the sub-commissions formed by the federal Budget and Planning 
and brailch Commissions, namely the preparatory commission formed in 
November 1971 for examining the section of transportation and communi­
cations. It was composed of five members"*", and headed by a Transport­
ation and Communications Commission member, N.I. Krasnobaev (a rail­
way district chief in Latvia). All of the sub-commission members 
held occupations relating to transportation: two engineers working
in the railways, one electric-welder and one engineer working in a 
railway carriage manufacturing factory, and one working as the head 
of a local locomotive depot. Their occupational positions are, however, 
located in various parts of the country: two in the Ukraine, one in
the RSFSR (the Chuvash ASSR), one in Azerbaidzhan, and one in Turkmenia 
Not all of the members were selected from the federal Commissions for 
Transportation and Communications. The two engineers, for example, 
were members of the Budget and Planning Commissions. At the meetings 
of the sub-commission, the members heard reports presented by the 
spokesmen of the related ministries and departments on the development 
of transportation in the country. They then examined these reports 
assisted by the experts and scholars. It was reported that they not 
only drew attention to neglected aspects of transportation in the
"*" The names of the five members are as follows: I.D. Shokh; G. Bairamov;
B.N. Leonovich; A.D. II'in; and G.S. Kalugin (see Izv., 11.11.71).
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country but also addressed quite a few proposals and recommendations 
of both a general and concrete character related to the problems 
to the relevant ministries and departmnets (see Izv., 11.11.71). At 
this stage, it may be possible that some ministries seek the support 
of the sub-commission members for the appropriation of larger funds.
At one of the federal sub-commissions set up for the examination of 
the budget in November 1965, for instance, the members were discussing 
the trading problems of different components of certain complete 
goods. First, the Deputy Minister of Trade, V. F. Ul'yanov was 
called in to explain the situation. At the same meetings, Ul'yanov 
argued the case for changing one of the figures in the draft plan.
A spokesman of the central Gosplan, R.A. Lokshin, defended the original 
figures. However, other members of the sub-commission supported the 
position of the Ministry of Trade as a reasonable request. The 
chairman of the sub-commission, I.I. Chugunov (chairman, Gor'ky 
Region Executive Committee) decided to ask the Gosplan to check the 
figures once again with a view to changing them (see Izv., 21.11.65). 
One of the interesting aspects revealed is, therefore, that the repre­
sentatives of different ministries, departments and agencies do not 
always take a united front at the meetings of the Commissions. At 
the end of the preliminary examinations, the sub-commissions always 
submit their findings together with recommendations and proposals to 
the Budget and Planning and their own branch Commission. The next 
stage consists of deliberations in the individual branch Commissions 
and among them and the Budget and Planning Commissions on the sub­
missions of the sub-commissions, on the basis of which the Budget and 
Planning and branch Commissions adopt a report to be submitted to the
budget session of the respective Supreme Soviet. In this process, the
277
Budget and Planning Commissions act, according to F.I. Panin (member 
of the Commission for Trade, Everday Services and Communal Economy),'^ 
as a kind of co-ordinating echelon for those proposals coming from the 
branch Commissions which contain financial implications. He implied 
also that the Budget and Planning Commissions weighed up the various 
proposals in the light of its own deliberations and could determine 
whether or not any particular proposal went forward. At the same time, 
the Budget and Planning and branch Commissions also make formal re­
commendations direct to the Gosplan and the Ministry of Finance.
Prior to the submission of the report and recommendations, these must 
be endorsed by the respective Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (see 
e.g. W S , No. 50, 1968, p. 833). Though this practice may appear to 
be a formality, it may be intended to recheck whether the resolutions 
of the Budget and Planning and branch Commissions have strayed beyond 
accepted norms.
As far as Standing Commission resolutions relating to current
legislation (including the national economic plan and the budget) are
concerned, government bodies appear generally to accept them promptly,
2though not always. This may be due firstly to the fact that the 
Commissions1 resolutions are known in advance to the government bodies, 
(possibly through the sub-commissions), or are even "cleared" by the 
government agencies, and secondly that the demands included in the 
Commissions1 resolutions are relatively minor points. In the case of 
Resolutions relating to legislation other than the national plan and
 ^ F.I. Panin (2nd secretary, Tartar obkom) was one of the deputies 
interviewed by the author on March 6, 1972.
2 For instance, upon the examination of the 1968 draft economic plan 
and the budget, the Belorussian Standing Commissions put forward 95 
recommendations to the Gosplan, and most of these are said to have 
received favourable response (see Beresten1, 1969).
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the budget, there will be only one or two amendments of provisions, 
a few addenda and clarification clauses. To take two examples from 
recent federal legislation:^" (1) the draft law on Public Health: 
one addendum to Article 32; one clarification clause to Article 23; 
and two amendments - Articles 18 and 30; (2) the draft law on Marriage
and Family: one amendment - paragraph 4 of Article 16; and one
addendum to Article 17. In the case of the annual economic plan 
and the budget, the Commissions' demands for increases in budget 
revenue and expenditure amount to, in the case of the federal budget, 
no more than 0.1% of the total budget (see Table 21-A). In the 
case of republican budgets, it varies from republic to republic, or 
from year to year (see Table 21-B) but does not exceed one half of 
one percent (except Latvia). The proportion of the amounts amended 
in the total budget is generally higher in the small republics 
(except Estonia) than those in large republics. Increased appropri­
ations have always been distributed for social welfare services, such 
as the development of district centres, purchasing of supplies and 
equipment for schools, hospitals, children's and other social-cultural 
institutions, etc. or for their repairs. The area of legislative 
amendment in the case of the national economic plan and the budget 
has thus always been confined to social-welfare items, although the 
discussions in the Commissions cover almost all spheres of national 
economic activities. This presumably reflects a conscious policy of 
the Soviet leaders to symbolise the Supreme Soviet as guardian of the 
people's well-being, while avoiding its becoming another significant 
political arena which might tend to undermine the existing power 
structure, in the leadership.
1 For examples in republican legislation, see Drcbyazko, 1961, p. 26.
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TABLE 21
AMENDMENTS TO THE DRAFT BUDGET BY THE
STANDING COMMISSIONS
A) F e d e r a l B u d g e t .
B u d g e t  Y e a r D r a f t  b u d g e t P r o p o s e d  b y  t h e P e r c e n t a g e
( m i l l i o n  r o u b l e s ) S t a n d i n g  Com mi s .
1 9 6 8 r e v . 1 2 3 , 8 0 0 + 112 m i l l i o n 0 . 0 9
e x p . 1 2 3 , 5 0 0 I I  II II
1 9 6 9 r e v . 1 3 4 , 0 0 0 + 1 2 2 . 7  " 0 . 0 9
e x p . 1 3 3 , 8 0 0 I I  I t II
1 9 7 0 r e v . 1 4 4 , 8 0 0 + 130 0 . 0 9
e x p . 1 4 4 , 5 0 0 I I  f l II
1 9 7 1 r e v . 1 6 0 , 8 0 0 + 1 5 4 . 5  " 0 . 1
e x p . 1 6 0 , 6 0 0 I I  I I II
1 9 7 2 r e v . 1 7 3 , 7 0 0 + 120 0 . 0 7
e x p . 1 7 3 , 5 0 0 II  I I I I
B) R e p u b l i c a n  B u d g e t  (A m e n d m e n ts  w e r e  s h o w n  i n  p e r c e n t a g e )
B u d g e t  Y e a r RSFSR U k r . B e l . K a z . U z b . E s t . L a t . G e o r g . Arm
1 9 6 8  r e v . 0 . 1 0 . 3 0 . 1 0 . 1 0 . 2 - 0 . 5 0 . 3 0 . 1
e x p . I I II I I 0 . 2 II - II I I II
1 9 6 9  r e v . n .  a . 0 . 3 0 . 2 0 . 2 0 . 1 - 0 . 8 0 . 3 0 . 5
e x p . i i II I I I I I I - I I II II
1 9 7 0  r e v . n .  a . 0 . 3 0 . 2 0 . 5 0 . 2 - 0 . 9 0 . 4 0 . 4
e x p . n I I II 0 . 2 II - I I II I I
1 9 7 1  r e v . 0 . 1 0 . 3 0 . 2 ' 0 . 2 0 . 2 0 . 0 2 0 . 7 0 . 4 0 . 4
e x p . II I I II II I I 11 I f I f I t
1 9 7 2  r e v . 0 .  3 0 . 2 0 . 2 n .  a . 0 . 2 0 . 0 2 1 . 3 0 . 3 0 . 4
e x p . II I I I I 11 II 11 II I t I I
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b) Supervisory Function
There is a substantial body of evidence indicative of increased 
activity by the Standing Commissions in the area of supervision.
Writing in Izvestia, the constitutional lawyer K. Sheremet reported 
that in the course of the seventh convocation (1966-1970), the federal 
Standing Commissions held 170 sessions, but added that the bulk of 
them dealt with checking up on the implementation of laws and decisions 
of the Supreme Soviet by the ministries, departments and other executive 
agencies (Izv., 6.2.71). During the sixth convocation (1963-1967), 
the Ukrainian Standing Commissions are said to have held 230 plenary 
meetings discussing more than 400 questions, a large proportion of 
which were concerned with supervision over the implementation of laws 
and acts of the Supreme Soviet1 (see Zlatopol'sky, 1967, p. 34). In
Turkmenia, in the pre-1958 period, the Budget Commission appears to 
have held only one meeting a year for examining the annual budget. Now, 
however, it is said to be constantly engaged in supervision of the 
financial and economic activities of the ministries and departments 
(Turkmenskaya Iskra, 28.12.69). According to Sil'vet, Head of the 
Department of the Work of Soviets in the Estonian Presidium, the Budget 
Commission formerly paid little attention to its supervisory function, 
despite the Estonian Supreme Soviet instruction to the Commission in 
1956 to accelerate this task (Sil'vet, 1960, p. 52). In this connection, 
the Estonian Supreme Soviet issued a similar instruction to the Budget 
Commission in July 1962 (Sovetskaya Est., 10.7.62). We shall describe 
below various ways and means of exercising this supervisory function by
1 Although under the new federal and republican regulations on the 
Standing Commissions, acts of the Council of Ministers are excluded 
from the Commissions' supervisory responsibility, some republican 
Standing Commissions continue to supervise the implementation of 
such acts. (see Zorin, 1969, p. 24).
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the federal and republican Standing Commissions, and attempt some 
evaluation of its nature. We shall begin by illustrating some of the 
kinds of operation in the preliminary study bodies. First, they may 
organize study tours to examine local situations.^ Our observations 
suggest, as far as the federal Standing Commissions are concerned, 
that the localities selected for visitation tend to correspond to the 
regions in which the members of the preliminary study bodies have their 
basic occupational positions. For instance, a preparatory group of 
deputies set up by the Commission for Trade and Everyday Services 
of the Soviet of Nationalities studied the organization of trade 
practices in the RSFSR, Latvia and Kirgizia; examination of its member­
ship showed that it consisted of six regional Party and government 
officials in the RSFSR; the chairman of the Latvian People's Control 
Committee; and the 1st secretary of a Kirgiz district Party committee.
Even the chairman of the preparatory group, T.I. Gorinov (chairman 
of the Mari ASSR Council of Ministers), based his statements on his 
own local conditions, saying that, "in the Mari autonomous republic, 
for example, the electrification of rural communities was completed 
back in 1965, but trade in light bulbs, irons and other electrical goods 
is expanding very slowly and in no way reflects the new state of 
affairs" (Izv., 19.4.68). Such facts are open to a number of different 
interpretation. Is it because in their own localities members have 
local contacts and can get "real" information, or show real rather than 
bogus examples to their fellow members? Is it aimed at increasing 
their local political prestige by dramatizing their status in a national 
institution? Perhaps, on the other hand, it is merely an economy measure,
1 For an example at the federal level, see Izv., 30.5.69.
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to save fares, since there is no concrete evidence that the members 
visited the various localities as a group. Perhaps each "visited" 
only his own locality. Whatever the reason, the chairman or members 
of a group tend to present at Commission meetings the information on 
the particular problems in their own region (see e.g., SDT, No. 2, 
1972, pp. 45-46 and No. 4, 1973, pp. 68-69).
Our examination of the composition of the preparatory groups of 
deputies by occupational position indicates to us another aspect of 
their operations. Samples collected are as follows:
1) Preparatory group set up by the Commissions for Construction 
and Industrial Building Materials.
1st secretary, regional Party committee
- 1st secretary, capital city Party committee
- chairman, republican TUC
- skilled worker, construction project
2) Preparatory group set up by the Commissions for Agriculture
- 1st deputy chairman, republican Council of Ministers
- Minister of Agriculture, " " " "
- 1st secretary, regional Party committee
3) Preparatory group set up by the Commissions for Public Health 
and Social Security.
- deputy chairman, republican Council of Ministers
- Minister of Social Security, " " "
- 1st secretary, city Party committee
- director, scientific-research institute
doctor
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4) Preparatory group set up by the Commissions for Trade and Every­
day Services
- chairman, autonomous republican Council of Ministers
- chairman, regional executive committee
- chairman city executive committee
- 1st secretary regional Party committee
- chairman, republican TUC
- chairman, republican People's Control Committee
In each group, there are generally one or two mid-level Party as 
well as government officials though more often the former. That is, 
a majority of members represent the second echelon of the Party and 
government apparatus. Therefore, the information supplied by them­
selves or by the central government may be re-examined by themselves, 
perhaps together with other members of the group. A similar pattern 
of representation is more apparent if one examines the chairmen of
the preparatory groups by their occupational positions.
TABLE 22
CHAIRMEN OF FEDERAL PREPARATORY GROUPS BY 
OCCUPATIONAL POSITIONS
- department head, CC CPSU 2
- 1st secretary, republican CC CP 2
- 2nd secretary, " " " " 3
- 1st secretary regional Party committee 18
- 1st secretary, republican Komsomol CC 1
- 1st deputy chairman, State Committee, federal
Council of Ministers 1
- 1st deputy chairman, republican Council of Ministers 4
- chairman, State Committee, " " " " ]_
- chairman, autonomous repub. Council of Ministers 2
- chairman, regional executive committee 4
- secretary, federal TUC 1
- president, (federal) Academy of Medical Science 1
- head, educational establishment 1
- department head, " " 1
- engineer, industrial enterprise 1
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The great majority of these are: a) Central Committee members and
b) working at the republican or regional level. Of the 43 preparatory 
groups examined, about half were chaired by the first secretaries of 
regional Party committees.
It would be interesting to note here who chaired which preparatory 
group. The preparatory groups formed by the Commissions for Industry, 
for Agriculture and for Construction and Industrial Building Materials 
were chaired more often by the first secretaries of regional Party 
committees or deputy chairmen of the republican Council of Ministers 
than by any other occupational positions. The groups set up by other 
Commissions were chaired generally by occupants of pertinent occupational 
positions according to the field of activity of these preparatory groups. 
For instance, the groups set up by the Commissions for Education,
Science and Culture are more likely to be chaired by officials of 
educational establishment or of the republican Komsomol.
We have also noted the presence of department heads, of the 
CPSU CC'*’ among the chairmen of preparatory groups. P.K. Sizov, head 
of the light and food industry, department), chaired a preparatory 
group set up in September 1968 by the Commission for Industry, Trans­
portation and Communications to study the food supply situation in the 
country (see W S , No. 37, 1968, pp. 596-597). While he may be classi­
fied with the group of second echelon of the Party apparatus, one 
might assume that, the motives for his presiding over a preparatory 
group may be different from those of a first secretary, regional Party 
committee. He may be mobilized to use his expertise for further fact­
finding operations, or to present his ready-made study results which
 ^ CC department heads are usually "technocrats" possessing expertise 
in a particular field of responsibilities, and working directly under 
the supervision of a particular CC secretary.
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are originally drafted in his department, or to canvass some opinions 
from different levels of Soviet bureaucracies which would not have 
reached him otherwise. It is, indeed, extremely difficult to know 
exactly what advantages the Supreme Soviet Commissions system affords 
him.
Another instance of the involvement of a high level Party Central 
Committee official in the work of a Commission may be worth noting.
In October 1969, the Commission for Construction and Industrial Building 
Materials of the Soviet of the Union adopted a resolution relating to 
the problems of mechanization and automation of construction works, 
and efficient utilization of construction machinery. This was based 
on a study by a preparatory group headed by N.V. Bannikov (first 
secretary, Karaganda Region Party Committee). The plenary meetings 
of the Commission were chaired by CPSU Central Committee secretary 
K.F. Katushev.'*' Finally, the Commission’s resolution was endorsed by 
the Presidium of the federal Council of Ministers within a week, a 
fact which was reported in the press (Izv., 19.10.69) - a most unusual 
occurrence. The question is whether this was due to the status of 
the chairman of the Commission, or whether the latter made use of the 
Commission so as to legitimize and dramatize decisions already made in 
the CC Secretariat. Although Katushev's responsibilities in the CC 
Secretariat relate to foreign affairs, he was undoubtedly well 
qualified for the work of the Commission by his earlier managerial and 
Party experience. (At the eighth convocation (1970), Katushev, became
K.F. Katushev, previously an ordinary member of this Commission, was 
appointed chairman in 1967, when the former chairman, S.D. Khitrov was 
commissioned to become the Minister of Construction of the federal 
Council of Ministers. Until 1968, Katushev had been 1st secretary 
Gor'ky Region Party Committee, CPSU.
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instead, the deputy chairman of the Commission for Foreign Affairs 
of the Soviet of the Union). It may, perhaps, not be too fanciful 
to suggest that this case may have related to a power play within 
the inner leadership. The December 1969 plenum of the Central Comm­
ittee was the scene of an important attack by Brezhnev on the effic­
iency of the economic administration. Katushev has usually been 
regarded as one of Brezhnev's main proteges and this case may have 
been intended to provide him with some ammunition.
A second observation on this case is that the members reported 
as expressing views and also the chairman of the preparatory group 
were the representatives of urban and industrial areas which would 
have been affected directly by these decisions. The report on the 
plenary meetings of the Commission stated that certain members, 
including S.R. Rasulov (first secretary, Tashkent City Party Committee), 
V.K. Klimenko (chairman, Ukr. TUC), and I.M. Burov (first secretary, 
Pavlodar Region Party Committee) expressed particular concern on 
these problems (SDT, No. 10, 1969, p. 83). It can be argued, therefore, 
other things being equal, that the top decision makers once again 
tapped the opinions of interested parties at the Commission before 
formalising their decisions. Most of the Commission's proposals were 
related to better co-ordination of the activities concerned by govern­
ment organs and other executive agencies (Izv., 19.10.69). It may 
also have some relevance that this case occurred in a period of 
intense lobbying operations in relation to the next five-year national 
economic plan."*"
One of the provisions of the decision adopted by the Presidium of 
the Council of Ministers was that the central Gosplan, together with 
the federal Ministry of Higher and Specialised Secondary Education, 
the committee on vocational-technical education and school construction 
work and to provide for the necessary measures in the plans for 1970 
and 1971-1975.
287
L ik e  t h e i r  f e d e r a l  c o u n te r p a r t s ,  th e  r e p u b l i c a n  S ta n d in g  
Com m issions b e g in  t h e i r  s u p e r v is o r y  f u n c t io n  in  th e  p r e l im in a r y  s tu d y  
b o d ie s .  W orking g ro u p s  o f  d e p u t ie s  w i l l  be  s e n t  t o  th e  l o c a l i t i e s  to  
i n v e s t i g a t e  th e  way p o l i c i e s  a re  b e in g  im p lem en ted , f r e q u e n t l y  i n  
c o l l a b o r a t io n  w ith  th e  c o r re s p o n d in g  C om m issions o f  th e  l o c a l  s o v ie t s  
and r e l a t e d  l o c a l  a d m in i s t r a t iv e  o f f i c i a l s  (K u lic h e n k o , 1965; and 
B ogovsky, 1 9 6 6 ). The l i s t  ( in  T a b le  2 3 )o f  th e  n in e  ch a irm en  o f  p r e ­
p a r a to r y  g ro u p s  i d e n t i f i e d  t h a t  th e y  te n d  t o  h o ld  e x e c u t iv e  p o s i t i o n s  
o f  a  f u n c t i o n a l  k in d  in  o r g a n iz a t io n s  r e l e v a n t  to  th e  c o n c e rn s  o f  th e  
g ro u p , a lth o u g h  t h i s  e v id e n c e  i s  a d m it te d ly  v e ry  f ra g m e n ta ry .
TABLE 23
CHAIRMEN OF REPUBLICAN PREPARATORY GROUPS BY 
OCCUPATIONAL POSITIONS
Com m ission
E duc. C u l t .  & S p o r t  RSFSR
11 11 11 11
T rade & E veryday  "
S e rv ic e s
" " " Kaz.
P u b l . H e a lth  & S oc . RSFSR
S e c u r i ty
I n d u s t r y  & T r a n s p o r t -  Kaz. 
a t i o n
9
s e c .  Komsomol CC 1
chm. r e g .  e x e c . c t t e . 1
d e p u ty  chm. " 2
d e p t ,  h e a d , Kaz. CP, CC 1
d e p t ,  h e a d , med. i n s t . 3
d ep . d i r e c t o r ,  a c a d . i n s t .  1
P . A. B ogovsky, d ep u ty  ch a irm an  o f  th e  E s to n ia n  Com m ission f o r  
P u b l ic  H e a lth  and S o c ia l  S e c u r i t y ,  s t a t e d  t h a t  though  a l l  o f  th e  members 
work in  a  c o n c e r te d  m anner, e a ch  h a s  h i s  own a r e a  o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  
h i s  own s u p e r v is io n  s p e c i a l i z a t i o n .  F o r i n s t a n c e ,  Kh.K. R o s in , c h ie f  
d o c to r  o f  a h o s p i t a l  checks on q u e s t io n s  o f  i n f e c t i o n ;  A .P . I l 'm o y a ,  
h e a d  o f  th e  g y n o p a th o lo g y  d e p a r tm e n t o f  th e  T a l l i n  c i t y  h o s p i t a l ,  i s  
c o n c e rn e d  w ith  th e  o r g a n iz a t io n  o f  i n v a l i d s ;  V. Ya. T ib a r ,  an i n d u s t r i a l
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worker, keeps his eye on homes for invalids; and Ya.A. Tunuvere, a 
kolkhoz chairman and Yu.A. Ryaim, director of a sovkhoz, supervise 
matters related to pensioners (see Bogovsky, 1966). If necessary, 
the republican Commissions may mobilize highly qualified specialists 
from outside for the Commissions' preliminary investigations. For 
instance, in 1969 the Ukrainian Commissions for Science and Culture, 
and for Machine-building and Instrument-making formed seven working 
groups whose membership included 36 scientists.’'" The working groups 
investigated the state of scientific research with a view to further 
development of machine building and instrument making. As a result 
of their enquiry into seven scientific institutes of the Ukrainian 
Academy of Science, the Commissions submitted recommendations to the 
Ukrainian Academy of Science in September 1969 (see P. Ukr., 20.9.69).
In February 1971, the Commissions heard a report from the President 
of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences on the measures adopted for the 
implementation of these recommendations (P . Ukr., 26.2.71).
Once the problems have been identified at the preliminary stage,
as in the case of the federal Standing Commissions, these will be
examined at the plenary meetings of the republican Standing Commissions.
At each plenary meeting at this stage, the chairman of the working
2group or the chairman of the Commission submits his report on the
However, the seven working groups were headed by members working at 
executive level: Yu.Yu. Kondufor, dept, head of Science and culture, CC 
Ukr. CP.,and the chairman of the Commission for Science and Culture headed 
the group to investigate the institute of economics; V.I. Vlasov, director 
of a machine building factory - working group for the institute of mould­
ing; Y.K. Rudenko, department head, Ukr. CP,CC - working group for the 
institute of the problems of industrial material; V.A. Kolesnik, leutenant- 
general-working group for the institute of durability; I.V. Pakhomov, dir­
ector of a factory - v/orking group for the institute of mechanics; I.B. 
Pruzhorsky, director of a factory - working group for the institute of 
sybernetics; and N.A. Turik, director of a factory - working group for the 
institute of economic-industrial research. (See P. Ukr., 20.9.69).
2 It is not uncommon to see reports on preliminary studies being pre­
sented by the Commission chairmen particularly in the RSFSR and Belorussia
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preliminary findings concerning the particular job of supervision. 
Related government or other spokesmen will be called in to submit 
counterreports. Discussion apparently centres on these two reports.
The nature of the discussion varies considerably, however, depending 
on the kind of meeting held. Some meetings are held jointly with 
other Commissions, or corresponding Commissions of local soviets, or 
with kollegii (boards) of the ministries, and still other meetings are 
held in particular localities. Some of the discussions taking place at 
these different types of meetings will be illustrated below.
On 25 July, 1969, three RSFSR Standing Commissions, those for 
Youth Affairs, Public Health and Social Security, and Education, Culture 
and Sports, held a joint meeting to discuss problems related to protect­
ing the health and the studying, working and living conditions of adol­
escents in the RSFSR. I. Sergeyev, chairman of the Commission for 
Public Health and Social Security, is reported as saying: "Soviet
achievements in pediatrics are known the world over. V»e must provide 
the same level of medical service for adolescents. At times medical 
problems become so closely interwoven with pedagogical problems that 
it is impossible to separate the two". L.K. Balyasunaya, RSFSR Deputy 
Minister of Education, spoke in her report about the necessity to 
expand the network of specialized schools for children with speech and 
hearing defects and all kinds of development disorders and of the great 
need to make provision for these children. Then, V.I. Rogova, deputy 
chairman of the RSFSR State Committee on Vocational-Technical Education, 
called attention to just one thing - the problem of dor: itories for the 
students of vocational-technical schools (only one-third of whom 
apparently have dormitory accommodation). Other speakers included G.Ya. 
Natarova (department head in a hospital), A.G. Sozykin (chairman of a
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regional executive committee), V.M. Zhivoderov (rector of a medical 
institute) and E.K. Shalaeva (head of a school).
The resolution adopted at this meeting is said to have spelt out 
in detail recommendations to the ministries and departments responsible 
for the health, education and upbringing of adolescents (Izv., 27.7.69). 
The nature of the discussion at the meeting does not appear to be, 
however, of a supervisory character. Rather what is involved is the 
formulation or harmonization of inter-ministerial policy on the educ­
ation of adolescents. In the words of I. Ovchinnikova, a special 
correspondent of Izvestia, "Numerous and diverse organizations are 
called upon to look after the health, upbringing and education of adol­
escents. Substantial results can be attained only if the efforts of 
these organizations are unified and their operations co-ordinated. It 
was this endeavour to co-ordinate the activity of the ministries and 
departments which are connected in one way or another with the life of 
adolescents that guided the participants in the joint meeting of the 
three RSFSR Standing Commissions" (see Ovchinnikova, 1969). This is 
to say that the meeting was intended to allow the exchanging of opinions 
among interested parties, and, if possible, to reconcile their attitudes 
so as to arrive at a common policy.
Although the joint meeting of several Commissions is a device 
particularly well suited to co-ordinate the policies of different admin­
istrations, the meetings of individual Commissions also appear to offer 
opportunities to this end. The Kazakhstan Commission for Construction 
and Industrial Building Materials held a meeting in November 1968 in 
a period of vast capital construction in the republic creating demands 
for radical improvement of designing technique and of timing of data- 
preparation. At this meeting, the chairman of Kazakhstan Gosstroi
(State Committee on Construction), S.A. Khachaturov, presented a report
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on"The work of design organizations in the Kazakhstan republic". This
was followed by speeches by Commission members - V.S. Polukhin and
S.F. Ladnova (operatives at the construction projects) and I.I. Stal'noi,
O. M. Beisenov and V.I. Golubev (spokesmen for the construction projects) 
who complained of the poor quality of documentation on the part of 
design organizations. Another deputy S.A. Yermodenko (1st secretary
of the Osakarovka District Party Committee) and a non-deputy member,
P. P. Yefim (head, Main Administration of Capital Construction under 
the Ministry of Agriculture) claimed that designs for rural areas 
sometimes do not take into consideration local peculiarities and climatic 
conditions. Reference was also made at the meeting to the failure
of many design organizations to make proper use of advanced exper­
ience at home and abroad. The chairman of the Commission, A .F . Klinkov 
(2nd secretary, Alma-Ata Region Party Committee) and a non-deputy 
member, N.V. Muzalevsky (1st deputy Minister for Industrial Building 
Materials) drew the attention of Kazakhstan Gosstroi and of design 
organizations to the need for developing standard designs and for 
centralization of building materials. On the other hand, the first 
deputy chairman of the republican Gosplan, S.S. Kuznetsov, the chief 
engineer of the republican branch of Stroibank (Construction Bank)
K.Z. Rovitsky, and directors of certain design organisations criticized 
"considerable" shortcomings on the part of the ministries and depart­
ments which neglected the planning and performance of designs and the 
provision of reliable detailed data including financial estimates.
These shortcomings allegedly caused large delays in design work. At the 
end of discussion, the Commission prepared various proposals and recomm­
endations for submission to Gosstroi and Gosplan, to certain ministries
and departments, regional executive committees and the Alma-Ata City
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Executive Committee "for further development and for strengthening the 
material base of design organization and improvement of their work"
(see Kaz. P ., 16.11.68). Judging from the press account of this 
meeting, the participants evidently expressed a variety of concerns 
on the matter in question, and the value of the discussion might have 
been to reveal different viewpoints and to foster understanding of the 
problems of others concerned, in different ways, with the work of 
design. It may be added that the cleavages of opinion observed were 
not on the basis of deputies and non-deputies, but rather on occupational 
and administrative divisions.'*" Indeed, the spokesman of the ministry 
may criticize the conduct of another ministry. At a meeting of the 
Lithuanian Commission for Education held in June 1970, the Minister 
of Higher and Secondary Specialised Education, G. Zabulis and the Deputy 
Minister of Education, V. Kishkis, criticized the Ministry of Construction 
as well as building organizations for failing to fulfill the plan for 
school construction in 1970. Criticisms voiced at this meeting, however, 
were directed at all bodies involved in school construction in the rep­
ublic including the Ministry of Education, and the resolutions adopted by
the Commission were not limited to particular government bodies,but directec
at all bodies concerned, and aimed at achievement of a common target.* 2
^ Administrative cleavages, in this context, were based on the funct­
ional divisions in the administration. Cleavages of opinion may occur, 
however, between the levels of the administrative hierarchy. For instance, 
at a meeting of one Ukrainian Commission in October 1966, N.G. Blagun,
N.A. Moiseev and A.G. Shokhanov (all chairmen of regional executive 
committees), criticized the conduct of the Ministry of Food Industry, 
Ministry of Trade and Ministry of Agriculture (see P . Ukr., 19.10.66).
2 The Commission recommended:
the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Higher and Secondary 
Specialized Education, and the local executive committees to check 
whether the construction organizations secured the necessary technical 
documentation, equipment and material for planned construction; 
the Ministry of Construction and the Ministry of Rural Construction 
to strengthen their supervision over the work of construction organ­
izations ; (cont)
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Nevertheless, the meeting evidently provided the bodies involved with 
an avenue for expressing their individual concerns as well as defending 
their individual positions.
All republican Standing Commissions, except the Commissions for 
Credentials and Foreign Affairs, examine the performance not only of the 
republican government but also of the local government and administrat­
ive bodies. In recent years, scrutiny of the performance of particular 
local bodies has been steadily increasing, and now accounts for something 
like one-third of the meetings held in every convocation. This is 
partly because the republican Presidia themselves now increasingly 
examine various problems at local level and issue instructions aimed 
at particular local bodies. The implementation of these instructions 
must be supervised by the republican Standing Commissions as well as 
by the local soviets. On many occasions, the republican Standing 
Commissions (particularly those of the smaller republics) have held 
meetings jointly with the corresponding Standing Commissions of the 
local soviets. Where this did not happen, preliminary studies were at 
least generally carried out on the spot with the assistance of the local 
soviet Standing Commissions (see e.g. Sovetskaya Est., 24.6.70) and 
sometimes with the participation of the members of the kollegii (boards) 
and specialists of the related ministries (see e.g. Sovetskaya Est., 
16.12.65). The plenary meetings of the Commissions begin with the
2 cont
the State Committee on the Affairs of Construction to examine the 
draft plan of school construction with a view to reducing the costs 
of construction;
Gosplan and the construction organizations to fulfill the target set 
for construction of general education schools and higher educations 
institutions; and
the Main Administration of Material and Technical Supply to supply in 
proper time the required building materials and equipment (See Sovet­
skaya Litva, 12.6.70).
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reports of the members who organized the preliminary studies and also
the counter-reports of the spokesmen of the local bodies concerned,
such as regional and district executive committees.^ These reports
are usually followed by discussion. Commission members working as
local government and Party officials in localities other than those under
discussion are still able to examine such problems, and express an 
2opinion on them. One could perhaps interpret their opinions and 
criticisms at the meetings as advice based on their experience in their 
own regions and districts. By familiarising themselves, through the 
Commissions' proceedings, with what others have done, they may also 
obtain insights on how to handle problems which remain unsolved in their 
localities.
Exchange of opinion among local leaders, and between republican and 
local leaders could be strengthened by the holding of meetings in the 
localities concerned. We could assume that a number of related local 
people and officials could present themselves at on-the-spot meetings 
to inform Commission members of the situation much more easily than if 
the meetings were held in the republican capitals. For instance, at the 
joint meeting of the Estonian Commission for Public Health and Social
At a meeting of the RSFSR Commission for Public Health and Social 
Security held in November 1970, for instance, co-reports of the Commission 
members, L.D. Gataulina (department head, Rostov medical institute) and 
L.N. Rudakov (2nd secretary Vologda Executive Committee), and the report 
of the deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Tartar ASSR, N.N. 
Lyashko, were presented (see WS, RSFSR, No. 47, 1970, pp.781-782).
2 At the meeting of the RSFSR Commission for Communal Economy and Public 
Services held in April 1970, the members discussed the reports of the 
deputy chairman of Krasnodar City Executive Committee, D.A. Ponomarev, 
and the chairman of Nizhne Tagil City Executive Committee, V.K. Nalivai 
on the state of A.T. Gnedov (chairman, Smolensk Region Executive Committee) 
V.V. Listov (1st secretary, Kemerov City Party Committee; and G.F.-R. 
Shafikov (1st deputy chairman, Bashkir Council of Ministers) criticised 
the unsatisfactory implementation of tecnhical and sanitary supervision 
by these city executive committees (see W S , RSFSR, No. 18, 1970, p. 289) .
295
Security, and the kollegia (board) of the Estonian Ministry of Public 
Health held in Pyarnu city in 1966, about 20 people were reported to 
have had an exchange of views on the state of medical services in the 
city.^ According to Soviet observers, on-the-spot meetings improve 
the Commissions' supervisory activity over the work of the local 
executive and administrative organs (Stepanov and Yunevichyus, 1962, p.110; 
and Sovetskaya Est., 23.1.70). Indeed, the deputy chairman of the Estonian 
Commission for Public Health and Social Security, P.A. Bogovsky (whose 
Commission has held a number of on-the-spot meetings) expressed his 
satisfaction with the state of implementation of the Commission's 
recommendations (see Bogovsky, 1966). However, in the view of M.I.
Raudam, chairman of the same republican Commission (1965) , the on-the- 
spot meeting is just one among many ways to enhance the Commission's 
supervisory capacity. He emphasized, for example, the necessity of 
carrying out the Commission's supervision over the local bodies in close 
contact with the Ministry of Social Security and also with the local 
soviet Commissions for Public Health and Social Security. To this end, 
he said, the Commission distributed its work plans regularly to the 
related ministries and the Standing Commissions of local soviets, and 
held meetings jointly with the kollegia of the Ministry of Public Health, 
with other republican Commissions and with corresponding Standing 
Commissions of district soviets. Commission members sometimes participated 
in discussions at board meetings of the Ministry of Social Security. At
 ^ The following 10 names were listed among the 20 speakers at the meeting: 
Kh. Rozin (hospital doctor) ; Ya. Tynuvere (chairman of a kolkhoz) ; E.
Kama (1st Deputy Minister of Public Health); E. Laos (deputy chairman, 
Pyarnu City Executive Committee); I. Kallakas (deputy chairman, Pyarnu 
District Executive Committee); U. Meikas (chairman, republican Public 
Health Workers' Union); A. Auksmaa (a member of the Commission for Public 
Health and Social Security of Pyarnu district soviet); G. Til'k (chairman 
of the Commission for Public Health of Aresk Village Soviet); A. Valkonen 
(1st .secretary Pyarnu City Party Committee); and L. Merisalu (secretary 
Pyarnu District Party Committee). See WS, Est., No. 42, 1966, pp. 538-539'
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one time, the Commission also organized seminars for the chairmen of 
the corresponding Standing Commissions of district and city soviets 
for the overall assessment of their performance in this field (Sovetskaya 
Est., 2.7.65). These various means to reinforcing the Commission's 
supervision do not appear to be limited only to the Public Health and 
Social Security Commission, but are employed by other Estonian Commissions 
as well (see Sil'vet, 1960, p. 53). One should add, however, that when 
a Commission holds a joint meeting with the board of the corresponding 
Ministry, attention is not necessarily limited to the performance of 
the local bodies but is often concerned with that of the Ministry itself. 
In this case, the Minister will be called in at the joint meetings to 
submit a report on the performance of his Ministry (see e.g. Kommunist 
Armenii, 10.4.69). Joint meetings with the board of the corresponding 
Ministry could indeed help to secure implementation of the Commission's 
formal resolutions, given the fact that the board is an advisory body 
to the Ministry concerned. The board of Ministry too might obtain some 
benefit for its advisory role by being kept informed by the Standing 
Commission of the latter's findings on the work of its Ministry. In 
some republics, such as the RSFSR, where no such joint meetings are 
held between the Standing Commissions and the boards of the Ministries, 
the findings of the latter are sometimes inserted into the resolutions 
of the corresponding Standing Commissions (see Krivenko, 1970a,p. 39).
■ Finally, there are meetings where the Commissions examine the 
performance of particular enterprises. On 29 September, 1369, for 
instance, the Kirgiz Budget and Planning Commission held a meeting to 
examine the financial and economic activity of the sovkhoz, "Tash-Moinok" 
in Kant district. The Commission's investigations had revealed many 
assignments unfulfilled over the years by the sovkhoz, which had in effect
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accumulated a huge amount of debts. In 1967, the loss already amounted 
to 55,000 roubles, but now had increased to 350,000 roubles. Moreover, 
the Commission alleged instead of attempting to improve the situation 
the director of the sovkhoz;, S. Dykambaev, the chief agronomist P.G.
Luchko, and the chief accountant, Ye.P. Avramenko, simply acquiesced 
in it. In its resolution, the Commission recommended that the Main 
Adminstration of Sovkhozes under the republican Ministry of Agriculture 
should "examine the case" of S. Dykambaev and Ye.P. Avramenko because 
of their carelessness in supervision, embezzlement and defalcation.
The Commission also recommended S. Dykambaev to make restitution by 1 
January 1970, that is within three months (see Sovetskaya Kir., 2.10.69). 
The strongly worded recommendation gives an appearance of an instruction 
obligatory upon the sovkhoz. We do not know, however, what kind of 
penalty was imposed by the Main Administration of Sovkhozes on S.
Dykambaev and Ye.P. Avramenko, nor we do know whether the sovkhoz was 
able to repay such a vast deficit, in so short a period.
It is indeed no easy task for outside observers to ascertain the 
extent of both federal and republican Commissions' success in their 
supervising activity. We have illustrated above that some republics 
have devised a larger battery of approaches than others to meet the 
situation where some ministries and departments default on their obligation 
under the Regulation on Standing Commissions to report on the measures 
adopted for the implementation of the Commissions' recommendations.
While the assessment of their performance in relation to supervision 
is difficult, some criticisms are reported in the Soviet press. The 
major criticism appears to be centred on a characteristic of supervisory 
activity in its present form, namely, duplication. The chairman of the 
Presidium of the Moldavian Supreme Soviet K. Ilyashenko, expressed the 
view that the Moldavian Commissions' resolutions are virtually indist-
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inguishable from many similar resolutions of executive agencies. They 
record the percentages of fulfillment and non-fulfillment of plans, 
etc. All they lack was an analytical research basis. And this, in 
our view, is the crux of the matter" (see Izv., 17.2.68). A similar 
opinion was also expressed by A. Agranovsky, speaking of federal 
Standing Commissions: "there is searching under way, and it is based
on one idea, on one thought: how not to become simply another agency 
(we have enough of them as it is) but to find one's place" (see 
Agranovsky, 1970). It is difficult to imagine that the Commissions can 
produce a competent piece of analytical work without having adequate 
staff of their own. In order to remedy this situation, Ilyashenko 
suggests that the Commissions should enlist scientists and specialists 
on a broader basis and maintain continual contact with the ministries 
and departments. Research into the recent operations of Standing 
Commissions (some of their operations were quoted earlier in this paper) 
suggests that the Standing Commissions enlist scientists and specialists 
for the examination of problems and maintain contact with the ministries 
through the latter's kollegii.
It appears that the main function of the supervisory activities of 
the Commissions (which are similar in form to Western Parliamentary Commi­
ttees) is, at a superficial level, to criticise the executives as do their 
Western counterparts. One basic difference is that they do not 
criticize policies and policy matter only how administrators and others 
implement these policies. Moreover, we have observed that the overall 
institutional strength of the Commissions with effect to government 
bodies seems to be perhaps: extremely small, despite the fact that the
Commissions have undergone considerable structural changes since 1966.
We have also observed that the divisions in the course of discussions
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at the meetings are more complex and multiple than these between 
representatives of the governed (Commission members) and governing 
(government spokesmen).
P A R T IV
functions and
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
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CHAPTER 9
FUNCTIONS OF THE SUPREME SOVIET ORGANS
Detailed research into the operation of the Predidia and the 
Standing Commissions confirms the existence of substantial gaps 
between what they actually do and what they are supposed to do 
under the federal and republican Constitutions (in the case of the 
Presidia) and regulations (in the case of the Standing Commissions).
We shall attempt below to interpret the descriptions we have 
offered in Chapter 6 and 8 of the operation of the federal and 
republican Supreme Soviet organs in terms of actual functions 
performed within the Soviet political system. In the Introduction, 
we have defined each of the possible functions of the Supreme Soviet 
organs. One would find, however, that inferences drawn from relevant 
cases in this Chapter tend to demonstrate not only the particular 
function but also simultaneously other functions as well. This is 
unavoidable, for the operations of the Supreme Soviet organs have not 
been consciously carried out along the lines that we have assumed 
they are actually functioning.
1. Legitimation and identification.
We have observed that the federal and republican Presidia helped 
transmit and maintain the dominant political culture'*' among Soviet
The dominant pattern of political culture is, according to F.C. 
Barghoorn, "a participatory - subject culture. Ordinary citizens 
must be obedient to their rulers' demands and must also display both 
enthusiasm and initiative in complying with their leaders' instructions". 
Lenin, Stalin and Khrushchev all persist with the same pattern, although 
there were differences in the "command" methods of leadership and 
administration, due largely to their individual personalities.
Barghoorn also considers that the "post-Khrushchev leadership ... sought
(cont)
302
citizens through their symbolic operation. Meetings of the federal 
Presidium relating to such questions as administrative boundaries and 
ratification of treaties provide settings for secular, national 
rituals; on the other hand meetings of federal and republican 
Presidia concerning election preparations help formulate the overall 
strategy for a country-wide ritual in which all Soviet citizens 
participate either actively or passively. Such direct and indirect 
involvement in political ritual enables the Presidia to play a part 
in reducing the atmosphere of political and social instability, and 
in contributing to an appearance of social consensus and public 
support, thereby adding a measure of credibility and legitimacy to 
the regime. And such rituals provide the current leadership with 
an outward, formal mantle of legitimacy and a v v:. of public 
support. While it is obviously difficult to estimate the 
psychological effort of these rituals on ordinary citizens, it 
would be rash to assume that they are negligible.^
(cont)
to fashion a responsive, persuasive, support-inducing administrative 
style. Executives at all levels were urged to be attentive to the 
views and considerate of the dignity of colleagues and subordinates. 
Higher executives in particular were exhorted to pay heed to the 
opinions of the trained experts whose best efforts were needed to 
solve the economic problems facing the country,..." (see Barghoorn, 
1966, p.16).
 ^ See Bocock, 1970, p.286. Bocock points to the analogy of political 
rituals with such religious rituals as the Christian Kiss of Peace 
where members of the congregation actually touch one another at a 
sacred moment in the liturgy. Such ritual evokes faith and articulates 
and exx^resses religious emotions. It has to be experienced in its 
setting to understand its significance; it is not something which 
makes sense in words.
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A large number of selected rank and file members of social and 
production organizations have now been given chances to participate in 
the activities associated with the Standing Commissions' formal 
functions - mainly legislative and supervisory functions. They are 
brought in to be educated in how at a face value at least state 
decisions are made and to disseminate their knowledge on the 
activities of the Supreme Soviet organs to their fellow members at 
work places. Thus, through a stream of communications issuing 
from the Standing Commissions, the Soviet regime hopes to promote 
acceptance by the people of the legitimacy of its structures and 
processes and functions, and identification by them of their 
interests with those of the regime.
2. Communication.
From our description of the structure and process of federal and 
republican Presidia, we see that they constitute a separate and 
coherent hierarchical mechanism. The federal Presidium, at the top 
of the pyramid, is largely concerned with co-ordinating and directing 
the work of the republican Presidia, while the latter guide important 
aspects of the work of the local Soviet executive committees. Both 
the federal and republican Presidia dispose of work forces of their 
own, comprising on the one hand their full-time staff organized in the 
departments of the Presidium, and on the other the members of the 
Standing Commissions of the Supreme Soviet. The basic operational 
relationship may be summarized as follows: the federal Presidium acts, 
upon information supplied by the departments of the Presidium or the 
Standing Commissions, vis-a-vis the appropriate federal bodies working 
in the particular problem area, or alternatively instructs the 
republican Presidia to take positive actions in the field specified.
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The individual republican Presidium then takes action, upon the 
instructions of the federal Presidium or on the basis of information 
supplied by its own departments or the Standing Commissions, vis-a-vis 
the appropriate republican bodies working in a particular problem 
area, or alternatively instructs local executive bodies to eliminate 
shortcomings identified (see Chart 1).
The Standing Commissions thus operate in many ways as a de facto 
auxiliary of the Presidia (see Chart 1). The Standing Commissions 
as such have, therefore, no hierarchical apparatus of their own. In 
particular, there is little direct contact between the federal and 
republican Standing Commissions, despite the fact that both of these 
are involved in investigating how acts and regulations of federal 
Supreme Soviet organs are carried out in the republics, regions and 
districts. Any communication between the federal and republican 
Standing Commissions will pass through the federal and republican 
Presidia (see Kulik, Luk'yanov and Tokmakov, 1970, pp.82-83). On the 
other hand, we have observed that the republican Standing Commissions 
maintain direct contact with the local soviet Standing Commissions.
The federal and republican Presidia are constantly involved 
in preparing communications (reports, instructions, policy 
statements, notes and memoranda), processing or distributing'^'
In distributing communications, the Presidia may also amplify them. 
Writing about the RSFSR Presidium, A.N. Vinogradov states that a large 
quontity of information on the positive experience of the work of the 
soviets of individual regions comes to the Presidum. This information 
is generalised and the most valuable material is distributed to the 
executive committees of regions and the Council of Ministers of the 
autonomous republics so that the best experience can be utilised.
See Vinogradov, 1967, p.57.
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communications, or receiving and reading communications. We shall 
first sketch out the sources of the information which is essential for 
the operation of this function, and depict the intricate communication 
network established in and around the federal and republican Presidia. 
There exist three main information-suppliers for each Presidium; its 
departments; the Standing Commissions of "its" Supreme Soviet, and, 
in the case of the federal Presidium ad hoc Commissions set up for 
the preparation of legislation; and the members of the Presidium 
themselves. The flow of information from the first two sources into 
the Presidium has been illustrated in various cases referred to above. 
But it would be unrealistic to dismiss the individual members of the 
Presidium as a source of information. As we observed, the ordinary 
members of the Presidium are members of other orgizations who are well 
qualified to supply information about their individual organizations.
At the same time, they are presumably eager to obtain information 
from other members or through the operation of the Presidium. One may 
assume that each member of the Presidium provides such information as 
he thinks expedient, either on his own initiative or at the request of 
the chairman and other members of the Presidium, while at the same 
time sorting out and screening information received by the Presidium 
from other sources. At Presidium meetings, he may contribute data from 
his background and interest which are different from those of other 
members. He furthermore transmits decisions adopted by the Presidium 
to his own organization in terms which reflect his own understanding of 
it. He may also feed information back to the Presidium about the 
impact of Presidium decisions on his organization (and his locality). 
The members of the Presidium are not the only existing feedback loop 
in the Presidium's communication network. Other information suppliers
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su c h  a s  t h e  S t a n d in g  Com m issions may a l s o  be  f e e d i n g  i n f o r m a t i o n  b ack  
t o  t h e  P r e s id iu m .  I n  t h i s  c o n n e c t i o n /  i t  i s  w o r th  c o n s i d e r i n g  t h e  com­
p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  L e g i s l a t i v e  P r o p o s a l s  Com m issions o f  t h e  f e d e r a l  and 
r e p u b l i c a n  Supreme S o v i e t s  ( s e e  T a b le  20 i n  P a r t  I I I ) ,  w h ic h ,  a s  we 
h av e  n o t e d ,  a r e  t h e  c h i e f  s o u r c e  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  f o r  t h e  P r e s i d i a ' s  
s u p e r v i s o r y  r o l e  o v e r  t h e  i m p le m e n ta t io n  o f  a c t s .  The same d a t a  
a l s o  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  e x e c u t i v e s  o f  a  v a r i e t y  o f  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  a t  
d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s  ( c e n t r a l ,  r e p u b l i c a n  and r e g i o n a l )  a r e  r e p r e s e n t e d .
I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e  f e d e r a l  L e g i s l a t i v e  P r o p o s a l s  C om m iss ions , t h e  
number o f  o f f i c i a l s  o f  r e g i o n a l  P a r t y  c o m m it te e s  i s  p r o p o r t i o n a l  t o  
t h e  s i z e  o f  t h e  r e p u b l i c s .  I t  i s  o b v io u s  t h a t  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  s u p p l i e d  
by  t h e  members o f  su c h  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  a s  t h e  P e o p l e ' s  C o n t r o l  C om m ittee ,  
KGB, P r o c u r a c y ,  TUC and  P a r t y  and  g o v e rn m e n t  a p p a r a t u s  c o u ld  g r e a t l y  
a s s i s t  t h e  P r e s i d i a  i n  o p i n i o n - t a p p i n g  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  f ra m in g  o f  
l e g i s l a t i o n ,  and  i n  t h e  c o - o r d i n a t i o n  o f  s u p e r v i s i n g  a c t i v i t i e s  r e l a t i n g  
t o  t h e  i m p le m e n ta t io n  o f  a c t s  c o n d u c te d  by t h e s e  v a r i o u s  b o d i e s .  I t  i s  
a l s o  a p p a r e n t  t h a t  d e c i s i o n s  a d o p te d  by t h e  P r e s id iu m  w i l l  som etim es  
c a r r y  o f f i c i a l  i m p l i c a t i o n s  e i t h e r  d i r e c t l y  o r  i n d i r e c t l y  f o r  t h e  
members o f  t h e s e  L e g i s l a t i v e  P r o p o s a l s  Com m issions i n  t h e i r  b a s i c  
o f f i c i a l  c a p a c i t y .  C o n v e r s e ly ,  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  member may in fo rm  t h e  
r e s p e c t i v e  P r e s id iu m  o f  t h e  a p p r a i s a l  o f  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  h i s  
P r e s i d i u m 's  d e c i s i o n  i n  h i s  o r g a n i z a t i o n  and  l o c a l i t y .  T h ese  f e e d b a c k  
lo o p s  d e s c r i b e d  may in d e e d  become an i n d i s p e n s a b l e  p a r t  o f  t h e  f e d e r a l  
and r e p u b l i c a n  P r e s i d i u m 's  c o m m u n ica t io n  s y s te m .  I n  c o n s i d e r i n g  C h a r t  
1 we s h o u ld  e m p h a s ize  t h a t  w h i l e  i t  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  P r e s i d i a ' s  commun­
i c a t i o n  n e tw o rk  as  d e d u c ed  from  p u b l i c  a c c o u n t s  o f  t h e i r  o p e r a t i o n ,  
i t  r e m a in s  an open q u e s t i o n  w h e th e r  i t  a d e q u a t e ly  r e f l e c t s  t h e  i n f o r m a l  
s t r u c t u r e  o f  co m m u n ic a t io n .  T h i s  i s  e s p e c i a l l y  t h e  c a s e  when commun­
i c a t i o n  i s  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  p o l i t i c s  o f  f u r t h e r i n g  g ro u p  c o n c e r n s .
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Chart 1. The Communication system of federal and republican
Pres id la
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FEDERAL STANDING
FEDERAL PRESIDIUM
REPUBLICAN PRESIDIA
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REPUBLICAN STANDING
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Legend: -_=5 flow of instructions
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The federal and republican Standing Commissions have also now establish 
ed their own communication network. We may first consider the sources of 
information which are prerequisites for the Commissions' operations, and 
which help to delineate the communication net of the Standing Commissions. 
In the case of the federal Commissions, the main sources of information are 
the government officials called in to report and provide the Commissions 
with the material on the subjects under examination, and the Commission 
members who themselves conduct the preliminary fact-finding operations.
We have already seen that, in the course of preliminary examination, 
the Commission members, particularly those employed as second echelon 
Party and government officials, put forward their individual regional 
concerns. This is presumably the reason why the members of the 
important Commissions such as Budget and Planning have been selected from 
all republics. Table 24 on the members of the seventh convocation 
Budget and Planning Commission who hold higher Party and government 
posts in their respective republics clearly demonstrate this factor.
In theory, therefore, the problems and claims of each republic can 
be voiced through its spokesman in the Budget and Planning Commissions 
of the two Chambers.
A similar pattern of regional representation may be discerned in 
the membership of the republican Standing Commissions. In the case 
of the latter, however, more complex information links have now been 
established: lateral links such as those with the boards of the
ministries; and vertical links such as those with the local Soviet 
Standing Commissions. Even the expertise which is necessary for the
Commissions' operations may be supplied by outside bodies --  the fact
that the average membership of the republican Standing Commissions is 
smaller them the federal one might have encouraged this practice.
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TABLE 24
REPUBLICS IN WHICH DEPUTIES SERVING ON THE FEDERAL
COMMISSIONS FOR BUDGET AND PLANNING HOLD REPUBLICAN
PARTY AND GOVERNMENT POSITIONS (7TH CONVOCATION)
Rep. P a r ty  CC Rep. C o u n c il o f  M in i s t e r s
1 s t .  2nd 1 s t  d e p u ty d e p u ty
s e c .  s e c .  s e c . ch a irm a n c h a irm a n
RSFSR 1 1
U k ra in e 1 1
B e lo r u s s i a 1 1
U z b e k is ta n 1 1
K a z a k h s ta n 1
G e o rg ia 1 1
A z e rb a id z h a n 1 1
L i th u a n ia 1
M o ld a v ia 1
L a tv ia 1
K i r g i z i a 1
T a d z h ik s ta n 1
A rm enia 1 1
T urkm en ia 1 1
E s to n ia 1 1
The s m a l le r  r e p u b l i c a n  S ta n d in g  C om m issions i n  p a r t i c u l a r  h av e  
d i s p l a y e d  an o u tw a rd  o r i e n t a t i o n  i n  t h e i r  o r i g i n a l  o p e r a t io n s  e x e r c i s i n g  
t h e i r  s u p e r v i s o r y  f u n c t i o n ,  in  c o l l a b o r a t i o n  w i th  o t h e r  s u p e r v i s o r y  o r g a n s .
I
T h is  p ro b a b ly  p ro m o te s  m ore e f f e c t i v e  k o n t r o l  a c t i v i t i e s  and r e d u c e s  
d u p l i c a t i o n  o f  e f f o r t .  On th e  o t h e r  h a n d , th e  f e d e r a l  S ta n d in g  
C om m issions g iv e  t h e  a p p e a ra n c e  o f  a  m ore c l o s e - k n i t  sy s te m , i . e .  th e  
o p e r a t io n s  h a v e  b e e n  l a r g e l y  c o n d u c te d  by th e  C om m ission members and 
d e l i b e r a t i o n s  w ere  c a r r i e d  o u t  among th e m s e lv e s  w i th  th e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
o f  a  few o u t s id e  spokesm en and  o b s e r v e r s .
H aving  o u t l i n e d  th e  som ew hat d i f f e r e n t  co m m u n ica tio n  n e t  e x i s t i n g  
i n  th e  f e d e r a l  and i n  th e  r e p u b l i c a n  S ta n d in g  C o m m issio n s, we s h a l l  now
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attempt some comments on the informal communication mechanism operating 
in the first of these. We shall begin by postulating, for the purpose 
of analysis, an unsophisticated model of a communication mechanism 
operating in the federal Standing Commissions. Let us divide the 
participants into four groups, attributing to each a particular 
communication role in the meetings. These are (a) Party and government 
top level officials; (b) Second echelon of the Party and government 
hierarchy; (c) executive members of the lower Party and government 
apparatus and other organizations; and (d) rank and file of various 
organizations (including intelligentsia - artists, doctors, teachers, 
etc.). The communication lines between these groups may be hypothet­
ically summarised as follows. Group (a) (together with some members 
of the Supreme Soviet Presidium and government officials who are 
invited to report on and explain their activities) pass on either 
information on a particular issue, or an order to Groups (b), (c) and
(d). The executives of Group (c) may express certain grievances and 
opinions upwards to Group (b). Now, Group (b) lies between Groups 
(a) and (c) in this two-way communication. This Group thus plays 
a most important role as a conduit. Group (d) may be viewed as by­
standers in this context.
Groups (c) and (d)♦
The presence of the rank and file of the various organizations 
has been frequently noted in the meetings of those Commissions whose 
activities relate to the examination of the national economic plan 
and budget or to the observation of laws and acts already enacted by 
the Supreme Soviet. A prominent economic leader serving on the Youth 
Affairs Commissions at its meeting of 26 February, 1970^ said
 ^ The agenda of the meeting was to consider the problem of why young 
people are leaving the countryside.
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that "the question raised was indeed an important oner and the members 
buried themselves in it. There was talk about schools, bathhouses, 
trade in the countryside, accident prevention on tractors, sports, 
and analysis of the aging of the countryside, etc. —  and all this in 
one meeting; but since it was held, a recommendation had to be adopted, 
and one was adopted, but how is it supposed to be carried out? Order 
is needed. I think, the correct selection of a specific question is 
halfway to a correct solution" (see Izv. , 30.7.70). It can be argued 
that tliis is the kind of meeting where the chairman failed to direct 
the discussion properly. This may have occurred because the chairman 
was inexperienced in the handling of the Commission, or too many 
people each with a different background attended, or the chairman 
deliberately steered the meeting in this way. An artist member 
attending the same meeting evaluated it in completely different terms:
"a very good meeting, I liked what seemed to be its ’spontaneity*.
You see, sometimes we know how to map out everything —  the rules of 
order, a list of speakers, who follows whom, who speaks about what. 
Order? Yes, order. But a newcomer will not even venture to speak. But 
there he speaks and learns to think with an orientation toward the 
state" (see Izv., 30.7.70). Needless to say, the messages expressed 
by these people can only be stated in general terms, and cannot be 
translated into immediate action. It is observed that the opportunities 
for the rank and file of the various kinds of organizations to speak 
are the greatest at the meetings of the Commissions for Youth Affairs, 
Conservation, Education, Science and Culture, and Trade and Everyday 
Services. At the meetings of other Commissions, participation in 
discussion is virtually limited to officials of the Party and government
apparatus and of production enterprises. Even at the meetings of the
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latter Commissions, however, the presence of rank and file members 
may contribute to public relations, or, as Soviet spokesmen interpret 
it, to their educational value. A special correspondent of Izvestia, 
interviewing Budget and Planning Commission member K.A. Ibrayeva (a 
machine operator of the Uzen Oil Field), during a recess of one of 
the plenary meetings, reported the following exchange: "Are you 
satisfied with the course of the discussion?" "Certainly", she 
responded, "I am a new member and this is the first time I have part­
icipated in sessions of this kind. This is a real classroom for learning 
the state approach to the solution of national economoc problems. I 
never before thought that the plan was born in such heated debates"
(see Izv., 19.11.70). As we have witnessed, therefore, the presence 
of such "bystanders" in the meetings should not be dismissed as insig­
nificant. It would be unwise to expect, however, all of the Commission 
members of "bystander" status to attend the meetings regularly. V.
Vasil*ev, speaking of the Armenian Standing Commissions, stated that 
the kolkhoz farmers have less opportunities to attend the Commission 
meetings them the unversity teachers and scientists (see Vasil*ev,V.
1966, p. 82). Nevertheless, given that the field of affairs is one in 
which they have a special interest, members from Groups (c) and (d) may 
find it in fact useful for extending their knowledge. Indeed, they are 
assigned to do particular work in the preparatory bodies (which in 
itself possesses educational value), and may thereby feel that they are 
doing something important. Apart from technical knowledge, they 
(particularly the Group (c) members) may also derive some education in 
political life. They are brought into contact with national political 
leaders in the Commissions, where they are given not only knowledge of 
what is going on but also an opportunity to learn how joint discussion
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and consultation take place. Enlisting the different levels of all 
concerned in the activities of the Commissions and giving them a 
sense of participation in some of the decisions about the work that they 
themselves have to do probably contribute to legitimation of the 
actions taken by the authority.
Group (b)
One of the roles of Group (b) will be to persuade Groups (c) arid (d) 
to commit themselves to collective responsibility and action. Group (b) 
is also capable of serving both as an agent for and a master of Groups 
(c) and (d). The downward communication of Group (b) to Group (c) is not 
confined to administrative co-ordination and conciliation activities, 
but also has an informing and educating aspect. When sub-commission 
chairman, T.N. Osetrov (1st deputy chairman of the Uzbek Council of 
Ministers) opened the discussion on the five-year plan of the meat and 
dairy' industry, V.P. Nazarenko (1st secretary, Kanev District Party 
Committee) asked the Deputy Minister of the Meat and Dairy Industry,
M. Barbashin, how the Ministry intended to meet the shortage of manpower 
in the light, food and meat industries. Barbashin answered that this 
could be done in two ways: first, the industries have to attract
workers by introducing incentives such as higher wages and better housing: 
and secondly, through renovation of equipment, advanced technology, and 
mechanization and automation of production it would be possible to 
achieve the equivalent of adding more than 1,000,000 persons to the 
ranks of the workers of light industry. As much as 94% of the planned 
growth in output of this branch would have to be attained through 
increased labour productivity (see Izv., 4.11.71). Barbashin's words 
may be taken as spelling out government policy guidance to Nazarenko 
and indirectly to raikom first secretaries generally, whose supervisory
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responsibilities include checking the performance of these
industries in their respective districts.
Some examples relating to the administration of education 
may serve to illustrate upward communication by the
second echelon officials of the Party and government apparatus. V.P. 
Borodin, chairman of the executive committee of Volgograd region, 
suggested in the sub-commission studying the agricultural sections of 
the economic plan and the budget, "nothing, essentially, is being done 
to train specialists for work in the livestock-raising complexes. The 
complexes employ considerable electric power and intricate equipment, 
which will be even more complicated tomorrow. It seems to me that 
the federal Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Higher and Specialised 
Secondary Education should think seriously of training personnel for 
work on automated livestock farms" (Izv., 6.11.71). On an earlier 
occasion, a similar opinion had been expressed by A.S. Drygin, 1st 
secretary of the Vologda regional Party committee (a rural area) at one 
of the plenary meetings of the Commission of the Soviet of the Union. 
Pointing out the urgent need for specialists in rural areas, he quoted 
some relevant figures for his own region: "there are only 40 economists
working in Vologda region which contains 441 rural production enterprises. 
"It is alarming", he added, "that many of the higher education graduates 
have not received specialised education" (Izv., 9.8.69). At another 
plenary meeting of the same Commission, G.V. Maleyev, rector of a 
polytechnic institute, who headed a preparatory group of deputies, gave a 
brief report entitled "On the Condition and Improvement of the Work of 
the Specialised Secondary Schools". The main emphasis of his report 
was as follows: —  "the existing system of running specialised secondary
educational institutions is poorly co-ordinated. They are presently
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administered by more than 2.00 ministries, departments and enterprises.
This undermines efficient management and effective supervision of 
studies" (P_., 21.5.71). An almost identical opinion was expressed by 
T.V. Lashkarashvili, the Georgian Minister of Education, six months 
later at one of the joint plenary meetings of the Budget and Planning 
and branch Commissions. However, Lashkarashvili, who headed the sub­
commission which studied public education sections of the national 
economic plan/went a step further than Maleyev, arguing that "it 
would be better to concentrate the’ administration of this entire net­
work of education institutions in one pair of hands" (Izv., 13.11.71). 
Unfortunately, we know nothing of the results of her suggestions.
K.M. Gerasimov, Gosplan chairman of the RSFSR, who chaired this joint 
meeting, may have included her proposal in the recommendations addressed 
to the central Gosplan, in view of Lashkarashvili's status and experi­
ence gained as Minister of Education of a republican Council of 
Ministers, but there is no confirmation of this.
Group (b) members not only select and transmit information about 
Groups (c) and (d), but also articulate interests of Groups (c) and (d). 
For instance, at one of the meetings of the Commission for Public Educ­
ation, Science and Culture of the Soviet of the Union, two educationalists 
stressed the need for preservation of historical monuments in the 
republics, regions and districts. K. Murtazaev, first secretary of 
the Bukhara regional Committee of the Party, proposed that serious 
attention should be paid to providing of museums with adequate financial 
material and teclinical assistance. Murtazaev, whose interests must 
certainly include the preservation of historical monuments in Bukhara 
region, was presumably furthering his own concern in agreeing with the 
educationalists’ suggestions. The chairman of the Commission, C.P.
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Trapeznikov, head of the Central Committee Department of Education 
and Science, concluded the discussions by underlining that the 
executive committees of the local soviets and the public should render 
assistance to the improvement of the conditions of the museums (see 
Izv. , 9.8.69). Trapeznikov was thereby "screening out" a demand by 
placing the obligation in the hands of local bodies.
We may note here a few problems which might persist in interpreting the
operations of Group' (b) members. First,it should be noted that the assumption 
about Group (b) was made largely on the basis of the first secretaries 
of regional Party committees, since the latter constitute the largest 
single occupational position in Group (b). Group (b) included in fact 
the members of other occupational positions as well. Therefore, it is 
difficult to determine the occupational motivation as such, which in 
reality vary from member to member within Group (b). Secondly, while
these people, and particularly the first secretaries of regional Party 
committees, are well established mid-career politicians who are capable 
of dealing simultaneously with a variety of issues and pressures, bal­
ancing one against another, and meanwhile maintaining a certain degree of 
confidence between the centre and themselves and their respective 
regions, one wonders how much they can devote themselves to Commission 
activities.^ Their time is very limited. There is a number of direct 
avenues available to them to pursue their own interests rather than in 
the Standing Commissions. Such a regional first secretary may on the 
other hand find that the Commissions' work presents opportunities for
 ^ A meeting such as the joint plenary'1 meeting of the Budget and Planning 
and branch Commissions which is generally held in the pre-budget session 
of the Supreme Soviet may be attended by all these people. The 1st 
secretary of a regional Party committee is usually a member or candidate 
member of the Party CC. The meetings of the Commissions are generally 
held about the same time as the plenum of the Party Central Committee.
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pursuing his own interests. He may lobby quietly behind the scenes, 
taking advantage of the presence of top Party and government officials, 
or, in the process of leading a sub-commission or working group, he may 
be able to establish informal communication links not otherwise obtain­
able, and he may simply exploit Groups (c) and (d) for pursuance of his 
own interests. One of the advantages in this process would be that he 
can claim that his own interests are national interests since Groups 
(c) and (d) members are coopted from all over the country and are not 
his own subjects.
Group (a)
The slight evidence available on the behaviour of Group (a) 
members may perhaps be best illustrated by a few examples of the 
performance of Commission chairmen at plenary meetings. Those 
Commission chairmen who generally enjoy higher status in their 
basic organizations are in a position to reject, approve or adjudicate 
between members' suggestions.1 However, interesting situations may 
arise when they are "outranked", in terms of basic position, by other 
Commission members.
When there is a sharp disagreement between a government agency and 
a group of deputies, the chairman may ask the deputies to investigate 
the problems further. For instance, as a result of investigations of 
a sub-commission under his chairmanship, K.K. Nikolaev, the first 
secretary of the Sverdlovsk regional Party committee, demanded, at one 
of the plenary meetings of the Budget Commission of the Soviet of the 
Union, higher output of bobbin threads, which were in short supply. A 
deputy chairman of the central Gosplan, V.P. Zotov, who had been called
We have noted earlier their statutory right (see especially Article 2 
of the federal regulation on the Standing Commissions) to influence 
the work of the Standing Commissions: they arrange for the meetings, 
represent the Commissions to other agencies, invite witnesses, arrange 
sub-commissions and direct the Commissions' work.
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to testify at the meeting defended his position by declaring that 
none of the three enterprises in the country where this type of thread 
was produced had sufficient capacity to increase their present 
production level. The chairman of the Commission, I.S. Senin, first 
deputy chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers, commissioned 
the sub-commission further with the task of communicating with these 
three enterprises, to establish the possibilities of increasing the 
output of the product in question (see Sovetskaya Bel., 30.11.62).
Senin may have agreed to investigate the problem further at the 
request of Nikolaev, whose political status is at least as great as 
that of either Zotov or Senin. On the other hand, Senin's judgement 
may be interpreted as implying that the government is unlikely to 
appropriate further funds for these industries, and the latter must 
make rational use of existing capacities to meet the demands.
There are cases where a Commission chairman does not accept the 
suggestion made by the chairman of a preparatory body. For instance, 
at one of the plenary meetings of the Budget and Planning and branch 
Commissinns, the group dealing with the construction and building 
materials industry took the view that the mangagement of the precast 
reinforced concrete industry should be concentrated in a single agency, 
on’ the grounds that this branch had been working ineffectively and 
using its capacities poorly. However, another member, I.G. Kebin, first 
secretary of the Estonian Central Committee posed the question - "but 
will the proposed adminstrative reorganization help matters?" Then he 
declared, "It will not. It is not administrative jurisdiction that 
matters here, but economy and organization of production". "Yes, for 
otherwise we may centralize what is best decided in the localities", 
agreed the chairman of the Budget and Planning Commission, P.A. Rozenko
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(chairman of the Ukrainian Gosplan). "A plant must supply a specific 
construction job with specific items. How can this be attended to 
from Moscow? This Ministry will inflict a volume plan on the plant, 
which will "chase" after cubic meters without troubling about the 
specific needs of a given construction job" (Izv., 11.12.66). After 
this exhcnage of opinions, most of the members did not agree with 
the deputy group on this question (the name of whose chairman was not 
available in the press report) and the group withdrew its recommendation. 
This is one of many such cases where the chairman rejects a deputy's 
proposal after its expediency has been called in question by a republican 
higher Party official.'*’
It should also be noted that there is a group of deputies who have 
authority and influence such as higher Party and government officials 
without any particular functions (e.g. chairmanship) in the Standing 
Commissions. These people may be able to manipulate, if they wish, the 
Commissions in such a way that the chairman is not able to be more 
than their spokesman. They may use their personal rights to promote 
reasonable motions and resolutions and take a hand in carrying out 
useful initiatives. If their outside (original) occupational work does 
not allow them to accept more time-absorbing functions, they may concentrate 
on some particular line of activity. Assuming that informal groupings 
have been formed centred on the influential members, the latters' 
followers in the Commissions may act under the impulses received from
1 Here is another point on which the research on Western managerial experi­
ence provides an interesting paralell. R. Stagner, writing on American 
company executives, suggests that, regardless of widespread talk about 
decentralization and democratization, the boss is still the boss. In 
80% of cases, the power of an executives division or his status in 
the company would decide the issue. It would be rare for a persuasive 
man in a lower echelon to win out over a less fluent but higher placed 
objector. See Stagner, 1972.
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their bosses. This would be more likely to occur in the republican 
Standing Commissions. Although we are talking here of the informal 
groups established insided the Commissions, the same pattern may 
apply for informal groups cutting across the Commission boundaries
and whose leaders are non-Commission members --  recall the case of
K.F. Katushev, p 286.
3. Mobilization.
It can be said, as we have speculated in the Introduction, 
that the Supreme Soviet organs involve two kinds of mobilization 
process: the mobilization of the general public, and the mobilization 
of administrative bodies.
Public mobilization is, as one might have expected, one of the 
major functions of the Supreme Soviet, i.e. the Supreme Soviet acts 
as a transmission belt of the regime. Indeed, both the federal 
and republican Supreme Soviet organs are consistently concerned 
with fostering public activity, by promoting positive attitudes and 
supportive action with respect to the current policies of the leader­
ship.
As has been noted ealier, much of the activity of the Presidia 
relates to the exercise of kontrol1 - the Presidia constitute one 
of a whole battery of structures designed to ensure that people 
observe rules and follow the instructions of authority. For 
instance, the federal and republican Presidia foster public action 
by organizing conference-seminars and holding on-the-spot investiga­
tions and meetings which aim essentially at bringing the activity of 
local government into harmony, and giving instructions in ways and 
means, in order to better observe rules. The Presidia have also
actively supervised the soviets for the mobilization of the masses
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in support of Party and government programmes under the banner 
of "socialist legality" and "mass-organizational work". It should 
be noted, at the same time, that this aspect of the Presidia's operat­
ions with regard to this function is complemented by the Party. The 
latter supervises the activities of the local soviets through 
its members. About 44.5% of the local soviet deputies (as of April 
1972) are Party members who constitute Party groups in the soviets 
and receive instructions from the corresponding local Party committees 
on their activities as deputies in the soviets (see SDT, No.4, 1972, 
pp.22-23).
The Standing Commissions also foster public mobilization through 
their own meetings. The meetings of the Foreign Affairs Commissions 
provide the best illustration. The unequivocal approval by carefully 
selected speakers of the government's activities relating to foreign 
relations receives nation-wide publicity through the media. Selected 
rank and file members of the Standing Commissions may feel, at the 
same time, a sense of participation which they can then transmit to 
others. The Commissions also foster public support of government 
measures by the use made of press and radio reports of Standing 
Commission activities, though some republics such as Estonia make 
considerably better use of mass media than other republics. The 
Commissions also establish an element of dialogue between the regime 
and the masses by visiting localities for preliminary investigations 
and by holding on-the-spot meetings. Regardless of what the regime 
learns from such contacts, this dialogue is evidently intended to 
project the image that the regime is anxious to create - that the 
Supreme Soviets are concerned with the welfare of the Soviet people 
and that their Standing Commissions act on the side of the people
as a kind of ombudsman.
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The second type of mobilization function, which is indirectly 
related to public mobilization, is administrative mobilization.
The account of the Supreme Soviet organs' formal functions, especially 
the legislative and supervisory functions, has shown that these are 
largely aimed at not only "public relations" but also rule-enforcement, 
administrative consultation, co-ordination and conciliation. As 
suggested in the Introduction, Frank's "Conflicting standard analysis" 
provided a helpful framework of analysis. Following Frank's approach, 
the canalizing activity of the Presidia may be described as follows.
The federal Presidium, usually acting as an arm of the "collective 
leadership", establishes new demands or enunciates new priorities 
among existing demands (legislative decrees and decisions), and 
enforces old demands (implementation of acts). The individual 
republican Presidium selects a particular locality for evaluation and 
enforces new or old demands. While the Presidium's criticism of a 
particular locality may be regarded as much a stirring of apathetic 
local executives into taking vigorous action, as an exercise of 
negative sanctions (in the terms discussed by Frank), the essential 
fact is that through this selective investigation, local executives 
are enabled to appreciate which demands by their superiors have, at 
the given moment, higher priority than others. Thus, the whole of 
this operation serves to encourage the local executives to keep in 
harmony with their superiors' contemporary wishes. one should also 
note that the demands set by the Presidia, and in particular, the 
republican Presidia, are largely confined to particular sections of 
state activity such as everyday services, public eating facilities,
323
housing and school construction, public health, education, anti- 
"parasite" activity, pensions, working conditions, mass-organizational 
activity, areas in which the local soviet machinery has major 
executive responsibilities. For other areas of state activity we 
assume, therefore, that some organs (and particularly those of the 
Party) may well be primarily responsible for this mobilization 
function, but this lies beyond the scope of the present investigation. 
If this assumption is correct, however, it is conceivable that the 
demands given priority by the different bodies at a given moment 
may collide with one another. Under such circumstances, the local 
executives may have to opt for the highest priority, according to 
their own judgement, and this carries some implications for the 
Presidia's priority-setting activities.
The mobilization of the administration is also carried out 
by the Standing Commissions in two ways: first, by exercising 
kontrol* over the performance of administrative bodies so as to 
help prevent them from straying from the approved channels; and 
secondly, by facilitating administrative co-ordination, co-operation 
and conciliation in pursuit of official objectives. We shall explore 
the mobilization of the administration a little further. The 
characteristics of the Commissions' supervision may be summarised as 
follows. First, each Commission constantly checks the state of 
administration in the field for which it is responsible. It can 
select any administrative bodies for the evaluation of their 
performance. The Commission attempts to effect improvements by 
directing specific recommendations to the administrative bodies 
concerned. The question is whether one could regard these recommend­
ations as a kind of enforcement to which administrative bodies are 
exposed. We have observed that there are a few isolated cases
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such as the recommendation directed to "Tosh-Moinok" sovkhoz, Kant 
district, Kirgiz republic, which gave the appearance of a direct 
sanction. In so far as any threat of sanctions is involved, it would 
probably not be realistic to think of the Commissions as initiating 
them. More likely higher Party or government authorities are probably 
using the Commissions as a channel to apply or threaten sanctions. 
However, any sanctions applied by higher authority may have both 
positive and negative effects on the body concerned. One advantage 
of sanctions, namely preventing the escalation of deficiencies, may be 
outweighed by the repercussions, if the severity of the sanctions 
is too high to be accepted. Thus, Commission recommendations of this 
kind may be interpreted as being intended not only to warn against the 
breach of commitments on the part of the executive and administrative 
bodies, but also to legitimize in advance the formal sanctions that may 
be imposed in future by other legitimate author.! ies. In this process, 
the Commissions may, therefore, intend to obtain a consensus of opinion 
on the application of the particular penalties. Possibly, they also 
wish to hold future sanctions at the lowest possible level with a view 
to offseting any disadvantages which might ensue from the application 
of the eventual formal sanctions imposed by other authorities. It should 
also be mentioned that the localities chosen as the targets of investi­
gation were not selected spontaneously, but chosen for study at the 
beginning of the year when each Commission was drafting its annual 
work plan.'*' All this said, however, negative publicity may be 
considered as a type of penalty.
On 25 March, 1960, for instance, the Belorussian Commission for Educ­
tion adopted its annual work plan, as follows:
- May -- the performance of cultural-educational institutions in 
Mogilev regions;
- End of July to beginning of August —  preparation for the new 
school year in Vitebsk region;
- October -- performance of theatres and concert halls;
- November -- development of national theatres in the republic;
- December —  construction of cultural institution in the republic. 
nrnhv.mkn . 1961. P. 17 .
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We do not know on what basis Commissions select particular 
problems and localities for study. The Commissions' main purpose in 
investigating particular bodies and making recommendations to them 
seems to be to convey official concern regarding certain problem areas 
to the relevant adminstrative bodies, and channel the activities of the 
latter along lines favoured by the top federal and republican officials.
The second type of administrative mobilization to which the Stand­
ing Commissions make some contribution takes the form of administrative 
co-ordination, co-operation and conciliation. We have mentioned before 
that the bulk of the Commissions' meetings deal with supervision of the 
implementation of laws and decisions of the Supreme Soviets by the 
ministries, departments and other executive and adminstrative agencies. 
One of the reasons for the orientation of the meetings in this direction 
may be that a policy such as the annual economic plan or five-year 
plan requires synchronized action by many agencies whose actions the 
planners seek to anticipate. The fulfilment of the plan must be checked, 
reassessed and adjusted after consultation with the interested parties 1 
concerned. Here, two operations will necessarily be involved: first,
to inform strategically located personnel about the co-ordination pro­
gramme which is built into the national economic plan, and to consult 
them about the workability of the programme which is an essential instru­
ment of the execution of the plan set by the planners; and secondly, to 
adjust the programme incrementally by constant consultation with related 
people. The Standing Commissions are not of course the main instrument 
for these purposes, but may act as an additional agency available 
to alleviate some of the difficulties of these operations.* What Soviet 
authorities call legislative activities concerning the national economic
plan and the budget may in fact involve in part the first operation
* T. Kirstein expresses a similar view that the Supreme Soviet Standing 
Commissions and, particularly, their sub-commissions serve as one of the 
consultative bodies in the Soviet decision making process (see Kirstein, 
1973, pp. 14-15).
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mentioned above. This is not to say, however, that the Standing 
Commissions functionally serve only for this operation. We have noted 
earlier that there is an area, notably the social welfare sections of 
the national economic plan and the budget, where the members can fight 
to obtain modest increased appropriations of materials and funds. The 
second operation noted above (incremental adjustment through consultation) 
may be manifested by the Commissions' supervisory activities. Much 
expertise and many key occupational officials in the Commissions are 
in a position to assist in this operation - the reappraisal of on­
going co-ordination programmes in the light of their consequences. At 
the fif til session of the 8th Belorussian Supreme Soviet convocation, the 
chairman of the Belorussian Commission for Agriculture, V.V. Prishchepchik 
informed the deputies that his Commission had examined the implementation 
of the agricultural section of the 1973 economic plan in the republic.
The Commission, he said, drew particular attention to the fact that 
during the first half of this year, the Belorussian Ministry of Agri­
culture and Belsel'khoztekhnika did not fully meet the requests of the 
kolkhozes and sovkhozes for the introduction of new techniques. Taking 
into account the recommendations of the Commission, the Belorussian 
Gosplan approved supplementary capital investment of 10 million roubles 
in the farm machinery fleets of the sovkhozes and also approved additional 
material for land-improvement projects (see Sovetskaya Bel., 30.6.73). 
Therefore, the formal proceedings of the Commissions evidently provide 
one institutionalized form (among others) for these operations. We 
have also observed this kind of administrative mobilization operating on 
vertical as well as lateral lines. The views of various administrative 
agencies at different levels will be heard and exchanged. In this 
operation, views are communicated in both directions both laterally and
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vertically. For instance, regional executives and administrators may 
hear the statements of higher officials, but may also express their 
concern to the latter. We have already seen evidence of this in the 
activities of the federal Standing Commissions. Similar evidence may 
be observed in the activities of the republican Standing Commissions."^
4. Interest articulation.
Evidence of the efforts to use the Supreme Soviet organs 
for the articulation of group interests has already come to light in 
our discussion of the communication mechanism. The Presidia, in 
their role as organizers of the Standing Commissions, seems to be 
one arena among others (and admittedly far from the most important) 
within which different agencies and localities compete for resources. 
The local executive committees receive instructions from the higher 
authorities, such as the ministries, to fulfill particular tasks, and 
also from the republican Presidia to remove shortcomings in their 
performances. The ministries may give instructions directly to the 
local Party committees as well, although they are not supposed to.
It is always a major problem for local leaders to find the resources 
to meet these obligations. The Supreme Soviet mechanism seems to have 
been developing as a further avenue for local leaders to press their 
claims for larger resources. Almost all the first secretaries of 
regional Party committees in the USSR are now represented in the
At meetings of the RSFSR Budget and Planning Commission, N.K. 
Blokhin (a regional executive committee chairman) and V.I. Ivanov 
(locomotive driver) expressed their dissatisfaction about the perform­
ance of the Ministry of Automobile Transport. M.A. Tairov (1st deputy 
chairman, regional executive committee) criticised the Ministry of 
Agriculture for neglecting the mechanization of farm operations. M.T. 
Troitsky (secretary, regional Party committee) and A.A. Popov (2nd 
secretary, regional Party committee) expressed also their dissatis­
faction on the performance of the Ministry of Light, Food and Dairy 
Industry. See Sovetskaya Rossia, 21.12.69.
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federal Standing Commissions. The evidence shows that they can 
fight at the sittings of the Standing Commissions for higher 
appropriations of social-welfare funds at least. We also saw a 
glimpse of allocation politics in the communication process of the 
Standing Commissions. Meetings of the Presidia may also provide the 
entire membership of the Presidia with opportunities for getting 
relevant information and perhaps lobbying for the furthering of the 
current concerns of their own organizations.
We have also seen that functional groups, echelon groups, social 
groups and institutional groups interact with one another in the 
performance of those organs' formal functions. It is hard to determine, 
however, that these groups interact with one another consistently on 
the basis of interest. As anticipated in the Introduction, our data 
were not sufficient to generalize about the dimensions of group 
politics involved in the sittings of the Supreme Soviet organs. Taking 
this fact into consideration, one might have recourse to Franklyn 
Griffiths' "Tendency analysis" and examine its applicability to the 
Supreme Soviet organs. It should be remembered, however, that Griffiths 
postulates a "loose coalition of actors" whose articulations regarding 
areas of policy manifest a shared "tendency" differing from the 
"tendencies" of other such coalitions. He also speaks of inter-"tend- 
ency" conflict. Griffiths wants us to identify such things as differ­
ences of emphasis implying alternative policy "thrusts", the "groups" 
concerned typically cutting across existing structural boundaries.
Again, our supporting evidence was so weak that the effort to generalize
 ^ See section 7 of Chapter 7. At the ninth convocaion election of the 
federal Supreme Soviet held in June 1974, all 148 obkom first secretaries 
were elected as deputies. Of 148, 4 became the members of the federal 
Presidium and 144 became the members of the federal Standing Commissions.
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the articulation of conflicting tendencies in the Supreme Soviet 
organs can hardly be regarded as rewarding. Even if one finds cases 
that make sense interpreted in Griffiths' terms, it is safe to assume 
that the Supreme Soviet organs are not the major setting for articula­
tion of tendencies within the Soviet political system. To put it 
briefly, the Supreme Soviet organs may be operating as one of the less 
important media for both the articulation of individual demands and 
the articulation of tendencies. What we propose to conjecture here is, 
therefore, the process of articulation operating in the Supreme Soviet 
organs. For this, we shall make partial use of Griffiths' analysis.
Griffiths divided the participants into three types: political 
elite; intermediate actors; and lower participants. An act of commu­
nication, in which an expectation is conveyed by one participant to 
another, takes place between these participants. These types are 
strikingly similar to those Groups we have posited, on the basis of 
earlier evidence, in our communication analysis. Griffiths also 
stated that an "increasing number of intermediate participants^ are 
engaged in the governmental process. Policy continues to be made in 
a highly organized context, but informal participation by members of 
the intermediate structure is serving increasingly to shape the 
situation in which the political elite acts" (see Skilling and 
Griffiths, 1971, p.372). These "intermediate participants" broadly 
correspond with the Group (b) of our analysis of the communication 
process in the Standing Commissions. It would thus be expedient to
 ^ In Griffiths' term, intermediate participants mean the politically 
active members of both formal organizations and informal groups who 
are not members of the political elite for a specific issue of all- 
union politics. See Skilling and Griffiths, 1971, p.359.
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depict the entire articulation process operating in the federal Supreme 
Soviet organs by outlining the involvement of Group (b) in this process.
We have observed that in many instances the federal and republican 
Presidia, usually acting as an arm of the "collective leadership", 
selected a particular locality for evaluation and inforced new or 
old legislative decrees and decisions. Thus, the wishes of the 
"collecitve leadership" on an issue at a given moment have been 
authoritatively transmitted through the Presidia to the local government 
organs. On the face of it, the latter appeared to have accepted the 
demands of the Presidia. If, on the other hand, it were not practicable 
to implement these demands, they would then consult and even lodge 
their complaints with their local political leaders, namely first 
secretaries of regional Party committees. We should recall here that 
almost all first secretaries of regional Party committees in the 
USSR are now represented in the federal Standing Commissions. One
should also recall that one of the supervisory operations of the 
Standing Commissions is to reappraise on-going co-ordination programmes 
in the light of their consequences and to adjust the existing policies 
incrementally. Therefore, the first secretary of a regional Party 
committee may further his own individual expectations at sittings of 
the Standing Commissions. A first secretary wil do so at first at 
sub-commission level, by making use of his own information and by
deploying his own professional expertise and operational control of 
the body, i.e. as head of a sub-commission. At the meetings of the 
Commission, he may attempt to effect the convergence of the expectations 
of others, by allying himself with similar expectations of the members 
of Groups (b), (c) and (d). On the other hand, there is a danger of 
his expectations being neutralized by the intervention of higher 
Party officials. Nevertheless, after the interactions between
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participants at the different levels in the Commissions, the latter 
adopts the recommendations which are to be directed at the relevant 
government bodies. In the process of the policy-adjustment by the 
latter, the recommendations of the Commission may be examined as a 
source of material to which they are morally obliged to refer. The 
revised policy which was drafted by the government bodies and approved 
by the "collective leadership" may again be transmitted as the demand 
of the latter at a given moment to the local government bodies through 
the Presidia. Thus, the process may be called a circular process of 
articulation operating in the Supreme Soviet organs. The articulating 
activities which we have observed in the communication process lends 
support to this process (see,e.g. p.308, p.315 and p.317).
However, this process is a part of extensive processes of articulation of 
conflicting individual demands and/or conflicting tendencies operating 
in the Soviet political system. On the other hand, it was obvious 
from our studies that conflicting individual demands and/or conflicting 
tendencies were not articulated (not publicly at any rate) in the 
Standing Commissions on foreign affairs. Articulation of conflicting 
individual demands and/or conflicting tendencies in the Supreme Soviet 
organs is confined to particular areas of state activity such as 
everyday services, public eating facilities, housing and school 
construction, public health, education, etc. Nevertheless, the 
circular articulating process is capable of throwing light on 
developments in the areas mentioned above, thus assisting the Soviet 
political system to adapt itself to the changing environment.
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CHART 2 . FORMAL AND ACTUAL FUNCTIONS OF THE SUPREME 
SOVIET ORGANS
Supreme Soviet organs 
(Presidium  & Standing Com m issions)
FORMAL FUNCTIONS
Organizational 
Pseudo -  executive 
Legislative 
Supervisory
ACTUAL FUNCTIONS
Communication
administ. M obilization
public
Legitimation ancT
Identification
Interest articulation
Political system
Executive and 
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To complete this Chapter, it remains to summarize the systemic 
relationships among the actual functions of the Supreme Soviet bodies 
and between these and their formal functions as presented in Chapter 
6 and 8. These latter we have classified as organizational, pseudo­
executive, legislative, and supervisory functions. These systemic 
relationships are plotted in Chart 2. As will be seen, we envisage 
the Supreme Soviet organs as a sub-system linking the political and 
social systems.'*' The Supreme Soviet organs communicate their messages 
through Supreme Soviet macro- and micro-communication nets to the 
masses as well as to the relevant executive and administrative bodies. 
For this purpose, the federal and republican Presidia organize and 
direct the activities of the Standing Commissions of the Supreme 
Soviets and also subordinate soviet organs - their "transmission belt". 
In this connection, particular importance attaches to the federal 
Presidium's organizational function, which is to keep the entire 
communication mechanism of the Supreme Soviets in control and operative. 
Having established a communication mechanism of their own, the Supreme 
Soviet organs may have thus become a more effective control-panel for 
the "transmission belt" than they used to be. The pseudo-executive 
function, as for instance in activities related to foreign affairs, is 
directed mainly towards legitimation of and identification with the 
regime. Such activities have always received greater publicity than 
other activities of the Supreme Soviet organs in Soviet mass media.
The performance of formal legislative and supervisory functions in 
policy areas other than international relations is also intended to 
contribute to legitimation and identification, but at the same time 
is aimed at motivating the public and the executive and administrative
1 See the distinction between these two systems in the Introduction.
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bodies (from central down to local level) to accept and to carry out 
the policies approved by the "collective leadership". In performing 
these formal functions, the Supreme Soviet organs furthermore serve 
as one of the mechanisms for tapping the opinions of the executive 
and administrative bodies at a given time and for a given issue.
Through the selective enforcement of rules and instructions by the 
Supreme Soviet organs, particularly by the federal and republican 
Presidia, the regime hopes to optimize results in certain sections 
of state activity. The Supreme Soviet organs, particularly the 
Standing Commissions, also serve as one of the arenas available for 
the articulation of interests on the social-welfare sections of the 
annual economic plan and budget. For the same and other areas 
(excluding defence, foreign affairs and heavy industry) of state 
activity, the federal and republican Supreme Soviet organs as a whole 
provide circular two-way transactions for the articulation of particu­
laristic demands and individual attitudes and perhaps also the 
articulation of tendencies. This process might assist the Soviet 
political system in adapting itself to the changing social and 
economic environment. However, the chief participants in the 
processes of articulation are evidently the executive and administrative 
officials and specialists rather than special groups in the public at 
large.
The performance of these actual functions by the Supreme Soviet 
organs would appear to serve different interests, depending on the 
particular function involved. In some cases, it would appear to serve 
the interests of individual Soviet leaders (e.g. Podgorny and 
possibly Brezhnev); in some, central government, local executive and
administrative leaders; and finally the public at large.
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CHAPTER 10
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Institutionalization means the process by which normative 
relationships and action patterns are established. The actual 
functions that the Supreme Soviet organs performed are indicative 
of established patterns of behaviour as an institution. The 
sequence of structural changes (occuring mainly in the Standing 
Commissions) we have noted earlier are aimed at the more effective 
performance of the functions, and also the performance of some new 
functions. It would be expedient, first, to speculate on the 
causes for these structural changes. This inquiry might suggest to 
us various factors which have contributed to the institutional 
development of the Supreme Soviet organs. We shall then examine each 
of these factors in the second following section.
Section 1
Causes for the structural changes 
It should be recalled (see Section 2 of Chapter 4) in the period 
between 1957 and 1960 that eight republican Supreme Soviets adopted 
regulations on their Standing Commissions (in the case of the Latvian 
Supreme Soviet, this formed part of a regulation on the Supreme Soviet). 
During the same period, the republican Supreme Soviet began to hold 
sessions with relative frequency. Then, the federal and republican 
Supreme Soviets adopted new, or revised, or supplementary regulations 
on the Standing Commissions between 1966 and 1968. This was 
followed by the adoption of regulations on the Supreme Soviets 
by the Lithuanian and Uzbek Supreme Soviets in 1969 and 
1970 respectively.^ Apart from the introduction of the first
These have not been examined here in any detail, since such 
regulations have so far been enacted in three republics only (the other 
was Latvia as noted earlier) and it cannot be assumed, therefore, that 
they represent a further general stage of institutionalization.
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"wave" o f  r e g u l a t i o n s ,  t h e r e  was a c o n s i d e r a b l e  i n c r e a s e  i n  th e  number 
o f  S t a n d in g  Com m issions a t  r e p u b l i c  l e v e l  from  t h e  f o u r t h  t o  t h e  f i f t h  
c o n v o c a t io n  (1 9 5 5 -5 9 ) .  A s i m i l a r  s h a r p  i n c r e a s e  was r e c o r d e d  i n  t h e  
f e d e r a l  Supreme S o v i e t  from  t h e  s i x t h  t o  t h e  s e v e n t h  c o n v o c a t io n  (1962- 
6 6 ) .  The p r o l i f e r a t i o n  o f  S t a n d in g  Com m issions i m p l i e s  g ro w in g  t a s k s  
m ounted  on th e  Supreme S o v i e t s  w h ich  c o n s e q u e n t ly  c a l l e d  f o r  r e g u l a t i v e  
i n s t r u m e n t s  t o  make r a t i o n a l  and  h a rm o n io u s  u s e  o f  t h e  new ly  c r e a t e d  
S t a n d in g  C om m issions ( s e e  K i s l i t s y n ,  1968, p . 9 2 ) .  (A s i m i l a r  e x p la n a ­
t i o n  may be  a p p l i e d  t o  t h e  a d o p t i o n  o f  t h e  r e g u l a t i o n s  on th e  Supreme 
S o v i e t s ) .  T h u s ,  t h e r e  i s  an  e v i d e n t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e tw e e n  s t r u c t u r a l  
ch an g es  and p r o l i f e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  S t a n d in g  Com m issions on t h e  one hand  
and  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  waves o f  r e g u l a t i o n s  and  t h e i r  p r o v i s i o n s  on th e  
o t h e r .
I t  s h o u ld  a l s o  be  rem embered t h a t  t h e  f i r s t  wave o f  r e g u l a t i o n s  
was c o n f i n e d  t o  t h e  r e p u b l i c s .  One c o u ld  t h u s  h y p o t h e s i z e  t h a t  t h e  
f i r s t  " p h a s e "  r e p r e s e n t e d  a c o n t r o l l e d  e x p e r im e n t  i n  a  number o f  
r e p u b l i c s ,  on t h e  b a s i s  o f  w h ich  th e  se c o n d  " p h a s e "  i n n o v a t i o n s  w ere  
i n t r o d u c e d ,  t h a t  i s  t h e  e i g h t  r e p u b l i c s  w ere  c a r e f u l l y  s e l e c t e d  b e ­
tw een  1957 and  1960 f o r  e x p e r i m e n t in g  and  t e s t i n g  d i f f e r e n t  t y p e s  o f  
r e g u l a t i o n s ,  b e f o r e  t h e  f e d e r a l  Supreme S o v i e t  a d o p te d  i t s  own i n  
1967. T h is  e x p l a n a t i o n  a c q u i r e s  p l a u s i b i l i t y  when one  c o n s i d e r s  th e  
g e o g r a p h i c a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  t h o s e  r e p u b l i c s  — two ( B e l o r u s s i a  and 
M oldav ia)  from  E a s t  c e n t r a l  E u ro p e ,  two ( E s to n i a  and  L a t v ia )  from th e  
B a l t i c  r e p u b l i c s ,  two (G e o rg ia  and A z e rb a id z h a n )  from t h e  T r a n s c a u c a s i a n  
r e p u b l i c s ,  and  two (U z b e k is ta n  and K i r g i z i a )  from t h e  c e n t r a l  A s ia n  
r e p u b l i c s .  I f  one c o n s i d e r s ,  on t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  t h e  v a r i e d  s i z e s  o f  
p o p u l a t i o n  and  p a t t e r n s  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  d i v i s i o n s ,  t h e  s e l e c t i o n  o f  
r e p u b l i c s  a p p e a r s  t o  be  e q u a l l y  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e .  I f , i n d e e d ,  t h e s e  
r e p u b l i c s  w ere  s e l e c t e d  f o r  e x p e r im e n t ,  t h i s  w ou ld  n o t  b e  w i t h o u t  p r e -
337
c e d e n t .  O th e r  c a s e s  a r e  on r e c o r d  w here  new ly i n t r o d u c e d  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  
a r r a n g e m e n ts  h av e  b e e n  t r i e d  o u t  f i r s t  a t  t h e  l o c a l  l e v e l  p r i o r  t o  
t h e i r  a d o p t io n  on a n a t io n w id e  s c a l e .  F o r  i n s t a n c e ,  on 13 December 1960, 
t h e  CPSU C e n t r a l  Com m ittee p a s s e d  a r e s o l u t i o n  t o  s e t u p  P a r ty  
d i s c i p l i n a r y  t r i b u n a l s  a s  am e x p e r im e n t  i n  Moscow and L e n in g ra d  C i t i e s  
and  Moscow R eg io n ,  b e f o r e  i t  was i n t r o d u c e d  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  USSR.'*'
However, t h e r e  i s  no d i r e c t  e v id e n c e  t h a t  d e l i b e r a t e  e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n  
was i n v o lv e d  i n  t h e  c a s e  b e f o r e  u s .
2
The d e v e lo p m en t  may h av e  a l s o  s p i l l e d  o v e r  from  lo w e r  s o v i e t s  
t o  t h e  h i g h e r  r e p u b l i c a n  and t h e n  f e d e r a l  Supreme S o v i e t .  I t  i s ,  u n f o r t u ­
n a t e l y ,  i m p o s s ib l e  on t h e  e x i s t i n g  e v id e n c e  t o  e s t a b l i s h  w i th  c o n f id e n c e  
t h a t  t h e  two s e q u e n c e s  w ere  c a u s a l l y  r e l a t e d ,  w h e th e r  w i t h  t h e  i n t e n t i o n  o f  
e x p e r im e n t ,  o r  a s  t h e  i n t e n d e d  o r  u n i n t e n d e d  r e s u l t  o f  a  d e v e lo p m e n ta l  
p r o c e s s  from  t h e  " f i r s t  p h a s e "  t o  t h e  " s e c o n d  p h a s e " .  I t  w i l l  b e  s a f e  
t o  assum e, h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  f i n a l  d e c i s i o n s  on d e v e lo p m e n ts  o f  t h i s  k in d  
s t i l l  r em a in  i n  t h e  h a n d s  o f  t h e  t o p  p o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r s ,  t h a t  i s ,  t h e  
l a t t e r  a r e  c a p a b le  o f ,  i f  t h e y  w i s h ,  s t o p p i n g  a  s p o n ta n e o u s  n a t u r a l  
d e v e lo p m e n ta l  p r o c e s s  a t  any t im e ,  o r ,  f o r  t h a t  m a t t e r ,  p ro m o t in g  t h e  
p r o c e s s .  I t  w ou ld  b e  e x p e d i e n t ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t o  d e s c r i b e  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s  i n  w h ich  t h e s e  d e v e lo p m e n ts  to o k  p l a c e  and w h ich  may be  
c o n n e c te d  i n  v a r i o u s  w ays .
See  S p ra v o c h n ik  P a r t i n o g o  R a b o t n ik a , Vypusk 4 ,  Moscow, 1964, p .  470. 
T h e re  have  b e e n  num erous o t h e r  su ch  e x p e r im e n t s  c a r r i e d  o u t .  A r e l e ­
v a n t  exam ple  i s  t h e  R e g u la t i o n  on t h e  Com m ittee  f o r  O r g a n iz in g  t h e  Work 
o f  D e p u t ie s  d r a f t e d  i n  I r k u t s k  i n  1962, w h ich  was i n t r o d u c e d  by way o f  
e x p e r im e n t  i n  t h e  O k ty a b r '  C i ty  D i s t r i c t  E x e c u t i v e  Com m ittee  and  o n ly  
l a t e r  i n  t h e  I r k u t s k  C i ty  S o v i e t .  The e x p e r im e n t  l a s t e d  more t h a n  two 
y e a r s .  I n  1962 s i m i l a r  c o m m it tee s  w ere  fo rm ed  i n  a l l  t h e  S o v i e t s  i n  t h e  
c i t y  o f  I r k u t s k  ( s e e  G r i t s e n k o ,  1 9 6 5 ) .
2
A c c o rd in g  t o  t h e  i n t e g r a t i o n - f u n c t i o n a l i s t s ,  " s p i l l - o v e r "  r e f e r s  to  
a  s i t u a t i o n  i n  w h ich  a g iv e n  a c t i o n ,  r e l a t e d  t o  s p e c i f i c  g o a l ,  c r e a t e s  
a  s i t u a t i o n  i n  w h ich  t h e  o r i g i n a l  g o a l  can be  a s s u r e d  o n ly  by t a k i n g  
f u r t h e r  a c t i o n s ,  w h ich  i n  t u r n  c r e a t e  a  f u r t h e r  c o n d i t i o n  and a n e e d  f o r  
more a c t i o n ,  and so  f o r t h  ( s e e  e . g .  H aas ,  1958 , p .  1 6 ) .
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In 1957 while his political future was still at stake, Khrushchev 
launched a major reform of the economic administration. Many Western 
observers have seen this as one aspect of decentralization and the 
attendant out-manoeuvering of ministerial power, an attempt to gain 
support from republican and regional Party leaders in the political 
struggle between Khrushchev and the so-called "anti-Party group" 
within the leadership. It should be noted, however, that the 1957 
reform was only the culmination of moves towards decentralization 
fostered by Khrushchev since 1953. During the years between 1953 and 
1957, decentralization went through a series of stages.''“
At a plenary session of the Central Committee in February 1957, 
Khrushchev denounced vigorously the ministerial system as the source 
of delay in decision-making and communication between the enterprises 
and the central ministries in Moscow (see P_. , 30.3.57). The resolution 
adopted by the federal Supreme Soviet in May 1957 abolished the State 
Economic Commission (which had been created in 1955 and invested with 
vast co-ordinating powers in December 1956), while Gosplan was re­
assigned responsibility for both long-term and current planning, but 
was stripped of all executive power. The great majority of the indust­
rial ministries was abolished in Moscow as well as in the republican 
capitals. At the same time, in each of 105 economic regions in the 
USSR, a regional economic council (sovnarkhoz) was instituted to act 
as the planning and operational authority for nearly all industrial 
and construction enterprises situated within its borders. Most
In September 1953, the Agricultural Departments in the raion soviets 
were abolished. This resulted in the weakening of the links between 
central and republican governments and kolkhozes, but was balanced by 
the stationing of groups of Party officials in the Machine Tractor 
Stations to supervise the farms in the M.T.S. zone. In 1954-5 some 11,000 
industrial enterprises were transferred from federal to republican 
jurisdiction. In May 1955, jurisdiction over a large number of decisions
cont.
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sovnarkhozes corresponded in area to existing oblasts,
krais, and smaller republics. Although the republican govern­
ments and Party organs remained subject to control from the centre, 
they obtained full jurisdiction within the line of command, 
making the regions subordinate in the first instance to the rep­
ublican capitals. In effect, the 1957 reorganization seems to have 
heightened particularly the co-ordinating role of regional and
republican Party secretaries who were called upon to supervise 
directly the activities of the sovnarkhozes.
Khrushchev1s alleged memoir, Khrushchev Remembers, gives 
the impression that he had some deep anti-autocratic sentiments.
The reminiscences quote his conviction that political power will 
always become dangerous unless it is checked continuously by 
public control. He appears to have tried, in a positive way, to 
set up "public bodies" to help to administer lav; and keep order.
He may thus have attempted to break av/ay from bureaucratic mechanisms 
as a means of social control and to experiment with group self­
regulation. It may be worth quoting Khrushchev1s speeches at 
the 21st and 22nd Party Congresses which reflect the official
1 cont
relating to planning and finance, previously vested in 
various central government agencies, was devolved on the republic 
government. In May 1956, industrial enterprises administered by 
twelve central government ministries were transferred to the full 
operative control of republican agencies (see Miller and Rigby, 
1965, pp.32-36).
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policy of the Party:
At the 21st Congress,
for the soviets to perform their role more successfully, 
they must resolutely uproot the elements of red tape and 
bureaucracy and show even more concern for satisfying the 
increasing demands of the people.
(P., 28.1.59)
At the 22nd Congress,
the powers of the soviets will be broadening and the soviets 
will be to an even greater extent ... a genuine people's 
regime, "working corporations" engaged in the practical 
work of directing economic and social processes. Many of 
the questions that today fall within the competence of 
executive agencies of authority and administration will 
be handled by the soviets and their committees.
(P., 19.10.61)
Soon after the large-scale economic reorganization was enacted 
in 1957, the Economic Commission of the Soviet of Nationalities (the 
federal Supreme Soviet), with two members from each republic, was 
formed to help co-ordinate the economic requirements of the republics. 
During the same period, as we have observed, the number of Standing 
Commissions doubled in all republican Supreme Soviets. These 
Commissions were introduced to exercise closer control over industry, 
agriculture, communal economy, construction, trade, health, education 
and social security. A. Zlenko, then secretary of the Presidium of 
Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, noted that the introduction of the new
Standing Commissions was the direct result of the decentralization of
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central authority to the republics (see Zlenko, I960, p. 14). Many 
of the Commissions were formed in line with tine existing republican 
ministries and departments. As the republican governmental bodies 
were re-formed, appropriate new Commissions were established and 
some old Commissions were renamed or dissolved (see Krivenko, 1970a, 
p. 35). The actual range of branch Commissions formed also took into 
account the distinct fields of each republican economy (see 
Kuznetsov, 1964, p. 40) .
The structural changes which occurred first at the republic level 
may have been designed to help meet requirements imposed by the 
political and socio-economic environment in these periods. One would 
be inclined to think particularly that the development of Supreme Soviet 
bodies in this period is a by-product of Khrushchev's early decentral­
ising measures (which date between 1953 and 1958 roughly) and a result 
of Khrushchev's deliberate fostering of extra-bureaucratic participation 
in administration. It is nevertheless a formidable task to assess 
exactly to what extent the changes in the republican Supreme Soviets 
were part of a programme to implement Khrushchevian notions of democracy 
and/or to assist Party control at republic level over the newly set-up 
administrative agencies and/or to serve as an instrument to mobilize 
the broa.d masses for the successful fulfillment of the seven-year plan, 
(which was launched at the "extraordinary" 21st Party Congress in 
February 1959). One might argue, on the other hand, that these changes 
were undertaken on the initiative of the republic leaders themselves. They 
may have not only exploitedthe favourable climate created by Khrushchev's 
initiative and attitudes but also themselves deliberately set out to 
create suitable climates. Reinforcement of republican Supreme Soviets 
may have been one of their own deliberate actions. We should remind
342
ourselves that it was the republican Presidia which initiated and 
drafted the regulations on the Standing Commissions, while their 
chairmen were full members of the respective Presidia of the Party 
Central Committees of their republics. A possibly related fact is that the 
republics were given, as we noted before, a high level of control over 
their sovnarkhozes. According to Alec Nove, this was largely the 
result of counter-pressure by republican leaders against Khrushchev’s 
original proposal which implied a bypassing arrangement giving Moscow 
direct access to regions over the heads of the republics. Subsequently, 
some republican leaders were accused of indulging in localism (mestnich- 
estvo) presumably as the result of efforts to defend the national 
interests of their localities (see Nove, 1962). But here one can do no 
more than speculate on how far the changes in the republican Supreme 
Soviets were motivated by the local leaders.
Finally, let us turn to the environment of the second sequence 
of changes in the federal and republican Supreme Soviets. Here there 
is a somewhat different picture of the climates under which these 
changes took place. The new leadership, after the removal of Khrushchev, 
has carried out various measures involving the recentralisation of 
administrative and supervisory functions (since 1965). Essentially 
the reform was intended to recentralise the agricultural and industrial 
administrations and to resolve the administrative anomalies bequeathed 
by Khrushchev. As part of these changes, in 1965 the old ministerial 
structure was restored in the central government. The consequent 
expansion of economic administration by the central government would 
have carried obvious implications for the federal Supreme Soviets, in view 
of its formal supervising responsibilities over the activity of the central 
government. Compared with the republican Supreme Soviets, however, 
the machinery of the federal Supreme Soviet was far more limited, 
and it could not have met these additional requirements without over-
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hauling its own structure. The new Party leader, L.I. Brezhnev, 
included the following passage in his report to the 23rd Party Congress 
in March 1966.
the federal Supreme Soviet and the republican Supreme Soviets 
are called upon to intensify work on developing Soviet legis­
lation and on verification of the execution of laws and to 
submit for the consideration of their sessions a broader 
range of questions of economic, socio-cultural and state 
construction. The work of deputies to the federal Supreme 
Soviet and the republic Supreme Soviets must become more 
active. The formation of new Standing Commissions of the 
Chambers of the federal Supreme Soviet might possibly 
contribute to this.
(P., 29.3.66).
Thus, one of the responses to meet the demands created by the 
reactivisation of the central government took the form of establishing 
new Standing Commission in 1966 in addition to the already existing 
Commissions .1
If our supposition is correct, namely, that a concern to exercise 
control and supervision over the powerfully reinforced central govern­
ment machine has prompted these changes, one must ask why this concern 
has found this particular expression.
In attempting to answer this question, it is expedient to look at 
recent developments in the power structure of the Soviet leadership. We 
have already noted T.H. Rigby's countervailing power model between an 
inner group of leaders. In this context, interest attaches to the role 
of Podgorny as initiator of moves to strengthen the Standing Commissions.
 ^ It should be noted that some Soviet scholars such as A.Ye. Lunev propose« 
as early as in 1962, to add new branch Commissions in the federal Supreme 
Soviet as a way to expand the scope of democratic principle. (See Lunev,196^
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Podgorny  s a i d  i n  h i s  s p e e c h  a t  t h e  f i r s t  s e s s i o n  o f  t h e  s e v e n th  
c o n v o c a t io n  o f  t h e  f e d e r a l  Supreme S o v i e t  h e l d  i n  A u g u s t  1966,, t h a t :  
t h e  e x i s t i n g  S t a n d in g  C om m issions o f  t h e  Chambers w ere  
n o t  a lw ays  i n  a p o s i t i o n  t o  d e a l  c o n c r e t e l y  and  i n  d e p th  
w i t h  q u e s t i o n s  p e r t a i n i n g  t o  t h e  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  a g iv e n  
b r a n c h  o f  t h e  economy o r  s o c i o - c u l t u r a l  work . . .  The 
f o r m a t i o n  o f  new S t a n d in g  Com m issions i n  t h e  Cham bers , 
as  w e l l  as  e n la r g e m e n t  o f  t h e i r  m em bersh ip  w i l l  make i t  
p o s s i b l e  t o  im prove  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  t h e  e x a m in a t io n  on t h e s e  
q u e s t i o n s .  . . .  an  even  more f a v o u r a b l e  c o n d i t i o n  w i l l  
b e  t h e  a d o p t i o n  o f  a u n i f o r m  l e g i s l a t i v e  a c t  t h a t  w i l l  
d e f i n e  t h e  t a s k s  and o p e r a t i o n a l  p r o c e d u r e  o f  t h e  S t a n d in g  
C om m iss ions . I t  w i l l  b e  n e c e s s a r y ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  i n  t h e  
im m ed ia te  f u t u r e ,  t o  d e v e lo p ,  w i t h  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  
e x p e r i e n c e  a c c u m u la te d ,  r e g u l a t i o n s  on t h e  S t a n d in g  Comm­
i s s i o n s  o f  t h e  Cham bers. . . .  t h e  p r e p a r a t i o n  o f  a  d r a f t  
f o r  su c h  a  docum ent m ig h t  b e  a s s i g n e d  t o  t h e  P r e s id iu m  
o f  t h e  Supreme S o v i e t  . . .
( I z v . , 3 . 8 . 6 6 ) .
The r e g u l a t i o n  was d r a f t e d  by t h e  P r e s id iu m  i n  c o l l a b o r a t i o n  w i th  
t h e  Com m issions f o r  L e g i s l a t i v e  P r o p o s a l s  o f  b o t h  Cham bers, and w i th  
c o n s i d e r a b l e  s p e e d  was a p p ro v e d  a t  t h e  t h i r d  s e s s i o n  o f  t h e  s e v e n th  
c o n v o c a t io n  i n  O c to b e r  1967.
One can o n ly  s p e c u l a t e  as  t o  how f a r  p r e s s u r e  from  su c h  g ro u p s  as 
t h e  j u r i s t s ,  o r  P a r t y  and  g o v e rn m e n t  o f f i c i a l s  b e lo w  t h e  t o p  l e a d e r s h i p  
l e v e l  h a s  e x e r c i s e d  i n f l u e n c e  i n  t h e  f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  p o l i c y  i n  t h i s  
a r e a .  S p e a k in g  o f  t h e  f e d e r a l  r e g u l a t i o n  a d o p te d  i n  O c to b e r  1967, M.S. 
S o lo m e n ts e v ,  c h a irm a n  o f  t h e  L e g i s l a t i v e  P r o p o s a l s  Commission o f  t h e
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Soviet of the Union, stated that "the Party, soviet and scientific 
officials and specialists have participated in the preparation of the 
draft regulation. They have made use of the experience of the 
Standing Commissions of the USSR Central Executive Committee and the 
Commissions of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities, 
as well as the practice of the Central Executive Committee f Chambers 
and Presidium, in organizing the work of the Standing Commissions. In 
the course of preparation of the draft, careful study was made both 
of the rich work experience of the republican Supreme Soviets' Standing 
Commissions and of the legislation on Standing Commissions of the 
supreme bodies of authority in the fraternal socialist states" (Izv., 
13.10.67).
The second echelon of Party and government officials such as 
the first secretaries of the regional Party committees and the ministers 
of the republican government may have given support for changing the 
Supreme Soviet structure on the basis of attitudes derived from their 
own past experience in the Supreme Soviet bodies. It is thus possible 
that the reasons for their support were quite different from those 
of the top Soviet leadership. The experts such as jurists probably had 
little influence on the leadership decision no undertake the structural 
changes, but their influence in the post-policy formation stage, when 
details and forms of the regulations were being settled, is more 
apparent. As noted earlier, groups of jurists took different stands 
in their interpretation of institutional questions such as the legal
status of the Presidium in relation to the Supreme Soviet, and of the
Standing Commissions in relation to the Presidium. Upon this evidence,
it seems clear that the new federal and republican regulations were not
drafted instantly by a simple directive from the top leadership. One
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may assum e, t h e r e f o r e ,  t h a t  t h e  d r a f t i n g  o f  t h e  r e g u l a t i o n s  i n v o lv e d
a p r o c e s s  i n  w h ic h  t h e  j u r i s t s  i n v o l v e d  h a d  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  o f
a r t i c u l a t i n g  o p i n i o n s  b a s e d  on s u c h  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  as  t h e  e x p e r i e n c e
o f  t h e  r e p u b l i c a n  Supreme S o v i e t s 1 23 and t h e  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  t h e  E a s t
2E uropean  P e o p l e ' s  A s s e m b l i e s .  " An i m p o r t a n t  s o u r c e  o f  p r e s s u r e  on
t h e  S o v i e t  l e a d e r s h i p  i n  t h e  p o s t - K h r u s h c h e v  p e r i o d  h a s  o f  c o u r s e
3
b e e n  t h e  " d e m o c r a t i c  m ovem ent" , w i t h  i t s  r e p e r t o i r e  o f  l e g a l ,  q u a s i -  
l e g a l  and i l l e g a l  c r i t i c i s m  and  p r o t e s t .  I f ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h e  e x p a n s io n  
o f  S t a n d in g  Com m ission a c t i v i t i e s  i s  i n t e n d e d  i n  any d e g re e  t o  u n d e r c u t  
t h i s  o p p o s i t i o n ,  i t  i s  d o u b t f u l  i f  t h e  e v id e n c e  w i l l  e v e r  be  f o r th c o m in g .
T hus ,  i f  t h e  e a r l i e r  r e g u l a t i o n s  on t h e  r e p u b l i c a n  S t a n d in g  Com m issions 
w ere  n o t  t h e  k i n d  o f  e x p e r im e n t  c a r r i e d  o u t  c o n s c i o u s l y  by  th e  S o v i e t  
l e a d e r s ,  t h e  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  t h e  o l d  r e p u b l i c a n  r e g u l a t i o n s  h av e  a t  l e a s t  
b e e n  made u se  o f  by t h e  S o v i e t  j u r i s t s  as  a r a n g e  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e  
p a t t e r n s .
2
N o ta b ly ,  A.Kh. Makhnenko s t u d i e d  t h e  s y s te m  o f  t h e  S t a n d in g  Com m issions 
o f  t h e  P o l i s h  Assem bly -  S e jm . See  h i s  p u b l i c a t i o n s  o f  1S63 and  1971.
I .K .  K u z n e tso v  made u s e  i n  h i s  p u b l i c a t i o n  i n  1969 o f  t h e  e x p e r i e n c e  
o f  t h e  German D e m o c ra t ic  R e p u b l ic  and  C z e c h o s lo v a k ia n  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  
s y s te m .  T hen , F . K a l in y c h e v  and A. L u k 'y a n o v  r e f e r r e d  t o  th e  e x p e r i e n c e s  
o f  H u n g a r ia n  and Rumanian A s s e m b l ie s  i n  t h e i r  j o i n t  p u b l i c a t i o n  i n  1966.
3
One o f  Novy M i r ' s  p e r e n n i a l  cam pa igns  f o r  t h e  d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n  o f  
S o v i e t  s o c i e t y  may be  s e e n  i n  a  r e v ie w  a r t i c l e  by  A. S a v in  ( se e  No. 5, 
1 9 6 9 ) .  In  h i s  a r t i c l e ,  S a v in  p r o p o s e d ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  a c h o ic e  o f  
c a n d i d a t e s  a t  e l e c t i o n s  t o  t h e  Supreme S o v i e t .  He c i t e d  " s o c i a l i s t "  
Hungary as t h e  m odel ,  b e c a u s e  s i n c e  1966 i t  h a s  b e e n  p o s s i b l e  t h e r e  t o  
h a v e  two o r  more c a n d i d a t e s  i n  e l e c t i o n s  t o  t h e  l o c a l  gov e rn m en t  
c o u n c i l s  and  t o  t h e  S t a t e  A ssem bly . S a v in  c o n c lu d e d  h i s  a d v ic e  on how 
t o  d e m o c r a t i z e  t h e  e l e c t o r a l  p r o c e d u r e  by s a y i n g  t h a t  " a  s i m i l a r  sy s te m  
o p e r a t e s  i n  some o f  t h e  o t h e r  s o c i a l i s t  c o u n t r i e s " ,  w i t h o u t  s p e c i f i c a l l y  
naming th e  Y u g o s la v  m odel w h ich  h a d  made a much g r e a t e r  s u c c e s s  o f  t h e  
c h o ic e  o f  c a n d i d a t e s  t h a n  H ungary .
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Section 2
Factors contributing to the institutional development
The inquiry into the structural changes has indicated to us 
that any structural changes within a heavily circumscribed political 
system such as the Soviet Union are likely to be closely interrelated 
to changes in other areas, particularly in policy issues and/or the 
power structure in the leadership.
We shall examine below each of the closely interrelated factors 
which have contributed to the institutional development.
1. Doctrine
We have observed in the previous section that, while different 
motives related to contemporary political developments were operative 
in the two "phases" of structural changes, the same "doctrine" 
served as a justifying instrument for the actions taken by the 
Soviet leaders leading to the reactivisation of the Supreme Soviet 
organs. Not only the symbolic expression of the doctrine, but also 
the expression of the two principles underlying the doctrine were 
well reflected in the structure and process of the Supreme Soviet organs
Democratic principle. We have established in our Introduction 
that the Supreme Soviet organs claim to be democratic and outlined 
how they understand "socialist democracy". It can be said that the 
Supreme Soviet organs provide vehicles for the democratic principle 
thus understood at two levels.
At one level, the Supreme Soviet organs encourage mass par­
ticipation in allegedly government and public affairs by supervising 
the implementation of socialist legality, mass-organizational work,
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public debate on new legislation, and the work of local soviets.
We have already expressed the view that the activities of the Supreme 
Soviet organs under the banner of socialist democracy were largely 
meant for public mobilization, i.e. to coordinate the activities 
of other supervisory agencies and to mobilize the masses behind 
the activities of the regime.
At another level, the Supreme Soviet organs have been involved 
in the democratic norm-setting process. For instance, they seem to 
have taken a direct part in the work of defining the rights and 
duties of local soviets, the status of deputies in the USSR, and 
regulations of federal and republican Standing Commissions. All these 
enactments contain some provisions incorporating the democratic 
principle. So far as the internal arrangements of the Supreme Soviet 
organs are concerned, these are all defined in democratic forms, and 
these forms clearly set some constraints to the mode of operation of 
these bodies, even if these constraints vary greatly in their impact. 
For instance, while it is plausible that the Standing Commissions 
actually hold meetings with the presence of a simple majority and 
adopt resolutions by a simple majority of members present at the 
meetings, (though such provisions may in fact be applied with less 
rigour: the Commissions may contact members of higher status by
telephone and adopt decisions by way of forming consensus rather 
than cut-and-thrust voting (see p. 319 )), literal conformity to 
provisions such as that the chairmen, deputy chairmen and members of 
the Standing Commissions are appointed by the Chamber of the Supreme 
Soviet is quite inconceivable in terms of the number of deputies to 
be appointed for these posts (e.g. 912 Standing Commission members
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at the 8th convocation) at the Supreme Soviet session which last 
merely two to four days. The nomination procedure for each of these 
candidates itself would require a long session. And these have 
never been reported in the press. The above illustration, therefore, 
casts doubt over the actual application of the democratic principle. 
Despite our reservation as to its actual application, the democratic 
principle which has been ensured at two levels, is a necessary 
instrument in the process of institutionalization. Without it, the 
Supreme Soviet organs can neither justify their operations nor 
maintain a certain degree of support for their activities from within 
and without the Soviet political system.
Representative principle. In the Introduction we have discussed 
the Soviet notion of representation in comparison with its Western 
equivalent. We shall briefly outline below the actual practice of 
representation in the Supreme Soviet organs based on our findings.
The soviet concept of representation based on the doctrine, i.e. 
the representatives of the soviets are drawn from all sections of 
society appears to be in practice implemented at the local level as 
well as in the Supreme Soviets.'*’ We have also observed that the 
membership of the Supreme Soviet organs have "roots" in the masses.
On the surface, this fact thus supports the Soviet claim that the
Cf. Sostav deputatov Verkhovnykh Sovetov soyuznykh, avtonomykh 
respublic i mestnykh sovetov deputatov trudyashchikhsya 1959g., Moscow; 
Itogi vyborov i sostav deputatov mestnykh Sovetov deputatov 
trudyashchikhsya 1961g, 1967g and 1969g, Moscow; Itogi vyborov i 
sostav deputatov Verkhovnykh Sovetov soyuznykh avtonomykh respublik i 
mestnykh Sovetov deputatov trudyashchikhsya 1963g., Moscow; Sostav 
deputatov mestnykh Sovetov deputatov trudyashchikhsya, isbrannykh v 
1965g., Moscow; and Verkhovnyi Sovet SSSR, Vos'moi sozyv 
(statisticheskii sbornik), Moscow, 1970.
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s o v i e t s  a r e  t h e  em bodim ent o f  t h e  m a s s e s ,  a l t h o u g h  t h i s  does  n o t  
n e c e s s a r i l y  s u p p o r t  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  a  "w o rk in g "  i n s t i t u t i o n .  The 
Supreme S o v i e t  o r g a n s  do f o s t e r  " s o c i a l i s t  d e m o c rac y " ,  a s  we h av e  
n o t e d  e a r l i e r ,  a t  d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s .  We h a v e  a d d u ced  e v id e n c e  f o r  
t h e  fo rm a t io n  o f  c l o s e r  t i e s  b e tw e e n  th e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  b o d i e s  and 
t h e  m asse s  t h r o u g h  th e  o p e r a t i o n s  o f  t h e  Supreme S o v i e t  o r g a n s ,  e . g .  
l o c a l  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s ,  o n - t h e - s p o t  m e e t in g s ,  im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  t h e  
n a k a z y  and  p r o p o s a l s  o f  t h e  e l e c t o r a t e s ,  an d  p u b l i c  d e b a t e s .
I t  s h o u ld  be s a i d ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  t h e  r e a l i t y  o f  t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  
t u r n s  o u t  a t  c l o s e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  t o  be  more com plex  and  ion t i d y ,  
d i c t a t i n g  a v a r i e t y  o f  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  t o  make s e n s e  o f  i t .  T h ro u g h o u t  
t h e  t h e s i s ,  we h a v e  exam ined  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  i n  t h e  Supreme S o v i e t  
o r g a n s  by r e f e r r i n g  n o t  t o  t h e  fo rm a l  e l e c t o r a l  a r r a n g e m e n ts  by w hich 
t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  i s  e l e c t e d ,  b u t  by r e f e r r i n g  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t o  
w h ich  th e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  r e f l e c t  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  t h o s e  whom 
t h e y  d e s c r i p t i v e l y  r e p r e s e n t ,  su c h  a s  g e n e r a t i o n ,  e d u c a t i o n ,  
n a t i o n a l i t y ,  i n s t i t u t i o n ,  o c c u p a t i o n a l  p o s i t i o n  r e f l e c t i n g  g e o g r a p h i c a l  
l o c a t i o n ,  c a r e e r  b a c k g ro u n d ,  e t c .  T h i s  a p p ro a c h  h a d  b o th  a d v a n ta g e s  
and  d i s a d v a n t a g e s .  One o f  t h e  a d v a n ta g e s  was t h a t  i t  h a s  p r e s e n t e d  
us  w i t h  i n t e r e s t i n g  i n s i g h t s  i n t o  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  
t h e  Supreme S o v i e t  o r g a n s  (which w i l l  be  d e s c r i b e d  l a t e r )  an d  th u s  
h e l p e d  us t o  a n a ly s e  t h e  a c t u a l  f u n c t i o n s  o f  t h e  Supreme S o v i e t  o r g a n s .  
We have  a l s o  o b s e r v e d  c h a n g e s  and  c o n t i n u i t y  i n  t h e  v a r i o u s  a s p e c t s  
o f  m em bersh ip . On t h e  d i s a d v a n t a g e  s i d e ,  t h i s  a p p ro a c h  s u g g e s t e d  
t h a t  t h e  d e s c r i p t i v e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  i n  t h e  Supreme S o v i e t  o rg a n s  
t a k e s  a  p l u r a l  and  m ixed  form . T h u s ,  t h e  p a t t e r n s  o f  i n t e r a c t i o n s  
b e tw e en  th e  r e p r e s e n t e d  g ro u p s  i n  t e rm s  o f  i n t e r e s t  w ere  e x t r e m e ly
d i f f i c u l t  t o  d i s c e r n .
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We will now attempt to answer ttie questions raised in the 
Introduction relating to the Soviet doctrine of the state.
Though insufficient, the data based on our approach indicated 
that the Supreme Soviet organs have not yet become "working" 
institutions. As we have noted above, the Soviet concept of rep­
resentation had an influence upon the composition of the Supreme 
Soviet organs. However, it was not adequate to explain the actual 
representation in these organs. Therefore, one needs to adduce the 
Soviet concept of representation in practice from our findings. Since 
we shall describe this tentatively in the following section (on the 
organizational structure), it suffices to point out here the major 
deviations from their alleged concept. First, the federal and 
republican Presidia are comprised of extremely select people (see 
Chapter 5). This is contrary to their claim that the Presidia, by 
their representative character, form a small replica of the Supreme 
Soviets (see Saifulin, 1967, p. 78). On the face of it at least, it 
is on the Standing Commissions which the alleged Soviet concept has 
exerted more influence than on the Presidia. This has been par­
ticularly noticeable since the seventh convocation (see Chapter 7, 
section 1). When we examined the composition of the Standing 
Commissions a little further, we have discovered that such professions 
as Party officials (notably obkom first secretary in the case of the 
federal Standing Commissions) had better proportional representation 
than the other professions (see p.232). The equal representational 
right to both sexes can hardly be justified by the fact that the 
women are in numerical terms dominated by men: the ratio being
usually two to eight in the federal Standing Commissions. It should
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It should also be mentioned of the fact that not a single woman is, 
at the moment, given the rank of obkom first secretary. It is the 
latter who have been playing, in recent convocations, a leading role 
in the federal Standing Commissions by heading, for instance, sub­
commissions of their respective Commissions. The second major de­
viation from the alleged concept is that there seems to have been 
established a division of functions among the representatives in 
the Standing Commissions. It is clear from our analysis that not 
every member of the Supreme Soviet organs is called upon to perform 
all the functions which the Supreme Soviet organs actually do.
True, the rank and file members of the organizations dominated in 
numerical terms the membership of the Standing Commissions. It is 
also true that they found their places in relevant Commissions: 
workers engaged in social services in the Commission for Social 
Services; students in the Commission for Youth Affairs; farm workers 
in the Commission for Agriculture and so on. Their presence in these 
Commissions however evidently meant for legitimation and public 
mobilization. It is equally doubtful as to their actual partici­
pation in the Commissions. V.P. Kazimirchuk and I.V. Pavlov's 
sociological case study on local soviet deputies reveals that 
members of social groups engaged in production work attend meetings 
less than those of non-production groups, owing to the character of 
their work: working alternate shifts, periods of rush and seasonal
work, unavailability of a replacement to do the deputy's regular job, 
etc. (see Kazimirchuk and Pavlov, 1971). One would expect in practice 
that the meetings of the Supreme Soviet organs would cause more in­
convenience in terms of distance for such members than the meetings 
of the local soviets, although the arrangements have now been made
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under the regulations of Supreme Soviet Standing Commissions to 
ensure their attendance. If this is the case, then the publicity 
given to their appointments as members of the Supreme Soviet 
organs may be aimed at legitimizing the representativeness of the Supreme 
Soviet organs (in order to make it more credible to a more sophis­
ticated and better educated public). The functions of administrative 
mobilization and interest articulation are likely to be performed by 
the representatives of the important sections of society, i.e. Party 
and government officials, managers of industrial firms, chairmen of 
kolkhozes and directors of sovkhozes, heads of academic and research 
institutions, heads of social and cultural organizations, etc. 
Nonetheless, the participation of various social groups, albeit 
restricted, in the Supreme Soviet organs would, theoretically speaking, 
help the examination, as Tikhomirov envisaged, of the social ramific­
ations and consequences of the solutions adopted by the government.
The forms of interaction we have observed earlier between and among the 
different groups of representatives, and their limited political 
consequences in certain areas of state activity and in the processes 
of actual functions, constitute the general elements of the represent­
ative principle of the Supreme Soviet organs. It thus indicated to 
us that, while it was obvious that the Supreme Soviet organs were 
not representative bodies in the Anglo-American sense, one could not 
assume a priori that they did not serve what one could legitimately 
call a representative role. By the same token, one could argue that 
the essence of much of what takes place in, say, the British Parliament 
that one would put under the rubric of "representation" can be equally 
understood in terms other than those related to the legislative pro­
cess, such as communication and mobilization.
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We have speculated earlier that the Soviet leaders are motivated 
to change the organizational structure of these organs by power 
consideration as well as policy issues (decentralization or re­
centralization of economic administration). At the same time, the 
Soviet leaders may have also been motivated by the functional use 
of these organs. The Supreme Soviet organs have actually performed 
the functions not only of legitimizing policy and mobilizing the 
public behind the regime, but also of what Tikhomirov called, guiding, 
co-ordinating and dovetailing all the ramified components of the 
administrative apparatus. If the Soviet leaders share Tikhomirov's 
view on this point of Soviet "doctrine", one could make the inter­
pretation that their action to reactivate the Supreme Soviet organs 
was derived partly from a doctrinal imperative. This will bring us 
to answer the third question as to whether these functions would lead 
to direct democracy.
Tikhomirov looks at the future positively by saying that:
As specialization proceeds, retention of the social 
division of labour in the realm of administration 
is not to be excluded even in the future. But it will 
naturally be based on new principles that reflect a
new stage in socio-economic development......
There is a new factor in the process of transition 
from organizational separation in the systems of state 
agencies: all state agencies are coming to resemble
each other more closely on the basis of the introduction 
of common democratic methods in their activity and the 
princii-)les of representative and direct democracy. As a 
consequence of the increasing interdependence of the
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various spheres of the life of society and the state, 
and the entirely natural processes of differentiation 
and concentration of various functions and phenomena, 
we see a closer functional resemblance between the 
various state agencies. Without losing their distinctive
characteristics, they are .... developing and improving
those ties and relationships that give the entire state 
apparatus the quality of a single, purposeful, operative 
mechanism. (See Tikhomirov, 1967, p. 22).
Thus Tikhomirov foresees the introduction of direct democracy 
as a necessary element in the developmental process of state agencies. 
The question whether the realization of direct democracy is a part 
of the social division of labour requires careful examination and 
can only be answered by empirical studies on this problem. "Doctrine" 
will be served as the ideal for the future development of the state.
It must be noted, however, that the doctrine could serve the Soviet 
leaders as a political instrument. They have indeed in the past 
readily sought justification for their action to reactivate the 
Supreme Soviet organs in the doctrine. Action based on the doctrine, 
whatever its real motives, could demonstrate to the masses that the 
leaders are doctrinally committed to the destined course.
2. Organizational structure
We have described various organizational aspects (which are 
listed in the Introduction) repeatedly throughout the thesis. We 
have also discussed the causes of the changes in the organizational 
structure, and noted its impact on the actual functions of the 
Supreme Soviet organs. To avoid repetition, we simply outline here 
the main characteristics of the organizational structure. And these
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characteristics carry, in our view, some implications for the 
institutional development of these organs.
(1) . The Supreme Soviet organs have established a hierarchical structure 
of their own, placing the federal Presidium at the top of the pyramid 
and the local soviets at the bottom. The communication networks have 
been built up within and around the hierarchically established Supreme 
Soviet organs. They help transmit the messages of the Supreme Soviet 
organs to appropriate individuals and groups and feed the information 
back to the Supreme Soviet organs. The communication networks have 
also helped the Supreme Soviet organs perform various functions.
%(2) . The Presidium's activities are directed by the chairman and 
deputy chairmen of the Presidium. Each Presidium is assisted by its 
secretariat and departments, and the Standing Commissions of the 
Supreme Soviet. The Standing Commissions are thus de facto subordinate 
bodies of the Presidium. The departments and secretariat are 
staffed by full-time officials. The membership of the latter appears 
to be fairly stable (see Appendix B). This indicates that their 
tenure is permanent. A majority of them have also had a legal educ­
ation or training. The members of the Standing Commissions are re­
cruited at every convocation, although membership is renewable in 
successive convocations with the consent of the Supreme Soviet.
But they are part-time members, i.e. they are at the same time en­
gaged in their original professions which impose certain physical as 
well as psychological restraints on their activities as members of 
the Standing Commissions.
(3) . The Supreme Soviet leaders, i.e. chairman and deputy chairmen 
of the Presidium and the chairmen of the Standing Commissions share 
certain characteristics which would tend to foster common attitudes.
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They have had, for example, experience with political affairs at 
some stage of their careers. The chairmen of the Standing Commissions 
hold also at the same time relatively high occupational and specialized 
professional positions. These common features would facilitate 
smooth communication between them, and serve the maintenance and 
strengthening of coherent actions.
(4) . The powers of the Presidium are defined in the Constitution.
However, the range of its powers is so vaguely defined that it has 
been possible to extend its scope (i.e., the powers the Presidium 
exercises are far less than those implied by the Constitution, and 
it has therefore been possible for their actual powers to increase 
somewhat without the need to redefine the constitutional provisions).
The regulations of the Standing Commissions have now been introduced 
for the federal as well as for all republican Supreme Soviets.
The regulations have legitimized their existence vis-ä-vis other 
state bodies, and de jure institutionalized the operations of the 
Standing Commissions by defining the rules of procedure, the rights 
and duties of the members and the tasks of individual Standing Commissions.
(5) . The Supreme Soviet organs have established relations with outside 
bodies through their operations and through their ordinary members.
The latter we call here "linkage". It is our opinion that linkages 
established through the membership are of considerable relevance to 
the institutional development. To summarize this aspect, we have 
divided linkages into four categories. These categories, although they 
are not exhaustive, purport to provide some insight into their relations 
with the environment and also to explore the Soviet concept of represent­
ation in practice in the Supreme Soviet organs.
(a). Power linkages. What is meant here is linkages with the power
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elite which controls the allocation of the authority and resources 
needed by the Supreme Soviet organs. The highest level of the 
power elite, such as Secretary-General of the CPSU and the first 
secretaries of republican CPs, are represented in the federal and 
republican Presidia (see p. 95 ). They can, therefore, if not 
actually direct the activities, make their presence felt by over­
seeing the Presidia's activities, particularly the organizational 
activities. The second echelon has a variety of representatives 
in the federal and republican Standing Commissions. What is worth 
noting here is that the source of supply for the categories of 
officials at this level varies from federal to re­
publican Standing Commissions and also so far as the Federal Comm­
issions are concerned, from Commission to Commission. As one might 
expect, obkom first secretaries and republican ministers are likely 
to be members of the federal Standing Commissions, whereas obkom 
second secretaries and raikom and raiispolkom officials are likely 
to be members of the republican Standing Commissions. We have also 
observed the division of leading Party and government officials 
in individual Standing Commissions. At the eighth convocation of 
the federal Standing Commissions, for instance, seven to eight deputy 
chairmen of republican Councils of Ministers or republican ministers 
are to be found in both the Commissions for Budget and Planning and 
those for Agriculture. The Commissions for Industry, for Public Health 
and Social Security, and for Trade, Everyday Services and Communal 
Economy have three or four such officials each. The rest of the 
Commissions may have one or two such officials. Ten CPSU and republican 
Party Central Committee officials (including secretaries and department
heads) are to be found in the Foreign Affairs Commissions. Five or
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more such officials are to be found each in the Commissions for 
Legislative Proposals, and for Credentials. The rest of the Comm­
issions share one to three such Party officials.
(b) . Social linkages. We have described earlier how agricultural 
and industrial enterprises and other social and educational instit­
utions have now tipped the scale of organizational representation 
over the Party and government apparatus, although the deputies of 
the latter in the Supreme Soviet have better chances of being 
selected as Commission members. A progressive increase in the 
agricultural and industrial groups has brought an increase in the 
lower age groups of the members of the Standing Commissions. They 
have thus widened the scope of the linkages with social groups and 
younger generations through the members of the Standing Commissions.
(c) . Functional linkages. These are the linkages with individuals 
and groups whose expertise is required for fulfilling the tasks of 
the Supreme Soviet organs. It was true that managerial representation 
(i.e. members with executive experience) has generally declined in 
each successive convocation in both the federal and republican Standing 
Commissions. This trend has, as we saw, promoted the increased part­
icipation by the social groups in the Standing Commissions and shown 
increase in the members who have completed secondary education. 
Nevertheless, our study of the expertise of the membership indicated 
to us that in recent convocations there has been a tendency to select 
members whose experience or current occupational pc ...ons roughly 
correspond with the fields of activities of the Commissions for which 
they are selected. We have also noted earlier that a majority of
the members of the federal and republican Presidia hold senior posts 
in their respective organizations, and have had, at some stage of
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their, career, experience with political affairs. This should have 
increased the effectiveness of the Presidia as a centre for directing 
the activities of the soviets.
(d). Republican and regional linkages. It is essential for the 
Supreme Soviet organs to establish geographical linkages with all 
parts of the USSR in order to perform their functions effectively.
The Supreme Soviet organs have indeed established such linkages 
(with all parts of the USSR) through their own hierarchical commun­
ication mechanism which we have mentioned earlier, and through their 
members. The following descriptions are thus centred on the latter.
We divide the members geographically according to the places where 
their occupational positions are actually located. In the federal 
Presidium, its deputy chairmen are by convention the chairmen of 
the Presidia of the corresponding republican Supreme Soviets, and 
its ordinary members1 current occupations are always located in either 
federal-level organizations or in the five big republics (RSFSR, Uzb., 
Ukr., Bel., and Kaz.). These republics, except the RSFSR, are also 
represented by the first secretaries of the republican Communist Party 
Central Committees. And the four important regions: Moscow, Leningrad,
Tartar and Bashkir are represented by the first secretaries of their 
corresponding Party committees.
In the federal Standing Commissions, the republican represent­
ations are distributed, on the whole, in proportion to the size of 
the republics (see Table 1). The weight of republican representation 
in individual Commissions varies, however, from Commission to Commission. 
For instance, at the eighth convocation, the Belorussian and Uzbek 
representation in the Commissions for Agriculture (two representatives 
each) is smaller than that of Azerbaidzhan and Lithuania (three
(cont.p.362)
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representatives each). This might indicate the relative importance 
attached by individual republics to the particular Commissions, 
although some Commissions such as Foreign Affairs do not show signs 
of this aspect. In the latter Commission, about two-fifths of its 
membership is made up of members who hold current positions at the 
federal level. This may be explained by the fact that the problems 
of international affairs need to be discussed at federal level.
Indeed, the number of obkom first secretaries represented in the 
Foreign Affairs Commissions of both Houses is the lowest among the Commi­
ssions, numbering only three (see Table 2). We have already mentioned 
earlier that the Commissions such as Budget and Planning are represented 
by each of the fifteen republican government and Party officials.
A proportional geographical representation is also seen in the 
republican Presidia and the Standing Commissions.
One of the important geographical linkages established in the 
federal Standing Commissions is the links with all of the regions 
existing in the USSR by way of the membership of almost all obkom 
first secretaries in the Commissions. We have listed in Table 2 
the obkoms whose secretaries are members of the various Commissions.
The pattern of regional representation presented in the Table is 
very similar to those in the seventh and also ninth convocations.
One of the observations which should be noted here is that some of 
these regions are notably concerned with the corresponding activities 
of the Commissions. For instance, complex and mixed industrial 
regions such as Bryansk, Tambov, Tula, East-Kazakhstan and Zaporozh'e 
are all in the Budget and Planning Commissions. Comparatively rural 
regions such as Bukhara, Karakalpak, Khakass, Krasnodar, Kustanai, 
Orenburg, Poltava, and North-Kazakhstan are in the Commissions for
(cont.p.365)
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TABLE 2
REGIONAL REPRESENTATION
IN THE FEDERAL STANDING COMMISSIONS (8th convocation only)
(1) Credentials (12 obkoms) (4) Foreign Affairs (3 obkoms)
M Alma-Ata Alkhangel
C Amur Brest
Gorno-Badakhshan C Khmel'nitsky
Grodno
M Kalinin
C Kalmyk
C Kaluga
Kokchetav
Nagorno-Karabakh
c Sakhalin
M Ul'yanovsk
M Voroshilovgrad
(2) Legislative Proposals (14 obkoms) (5) Agriculture (12 obkoms &
Adygei 1 kraikom)
Cherkassy Bukhara
Chernovitsy Karakalpak
Chita Khakass
Chuvash Kirovograd
C Kabardino-Balkar M Krasnodar*
M Minsk M Kustanai
C Mordva Mari
C Odessa M Omsk
M Saratov M Orenburg
Ryazan' C Poltava
South Ossetia Rostov
M Ural' North-Kazakhstan
C Yakutsk Voronezh
(3) Budget and Planning (18 obkoms) (6) Industry (11 obkoms &
Adzhar C Tuva 1 kraikom)
M Bryansk C Udmurt M Donets
Checheno-Ingush C Vladimir C Ivanovo
Chernigov East-Kazakhstan M Khar'kov
C Karelia C Zaporozh'e Kashkadar ' ya
C Kirov M Kemerovo
Crimea Krasnoyarsk*
c Kurgan Magadan
Nakhichevan' Perm'
c Novgorod M Sverdlovsk
Surkhandaria M Volgograd
Tambov Volynia
M Tula C Yaroslavl1
-J- The regional names listed in this Table are the names of the obkom. 
Exceptions to this are marked with * indicating kraikom. The mark M 
indicates these regions whose first secretaries are full members of the 
CC, CPSU and those marked with C indicate candidate members of the 
CC,CPSU.
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(7) Construction and Industrial
Building Materials (9 obkoms &
1 kraikom)
Dzhambul 
Gomel1 
Fergana 
M Irkutsk 
M Kaliningrad 
Karaganda 
C Lipetsk 
M Leningrad 
Pavlodar 
Primor'e*
(8) Transportation and
Communications (11 obkoms)
M Aktyubinsk 
Gor'ky 
Gur1ev
Karachaevo-Cherkess 
M Novosibirsk 
Osh
Smolensk 
Sumy 
Syrdaria 
Ternopol1 
C Tyumen'
(11) Trade, Everyday Services 
and Communal Economy
(10 obkoms & 1 kraikom)
M Belgorod
Khabarovsk*
C Kostroma 
Kuibyshev 
C Mogilev 
Murmansk 
C Pskov
Semipalatinsk
Tashkent
Transkarpatkia
Vinnitsa
(12) Youth Affairs (7 obkoms &
1 kraikom)
Gorno-Altai
Kamchatka
Krasnodar*
Kiev
Namangan 
C Tomsk
Tselinograd
Vitebsk
(9) Education, Science and 
Culture (6 obkoms)
M Dnepropetrovsk 
Kherson
C North Ossetia 
C Penza
Samarkand 
C Vologda
(10) Public Health and Social 
Security (9 obkoms)
Ashkhabad 
C Buryat 
Chimkent 
Komi.
Kursk 
Kzyl-Orda 
C L 1vov
Nikolaev
Rovno
(13) Conservation (9 obkoms &
2 kraikoms)
Abkhaz 
M Altai*
Andizhan' 
Astrakhan' 
Dagestan 
C Ivano-Franko 
Khorezm
Orel
Stavropol’*
Taldy-Kurgar
Zhitomir
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Agriculture. Donets, Khar'kov, Kemerovo, Sverdlovsk and Volgograd, 
which are known as heavy and mining regions, are all in the Commissions 
for Industry. Light or mixed industrial regions such as Ivanovo, 
Kashkadar'ya and Krasnoyarsk are also in these Commissions. Irkutsk, 
Karaganda, Lipetsk and Leningrad where a variety of industrial 
building materials are produced, are all in the Commissions for Con­
struction and Industrial Building Materials. An important industrial 
region, Gor'ky, a complex gas pipe line region, Gur'ev and an oil- 
producing region, Tyumen' are in the Transportation and Communications 
Commissions. Altai and Astrakhan, which are both faced with the 
problems of industrial pollution, and Stavropol', which is concerned 
with the problems of land development and irrigation are in the 
Conservation Commissions. The Commissions for Credentials, for Educ­
ation, Science and Culture, for Public Health and Social Security and 
for Trade, Everyday Services and Communal Economy can be represented 
by any regional first secretaries since all regions are concerned with 
these problems. On the other hand, the first secretaries of these 
regions may have relevant experience required in these Commissions. 
However, if one looks at the actual number of regions whose first 
secretaries are at the same time full or candidate members of the 
Central Committee, CPSU (twenty-fourth Congress) in each Commission, 
the above mentioned four Commissions (except perhaps Credentials) 
may be given a relatively lower status in the hierarchy of Commissions 
than, say, the Legislative Proposals, Budget and Planning and Industry 
Commissions.
The characteristics of the organizational structure described 
above do not directly contribute to the institutional development
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of the Supreme Soviet organs. Having outlined them, we are now 
in a better position to observe the importance of other variables 
for institutional development. Many of the actions relating to 
institutionalization are conditioned by this organizational structure.
3. Power structure of leadership
The power structure of the Soviet leadership appears to have 
been one of the key determinants of the reconstitution of the federal 
and republican Standing Commissions since 1958. It appears that the 
Supreme Soviet organs' linkages (previously described as power linkages) 
with the Soviet leadership, which controls the allocation of the auth­
ority and resources (including financial support and manpower) needed 
by the Supreme Soviet organs to function, is the strongest of all the 
linkage variables. Although all successive Soviet leaders have made 
use of the doctrine as a prime reason for reactivisation of the 
Supreme Soviet organs, the leaders have carried out structural changes 
under different conditions. And the action leading to this movement, 
as in the cases of some East European countries, was largely dependent 
on the motives and intentions of the leadership. It would be partic­
ularly relevant to note here the present power structure of leadership.
It will be as well to recall again what was said earlier about 
the connection between Khrushchev's position and prior developments 
in the Supreme Soviet organs. It was clearly Khrushchev who as the 
dominant leader in the Soviet leadership during this period was actively 
committed to the reactivisation of the Supreme Soviet organs.
In a situation where supreme power is shared (though unequally) 
among a number of leaders (i.e. the post-Khrushchev leadership structure), 
each of these can be expected to attempt to enhance the role of the 
particular structures for which he is responsible. Conversely,
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the activisation of the federal and republican Presidia has probably 
contributed to the entrenchment of the oligarchical structure of power 
and helped to prevent a recurrence of one-man dominance. One might 
also conjecture that Podgorny's apparent demotion from the position of 
the second most important Central Committee Secretary to the chairman 
of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in 1965 was accompanied by some 
understanding that the role of the Presidium mechanism would be upgraded. 
At the same time, we should remind ourselves of the political relation­
ship between the Presidia and other Supreme Soviet machinery and the 
ministries. Formally, at least, a major function of the federal and 
republican Standing Commissions, whose activities are co-ordinated 
and directed by the respective Presidium, is to control the activities 
of the central and republican governments. Since enhancement of the 
role of the Presidium tends to be at the expense of government executive 
bodies, such a development might enjoy a certain support from the 
Party leaders (especially Brezhnev) who also have an interest in setting 
limits to the power and independence of government bodies. On the 
other hand, it is quite conceivable from our studies on the operations 
of the Supreme Soviet organs that the information on the activities of 
local government supplied by the Supreme Soviet organs is of great 
value for the Council of Ministers to reassure itself on the validity 
of information supplied by its own administrative apparatus. Indeed, 
the Supreme Soviet organs provide alternative channels of communica­
tions which help to prevent subordinates from obstructing the upward 
movement of information about their malperformance.
One could, therefore, conclude by saying that changes in the 
present power structure of leadership could well bring changes of policy 
on the future development of the Supreme Soviet organs, affecting 
in either a positive or negative direction the existing
structure and functions of the Supreme Soviet organs.
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4. Environment
In the process of institutional development, changing environ­
mental factors affect the course of its development, provided that 
the organization concerned has the mechanism to respond to the 
environmental forces. One of the salient facts of the organizational 
structure is that the Supreme Soviet organs are now able to maintain 
rapport with the environment through the built-in linkages established 
in the structure. Environmental forces are thus conveyed through the 
linkages to the organization, and resolved through some settlement, 
which affect the course of its development. One might perhaps be 
able to explain the protracted ineffectiveness of the Supreme Soviet 
organs in the pre-1957 period by the fact that the membership linkages 
were then so limited and restricted that their rapport with the en­
vironment was virtually non-existent.
We have already pointed out the importance of changes in the 
structure of leadership in the development of the Supreme Soviet 
organs. It is, however, not an easy task to determine the extent of 
reciprocity between the Supreme Soviet organs and the other environ­
mental factors listed in the Introduction. Given that, as William 
E. Griffith stated, the members of the Soviet political elite are 
not the servants but - if they have anything to say about it, and they 
do - the masters of the economic and social forces (see W.E. Griffith, 
1974, p. 252), then the latter have only indirect 5 a • _ce upon the 
process of institutionalization. We have seen that the changes in 
domestic policy issues were reflected in the changes in the organ­
izational structure. As a corollary to this, educational reform 
such as the ten year schooling made obligatory by 1970 changed the 
educational pattern of the membership. We have also observed that the
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abortive "liberal movement" in Czechoslovakia in 1968 has led to 
the introduction of the Youth Affairs Commissions into the federal 
Supreme Soviet in 1969 and into other republican Supreme Soviet 
in the following years. The Commissions for Conservation and for 
Consumer Goods were added in 1967 and 1974 respectively as a result 
of growing demands in these fields of state affairs. The above 
facts are, however, concerned with the impact of the environment on 
mainly the internal structure. But one should note that these 
structural changes have in fact promoted the performance by the 
Supreme Soviet organs of various functions. We can expect further 
development in socio-economic factors in the future and thus various 
social groups represented in the Supreme Soviet organs may attempt 
to exert more influence upon the operations of the Supreme Soviet 
organs.
5. Politics
Since the functions performed by the Supreme Soviet organs are 
shared in various degrees by a number of other bodies (including 
Party bodies), the fact that they, in particular, have markedly in­
creased their involvement in these functions invites explanation, 
and is clearly fraught with political implications. We may be able 
to throw some light on four aspects (listed in the Introduction) of 
politics by considering the probable interests of individual members 
of the Supreme Soviet organs and other outside bodies in relation 
to the functions of the Supreme Soviet organs.
Aspect A : Politics over available resources such as status, power
to influence the behaviour and position of others,
planning decisions and financial resources.
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It now appears to have become a status symbol for Party officials 
to be in the Supreme Soviet Presidia or in the Standing Commissions.
We have noted earlier that the Secretary-General of the CPSU,CC is in 
the federal Presidium and first secretaries of the republican Central 
Committee are in the republican Presidia. The first secretaries of 
the obkoms and kraikoms are all but a few in the federal Standing 
Commissions. Among these obkom and kraikom first secretaries, those 
who are full members of the Central Committee are placed in relatively 
important Commissions (see Table 2). Some of the other secretaries 
of local Party committees are either in the federal or republican 
Standing Commissions. The meetings of the Supreme Soviet organs 
indeed give an appearance of becoming a disguised convocation (in 
addition to the meetings and plenums of the Central Committee) for 
Party officials.
The participants in such politics may envisage the Supreme Soviet 
organs as a base for not only building up status but also extending or 
limiting the pursuit of political power. For instance, the Secretary- 
General may like to use the Supreme Soviet organs as a device to help 
curb the local power of regional machines. One effect of the criticism 
directed by republican Presidia at particular localities must be to 
disturb local patterns of informal relationships and thereby make it 
more difficult for local leaders such as the first secretary of the 
regional Party committee to build up a strong clientele.^ It seems,
1 The chairman of the Kirgiz Presidium, T. Kulatov stated that "last year 
(1965) alone the Osh Region Executive Committee adopted 95 decisions on 
economic questions jointly with the regional Party committee. I do not 
doubt that the executive committee could have decided many of these 
questions independently. Sometimes one is at a loss to explain this 
helplessness" (see Izv., 22.7.66). Criticism of excessive indulgence 
in such "joint" decisions is often voiced by Party bodies themselves, bui 
criticism by a senior member of the soviet hierarchy is somewhat unusual 
and may indicate a concern to promote his "own" hierarchy and reduce its 
dependence on the Party machine.
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on the surface at least, that this type of action by the republican 
Presidia is meant to deter any informal groups, particularly regionally- 
based groups, from indulging in nepotism, and pursuing their own interests 
as against national interests. However, the composition of the republican 
Presidia (see Table 9 and 10 in Part II) should be kept in mind, for it 
includes a number of regional Party and government officials, who would, 
in a sense, be hurting their own interests insofar as they participate 
in Presidium kontrol' over the regional level. Taking the Belorussian 
Presidium as an example, five out of six regions in Belorussia were 
represented by the chairmen of their executive committees on the Belorussiar 
Presidium of the eighth convocation. Though the number was less at the 
seventh convocation, still three chairmen of regional executive committees - 
the Mogilev, Brest and Vitebsk region - and two second secretaries of 
regional Party committees - Minsk and Grodno region - v:ere represented 
among other members of the Presidium (if one is concerned with collusion 
at local level, criticism against the regional executive committee is in 
effect equally levelled at the regional Party committee). During the 
seventh convocation, the Belorussian Presidium took some 31 decisions 
relating to its supervising activity, 17 of which were levelled at 
regions whose leaders were members of the Presidium - six decisions re­
lating to Brest region; Minsk region four; Mogilev region three; Grodno 
region two; and Vitebsk region two. The rest of the 14 decisions were 
directed at the remaining region (Gomel), at districts or cities, or at 
the republic as a whole. This factor together with the Presidia's 
intricate communication network does not seem to support a hypothesis of 
direct action against collusion at local level, but perhaps rather of 
discouragement of the formation of active collusion. Speaking 
theoretically, leaders at all levels can at least check each other's 
moves through the Presidia's operations. One could postulate, therefore,
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that the Presidia's supervisory functions is n 't supervisory activity 
at all, but rather it serves as a preventive c. Lee of some kind.
The local leaders know in advance of the criticism of the respective 
republican Presidium, and this provides them with time to escape from 
serious embarrassment, or, what would be worse, having sanctions 
eventually imposed on them by the higher Party and government 
apparatus. Nevertheless, it enables the Soviet regime to preserve 
the official dignity so essential to any bureaucratic polity, 
and to give the appearance of following formal procedure, while at 
the same time, it serves as some restraint on the behaviour of the 
local leaders. On the other hand, the first secretaries of regional 
Party committees, whose holdover rate is the highest among the 
Commission members, who often lead the sub-commissions and who supply 
the information about their own regions on particular problems 
to the Commi sions concerned, may perceive the Supreme Soviet 
organs as a potential arena of contending centre-region 
pressures. Indeed, the Supreme Soviet organs could well be, 
as we have noted earlier, one arena among others within which 
different agencies and localities compete for resources (see pp.327- 
328). At any rate, up-and-coming regional and republican
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officials will welcome the opportunities for publicity and for 
catching the eye of top leaders which membership of the federal 
Presidium, especially, affords. Allocation politics does not 
limit itself to the centre-region vertical dimension. We have 
seen evidence that ministries, departments and agencies fight 
for the appropriation of larger funds (see, e.g. p.276 and p.326). 
We have witnessed that the government organs do not always take a 
united front at the meetings of the Commissions, although on these 
occasions the problems discussed are not always related to resource 
allocation: local executive committee chairmen criticize the 
conduct of republican ministries (p.292, footnote 1); a republican 
minister proposes changes in the central administration (p.315); 
the spokesman of a federal ministry criticizes the conduct of 
another federal ministry (p.276); the spokesman of a federal 
ministry instructs a raikom secretary what to do with particular 
problems they face (p.313); and Permanent Representatives of 
republican Councils of Ministers in the federal Presidium act as 
"watchdog" of their republics* interests in the central 
administration(p.95),
We could also assume that informal groups are formed in the
Supreme Soviet organs centred on influential members The
0
latter's followers in the Supreme Soviet organs may act under
the impulses received from their bosses --  recall the cases
of Brezhnev-Niyazbekov (pp.125-126) and Brezhnev-Katushev 
(pp.285-286). These groupings would also occur in the republican 
Supreme Soviet organs. Although we are talking here of
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the informal groups established inside the Supreme Soviet organs, the 
same pattern may apply for informal groups cutting across the boundaries 
of the Supreme Soviet organs and whose leaders are non-members of the 
Supreme Soviet organs.
Aspect B: Politics in establishing authority relations among the
participants and defining their role in the operations 
of the Supreme Soviet organs.
In this section, we narrow the definitions of the participants 
down to the members of the Supreme Soviet organs, particularly the 
Standing Commissions. It has been one of the hardest tasks in our 
study to determine the role definitions of individual members of the 
Supreme Soviet organs, given the absence of detailed records of their 
activities. In attempting to interpret the admittedly limited data 
related to the communication process in the Standing Commissions, we 
have had recourse to a classification of role definitions in terms of 
reference groups.1 While taking into account the hierarchical structure 
of the Soviet political system, we have defined the role of each group 
according to the extent the group projects its relative power in the 
communication process, Group (a) members, for instance, (see p. 310 and 
pp. 317-320) have even acted as role definers for Groux^s (c) and (d) 
members, for Group (a) members have the political resources (such as the 
power to exercise sanctions) to persuade Group (c) and (d) members to 
accept their role definitions or set of expectations in a particular set 
of circumstances. In more concrete terms, the presence of Groups (c) 
and (d) is perceived by Group (a) as primarily serving the purposes of 
legitimation and public mobilization. The roles of Group (a) itself
1 Cf. Maureen E. Cain, "Some suggested developments for role and reference 
group analysis", in the British Journal of Sociology, vol. XIX, no. 2 
(January 1968).
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may roughly be defined in terms of "collective leadershix?". Group (b) 
serves as an agent for and a master of Groups (c) and (d). Group (b) 
also damps down deviant role expectations of Groups (c) and (d), while 
itself being periodically called upon for administrative mobilization 
and interest articulation in certain areas of state activities.
The authority relations established, above may be called here 
"rules of the game". In the absence of "rules of the game", the 
Standing Commissions, for instance, whose membership consisted of a 
variety of organizational and functional groups with different educational 
and career backgrounds, might drift in directions deemed unfavourable by 
the Soviet leadership. The Commission members might openly criticize 
and argue about policies taken by the Soviet leaders on such issues as 
foreign affairs, the national economic plan, nationality problems, social 
services, etc. This would be regarded by the Soviet leaders as dys­
functional to the existing Soviet political system (to say the least).
The role definitions of groups based on their relative proximity to the 
centre (the political leadership) may, however, be treated as an indicator 
that behaviour is likely to be in a particular direction. Even where 
operations are carried out under the "rules of the game", there may still 
be situations where behaviour conforms to the expectations of. certain 
individuals and groups but not of others. Thus, deviant expectations 
of some members may have an effect on the existing "rules of the game". 
However, the main sources of change and development may be found pre­
cisely in this type of deviant activity relating to authority relations. 
Politics with a view to changing existing authority relations in the 
Supreme Soviet organs would be likely to affect the functions currently 
performed by these organs.
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Aspect C: Politics in formalizing functional values of the operations
of the Supreme Soviet organs.
The main object of the Soviet leadership with regard to the functional 
value of the Supreme Soviet organs appears to be to serve the latter as 
a kind of more effective control-panel for its "transmission belts" which 
help impose the regime's will on society and on all social groups,, and 
also to serve them as canalising bodies by applying or threatening 
sanctions against the lower Party and government apparatus. We could 
thus assume that the Soviet leadership has at least recognized the 
relevance of this branch of the State organs in alleviating some of 
the problems experienced in administering the country.
The members of the second echelon of the Party and government 
apparatus agree to perform a certain role in the process of legitimation 
of the laws and official policies currently in force, while being given 
the assurance that the new laws and policies receive scrutiny in the 
final stages of the drafting process. They are also assured that con­
sultation and co-ordination with a view to implementing them take 
place among themselves, and, if necessary, subsequent amendments, though 
limited, to the newly introduced laws and policies are considered.
The Supreme Soviet organs have thus been restructured to meet such re­
quirements. The members of the second echelon of the Party and government 
apparatus are certainly caught up in the operations of the Supreme Soviet 
organs whether they want or not, by the rapid institutionalization of 
this particular branch of the state machine. The Soviet leadership has 
awarded them with status in return for their services in the operations 
of the Supreme Soviet organs desired by the collective leadership.
If our assumptions are correct, it appears that these people (mid-career 
politicians) have potential influence upon the future destinies of these
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bodies, particularly if they envisage the Supreme Soviet organs as 
places for exercising their pursuit of political power.
Contact with the masses has become closer through the operations 
of the Supreme Soviet organs. This has been strengthened by the 
introduction of such new procedures as "on-the-spot" meetings.
The social groups, whose representatives are members of the Supreme 
Soviet organs appear to have obtained additional chances to air some 
of their grievances. The main object of this exercise on the part of 
the Soviet leadership appears to be, however, not to improve the 
decision-making process, but to improve the decision-implementing pro­
cess and also to moderate conflict and protest on the issues concerned. 
While conflict and protest may remain essentially latent phenomena under 
a totalitarian system with terror, they may potentially become explosive 
under an oligarchic political system without terror. One motive for 
the restructuring of the Supreme Soviet organs may thus have been to 
reduce pressures of protest. If the operation of the Supreme Soviet 
organs, on the other hand, is to remain alive and meaningful in some 
form or another, they have to digest and accommodate some demands from 
the masses as well. Otherwise, the operation of the Supreme Soviet 
organs remains yet another gimmick of the democratic facade. We have 
already suggested the possible deviant expectation of members of social 
groups. Be that as it may, what is apparent and what may prove to be 
significant in future is that the Soviet political leaders are anxious 
to improve the image of "the highest organ of State power" against the 
deep rooted cynicism attached to it among the Soviet people.
Aspect D: Politics in attempting to establish identity.
Since the Soviet leadership began to see the Supreme Soviet organs 
as a useful organic part rather than simply a decorative appendage of
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the Soviet political system, the leaders associated with this movement 
may attempt to translate their hopes and aspirations into a modus 
operandi which captures the imagination and the loyalty of all associated 
with the effort. Thus, not only the Presidium chairman and deputy 
chairmen but also the full-time officials of the Presidium (and perhaps, 
some part-time officials) and also chairmen of the Standing Commissions 
might have developed an organizational allegiance and might seek to 
support "their" organization against others by defending new values 
which have not yet received general acceptance. Despite some isolated 
evidence (see the case of the chairman of the Kirgiz Presidium,
T. Kulatov, p. 370 , footnote 1), there is no direct evidence relating 
to this aspect of politics.
Nonetheless, one would be able to observe a certain operational 
cohesiveness between the Presidium and the Standing Commissions.
The Presidium, on the whole, supervises the work of the Standing Comm­
issions, and intervenes, if so required, in the work of the Commissions.
As a routine operation, the Presidium checks the content of the 
recommendations in their drafting stage by sending some of its members 
and its secretary to the meetings of the Commissions. Even if the 
Commissions formally adopted the recommendations, the latter still 
require the Presidium's final endorsement for submitting these to the 
related bodies. The Presidium, on the other hand, patronizes the 
Commissions in assisting the implementation of the Commissions' recommend­
ations. The Presidium can do this by adopting a separate resolution 
which embodies the Commissions' recommendations (see p.255 , footnote 2), 
or asking the Supreme Soviet to issue an instruction to the chairman of 
the Council of Ministers (see p. 256 ), or asking the Presidium of the 
Council of Ministers to instruct government ministries and departments
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(see p. 256 ). Such matters as Presidium backing for the Standing 
Commissions when they address recommendations to government bodies 
may thus be interpreted as signs of an institutional esprit de corps.
We have also observed the occasional attention paid by other 
outside bodies to the operations of the Supreme Soviet organs. Some 
republican Standing Commissions send copies of their resolutions not 
only to the respective Supreme Soviet Presidium but also to the corres­
ponding republican Party Central Committee (p. 257 ). At the request 
of the republican Presidium, the Party Central Committee instructs the 
other local Party bodies. Such external support would encourage the 
Supreme Soviet leaders.
The supervision of the state of implementation of acts issued by 
the Presidium is, by and large, carried out by the departments of the 
Presidium and the Standing Commissions. However, other supervisory 
bodies such as the Procuracy and People's Control Committee appear to 
co-operate in this matter. Yu.A. Tikhomirov goes as far as to suggest 
that the People's Control Committee should be separated from the Council 
of Ministers and be subordinated directly, like those in Poland, to the 
soviets from top to bottom. This would ensure, in his view, greater 
independence and effective work on the part of the control apparatus 
and would render its functioning and legal status more clear-cut (see 
Tikhomirov, 1967, p. 22). We have also observed that, at republic 
level, the supervisory capacity of the Supreme Soviet organs is 
reinforced by collaboration with the kollegii  ^of the individual
1 There has been a proposal to abolish the principle of edinonachalie 
(one-man rule) in the leadership of the ministries since 1966 and to 
strengthen ministerial kollegii. This proposal now seems to be pro­
moted by its supporters with slogans about the "development of the 
principle of democratic centralism" and "making ever new masses of 
toilers participate in the administration of production and public 
affairs" (see, e.g. Kommunist Belorussii, no. 11, 1973).
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ministries and also with the Standing Commissions of local soviets.
In the process of fulfilling their formal functions, such external 
functional assistance is indispensable. The "co-operation" with 
other state bodies could optimise their organizational efficiency, 
while at the same time eliminating the problems of non-effective 
duplication. On the other hand, the operations of the Supreme Soviet 
organs may be circumscribed by the external bodies whose co-operation 
is constantly required. Moreover, the formal functions performed by 
the Supreme Soviet organs may affect the functional boundaries of the 
other state bodies. For instance, the Juridical Commission of the 
Council of Ministers'1' may constitute real or potential competition, 
for it performs similar functions and services to those of the Legis­
lative Proposals Commission.
We have noted earlier that certain individuals and groups may 
change the behaviour expected of them by other groups and individuals.
One reason why this may be likely to occur is the lack of identification 
and autonomy of the Supreme Soviet organs. The identity of each 
Commission member, for instance, would appear normally to be intrinsically 
in his original occupation since his duties as deputy take up a relatively 
small proportion of his total time and attention. That is to say that 
each member potentially assumes his own presence in the Supreme Soviet 
organs as extrinsic and casual. There may be occasions when the rank 
and file members of the Commissions meet with contradictions between 
their assumed role definitions in the Commissions and their role 
definitions in their working places. This would certainly not foster
1 P. Juviler has stated that if the Legislative Proposals Commission did 
not exist, the Juridical Commission could take over their drafting 
functions, for its work includes the kind of technical collation and 
opinion sampling which has been entrusted to the Legislative Proposals 
Commission. See Juviler, 1960, p. 399.
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an organizational allegiance and esprit de corps in their actions.
We are not arguing, however, that the lack of identification would lead 
to dysfunction in the Standing Commissions, but rather lead to unexpected 
behaviour on the part of some Commission members, despite the fact that 
the latter are guided and assisted by the Presidium. In any event, to 
organize not only the Standing Commissions, but the entire system of 
soviet bodies (from federal Supreme Soviet down to local soviets) re­
quires strong leadership on the part of the chairman, deputy chairmen, 
secretary and staff members of the federal Presidium. They, more than 
any other participants, are supposed to be the most actively engaged in 
the politics of identity, for as long as the lack of identity and 
autonomy persist, an extension of their own specific power base 
scarcely seems conceivable. It should be added, however, that any de­
velopment toward organizational allegiance among ordinary members 
would only be likely in the context of a more general change in the 
structure of power and relations between the regime and public such 
as took place in Czechoslovakia in 1968.
In sum, in Table 3 is shown the involvement of various participants 
in the four aspects of politics.
TABLE 3.
PARTICIPANTS IN POLITICS
Aspects A B C D
Participants
Soviet leadership * * *
Supreme Soviet leadership * * * *
Presidium officials * *
Administrative levels * * *
Institutional groups * *
Functional groups *
Social groups * *
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Institutional development
We shall now attempt to summarize the process of institutional 
development.
The operations of the Supreme Soviet organs appear to have been 
regularized by constitutions and rules of procedures, and uniformities 
of behaviour have been established based on informally understood 
norms, "rules of the game". Without such uniformities of actions and 
behaviour, we could neither comment on the functions of these organs 
nor treat them as an "institution". Having described various contrib­
uting factors, it will be expedient to draw a chart of institutional 
development. The state of three factors, namely, (A) Environment,
(B) Power structure of Soviet leadership, and (C) Doctrine could affect 
the Supreme Soviet organs in their operations and organizational structure, 
which may lead to the addition of new norms and values. The latter 
are, however, established through political processes among the part­
icipants who are directly and indirectly associated with the operations 
of the Supreme Soviet organs. The effects of newly disposed norms and 
values may feed back to the three factors mentioned above (A, B and C).
Our previous analysis posits also some flow of feedback from the factors 
(D) and (E). In this way, the process of institutional development is 
repeated again and again (see Chart 3).
One could further break down Chart 3 into four different types of 
the process of factoral interaction (interaction mainly between factors 
A, B and C) as follows
Type 1
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Type 2
A
B A D--E — F
\ : .c
Type 3
BX ' & D—— $»E— V'F
Type 4
A> . .B----4 D — E >■"■*»[ F
As one might notice immediately, the central factor in the pro­
cess in all types (except type 4) is factor B, which is the chief 
power source for maintaining the flow of the developmental process.
In type 1, the wishes of the Soviet leaders to reactivate the Supreme
\Soviet organs for desired purposes are executed by stimulating the 
environment (such as the introduction of a new educational system, 
econcnrc palicy and administrative changes) and by justifying their 
actions with the "doctrine of the state". Their actions to change 
the Supreme Soviet organizational structure may also be a part of a 
subsequent change of their own power structure. In type 2, on the 
other hand, a changing socio-economic environment may impel the leaders 
to adapt the Supreme Soviet organs to the new situation. The Soviet 
leaders will take action to this effect by placing the doctrine in 
point d'appui and even revising the content of the doctrine so as to 
comply with their efforts. As a reverse process in type 2, the Soviet 
leaders may consciously implement the "doctrine of the state". What 
has happened in the case of the Supreme Soviet may well be type 1.
On the other hand, the reality may lie in the mixture of types 1, 2 and
3, for the factors are more likely to interact in both ways - forward
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and backward. Type 4 shows the impact of three factors upon the 
organization independently. This x>rocess might occur in future 
but only if the Supreme Soviet organs had established a certain 
degree of identity.
One thing that it is difficult for outside observers to find 
out about is resistance in the process of institutional development. 
Although we have discussed this problem earlier to an extent, it 
should be restated that the introduction of new norms and values in 
the existing state organs are likely to meet with some resistance.
For instance, the rank and file of various organizations who are 
members of the Supreme Soviet organs may feel that they are being 
exploited by being asked to shoulder more responsibility for little 
extra reward. And perhaps, the second echelon of the government and 
Party officials may also feel threatened, because they fear a certain 
loss of political control. They may thus try to stifle the enthusiasm 
of other members. One would expect to have, therefore, a period of 
uncertainty as to the actual functions of the organs. The spirit of 
co-operation may evolve as these fears and anxieties slowly dissipate 
and may consequently develop into further institutionalization of these 
organs. Some republican Supreme Soviet organs, say Estonia, may have 
gone through such a period and have become fully institutionalized.
The federal Supreme Soviet organs may, however, have to wait for some time
to see such a development.
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CONCLUSION
The final part of this thesis is made up of a study of the 
two interrelated themes - Functions and Institutional Development.
Our contribution based on this study lies mainly in establishing 
that the Supreme Soviet organs are not mere "rubber stamp" organs 
for outside bodies,but. perform various functions which are required 
in both the political and social systems. We have also made some 
contribution towards identifying the process of institutional 
development. However, the author does not presume to make major 
predictions as to the future course of developments of this particular 
institution. This study is to a considerable degree a pioneering 
and exploratory one. For this reason, we have covered the aspects 
of the Supreme Soviet organs under the two interrelated themes as 
widely as possible. This study attempted to construct neither theory 
nor model, but to produce a certain formula of analysis by making 
eclectic use of available theoretical and comparatice tools: 
totalitalianism, organizational theory, bureaucratic politics, 
modernization-development-industrialization model, 6lite study, 
interest group study, role theory and communication model as 
appeared appropriate to the various aspects considered. Clearly, 
this approach has both advantages and disadvantages. Among the 
latter is that to a considerable degree depth has necessarily been 
sacrificed to breadth. What is perhaps now called for is closer study 
of particular aspects such as legislative or supervisory functions 
and here attention should not be limited exclusively to the Supreme 
Soviet organs but extended to other bodies as well: only thus will 
it become possible to delineate more precisely the extent of 
particular functions performed by the Supreme Soviet organs, given
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the obvious fact that the sub-systems in the Soviet political system 
do not operate independently of each other. In other words, while 
I would defend the validity of institutionally focussed research at 
particular stages in the study of the Soviet political system (or 
any other social system), there comes a point when this framework 
must be transcended. If the present study proves a useful basis 
for such further specialized research, the author will be well
satisfied.
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APPENDIX A 
LIST OF VARIABLES
Column Variable
1
2 - 5
6 - 8
9
10-11
12-14
15
16-17
18
19
20-22
23-24
25-26
27-28
29-30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
Deck number
Individual's identification number
Identification of position in the 
Supreme Soviet
Convocation of the Supreme Soviet
Nationality
Year of Birth
Highest level of non-Party education
Nature of highest level of non-Party 
education
Higher Party education
Party or non-Party members
Position held at the time of election in 
other than Supreme Soviet
Power of position
Organizations in which position is 
located
Republics in which position is located
Occupational field of position
Rural/urban environment of position
Career Background
Role : top-line executive
Field: law enforcement-investigation- 
security
" : economic-finance-planning
" : foreign affairs
" : agriculture
" : education, science and culture
" : services
" : public health and social security
" : transportation-communications
" : industry-labour
" : youth affairs
" : military
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
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APPENDIX A (cont)
.eld Column Variable
29 44 Field: political affairs-agitation- 
propagenda
30 45 I I  • publications
31 46 Level: prima ry-.in formal-workplace
32 47 * village-industrial-settlement
33 48 II raion-city-okrug
34 49 I f oblast-krai
35 50 1 republic
36 51 II all-union
37 52 Organization: Party/Komsomol
38 53 II : Soviet/gov./TUC
39 54 I I : police/judicature
40 55 II : military
41 56 II : non-economic operative
organizations
42 57 II : productive enterprise
43 58 Role: executive
44 59 Field: law enforcement-investigation- 
security
45 60 I I  . economic-finance-planning
46 61 I I  . foreign affairs
47 62 I I  # agriculture
48 63 I I  , education, science and culture
49 64 I I  , services
50 65 >1 • public health and social security
51 66 1 transportation-communications
52 67 I I  • industry-labour
53 68 I I  , youth affairs
54 69 1 military
55 70 I I  . political affairs-agitation- 
propaganda
56 71 " : publications
57 72 Level: primary-informal-workplace
58 73 i i  . village-industrial settlement
59 74 i i  . raion-city-okrug
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
?
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
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APPENDIX A ( c o n t )  
F i e l d  C o lu m n  V a r i a b l e
60 75 L e v e l : o b l a s t - k r a i
6 1 76 " r e p u b l i c
62 77
7 8 - 8 0
" : a l l - u n i o n
— 1 D eck  n u m b e r  (2)
— 2 - 5 I n d i v i d u a l ' s  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  n u m b e r
6 3 6 O r g a n i z a t i o n :  P a r t y / K o m s o m o l
64 7 II : S o v i e t / g o v . / T U C
65 8 II : p o l i c e / ' j u d i c a t u r e
66 9 II : m i l i t a r y
6 7 10 It : n o n ~ e c o n o m i c  o p e r a t i v e
o r g a n i z a t i o n s
68 11 11 : p r o d u c t i v e  e n t e r p r i s e
69 12 R o l e : s p e c i a l i s t
70 13 F i e l d : lav /  e n f o r c e m e n t - i n v e s t i g a t i o n -  
s e c u r i t y
71 14 II , e c o n o m i c - f i n a n c e - p l a n n i n g
72 15 II . f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s
73 16 II . a g r i c u l t u r e
74 17 11 • e d u c a t i o n ,  s c i e n c e  a n d  c u l t u r e
75 18 II , s e r v i c e s
76 19 II p u b l i c  h e a l t h  a n d  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y
77 20 II , t r a n s p o r t a t i o n - c o m m u n i c a t i o n s
78 21 11 • i n d u s t r y - 1 a b o u r
79 22 II y o u t h  a f f a i r s
80 23 II m i l i t a r y
81 24 II . p o l i t i c a l  a f f a i r s - a g i t a t i o n -  
p r o p a g a n d a
82 25 11 : p u b l i c a t i o n s
83 26 R o l e  : o p e r a t i v e
84 27 F i e l d : lav / e n f o r c e m e n t - i n v e s t i g a t i o n -  
s e c u r i t y
85 28 II e c o n o m i c - f i n a n c e - p l a n n i n g
86 29 11 : f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
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APPENDIX A (cont) 
Field Column Variable
87 30 Field: agriculture
88 31 " : education, science and culture
89 32 " : services
90 33 " : public health and social security
91 34 " : transportation-communications
92 35 " : industry-labour
93 36 " : youth affairs
94 37 " : military
95 38 " : political affairs-agitation-
propaganda
96 39 " : publications
97 40 Previous experience in the 4th Supreme 
Soviet
98 41 Previous experience in the 5th Supreme 
Soviet
99 42 Previous experience in the 6th Supreme 
Soviet
100 43 Previous experience in the 7th Supreme 
Soviet
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